Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece (32 page)

The
aspis
, on the other hand, failed in all these respects. The double-grip system severely limited the warrior’s overall range of motion. Unlike the single-grip shield, which could be held out at full arm’s length, the
aspis
could only be held out as far from the body as the elbow, or about half the distance. It would have been especially difficult for the hoplite wearing a heavy bronze cuirass to reach across his torso to deflect a thrust aimed at his right side. It would have been even more difficult for him to use his
aspis
to deflect a thrust directed at his legs. For unlike a warrior armed with the single-grip shield who could simply alter his footing and lower his shield arm, the hoplite would have had to stoop down for his shield to deflect the sword or spear of his attacker. In any instance, the weight and size of the
aspis
made it awkward to wield, especially over any prolonged period. The Corinthian helmet can be seen in much the same light as well. Besides the considerable weight of the helmet and the discomfort of wearing it, the highly protective helmet impaired the hoplite’s field of vision and made it nearly impossible for him to hear.

When one considers the great skill and workmanship that went into designing and making such engineering masterpieces as both the Corinthian helmet and the
aspis
,
³¹
it is hard to believe that they were not created for a particular type of fighting. That style would hardly have been fighting a series of duels between individuals with their mobility impaired by awkward armor, which limited their range of motion, restricted their vision, and deprived them of their hearing. The most reasonable way to understand the use of the shield is described by Thucydides’ often-quoted passage: “through fear each man draws his unarmed side as close as possible to the shield of the man stationed on his right, thinking that there is the greatest safety in the tightest formation possible (
synkleisis
).”
³²
As Greenhalgh remarks, “the significance of Thucydides’ observation is that some lateral, not frontal, protection was obtained from the next man’s shield, and that it was vital not to allow a gap to develop which might break the line, since a broken phalanx was as good as lost.”
³³

Peter Krentz has criticized the traditional understanding of archaic battle for its “excessively literal interpretation of the sources both for the formation and manner of fighting.”
³⁴
He makes light of the double-handled shield, which is “like any shield carried on one arm,”
³⁵
and suggests that a hoplite “could have covered himself nicely by turning sideways to the enemy,” which “would also have enabled a more powerful spear thrust.”
³⁶
In fact, this technique would have worked just as well with a smaller shield, which would have been easier to wield without the double grip and wide diameter, and would have presented a smaller target to the enemy. Of course, the logical reason for soldiers preferring the larger
aspis
is what Thucydides describes in 5.71.1, which is precisely why we
should
“assume that Thucydides did not exaggerate and should be taken literally.”
³⁷
Krentz gives his own account of how phalanxes collided, inspired by the Myrmidons’ charge in the
Iliad
:
³⁸

However neat the phalanx was when it began to move, by the time it reached the enemy it tended to dissolve into small clusters and individuals, the braver men striking out on their own, the less confident men bunching together. Archaic hoplites were amateurs, mostly farmers, who lacked the training necessary to advance in an evenly spaced formation.
³⁹

Not by coincidence, this reconstruction contrasts sharply with Victor Davis Hanson’s vivid portrayal of the terrible shock collision of hoplites in
Western Way of War
.
⁴⁰
However, it is hard to believe that even the Spartans, the closest archaic and classical Greece came to professional soldiers, lacked the discipline and courage to maintain their ranks during an infantry charge.
⁴¹
Yet they did not annihilate every Greek force they faced. For example, the Athenians more than held their own against the Spartans at Tanagra in 457.
⁴²
What would have happened if one side did maintain ranks and a relatively tight formation while the other side became frightened and scattered before impact? I think the side that maintained relatively uniform ranks, which is what Tyrtaeus exhorts the Spartans to do, would break right through the opposing line, assuming that they would even need to make contact to win.

Krentz criticizes the orthodox argument for the ritualistic/agonistic nature of archaic hoplite warfare because it is based on late sources, but he presents an alternative model based on a second-century AD account about the Messenian Wars.
⁴³
This is despite the fact that at least the First Messenian War took place before the Spartans first adopted hoplite tactics. A common feature of “revisionist” challenges is to propose a hypothesis that seems to contradict individual points of the orthodoxy.
⁴⁴
These hypotheses are then treated as facts that disprove the theory without offering an alternative to help explain the larger picture. Krentz, for instance, concludes, based on his idea that phalanxes did not maintain a tight formation nor crash into one another, that, “Archaic Greece did not experience a military revolution, much less one that led to political revolutions as well.” There was an evolution in equipment, but this was “in order to help a man do better what he was already doing.”
⁴⁵
But how did a double-grip one-meter-in-diameter shield and a Corinthian helmet help an amateur farmer charge an opposing phalanx only to retreat into small clusters or individual combat before making contact with the enemy?

