Margaret Thatcher: The Autobiography (84 page)

BOOK: Margaret Thatcher: The Autobiography
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There was a majority at the meeting in favour of overturning the NADs recommendation, but instead of terminating the discussion and summing up the feeling of the meeting in favour of that, I gave Michael Heseltine (and Leon Brittan) permission to explore urgently the possibility of developing a European package which the Westland board could finally accept. If this had not been done and a package which the Westland board could recommend had not been produced by 4 p.m. on Friday 13 December, we would be obliged to reject the NADs recommendation.

In fact, the Westland board did not accept the European bid and chose to recommend that from Sikorsky-Fiat. But Michael had now developed another fixation or perhaps tactic. At the ‘E’(A) meeting it was recognized that the timetable would allow for another meeting of ministers before the Friday deadline. But there was no decision to call a meeting; and indeed none was necessary. What was the point? Westland’s board knew precisely where they stood: it was up to them and the shareholders. Michael urged John Wakeham to get me to call another meeting, saying it was a constitutional necessity under Cabinet government. It so happened that officials had rung round to see whether people would be available if a further meeting was called: but that was very definitely not a summons to a meeting, because no meeting had been arranged. This was of little consequence, however, because from this point on Michael became convinced that he was the victim of a plot in which more and more people seemed to be involved.

The next twist came soon. Without any warning Michael raised the issue of Westland in Cabinet on Thursday 12 December. This provoked
a short, ill-tempered discussion, which I cut short on the grounds that we could not discuss the issue without papers. Nor was it on the agenda. The full account of what was said was not circulated, though a summary record should have been sent round in the minutes. Unfortunately, by an oversight this was not done. The Cabinet Secretary noticed the omission himself and rectified it without prompting. However, Michael Heseltine was not satisfied with the brief record, complaining that it did not record his ‘protest’. For Michael the plot was thickening fast.

Michael lobbied backbenchers. He lobbied the press. He lobbied bankers. He lobbied industrialists. GEC, of which Jim Prior was chairman, mysteriously developed an interest in joining the European consortium. The consortium itself came forward with a new firm bid. Each new development was adduced as a reason to review the Government’s policy. The battle was fought out in the press. There was an increasingly farcical air about the affair, which was making the Government look ridiculous. There was even a completely contrived ‘Libyan scare’. Michael Heseltine suggested that the long-standing involvement of the Libyan Government in Fiat raised security questions about the Sikorsky bid. In fact, Fiat would have owned 14.9 per cent of Westland and Libya owned 14 per cent of Fiat. Fiat already supplied many important components for European defence equipment. The Americans, who were even more sensitive than we were about both security and Libya, seemed quite content for Fiat to be involved with Sikorsky.

I rejected Michael’s argument that we needed now to come down in favour of the European bid. But the public row between Michael and Leon continued over Christmas.

Westland’s board were still extremely anxious about whether they could look forward to British and European government business. In answer to John Cuckney, I wrote to say that ‘As long as Westland continues to carry on business in the UK, the Government will of course continue to regard it as a British and therefore European company and will support it in pursuing British interests in Europe.’ Michael had wanted to include a good deal of other less reassuring material in my reply but I rejected this. Imagine, therefore, my admiration when I found early in the New Year that Lloyds Merchant Bank had sent him a letter which enabled him to make all the points in his published reply about what – in Michael’s view – would happen if Westland chose Sikorsky rather than the bid of the European consortium. It was in response to
Michael’s letter that Patrick Mayhew, the Solicitor-General, wrote to him of ‘material inaccuracies’. The leaking of the Solicitor-General’s letter to the press magnified the Westland crisis and eventually led to Leon Brittan’s resignation; but all that lay in the future.

I now knew from Michael’s behaviour that unless he were checked there were no limits to what he would do to secure his objectives at Westland. This had to stop.

