No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller (4 page)

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Authors: Harry Markopolos

BOOK: No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller
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Bernie Madoff was a much bigger fish, but oddly enough not much more difficult to catch.
 
Actually, it was another fraud that first brought me into the financial industry. My father’s former banker, the man who got the family into fast food, was working as a registered representative, a salesman, at a firm called Yardley Financial Services. It was shut down after the CEO was caught selling fake London gold options. The former banker joined several other former Yardley employees and opened Makefield Securities. My dad bought a 25 percent interest in the firm, and I went to work there in 1987.
 
I began by doing oil and gas partnership accounting, completing depreciation schedules, matching trade confirms—all relatively basic and often very boring work. I probably was underpaid for the work I was doing, but whenever you work for family you’re going to be underpaid. Look at Bernie Madoff’s two sons. Their father was running the most successful fraud in history and—at least according to Bernie—he wouldn’t let them participate.
 
My first day as a licensed broker was October 19, 1987. I remember it well because that was the day the stock market crashed. Makefield was an over-the-counter market marker that traded between 12 and 25 stocks. We relied on Harris terminals—dumb terminals I called them because they did not automatically update prices. They simply provided the quote at the moment you hit the stock ticker. But they showed who was bidding and asking on shares at different prices. I came in to work that morning ready to begin my career as a broker, and instead walked into chaos.
 
We had only four phone lines coming in. They started ringing at 9 A.M. and never stopped. Not for a second. I knew that it was unusual, but I hadn’t been in the market long enough to understand it was unprecedented. I did know that it wasn’t good. We were one of the few companies buying that day, because we were short; we had been betting that the market would go down, and needed to cover our positions. For much of the time we didn’t even know where the market was—our computers couldn’t keep up with the price declines. The New York Stock Exchange tape was delayed about three hours, so at 1 o’clock in the afternoon we were still getting trades from 10 A.M. There wasn’t a moment of calm the entire day. Everybody in the office was shell-shocked. They were trading every step down. I had been trained, but I wasn’t ready to be thrown into the battle. I was so junior that they certainly weren’t going to trust me. I spent the day running errands and setting up trading calls so that our traders could handle their calls more efficiently. We knew the market was crashing, but we didn’t have enough information to understand how bad it was. The end of the day was the ugliest close anybody would ever want to see. We worked through much of the night processing trades, trying to get some understanding of where we were. The market had fallen almost 23 percent.
 
So much for my first day as a licensed broker.
 
What surprised me from the very beginning of my career was the level of corruption that was simply an accepted way of doing business. Bernie Madoff wasn’t a complete aberration; he was an extension of the cutthroat culture that was prevalent from the day I started. This is not an indictment of the whole industry. The great majority of people I’ve met in this industry are honest and ethical, but in a business where money is the scoreboard there is a certain level of ingrained dishonesty that is tolerated. I became disillusioned very quickly. I learned that the industry is based on predator-prey relationships. The equation is simple: If you don’t know who the predator is, then you are the prey. Frank Casey, who discovered Madoff for our team, referred to those elements on Wall Street that conduct their business for bottom-line profits rather than serving their clients as “rip your face off financing.” I don’t know where my education went wrong, but my brother and I had been taught that there was no such thing as a minor lapse of ethics. Either you were honest or you were not. It was not possible to be partly honest. I learned that at Cathedral Prep in Erie, Pennsylvania. It was the kind of Catholic school that had a very strict rule that every teacher followed: Once a teacher knocked you down he had to stop beating you.
 
I was one of the better-behaved students and was knocked out cold only once. At the beginning of the year we had to turn in two bars of soap to use in the showers after gym. I brought two bars of Pet‘um Dog Soap, which leaves your coat shiny, clean, and tick-free. It had a nice drawing of a Scottish terrier on the wrapper, which I showed to my classmates. That was my mistake. The teacher called us individually to drop our soap in a box at the front of the room. When my name was called, the rest of the class started laughing loudly. The teacher looked in the box and found my Pet’ums. “Come here, Meathead,” he commanded. He grabbed a thick textbook and beat me with it until I went down. He followed the rules! When I got a beating like that I couldn’t go home and tell my parents, because my father would then give me another beating for causing a problem in school.
 
A prank I did get away with was infesting the school with fruit flies. In 10th-grade biology class we were breeding fruit flies for a series of experiments. I managed to sneak a vial home and secretly bred two complete cycles, so I had tens of thousands of fruit flies in a five-gallon jar. I explained to my mother that I was breeding them for a special science project. One morning I convinced her to bring me to school early. I slipped into the school through an open door by the cafeteria and released them all. It took them three days to infest the entire building, which had to be fumigated over the weekend.
 
More often, though, I got caught. Detention was held on Saturday mornings, when our job was to clean the school. I was a regular in detention. My parents never knew, though; I managed to convince my mother that I was in a special honors program that met on Saturday mornings. She would brag to her friends that her son Harry was so smart he was invited to attend honors classes on Saturdays!
 
At Cathedral Prep the difference between right and wrong was demonstrated to me on a daily basis. I learned there that actions had consequences. When I began working in the financial industry I learned very quickly that dishonest actions also had consequences—often you ended up making a lot more money. The most valuable commodity in the financial industry is information. Manipulating the market in any way that gives an individual access to information not available to other people on an equal basis is illegal. In early 1988 I was promoted to over-the-counter trader. I was making a market in about 18 NASDAQ stocks. One of the companies with which I traded regularly was Madoff Securities. That was the first time I had ever heard the name. All I knew was that it was a large and well-respected company at the other end of the phone. Madoff was a market maker—the middleman between buyers and sellers of stocks—and if you were dealing in over-the-counter stocks, eventually you had to do business with Madoff. It was soon after I started trading that I encountered massive violations taking place on an hourly basis. This was not true at Madoff specifically; in fact, I don’t remember a single incident in which its brokers were dishonest. But I had just learned all the regulations, and I saw them broken every day, every hour; and everybody knew about it and nobody seemed to care. The regulations were quite clear. The sellers in a deal have 90 seconds to report a trade. By not reporting it they were allowing the price to stay at levels different from those that would have resulted if the trading volume had been reported. Basically, it meant they were trading on inside information, which is a felony. It causes a lack of the transparency that is necessary to maintain fair and orderly markets.
 
