Lone Wolf Terrorism (29 page)

However, the police were able to trace the sales history of the SUV using its VIN. There were no fingerprints or DNA recovered, but the VIN led them to the previous owner, who then was able to provide more information that led to Shahzad's identity. Surveillance cameras in a Bridgeport, Connecticut, shopping center—Shahzad bought the car through an Internet ad from a woman who did not know what it was going to be used for—recorded him taking the SUV for a test drive before purchasing it. Other information, including an e-mail and a cell-phone call Shahzad had made to the woman regarding the purchase, led to him being arrested on a plane that was taxied on the runway at Kennedy Airport in New York, ready to take off on a flight to Dubai. The entire investigation leading to his arrest took just two days from the time of the incident.
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The lightning speed with which Shahzad was tracked down was unusual for most terrorist investigations. The search for Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, took more than seventeen years, while the search for Eric Rudolph, who set off bombs at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta and bombed abortion clinics, took nearly seven years. Those investigations, however, were in those ancient days of the latter part of the twentieth century, before state-of-the-art automated systems greatly facilitated the analysis of evidence discovered at the scene of an incident. Technology, particularly advances in biometrics, will likely improve the results of many investigations of lone wolf terrorist attacks.

As noted in the previous section, biometrics can be used for both preventive and responsive measures to terrorism. For forensic investigations, fingerprints are the most widely used biometric, since there is a large database available to match against those fingerprints discovered at the scene of a crime or terrorist incident. As of 2011, the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System had more than 70 million criminal fingerprints, 31 million civil fingerprints, and 486,000 unidentified latent fingerprints (i.e., those left behind at a crime or terrorist scene) from which to look for a match.
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If a CCTV camera or other video device is able to capture
the facial image of a lone wolf at the scene of an attack, then that image can be compared to a database containing facial images of individuals to determine the identity of the lone wolf, provided that the lone wolf's photo is already in the database.

One of the more interesting applications of biometrics in forensic investigations involves enhancing artist sketches of suspects so that these can be used in facial recognition software. When there is no facial image of a suspect captured on a CCTV camera but there are witnesses, a police artist will sketch an image of the suspect based on the eyewitness accounts. Using super-resolution (hallucination) techniques, that image can then be made into a high-resolution, picture-like image to be used for facial-recognition analysis.
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Another creative application of biometrics for forensics is the use of tattoos. As more people ink their bodies, law enforcement agencies are finding novel ways to use such artwork in their investigations. “You wouldn't think of tattoos as a biometric,” said the FBI's Stephen Fischer Jr., “but we're starting to work on a tattoo database. Scars, marks, and tattoos we call it. Is it positive identification? No. But it's a good investigative lead.”
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The FBI's Biometric Center of Excellence recently launched the TattooID pilot program, which allows users to initiate a search utilizing a test image to find similar images. Users can also enter keywords or characters related to a tattoo to see if there are matching images. The idea behind the program is that individuals can be matched by the design and location of their tattoo(s).
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As the database of tattoos increases, it could become a valuable asset not only for identifying people who are using a false identity, but also for helping to locate and arrest an individual who has committed a crime or terrorist attack. For example, if a lone wolf placed a bomb in a shopping area, and his face was hidden from CCTV cameras, there still could be images captured of other parts of his body where there is a tattoo. If the lone wolf had a previous criminal record and was in the tattoo database, then the tattoo image captured by the video can be compared to tattoos in the database to reveal the identity of the perpetrator. “All these kids who put the tattoos on
their necks and stuff like that,” said the FBI's William Casey, “[don't realize that] if they rob a bank, the camera usually gets those types of [images].”
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For all the parents who are not thrilled with the idea of their children getting tattoos, they may have now finally found a way to persuade them not to get one.

Psychological Profiles and Psychological Warfare

When lone wolves are not killed or captured shortly after their attacks, psychological profilers usually emerge to offer their expertise on who the lone wolves might be and what may have made them do what they did. It is a controversial endeavor, however, since psychological analysis is offered by professionals who have never met with the person they are profiling and do not know anything firsthand about the individual's personality or mind-set. Everything is based on assessing the type of attack, weapon used, target, victims, and so forth, to derive a psychological profile. If the lone wolf decides to communicate after the attacks, then his or her written messages, handwriting, or Internet-posted material become part of the profile.

