One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war (69 page)

Communications circuits were overloaded: CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

That afternoon, NSA received: Message from director, NSA, October 24, 1962, NSA Cryptotologic Museum, Fort Meade, MD.

"in a position to reach": JFK3, 41.

"surprise attacks": Anderson message 230003Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

"I give you my word": Kohler cable to State Department, 979, October 16, 1962, SDX.

"the appearance of": CINCLANT (Dennison) message to JCS 312250Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

"Initial class probable sub": U.S. Navy messages 241610Z and 250533Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC, also available through "The Submarines of October," Electronic Briefing Book 75, NSAW. The submarine was located at 25deg25'N, 63deg40'W. It was dubbed "
C-18
" by the Navy.

What had started off: See Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne,
Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 79-98, for an account of the
B-130
journey, based on interviews with Capt. Nikolai Shumkov.

"special camps are being prepared": Savranskaya, "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,"
Journal of Strategic Studies
(April 2005).

Shumkov understood the power: Weir and Boyne, 79-80; Aleksandr Mozgovoi,
Kubinskaya Samba Kvarteta Fokstrotov
(Moscow: Voenni bibliography Entryd, 2002), 69.

"If they slap you": Savranskaya, "New Sources." See this article also for conflicting evidence over whether Soviet submarine captains had the authority to use nuclear torpedoes if attacked.

The information on the overhead screens: SAC historians jotted down the daily totals and recorded them in
Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, SAC Historical Study No. 90,
Vol. 1, NSA. Photographs of the SAC control room are in Vol. 2, FOIA.

By the time SAC reached:
SAC Historical Study No. 90,
Vol. 1, 58.

"high priority Task 1 targets": William Kaufmann memo,
Cuba and the Strategic Threat,
October 25, 1962, OSD.

At 11:10 a.m.: Cuba crisis records, 389th Strategic Missile Wing, FOIA.

"This is General Power speaking":
SAC Historical Study No. 90,
Vol. 1, vii.

It was received loud and clear: G. M. Kornienko,
Kholodnaya Voina
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnesheniya, 1994), 96. It is unclear whether the Soviets intercepted the DEFCON-2 order, in addition to Power's message. The DEF CON-2 order was classified top secret; Power's address was unclassified. See Garthoff,
Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis,
62.

tried as "a war criminal": Quoted in Richard Rhodes,
Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 21.

"SAC bases and SAC targets": Brugioni,
Eyeball to Eyeball,
262-5.

"They're smart": Fred Kaplan,
The Wizards of Armageddon
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 265.

"mean," "cruel": Gen. Horace M. Wade OH, AFHRA.

"The whole idea": Kaplan, 246.

Using maps and charts: Kaufmann memo,
Cuba and the Strategic Threat,
OSD.

Just to move the 1st Armored Division:
USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962,
NSAW, 79-88, 119-21. USCONARC briefing to House Appropriations Committee, January 21, 1963.

"Soon military police": Dino Brugioni, "The Invasion of Cuba," in Robert Cowley, ed.,
The Cold War
(New York: Random House, 2006), 214-15.

The British consul in Miami:
British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
(London: Archival Publications, 2001), 278; "Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis," 6-9, NSAW;
NYT, WP,
and
LAT
reports from Key West, October 1962.

Military shipments did not always: USCONARC, 117.

Fidel Castro had spent the night: Author's interview with Rafael Del Pino, former Cuban air force aide to Castro, September 2005. Unpublished MS by Del Pino.

"Our greatest problem": Notes on meeting between Castro and Cuban military chiefs, October 24, 1962, released by the Cuban government, Documentos de los Archivos Cubanos, Havana 2002.

This stretch of coastline: Szulc, 474-6.

A thirty-minute drive: Author's visit to Tarara beach and SAM site, March 2006. Both the SAM site and the antimissile site are still visible on Google Earth at 23deg09' 28.08''N, 82deg13' 38.87''W.

As he drove back to Havana: Acosta, 165. For Castro's thoughts, see Blight et al.,
Cuba on the Brink,
211. Photographs of Castro's visit to the AA unit are available on Cuban Web sites.

"Fidel gets his kicks": Franqui, 189.