There will no doubt continue to be lively discussion about tactics, but it will be difficult to explain why such a shield and grip system was designed for any other style of fighting than that which Thucydides described three centuries after the invention of the
aspis
. Why would it take so long to figure out how to use the shield to its best advantage when mass fighting was already taking place in the eighth century? Why propose an extended period of evolution in technique when close-order fighting was already being practiced, as nearly all scholars agree? Why would the Greeks invent the
aspis
only to change to a style of fighting as duelists
⁴⁶
in hoplite armor for the next two centuries? It is inconceivable that the Greeks would invent specialized armor only to use it in a manner that contradicts its design.
⁴⁷
It is even more incredible that they would need over two hundred years before realizing during the Persian Wars
⁴⁸
how to fight with identical equipment, when those arms clearly perfect the type of mass
fighting to which Homer may bear witness.
⁴⁹
The burden of proof rests with those who want to argue that hoplites in the seventh century fought in a looser, less cohesive phalanx. Evolution in fighting style and technique no doubt took place, such as the use of throwing spears and the use of swords as a primary weapon. Tyrtaeus exhorts the lightly armed men, moreover, to “throw great rocks and hurl smooth javelins while [they] stand close by the heavy-armed men.”
⁵⁰
However, these elements do not in and of themselves change the essential character of hoplite warfare. What was most likely an early experimental stage before warriors adopted the uniformity of weapons and of methods does not change the obvious references of Tyrtaeus to the classical phalanx: “let him stand with his shield … with foot placed alongside foot and shield pressed against shield, let everyone draw near, crest to crest, helmet to helmet, and chest to chest, and fight against a man, seizing the hilt of his sword or his long spear.”
⁵¹

Why would a hoplite encounter in the middle of the seventh century be fundamentally different from one in the fifth century? The archaeology for the period suggests a different story. Snodgrass has pointed out “there is a substantial class of evidence, that of the actual surviving pieces of armour dedicated at Olympia and other sanctuaries, which is more robust than either new textual interpretations of Homer, or new readings of battle scenes in art. It tells a firmly consistent story, that the middle years of the seventh century saw a sharp rise in frequency of use of the ‘classic’ items of hoplite armour on Greek battlefields: something in Greek warfare changed significantly in these years.”
⁵²
He argues for a period of transition during which Greek armorers worked their way through experiment toward the “classic” forms of hoplite equipment.

This firmly fixes the
terminus ante quem
for the hoplite revolution at 650. However, changes in and refinements of equipment need not indicate an alteration in the basic nature of what became the classical phalanx. This includes the relatively large size and cohesion of its ranks,
⁵³
and the decisive role played by the massed ranks of heavy infantry. The Homeric texts, moreover, may show that some form of mass fighting involving nonaristocratic warriors took place prior to the phalanx. This could have provided a precedent for participation by nonelite soldiers, some of whom must have been able to afford the new arms once the massed close-order tactics did come into use. Therefore, though the Homeric testimony
⁵⁴
cannot be used to disprove a hoplite revolution by arguing for a pre-polis hoplite phalanx, Homer may show that mass fighting had a long history before the full adoption of hoplite armor,
⁵⁵
and that aristocratic soloists did not monopolize the battlefield. It appears unclear in light of the current reading of Homer’s poetry whether an early stage of
exclusive
aristocratic combat by individual warriors or soloists
⁵⁶
ever existed. This removes an important objection to the idea that the phalanx had revolutionary consequences, namely, that hoplite warfare “ran so entirely counter to historical precedent.”
⁵⁷
At the same time, there was no hoplite phalanx without the
aspis
.

The reasons for going hoplite were mostly pragmatic but were also consistent with archaic Greek ethics and culture. Recent study suggests that “mass armies, and not heroic champions, are the decisive element in Homeric battle, and the importance of their role is absolutely integral to the battle-descriptions.”
⁵⁸
Though this is not conclusive proof that Homeric warfare is historical, it is at least plausible that
such a depiction of warfare had some resemblance to real battles of the eighth century. The key innovation that transformed battle was the introduction of the double-grip system. Even if hoplite phalanxes were organized based on the clans in early Greece, as soon as the new form of fighting was adopted, the lead position in battle was taken away from the aristocrats. The original size of the hoplite class, which was probably small, would not have determined whether the new form of fighting would have had a revolutionary effect. However one defines the aristocracy, its power was lessened once aristocrats took their place in the phalanx next to commoners soon after the invention of the double-grip shield. Scholars have placed too much emphasis on the insufficient time for a separate hoplite class to become a self-conscious political force to create a revolution. The transition, once the
aspis
came into use, would not require a long period of perfection and formalization of phalanx warfare, which continued to evolve throughout the classical period while maintaining its essential character.

The dependence on nonaristocrats in battle by itself would have diminished the political stature of aristocrats. Even a small number of nonaristocrat hoplites was now essential and in a position to contest the exclusiveness of aristocratic privilege or to support an aristocrat looking to challenge his peers. Enough time for nonaristocrats to become unified was provided by the long period of mass fighting before its formalization with the new equipment in the fully developed phalanx. In any case, for a “revolution” to take place it would not have required a “class consciousness” on the part of the many independent, well-to-do farmers with the means to sustain and to arm themselves with their own hoplite panoply. The need and desire to protect their farmland would have provided sufficient motivation to fight and demand a voice in polis decisions. The tension from this middle stratum may be seen in the figure of Homer’s Thersites, a man of no account in battle or in council, who is a caricature of the new threat to the established political order. There is also the instance of Odysseus rebuking the
demos
as worthless in war and in council.
⁵⁹

Raaflaub rejects the idea of a “hoplite revolution.” He acknowledges that military changes not only took place but also were an integral part of the rise of the polis.
⁶⁰
However, he sees political institutions, military practice, and cultural values evolving throughout the archaic period. The development of the phalanx plays a key role in the emergence of the polis, but it is just one important element in the “integration of the polis” in the seventh and sixth centuries without causing any radical breaks from the past. Raaflaub sees a gradual progression in the individual’s relationship to his community.
⁶¹