One L (24 page)

I was fairly nimble with Perini's questions about the case, but had more difficulty when he asked me to compare it with others we'd read in recent weeks. Most of the time I sat there with a look of profound concentration or made weak responses—“weasling,” Perini called one of them—before he went on to someone else, Clarissa or Hochschild or Cauley, for answers. I'd done well enough, though, that he returned to me throughout the period with more questions.

In the next twenty-four hours, I was the object of the kind of assessment I'd practiced on everyone else. Terry, forever generous, told me it was the toughest case of the year. It wasn't. Stephen also praised me lavishly. Aubrey, on the other hand, seemed to think I could have done better—he asked if I had read Perini's hornbook, in which, apparently, all the answers to the questions I'd missed were contained. A number of persons made it a point to tell me I had looked relaxed at those moments when Perini had come to stand directly over me.

To all of them I gave the same response: I was satisfied. I had not been great, but I fell into no swoon over an imperfect performance. In December that had seemed evidence that I was developing some perspective on the HLS achievement ethic, resisting that impulse to write off as worthless or a disgrace all things not done superbly.

But in the second term, I found that being called on had even greater significance. I was suddenly no longer a member of that legion who half swallowed their hearts every time they entered the room with Perini. He would not call on me again, and in class each day I suddenly felt almost like an outside observer. Most of my classmates still brought to Contracts the same rapt intensity they had from the start of the year. The effects of the Incident had been more or less expunged. Reportedly, Perini was still bitter about the affair and his public embarrassment. Letters and articles, most of them defending Perini, appeared on a couple of occasions in various law school publications, but within the classroom it was all but forgotten. Perini displayed the same domineering charm, and the great majority of the members of Section 2 still thought of him as an inspired teacher and of Contracts as the best class we had.

But not me. My sense of release had a strong effect on the way I regarded the man and the course he taught. Standing next to Perini one day late in January, I was stunned to discover that he was two or three inches shorter than I had thought at the beginning of the year. Truly, he was diminished in my estimate. No longer afraid, I felt my resentments of him more clearly, particularly of his pretensions. In class we were paying a good deal of attention to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a statutory scheme devised like the Model Penal Code by a national group of legal scholars and since adopted as the law of every state. Article 2 covers “sales,” and has supplanted much of what was once dealt with in traditional common-law contract doctrine. When you buy something in any store in America, the UCC now regulates many aspects of your purchase. As we had done with the Penal Code in Criminal Law, Perini would compare the holdings of the Contracts cases we were studying with the analogous stipulations of the UCC.

Perini loved to show off with the UCC. Article 2 is a hundred pages of intricate provisions, but Perini seemed to have it memorized down to the commas. Even when he touched on points inadvertently, in an aside, he would press his fingers to his forehead like a sideshow clairvoyant and come up with the precise portions of the Code in which an issue was discussed. “You'll find that, I believe, in 2–617, paren ‘a,' sub 1.” He was always right and the class was in awe of his grasp of detail. The first semester he'd made similar citations to his hornbook or to treatises.

There were some among the small group of students who shared my quiet hostility to Perini, who believed those episodes were phonies, scripted events carefully acted out in order to intimidate the section. I did not go that far, although I was increasingly aware that Perini did make errors, albeit trivial ones, often contradicting his own hornbook. What disturbed me in those instances and others like it was the way Perini played on our lack of knowledge and power. He had had twenty years to learn the UCC; we were new to it, vulnerable—and captive. If you came to class, you had no choice but to watch those flamboyant demonstrations, possessing no real standard by which to know if they deserved the kind of open admiration Perini seemed to expect. On the whole, I had the sense that Perini was using the classroom to live out some strange vision of himself and that struck me as a misappropriation of a teacher's power.

As my esteem for Perini declined, I tended to shirk the work of the course. That was an adolescent reaction, but the only tangible rebellion I could make. On Monday mornings, I found myself running contests with myself to see if I could read through a week's Contracts assignments in three hours or less.

For me, the compensating time and interest went into Civil Pro. As the second term began, Nicky Morris had stopped talking down to the class. We'd absorbed a groundwork of legal concepts and terminology and Morris had now started on the kind of wide-ranging philosophical tour which Peter Geocaris had said at the beginning of the year was in the offing.

Ostensibly, the second term in Nicky's course was devoted to close examination of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The federal rules regulate most aspects of how a federal court runs: how actions are initiated, how information can be gathered by each side, the handling of many details relating to trial and appeal. Not only are the rules central in federal courts, but they are also the model for the procedural schemes of many of the states and study of them is an indispensable if unexciting part of most first-year educations at the law.

But Nicky's teaching of the rules was anything but dull. In late December we had spent a number of days studying
Erie Railroad Company
v.
Tompkins
, a 1938 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which had proved the intellectual watershed of the course. In
Erie
, the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal judges to apply state law rather than federal law to many of the cases which came before them. Thus federal courts in different states would often be using differing rules in evaluating the same legal questions.

“By recognizing variation in the law,” Nicky told us, “the Supreme Court is accepting the idea that no one rule can be thought of as somehow ‘natural.' We see the law after
Erie
only as an imposed order, a response to political and social tradition and not something sent from heaven. The law can change; the law can vary from place to place. And in those changes and variations, the law, like any other social product, reflects the persistent conflicts and contradictions within the society.”

In teaching the cases we read to illustrate the federal rules, Nicky returned to those themes. He demonstrated how each rule, despite a neutral appearance, reflected those ‘persistent societal contradictions' which he had first mentioned in
Erie
. He continued to talk about the tension between our common desire that the law be uniform and certain, and our wish that it somehow meet the needs of justice in the individual case. He described the conflicting roles of judges, members of a decision-making elite in a democratic society. Should judges conform to popular sentiments? Nicky asked us. Should judges somehow watch out for the welfare of those who come before them? Should they assist the ignorant, or just apply disinterestedly the machinery of the law? Nicky talked about differing concepts of the duties of the parties to a lawsuit. Should they be forced to aid each other in some kind of higher service to the truth, or were the plaintiff and defendant independent gladiators, going at each other with no holds barred? What is the community's stake in the just resolution of disputes? How much does the idea of a right require an individual to enforce it on his own?

The questions, the conflicts, were elaborate and Nicky began to work them out in increasing complexity as the term wore on. Some members of the section were infuriated by Morris's approach. They found it abstruse, confusing, and—worst—impractical.

“He's in outer space,” Ned Cauley told me one day. “We're not learning Civil Procedure; we're learning Nicky Morris's theory of rules. What's going to happen to all of us when we go into a courtroom and make a motion under Rule Twelve E? Do you think the judge is going to give a damn whether it's a model of legal informalism?”

But the majority of the section were enthusiasts and I was among them. Like Ned, I had come to law school for professional training, but I was also looking for something more, something which was lost when teachers concentrated more directly on the kind of professionalizing Ned desired. In those classes, law study was treated primarily as the means for learning the circumscribed skills and customs of a sort of elevated priesthood. The uniqueness of legal thought was emphasized. In consequence, I and many other classmates were often left with the sense of a gap between legal ideas and those we had known in other areas of study. Nicky was out to efface that boundary.

“The law,” Nicky said at one point in the second term, “is a humanistic discipline. It is so broad a reflection of the society, the culture, that it is ripe for the questions posed by any field of inquiry: linguistics, philosophy, history, literary studies, sociology, economics, mathematics.”

Nicky did not touch on all those subjects, but his teaching was always animated by a sense of the law's search as unlimited and profound. In Morris's class I found myself launched once again on that kind of scrutiny of the most fundamental assumptions regarding the way we lived each day—the manner in which we treated each other—which had seemed so important when I had come to school. Each time I walked into Morris's classroom all that rapturous discovery of the first six weeks returned. And I knew I would leave after each meeting with that same crazy feeling, half heat, half thirst—the sensation of being nearly sucked dry by excitement.

2/11/76 (Wednesday)

Life around the law school at the moment is consumed by the Ames competition, politics, and flu. It seems as though everybody has been bitten by the same bug. Annette was sick three days last week. I was out on Thursday. The classes all resound with coughs and sniffles.

The Massachusetts primary is drawing near and many of the candidates seem to feel obliged to touch base at that august American institution, the Harvard Law School. It's not the students' votes they're after—most of those belong to Udall, as mine does, or to Fred Harris. Some candidates, I guess, come to meet with HLS profs, many of whom are advisors to the various campaigns. More of the pols, I think, just want to latch hold of the law school name so it can be boosted throughout the campaign. ‘Well, when I spoke to that question at Harvard Law School…' I've tried to see them all. First through was Jimmy Carter, the Georgia peanut farmer, way back in September when most people didn't know who he was. Many of his lines sounded like bumper-strip slogans, and he was incredibly, even disturbingly, neat about his person. Friday, Scoop Jackson proved dull and unimpressive before a crowd in Austin. Shapp, Mo, and Harris will be by before the end of the month.

I feel more relaxed in school now than I have all year. The promises the 2Ls and 3Ls made me—that someday it would be easier to read a case—have finally come true. Something fell into place after Christmas. It's still not like the funny papers, of course, but comprehension is fluid, line by line. Even with Ames, I have more free time than in the worst moments last term, and after the draft brief, I should be able to knock off weekends for a while. I can be with Annette more often now. A few days ago, we actually got out for a movie in the middle of the week, and I've also reorganized my schedule somewhat, getting up with A. in the mornings so we can have coffee together before she heads off to teach.

As for classes, I am still enjoying the elective, Law and Public Policy. Sternlieb has spent the first weeks trying to acquaint us with the social science skills he considers invaluable to policy planners. Right now we're doing statistics and the Bayes theorem. Last week it was game theory. Before that, we had another heavy dose of economics, going over marginalism, Pareto optimality, and cost/benefit analysis.

Along that line, I have some advice for anybody considering law school: take some econ before you come. The policy course is the fourth of the year to place considerable emphasis on economics. The free market in Contracts; allocation theory in Torts. In Property, Fowler has introduced us to something called Coase's theorem, an economic approach to the distribution of property rights. Even Nicky on occasion has talked about rules in terms of their costs and benefits. In all instances, econ has been introduced as a rationalizing principle, a way to make more sense of the many hard choices in the law.

For those of us without any background in the subject it is sometimes heavy sledding. Nothing is surer to turn on Sondergard's tears than prolonged talk of economics. Another section has been in a state of muted rebellion all year against their young Contracts professor who follows an unyielding economic analysis, which, for a lot of students, is like not being allowed to come up for air.