While a psychological profile by itself cannot result in the specific identification of the lone wolf, it can still narrow the gap in knowledge about the type of person who committed the attack. It can also be used to design a “psychological warfare” program aimed at increasing the stress level of the lone wolf in the hope that he or she will make a mistake that will result in an arrest.

Austrian police used this strategy against Franz Fuchs, a right-wing extremist who launched a bombing campaign in Austria and Germany in the 1990s. Fuchs's targets were immigrants and organizations and individuals he believed were friendly to foreigners. Between 1993 and 1996, he sent twenty-five mail bombs and planted three pipe bombs that killed four people and injured fifteen others. Most of the bombings occurred in Austria, where the authorities turned to criminal psychologists for help in their search for the individual known as “Austria's Unabomber.”
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Thomas Mueller, who was one of the psychologists consulted, developed a five-phase program aimed at capturing Fuchs. He referred to it as a “psychological duel,” a way to break the anonymity of the bomber and force him to make a mistake. Mueller had a lot to work with, since Fuchs had sent several letters to the authorities during his bombing campaign. The first phase was to publicly acknowledge the skills of the bomber, emphasizing his detailed knowledge of electronics, physics, and chemistry. The second phase was to make Fuchs feel guilty for his crimes, an attempt to instill a “bad conscious” in him. Since they knew of his militant, right-wing sentiments based on his letters and the victims he chose to attack—and that he also liked small children—Mueller released a recording to the media of an interview he conducted with a neo-Nazi who was initially suspected of the bombings but was put in prison for other