A few months earlier: Estimate by Soviet defense minister Malinovsky; Blight and Welch,
On the Brink,
327.

The Marine regiment selected: Marine Corps records, October 1962, JFKARC.

"Where are we gonna go?": Author's interview with Maj. Gregory J. Cizek, operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, April 2005.

who "spent his time": Author's interview with Don Fulham, assistant operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, May 2005.

Whatever happened, casualties: CINCLANT message, November 2, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

"diversionary replies": CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

"purposeful and completely unruffled": Gribkov and Smith,
Operation ANADYR,
69.

He quickly agreed: Statsenko report.

"A force that remains": Szulc, 179.

"You don't want to celebrate": Beschloss, 501.

"You'll be interested": Ibid., 502.

Had Kennedy known: Yesin interviews, July 2004 and May 2006. See also Yesin et al.,
Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr',
154.

The targeting cards: Author's interview with Maj. Nikolai Oblizin, deputy head ballistic division, July 2004.

Launching the missiles successfully: For description of the sequence of firing an R-12 missile, I am indebted to Col. Gen. Yesin, former chief of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, who served with Sidorov's regiment as a lieutenant engineer.

The regiment of Colonel Nikolai Bandilovsky: The sites in western Cuba were designated San Cristobal 1, 2, 3, and 4 by the CIA, from west to east. The first two sites (Bandilovsky) were actually sixteen and thirteen miles west of San Cristobal. The other two (Solovyev) were about six miles west and seven miles northeast.

He ordered Sidorov and Bandilovsky: Statsenko report.

CHAPTER FIVE: "TILL HELL FREEZES OVER"

"The Americans have": Presidium protocol No. 61. Fursenko,
Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS,
620-2.

Nikita "shit in his pants": Attributed to Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Kuznetsov, in Kornienko, 96.

"That's it": Semichastny, 279.

"You don't have to worry": Testimony of Emilio Aragones in Blight et al.,
Cuba on the Brink,
351.

The two men sent by the CIA: Vera interview.

The lack of power would also: CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

A dispatch from Ambassador Dobrynin:
CWIHP,
8-9 (Winter 1996-97), 287.

a proximity fuse: Alexander Feklisov,
The Man Behind the Rosenbergs
(New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 127.

"what we would call":
NK1,
372.

"He sure as hell": Warren Rogers interview in
Tulanian
(Spring 1998).

"to finish with Castro": Author's interview with embassy counselor Georgi Kornienko, July 2004; KGB report to Moscow, SVR; Fursenko and Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble,
261.

It was the tip: Dobrynin telegram, October 25, 1962, LCV; Fursenko and Naftali,
One Hell of a Gamble,
259-62.

"Stop the conveyor": Article in
Hoy Dominical
[Havana], November 18, 1962; CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

Coffee could see rows and rows: Author's interview with Lt. Gerald Coffee, December 2005; his mission number was Blue Moon 5012.

"alertness in a rapidly": Undated letter to Coffee from Marine Corps Cdr. David Shoup.

The overflight of the Crusader: Gribkov et al.,
U KrayaYadernoi Bezdni,
253-60.

Kovalenko controlled two Luna launchers: Malinovsky memorandum, September 6, 1962, LCV, trans. in
CWIHP,
11 (Winter 1998), 259. Together with the launchers, each regiment controlled four nuclear Luna missiles and eight conventional missiles.

His most recent report: Author's interview with Carlos Pasqual, January 2006. CIA Operation Mongoose memo from Richard Helms, December 7, 1962, JFKARC.

As they sorted through: Richard Lehman, "CIA Handling of Soviet Build-up in Cuba," November 14, 1962, CREST.

had "come to view": Ibid.

"the establishment on Cuban soil": NIE 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba," September 19, 1962, CREST.

"large intercontinental rockets": CIA inspector general report on handling of Cuban intelligence information, November 22, 1962, 19, 31, available through CREST. The report was disseminated by CIA on October 2, with the dismissive headquarters comment. The
Poltava
docked in Mariel on September 16 with eight R-12 missiles on board, according to RSVN documents inspected by Karlov.

"giant missiles": Marchant dispatch, November 10, 1962, NSAW Cuba; also published in
British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.

a "wide, unpaved": Report by M. B. Collins, November 3, 1962, British Archives on Cuba,
Cuba Under Castro,
Vol. 5:
1962
(London: Archival Publications, 2003), 155.