Westland was placed on the agenda for the Cabinet of Thursday 9 January. At that meeting I began by rehearsing the decisions which had been made by the Government. I then ran over the damaging press comment which there had been in the New Year. I said that if the situation continued, the Government would have no credibility left. I had never seen a clearer demonstration of the damage done to the coherence and standing of a government when the principle of collective responsibility was ignored. Leon Brittan and then Michael Heseltine put their respective cases. After some discussion, I began to sum up by pointing out that the time was approaching when the company and its bankers at a shareholders’ meeting had to decide between the two consortia. It was legally as well as politically important that they should come to their decision without further intervention by ministers and there must be no lobbying or briefing directly or indirectly. Because of the risks of misinterpretation during this period of sensitive commercial negotiations and decisions, answers to questions should be cleared interdepartmentally through the Cabinet Office so as to ensure that all answers given were fully consistent with the policy of the Government.

Everyone else accepted this. But Michael Heseltine said that it would be impossible to clear every answer through the Cabinet Office and that he must be able to confirm statements already made and answer questions of fact about procurement requirements without any delay. I suspect that no one present saw this as anything other than a ruse. No one sided with Michael. He was quite isolated. I again summed up, repeating my earlier remarks and adding that consideration should also be given to the preparation under Cabinet Office auspices of an interdepartmentally agreed fact sheet which could be drawn upon as a source of answers to questions. I then emphasized the importance of observing collective responsibility in this and in all matters. At this Michael Heseltine erupted. He claimed that there had been no collective responsibility in the discussion of Westland. He alleged a breakdown in the propriety of Cabinet discussions. He could not accept the decision recorded in my summing
up. He must therefore leave the Cabinet. He gathered his papers together and left a Cabinet united against him.

I have learnt that other colleagues at the meeting were stunned by what had happened. I was not. Michael had made his decision and that was that. I already knew whom I wanted to succeed him at Defence: George Younger.

I called a short break and walked through to the Private Office. Nigel Wicks, my principal private secretary, brought George Younger out; I offered him, and he accepted, the Defence post. I asked my office to telephone Malcolm Rifkind to offer him George’s former post of Scottish Secretary, which he too subsequently accepted. We contacted the Queen to ask her approval of these appointments. Then I returned to Cabinet, continued the business and by the end of the meeting I was able to announce George Younger’s appointment. Within the Cabinet at least all had been settled.

When the House reassembled on Monday 13 January, at a meeting that morning Willie, Leon, George, the Chief Whip and others discussed with me what should be done. It was decided that Leon, rather than I, would make a statement on Westland in the House that afternoon. It went disastrously wrong. Michael Heseltine trapped Leon with a question about whether any letters from British Aerospace had been received bearing on a meeting which Leon had with Sir Raymond Lygo, the Chief Executive of British Aerospace. It was suggested (as it transpired quite falsely) that at his meeting with Sir Raymond Lygo Leon had said that British Aerospace’s involvement in the European consortium was against the national interest and that they should withdraw. The letter in question, which had arrived at No. 10 and which I saw just before coming over to the House to listen to Leon’s statement, had been marked ‘Private and Strictly Confidential’. Leon felt that he had to respect that confidence, but in doing so he used a lawyer’s formulation which opened him to the charge of misleading the House of Commons. He had to return to the House later that night to make an apology. In itself it was a small matter; but in the atmosphere of suspicion and conspiracy fostered by Michael Heseltine – who mysteriously knew all about this confidential missive – it did great harm to Leon’s credibility. The letter was subsequently published with the permission of its author, Sir Austin Pearce, but it contributed little to the debate since the day after that Sir Raymond withdrew his allegations as having been based on a misunderstanding. By then, however, Leon’s political position was all but irrecoverable.

But none of this made my life any easier when I had to reply to Neil Kinnock in the debate on Westland on Wednesday 15 January.

My speech was strictly factual. It demonstrated that we had reached our decisions on Westland in a proper and responsible way. Indeed, as I listed all the meetings of ministers, including Cabinet committees and Cabinets which had discussed Westland, I half felt that I had been guilty of wasting too much of ministers’ time on an issue of relative unimportance. Although it set out all the facts, my speech was not well received.