offenses. In the interview, the neo-Nazi lamented that he had not yet been permitted to see his newborn daughter. Mueller hoped that would make Fuchs feel responsible for the situation.
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The third phase of the psychological duel involved giving inside information to two journalists who then wrote a book about the bombing campaign, which included Mueller's profile of the bomber. The profile described the bomber as an Austrian male in his fifties who probably completed secondary education, lived in a family house, and possessed specialized tools along with a hobby workplace. He was described as a Catholic who had knowledge of hierarchies and religious titles and liked order and tidiness. He was also portrayed as somebody who had knowledge of chemistry and an interest in history. The police hoped the bomber would read the book and realize that they knew a lot about him. It was thought that adding pressure might increase the bomber's level of anxiety, which might in turn lead him to make a crucial error. (The book, however, was not found among Fuchs's possessions after he was arrested.) The
fourth phase of the plan involved a government announcement that the police were now being given more powers to collect intelligence on the bombing campaign, and the final phase included a government statement that ten Austrians were prime suspects in the bombings and that they were under close and continuous observation.
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The strategy, particularly the government announcement that suspects were being watched, appeared to work, as Fuchs grew more apprehensive about being caught. He became suspicious of two women who drove by his house twice one night in October 1997, shortly after the government's announcement. Thinking that they were undercover policewomen, he followed them, which of course doesn't seem like a good strategy if you believe the authorities are watching you. One of the women thought Fuchs was a stalker and called police. When police stopped Fuchs, he thought they were about to arrest him for the bombings. He tried to commit suicide by setting off an improvised explosive device. He survived the blast but lost both hands and injured a nearby policeman. Fuchs, who was convicted of the bombing campaign and sentenced to life in prison in March 1999, eventually succeeded in committing suicide the next year.
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Another example of police using psychological profiling and psychological warfare to arrest an anonymous lone wolf terrorist was the case of George Metesky. Known as the “Mad Bomber,” Metesky terrorized New York City between 1940 and 1957 by planting thirty-three improvised explosive devices, of which twenty-two exploded, in public settings including movie theaters, libraries, train stations, and other locations. There were no fatalities, but fifteen people were injured by the bombings. The bombs became more powerful as the years went by. Just like the Unabomber case years later, the bombing campaign frustrated and embarrassed the police, who seemed helpless to deal with the violence.
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The first bomb, which did not explode, was left at the utility company Consolidated Edison (also known as Con Ed), in November 1940, with a note calling the company “crooks.” Metesky had worked there and was denied disability benefits, despite being injured on
the job. A second, similarly constructed pipe bomb without a note was discovered nearly a year later, lying on the street a few blocks from the Con Ed offices. Then there was a hiatus for many years. Metesky wrote letters stating that he was halting his bombing campaign out of patriotism for US involvement in World War II. Years later, in March 1950, a third unexploded bomb was found in Grand Central Station. Police were beginning to think that the lone wolf terrorist never intended to have his bombs explode. That belief was proven wrong when additional bombs that Metesky had placed in Grand Central Station and the New York Public Library exploded in 1951. Over the next several years, many more bombs would explode in public places.
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Frustrated with their inability to catch the Mad Bomber, police turned to a psychiatrist, Dr. James Brussel, in 1956, to produce one of the first-ever psychological profiles of a terrorist. Brussel surmised, based on the many letters that Metesky had sent to newspapers, police, and Con Ed over the years, as well as the phallic construction of the bombs and other facts of the case, that the bomber was a single man between forty and fifty years old, disinterested in women, an introvert, unsocial but not antisocial, egotistical, moral, honest, and religious. He was portrayed as a skilled mechanic, an immigrant or first-generation American who was neat with tools, and a present or former employee of Con Ed, with a possible motive for the bombings being that he was discharged or reprimanded. Brussel also concluded that the bomber's resentment kept growing and that it was probably a case of progressive paranoia. Some of the other characteristics in Brussel's profile of Metesky included that he was meticulous and feminine, possibly homosexual, and most likely living with his parents or sisters. Brussel also predicted that when the police finally caught up with the Mad Bomber, he would be wearing a buttoned, double-breasted suit. (Metesky was arrested at home in his pajamas but changed into a buttoned, double-breasted suit for the ride to the police precinct!)
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Brussel urged the police to publicize the profile as a way of goading
Metesky to communicate with the authorities. Part of the profile was published in the
New York Times
and other New York newspapers on Christmas Day in 1956. Brussel soon received a call from Metesky in which he said, “This is F.P. speaking. Keep out of this or you'll be sorry.” (F.P., it would later be learned, stood for “Fair Play,” the name Metesky was using in all his communications.) Although the call was too brief to be traced, Brussel felt that it would only be a matter of time before Metesky's arrogance would cause him to make a mistake.
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Metesky's mistake occurred when the
Journal-American
newspaper, in conjunction with the police, published an open letter to the bomber the day after the profile had been published, urging Metesky to give himself up in return for guarantees of a fair trial and an opportunity to publish his grievances in the newspaper. Metesky, arrogant and overconfident, just as Brussel had predicted, declined the offer in his response, writing, “Where were you people when I was asking for help? Placing myself into custody would be stupid—do not insult my intelligence—bring the Con Edison to justice.” The
Journal-American
published his letter and requested more information from Metesky about his grievances. Metesky complied with a second letter that included the fact that he had pursued a workman's compensation claim against Con Ed. After publishing that response, the newspaper asked him for more details and dates about the compensation case so that a new and fair hearing could be held. Metesky fell into the trap and wrote back that he was injured on September 5, 1931. (In his original letters to Con Ed, Metesky claimed he was knocked down by a backdraft of hot gasses from a boiler, which later caused him to develop tuberculosis.) The authorities now had an exact date to check against Con Ed's records. They had already been given Metesky's file by an alert employee at Con Ed, who, after going through old records, noticed similarities in the wording of his original letters requesting compensation and his recent letters in the newspaper. Among the phrases that caught her attention was the threat to “take justice in my own hands.” Police had no trouble locating him, since he was still living with his sisters at the same Waterbury,
Connecticut, address that was listed in his work file. The fifty-three-year-old Metesky was arrested in January 1957. He was found by psychiatrists to be “an incurable paranoid schizophrenic with a strong impulse to martyrdom” and was committed to an asylum for the criminally insane. Upon his release in December 1973 he returned to his home in Waterbury, where he died in 1994.
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