The vaults were hot and humid: Reminiscences of Rafael Zakirov, former FKR nuclear control officer, V. I. Yesin, ed.,
Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr',
1st ed. (1999), 179-85. See also Zakirov, October 2007 article.

The Soviet trailer-launched missiles: Malinovsky memo, May 24, 1962, LCV, trans. in
CWIHP,
11 (Winter 1998), 254.

"to deliver a blow": Malinovsky order to Pliyev, September 8, 1962, LCV, in ibid., 260.

a "liberated zone": Author's visit to Mayari Arriba, March 2006.

Raul understood immediately: Yazov, 157; see also Gribkov et al.,
U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni,
119.

The Soviet officer responsible: Gribkov et al.,
U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni,
90, 302-3.

Soon after arriving in Oriente:
Cuba under Castro,
Vol. 5, 152.

Everything was in place: Svetlana Chervonnaya interview with Sgt. Vitaly Roshva, May 2006; Gribkov et al.,
U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni,
87-8.

Raul received regular intelligence: Blight and Welch, eds.,
Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
102.

They took elaborate precautions: Zakirov, October 2007 article.

Known to the Marines: "Guantanamo Bay Compared to Attack-Ready Suburbia,"
Washington Evening Star,
November 14, 1962.

By nightfall, 2,810 dependents: CINCLANT history, chap. VII. Evacuation details from Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.

But nearly half the 2,400: Gitmo situation report No. 15 250100Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

a series of yellow, green, and red: AP report from Guantanamo in
Chicago Tribune,
November 13, 1962.

At first, Adlai Stevenson: George Plimpton OH, JFKL.

Stevenson was humiliated: Porter McKeever,
Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Legacy
(New York: William Morrow, 1989), 488.

"What year is this?": Arkady Shevchenko,
Breaking with Moscow
(New York: Knopf, 1985), 114.

"Missile," he wrote: Presidential doodles file, JFKL.

"Terrific": O'Donnell and Powers, 334.

The nightwatchman: Scott D. Sagan,
The Limits of Safety
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 99; NORAD Combat Operations Center logs, October 26, 1962, Sagan Collection, NSA.

Nobody knew what to make of: E-mail message to the author from Jim Artman, former F-106 pilot, Duluth.

"discretion was":
ADC Historical Study No. 16,
212-14.

At Williams Air Force: Ibid., 121, 129.

The order to flush: Historical Resume of 1st Fighter Wing Operations During Cuban Crisis, December 13, 1962, AFHRA; e-mail correspondence with Dan Barry, former F-106 pilot, Selfridge AFB.

They eventually concluded: NORAD log, NSA.

CHAPTER SIX: INTEL

"brainwash" the press: Handwritten note from Maj. Gen. Chester Clifton, October 22, 1962, JFKL.

it would be "nice": The suggestion was made by Vice Adm. Wallace Beakley, deputy commander of the Atlantic Fleet--Diary of Vice Adm. Alfred Ward, commander Task Force 136, USNHC. See also deck logs for
Pierce
and
Kennedy,
NARA.

"friendly gestures": Message 251800Z from COMSECONDFLT, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

labeled "scientific instruments": Personal notes of Lt. Cdr. Reynolds, Battleship Cove Naval Museum. The
Kennedy
is now on permanent display in Fall River, MA.

The streets around: Brugioni,
Eyeball to Eyeball,
190-2.

The overnight intelligence haul: Photo Interpretation Report, NPIC/R-1047/62, October 25, 1962, CREST.

were "fully operational":
Supplement 6, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba,
October 26, 1962, CREST; Brugioni,
Eyeball to Eyeball,
436-7. For information provided by Penkovsky, see Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin,
The Spy Who Saved the World
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 334-46. The Penkovsky materials were labeled IRONBARK and CHICK ADEE, and mentioned in the October 19, 1962,
Joint Evaluation,
CREST.

"a fear or stampede": Brugioni,
Eyeball to Eyeball,
437.

He liked to boast: Arthur Lundahl OH, July 1, 1981, Columbia University Oral History Research Office.