Russia (53 page)

The collapse of the Soviet Union left some successor states even worse off than Russia. Belarus has ever since been seeking reunion, and Ukraine, despite chances of being accepted into NATO’s protective embrace, needs the Russian market and therefore remains ambivalent about the West, keeping its options open. Both states have large numbers of Orthodox communicants as well as other historic ties which make many of their citizens sympathetic to Moscow. Russia may yet prove the preferable option for Ukraine both for trading purposes and to ensure energy supplies. Russia’s ability to interrupt or cut off the flow of oil and natural gas not only to what Russians call ‘the near abroad’ but to Western Europe and the Balkans too gives it considerable clout. So does its continuing occupation of Kaliningrad, the Baltic port once called Konigsberg which it acquired in the eighteenth century and contrived to hold on to both in 1945 and in 1991.

This powerful naval base wedged in between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic frightens its neighbours and is a serious nuisance for NATO, but when the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania in August 2003 prompted demands for its demilitarization Moscow refused. The retention of the enclave provides it with a powerful lever, and it is not the only one at Moscow’s disposal. The presence of large Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states provides another. The states which host them distrust them, and, as we saw in Chapter 15, there have been charges that Russians in the ‘near abroad’ are denied civil and political rights. Moscow can exploit and even manipulate this situation to its advantage.

Russia’s position in the Caucasus is no less strong, though the commitment is expensive because of the need to contain Chechen extremism. Since 11 September, however, the Western Powers have become more sympathetic to Moscow’s point of view. The troubles will eventually subside for a time when the insurgents tire, as has always happened in the past. Meanwhile, despite the dreadful costs, no Russian government dare give in. The safety of the northern Caucasus, of oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea, and of communications to the south is an interest which Moscow cannot afford to jeopardize.

Georgia has become an American client - though an unstable one — but with allies in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which dislike rule from Tbilisi, Russia can still exert influence there. Armenia, to the south of Georgia, still aligns with Russia and, thanks to careful nurturing over many years, Russia’s relations with Iran are good. Along with the other states bordering the Caspian Sea, the two countries have agreed the bases of exploiting its oil and gas reserves, but Russia’s position is stronger than the rest because of its pipeline facilities.

In Central Asia Russia’s position is stronger still. Kazakhstan, the largest state in the region, is a firm ally, and Russia maintains test sites, an air base and a cosmodrome on its territory. The Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz as well as the Kazakhs know the Russians well and trust them more than other outsiders. Turkmenistan exports its natural gas through Russia, and Tajikistan has so far allowed Russian troops to patrol its frontiers with Afghanistan. A common concern to combat Islamic fundamentalism and to stabilize Afghanistan have recently brought Russia and the United States closer than for decades, but Russia now seems to be the preponderant strategic influence in Central Asia once again.

In May 2003 Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Belarus and Armenia, agreed to set up a collective security organization with headquarters in Moscow, a rapid-reaction force for Central Asia under
Russian command, and a common air-defence system. They also agreed to co-ordinate foreign policy and security.
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The Collective Rapid Deployment Force was set up within a year, and, in return for rescheduling part of that country’s sizeable debt,
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Russia also obtained a permanent lease on a military air-base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, at the heart of the region and within range of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China.

Russo-Chinese relations since the collapse have prospered. Trade between the two countries almost tripled during Putin’s first term. Both powers are involved together with three Central Asian states in the ‘Shanghai Forum’, and their common interests include anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency (China approves of Moscow’s policy in Chechnya, Russia of Chinese policy in Taiwan and Tibet), international conflict management, and Iraq. China implicitly recognizes Russia’s leading role in Central Asia. Divergent interests may divide them in future, but for the moment the Russo-Chinese entente holds.
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Furthermore, as in the Soviet period, relations with India are good, and India remains a major importer of Russian arms and military technology. In Asia, then, Russia’s power and influence have been growing again.

The United States is the world’s only superpower, but even a superpower’s ability to control territory and peoples has its limitations, as the intervention in Iraq has demonstrated. Russia lacks the strength to challenge America in the foreseeable future, yet nothing is immutable. The world changes, and the strategic order will change with it. Russia has begun to recover. Its military capability is considerable albeit much reduced, and its tradition of careful diplomacy based on superior intelligence, realism and understanding of other cultures gives it advantages which others lack, and will stand it in good stead. History provides no sure guide of things to come, but, as I write in September 2004, it would be unwise to write off Russia’s chances of future power.