Muslim Mafia (23 page)

“I have been a victim of both gender and religious discrimination,” she wrote in a blistering four-page letter to Awad and then-CAIR chairman Ahmad.
⁹

“At first glance,” she added, “it may appear unusual to claim discrimination while working for a civil rights organization. It may seem even more unusual that I am a Muslim claiming religious discrimination while working for a Muslim organization.”

But, Haddadi continued, “I have struggled for two years—along with others—with frustration and acts of discrimination.”

She says the discrimination against her started several years ago when CAIR operations director Iqbal tasked her to update CAIR’s internship application form by adding a section asking applicants to identify which sect of Islam they belong to. Haddadi told Iqbal, a Sunni Muslim, that she felt uncomfortable making such a change. That upset him, she says, and led him to quiz her about her own beliefs.

“This is where he discovered that my background is Shia,” she said, “and from that point his attitude changed towards me.”

The leadership of CAIR is dominated by Sunni Muslims, who account for about 90 percent of the world Muslim population.

Soon, Haddadi says she was demoted to part-time receptionist. She spent the next couple of years answering phones. “I have been frustrated with discrimination at CAIR for two years,” she complained to CAIR’s front office.

“SECRET HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION”

Tannaz Haddadi says hers was not an isolated case. CAIR has engaged in a pattern of gender and religious bias against employees.

“CAIR has it’s [
sic
] own secret history of discrimination before Mr. Iqbal came, that has caused many employees to quit and very few to come back,” Haddadi wrote.
¹⁰

When she threatened to file a formal complaint of discrimination with the EEOC, she says she was told not to complain, because her mistreatment was “for the sake of Allah.”

With that, Haddadi decided to resign.

CAIR declined comment. But at least three other office workers allegedly witnessed acts of discrimination against Haddadi, including CAIR’s office manager, a civil rights coordinator, and an executive assistant.

CAIR has also discriminated against non-Muslim employees and volunteers.

CAIR intern Corina Chang, for one, confided to Gaubatz that she and two other non-Muslim interns—both of whom also happen to be women—had been discriminated against because they were not Muslim. She said CAIR excluded them from participation in its nationwide Mosque Census Project, a comprehensive survey of Islamic centers in America.

Indeed, CAIR invited only Muslims to meetings on the project and notified only Muslims about the conference calls to discuss project details. Upset, Chang complained to her boss and was allowed to sit in on a call.

Civil rights activists often volunteer at CAIR even though they are not Muslim.

MYTH
: CAIR’s membership is steadily increasing with the size of the Muslim population in America.

FACT
: CAIR’s growth is moving in the opposite direction. The Muslim group is rapidly losing members, even as the overall Muslim population rises from immigration, high birth rates, and religious conversions.

CAIR publicly claims to have fifty thousand members, but according to internal memos, its real number of paid members is a paltry 5,133—far short of CAIR’s post-9/11 target of one hundred thousand.
¹¹

At a 2002 board meeting, CAIR set a goal to “increase CAIR membership” to one hundred thousand by the end of the year, in part by expanding the definition of “member” to include foreign Muslim donors living overseas and anyone whom CAIR registered to vote in the U.S., including non-Muslims.

“New definition is: Anyone who fill [
sic
] out a membership form ($10 fee) or donate to CAIR both on an annual basis or register to vote will be considered as a CAIR member, unless someone specifically decline [
sic
] to be a CAIR member,” minutes of the high-level meeting state.
¹²

“Membership will be open to all either American or international donor [
sic
], Muslim or non-Muslim,” the meeting notes add.

CAIR also converted family and organization memberships to individual memberships to increase its totals.

The board advised staff involved in the new membership drive to use the slogan: “We need you to become a CAIR member.”

Despite the ambitious campaign and sympathetic post-9/11 media coverage, CAIR didn’t come close to meeting its goal. Lowering its expectations, it subsequently came up with a long-term goal of sixty thousand members by 2011.
¹³

But if current trends continue, it will miss that mark as well.

In a court brief, CAIR’s attorneys blamed slumping membership and donations on bad publicity from the Holy Land Foundation trial.
¹⁴

While certainly a factor, membership began falling long before the trial began in 2007. Internal notes from CAIR’s meetings predating the trial complain of “weak membership drives.” In fact, internal records show that CAIR’s membership hit a high of only 9,211 after its big post-9/11 push for new members.
¹⁵

Using Pew Research’s survey estimate of 2.5 million American Muslims, CAIR’s current five thousand members represent just two-tenths of one percent of the U.S. Muslim population. Using CAIR’s inflated guesstimate of seven million American Muslims, CAIR represents an even smaller fraction of the Muslim community.

CAIR’s total membership in the nation’s largest Muslim state of California is just 903—barely enough to fill one city mosque.
¹⁶

Bottom line is, CAIR is unsupported by the broader Muslim population, which finds it more a liability than an asset.