This happened in my trades every day. It was an accepted way of doing business, although I couldn’t accept it. I would report it regularly to the district office of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in Philadelphia, and they never did a thing about it.
 
My younger brother had similar experiences. At one point he was hired by a respected brokerage firm in New Jersey to run its trading desk. On his first morning there he walked into the office and discovered that the Bloomberg terminals that supposedly had been ordered hadn’t arrived. Then he found out that the traders didn’t have their Series 7 licenses, meaning they weren’t allowed to trade. And then he learned that the CEO had some Regulation 144 private placement stock, which legally is not allowed to be sold. But the CEO had inside information that bad news was coming and he wanted to sell the stock. My brother explained to the CEO, “You can’t sell this stock. It’s a felony.” The CEO assured him he understood.
 
My brother went out to lunch with the Bloomberg rep to try to get the terminals installed that he needed to start trading. By the time he returned to the office, the unlicensed traders had illegally sold the private placement stock based on insider information. My brother had walked into a perfect Wall Street storm.
 
He called me in a panic. “What do I do?”
 
I said, “These are felonies. The first thing to do is write your resignation letter. The second thing you do is get copies of all the trade tickets; get all the evidence you can on your way out the door. And the third thing you do is go home and type up everything and send it to the NASD.” That’s exactly what he did. The NASD did absolutely nothing. These were clear felonies and the NASD didn’t even respond to his complaint.
 
When I started at Makefield in 1987, the industry was just beginning to become computerized, so most of the business was still done on the phone. I would spend all day with a phone hanging from my ear. I spoke with many of the same people every day and often got to know them well—even though I never met them in person. Among the people I most enjoyed speaking with was a client named Greg Hryb, who was with Kidder Peabody’s asset management arm, Webster Capital. Greg was nice enough to take time during those calls to teach me the business. When he started his own asset management firm, Darien Capital Management, in June 1988, he hired me as an assistant portfolio manager and an asset manager trainee. I moved to Darien, Connecticut, that August, and it was there that my education really began.
 
Darien Capital Management was a small firm; there were only four or five of us working there. But in the early 1990s we were managing slightly more than a billion dollars. And that’s when a billion dollars was a lot of money. We considered ourselves an asset management firm, but we operated as a hedge fund. Because we were so small, each of us had to wear many hats, which was a great opportunity for me. I did everything there from routine correspondence, monthly client statements, and handling of compliance issues to assisting a very good fixed-income portfolio manager. It was a lot of grunt work, but I was in on all the action. I got to learn the business of being a money manager by being an assistant portfolio manager. I learned more there in three years than I might have learned elsewhere in a decade.
 
Certainly one of the more important things I learned was that the numbers can be deceiving. There is a logic to mathematics, but there is also the underlying human element that must be considered. Numbers can’t lie, but the people who create those numbers can and do. As so many people have learned, forgetting to include human nature in an equation can be devastating. Greg Hryb showed me the value of networking; he helped me build the wide spectrum of friends and associates I was able to call upon during the nine years of our investigation.
 
I stayed at Darien Capital for three years. One of the people who marketed our products was a woman named Debbi Hootman. Eventually I became friendly with Debbi and her future husband, Tim Ng, who was working at Smith Barney at that time. Eventually Tim recommended me to Dave Fraley, the managing partner at Rampart Investment Management Company, in Boston, who hired me as a derivatives portfolio manager.
 
Rampart was an eight- or nine-person institutional asset management firm that ran almost nine billion dollars, the majority of it for state pension plans. When I began working there it had a suit-and-tie, kind of starchy New England atmosphere. It exemplified the conservative Wall Street firm. Gradually, though, just like in the industry itself, standards were relaxed and we evolved into a more casual dress-down-Fridays place to do business. It was at Rampart that I began my pursuit of Madoff and my battle with the SEC.
 
The relentless quest pursued by just about every person working in the financial industry is to discover inefficiencies in the market that can be exploited. It’s sort of like trying to find a small crack in a wall—and then driving a truck through it. At one time, the business of Wall Street consisted almost entirely of selling stocks and bonds; it was a staid, predictable business. Stocks went up; stocks went down. But then some very smart people began developing an array of creative investment products, among them indexed annuities, exchange-traded funds, structured products, and mortgage-backed securities. The business of basic investments became extraordinarily complicated, far too complicated for the casual investor to understand. Every firm in the industry and practically every person in the business had a theory and developed their own niche product in which they became expert. Everybody. These products were created to take advantage of every move the market made. Up, down—that didn’t matter anymore. So rather than simply picking stocks in companies whose names they recognized and whose products they used, investors suddenly had a supermarket of esoteric—meaning sometimes speculative and risky—investment opportunities from which to choose. Rampart’s investment strategy was called the Rampart Options Management System. It’s not important that you understand what we did, but simply that Rampart sold call options against client portfolios in a highly disciplined fashion, which would generate cash flow while reducing the overall risk. We were writing covered calls on big stock portfolios for institutions. It was a strategy that over an entire market cycle increased income while decreasing risk—as long as our client didn’t panic at the top. Unfortunately, as I learned, too many clients panicked right before the market topped and pulled out just before the strategy was about to become highly profitable.

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