Michael Heseltine spoke, criticizing the way in which collective responsibility had been discharged over Westland and quite ignoring the fact that he had walked out of a Cabinet meeting on Westland because he was the only minister unwilling to abide by a Cabinet decision.

Leon summed up for the Government in a speech which I hoped would restore his standing in the House and which seemed a modest success. The press, however, still kept up the pressure on him and there was plenty of criticism of me as well. It seemed, though, that given time, we were over the worst. It was not to be. On Thursday 23 January I had to make a difficult statement to the House. It outlined the results of the leak inquiry into the disclosure of the Solicitor-General’s letter of 6 January. The tension was great, speculation at fever pitch. The inquiry concluded that civil servants at the Department of Trade and Industry had acted in good faith in the knowledge that they had the authority of Leon Brittan, their Secretary of State, and cover from my office at No. 10 for proceeding to reveal the contents of Patrick Mayhew’s letter. For their part, Leon Brittan and the DTI believed that they had the agreement of No. 10 to do this. In fact I was not consulted. It is true that, like Leon, I would have liked the fact that Michael Heseltine’s letter was thought by Patrick Mayhew to contain material inaccuracies needing correction to become public knowledge as soon as possible. Sir John Cuckney was to hold a press conference to announce the Westland board’s recommendation to its shareholders that afternoon. But I would not have approved of the leaking of a law office’s letter as a way of achieving this.

In my statement I had to defend my own integrity, the professional conduct of civil servants who could not answer for themselves and, as far as I could, my embattled Trade and Industry Secretary. I never doubted that as long as the truth was known and believed all would ultimately be well. Yet it is never easy to persuade those who think that they know how government works, but in fact do not, that misunderstandings and errors of judgement do happen, particularly when ministers and civil servants
are placed under almost impossible pressure day after day after day, as they were by Michael Heseltine’s antics.

Alas, Leon’s days were numbered. It was a meeting of the ′22 Committee, not any decision of mine, which sealed his fate. He came to see me on the afternoon of Friday 24 January and told me that he was going to resign. I tried to persuade him not to; I hated to see the better man lose. His departure from the Cabinet meant the loss of one of our best brains and cut short what would have been, in other circumstances, a successful career in British politics. But I was by now thinking hard about my own position. I had lost two Cabinet ministers and I had no illusions that, as always when the critics sense weakness, there were those in my own Party and Government who would like to take the opportunity of getting rid of me as well.

I knew that the big test would come in the House of Commons the following Monday when I was to answer Neil Kinnock in an emergency debate on Westland. I spent the whole of Sunday with officials and speech writers. I went through all of the papers relating to the Westland affair from the beginning, clarifying in my own mind what had been said and done, by whom and when. It was time well spent.

Neil Kinnock opened the debate that Monday afternoon with a long-winded and ill-considered speech which certainly did him more harm than it did me. But I knew as I rose to speak that it was my performance which the House was waiting for. Once again, I went over all the details of the leaked letter. It was a noisy occasion and there were plenty of interruptions. But the adrenalin flowed and I gave as good as I got. The speech does not now read as anything exceptional. But it undoubtedly turned the tide. I suspect that Conservative MPs had by now woken up to the terrible damage which had been done to the Party. They would have found in their constituencies that weekend that people were incredulous that something of such little importance could be magnified into an issue which threatened the Government itself. So, by the time I spoke, what Tory MPs really wanted was leadership, frankness and a touch of humility, all of which I tried to provide. Even Michael Heseltine deemed it expedient to protest his loyalty.

But the most damaging effect of the Westland affair was the fuel which had been poured on the flames of anti-Americanism.

On the heels of Westland came the question of privatizing British Leyland. Paul Channon, whom I appointed to succeed Leon, was faced within days of taking office with a fresh crisis and one which affected the
jobs of many thousands of people and concerned a significant number of Conservative MPs, including ministers.

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