And given the anemic size of its member database, CAIR cannot possibly deliver on its threats to bring the weight of the Muslim community to bear against national politicians, CEOs, or advertisers for media personalities it doesn’t like.

The actual size of CAIR’s political clout and boycotting potential is quite puny, which might come as a shock to weak-kneed advertisers who have caved in to CAIR’s demands in the past. It turns out that the handful of vociferous Muslims whom CAIR activated into emailing or calling to protest ad sponsors never represented the millions of consumers CAIR suggested. They’re merely CAIR’s loyal henchmen who receive their marching orders through the group’s “action alert” email list, which also is relatively anemic in size.

ALL BARK, NO BITE

So fear not, corporate America: CAIR has no real boycotting power in your state. And fear not, Washington: CAIR has no real voter leverage in your district. The only thing it has is a few loud mouths.

“This is the untold story in the myth that CAIR represents the American Muslim population,” says Zuhdi Jasser, director of the Phoenix-based American Islamic Forum for Democracy. “They only represent their membership and donors,” whose interests often diverge from the greater Muslim community.
¹⁷

Even former CAIR officials, such as ex-chairman Ahmed, agree that CAIR too often neglects Muslim constituents’ needs to focus on political and foreign policy matters.

They say the perception of CAIR among the general Muslim public is that it concentrates too much on the Palestinian issue, as well as other foreign matters such as the alleged abuse of terrorist detainees at Gitmo.

Also, former CAIR civil rights manager Salaam says that Muslim constituents complain that CAIR “does not return phone calls” from them when they seek CAIR’s help. Headquarters has also improperly handled cases, he says, while showing reluctance to refer cases to other organizations with more expertise or better resources.

“CAIR is very concerned about its reputation in the community,” Salaam cautioned CAIR executives in one internal report. “Without the community (and Allah’s help), CAIR would fail.”
¹⁸

Of course, its reputation hit a new low last year with the Jamil Morris Days fraud case. The scandal and coverup culminated in a lawsuit filed by Muslim constituents against CAIR, as discussed at length in an earlier chapter.

All of this is converging to depress CAIR’s membership numbers.

MYTH
: CAIR is financially sound.

FACT
: CAIR’s national headquarters is operating in the red, with losses mounting each year, and it’s struggling to keep its doors open.

Income from membership dues slowed to a trickle in 2006, the latest available IRS tax filing, and CAIR operated at a loss of more than $160,000 in that calendar year, following a deficit of nearly $50,000 in 2005. In 2004, in contrast, CAIR reported a surplus of more than $338,000.
¹⁹

During the hemorrhaging, though, its top executives still raked in six-figure incomes, including $121,760 in total compensation for CAIR chief Awad. In fact, headquarters still supports an eye-popping $1 million payroll.
²⁰

Dues plummeted from more than $700,000 in 2000, when CAIR charged $25 per member, to slightly more than $40,000 in 2006, when dues cost $35, according to IRS statements.
²¹

“Membership dues measures the organization’s success and base of support,” CAIR states in the section of its report to the IRS explaining why it collects dues. Well, CAIR fails to measure up in both areas.

Revenues from CAIR’s annual fundraising dinner are also drying up. Tax records show CAIR hauled in just under $90,000 in 2006, compared with a little more than $170,000 in 2004—a drop of nearly 50 percent.
²²

Again, CAIR blames the government for the shortfall, arguing it has scared off donors by linking CAIR to terrorist fundraising.

“The public naming of CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator has impeded its ability to collect donations, as possible donors either do not want to give to them because they think they are a ‘terrorist’ organization or are too scared to give to them because of the possible legal ramifications of donating money to a ‘terrorist’ organization,” CAIR lawyers complained in the court brief cited earlier.

But CAIR has only itself to blame. In 2002, as CAIR was complaining about a “lack of funds” and launching a campaign to solicit Muslims for more dues, Awad privately assured CAIR staffers and the Muslim community at large that “all allegations against CAIR are baseless.”
²³
That turned out to be false, based on reams of government evidence, and now he and CAIR have lost credibility in the community.

A DESPERATE REORGANIZATION

By 2007, CAIR realized it had to do something drastic to stay in business. So it huddled with its auditor Joey Musmar and counsel Joe Sandler and together they hammered out a reorganization plan.

Most key, CAIR changed its IRS tax-exempt status from a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization to a 501(c)(3) organization in order to attract more donations. Donations to 501(c)(4) organizations are not tax-deductible, while donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible to the full extent of the law.

CAIR also created a holding company to shield its real estate investments. Though cash-poor, CAIR is relatively asset-rich and controls an estimated $3 million worth of real estate in the Washington area, excluding its national headquarters.
²⁴

But that could soon change. Things are so bad at CAIR that: