Legions of Rome (83 page)

The resourceful Pompeianus was able to slip out of Verona by night, and he assembled a force of pro-Maxentius troops which he then led against the army besieging the city. Constantine, on hearing that Pompeianus’ force was approaching, divided his army, leaving part to continue the siege and leading the remainder to meet Pompeianus in the field. On forming two battle lines on the plain, and finding that Pompeianus’ troops outnumbered his, with the opposition front line extending much further than his and threatening to wrap around his flanks when both sides engaged, Constantine depleted his second line to fill out the front line to match the opposition.

This battle began toward the end of the day, and raged right through the night. Constantine, a tall man with great bodily strength and with considerable combat experience, was in the thick of the fighting. Dawn revealed a battlefield littered with mounds of bodies, and a victory for Constantine. Among the dead was Pompeianus, Maxentius’ loyal and diligent general. On August 28, when word of Pompeianus’ defeat reached Verona, the city capitulated to Constantine, who imprisoned every member of the Maxentian garrison. [Gibb.,
XIV
]

In the early autumn, as Constantine prepared to march on Rome, his subordinates begged him not to expose himself to danger by personally taking part in the next round of fighting, and in so doing putting the future of the Roman state at risk. He was, after all, one of the few Roman commanders-in-chief since Julius Caesar who physically took up sword and shield and fought alongside his men in battle.

At Rome meanwhile, Maxentius did not allow news of the defeats in the north to become public. Instead, he levied more troops locally and made plans for a deciding battle outside the capital. There, he was confident, he would destroy the threat posed by his brother-in-law Constantine in the same way that he had dealt with the feeble efforts of Severus and Galerius to dethrone him.

AD
312
LXVII. BATTLE OF THE MILVIAN BRIDGE
Deciding who rules

The site for the deciding battle between the rivals for the western throne was chosen by Maxentius, Constantine’s Rome-based co-emperor and brother-in-law. That site was the flat river plain north of the Tiber river, just under 2 miles (2.4 kilometers) from the city. The plain was reached from the Field of Mars by the Milvian Bridge, the stone piers of which dated back to the first century
BC
. As part of his battle strategy, Maxentius had the wooden decking of the bridge removed, and gave orders for a bridge of boats to be built across the river nearby.

In October, Constantine and his army came marching down the Flaminian Way toward Rome. Constantine would later tell Eusebius that one day just after noon—usually the time that a Roman army ended its marching for the day and made camp—“he saw with his own eyes the trophy of a cross of light in the heavens, above the sun, and bearing the inscription, ‘Conquer by this.’” [Eus.,
EH
,
XXVIII
]

Eusebius claimed that all of Constantine’s army also saw this sign in the heavens, but no other classical author confirms this. In fact, there would be much skepticism voiced down through the ages about the entire episode, even by Christian theologians. Dr. Ernest Richardson, Eusebius’ nineteenth-century translator, was to say, “There are all sorts of explanation, from that of an actual miracle to that of pure later invention.” Richardson, himself a theologian, suggested that perhaps what Constantine, under intense mental strain at the time, actually experienced was “some natural phenomenon of the sun,” or “a simple dream, or an hallucination.” [Ibid., n. 3019]

Or perhaps Constantine was a very clever tactician who saw an opportunity to let his highly superstitious soldiers think that he was divinely guided and so, therefore, were they. Nor was he averse to lying to Bishop Eusebius—at the same time that he described his vision of the cross in the sky to Eusebius, he assured him that he had marched on Italy because “life was without enjoyment to him as long as he saw the imperial city thus afflicted” by Maxentius’ rule. And that accordingly “he resolved to deliver Rome from Maxentius.” [Eus.,
EH
,
XXVI
] He told Eusebius this many years later, after he had emasculated Rome and made his capital elsewhere; in fact, Rome was a city Constantine disdained so thoroughly he would only visit it twice after
AD
312, and only then to preside over the tenth and twentieth anniversaries of his rule and rub the noses of the Romans in his authority.

That night after his “vision,” Constantine told Eusebius, as he slept, “the Christ of God” came to him in a dream “and commanded him to make a likeness of that sign he had seen in the heavens.” [Ibid.,
EH
,
XXIX
] Next day, when Constantine rose from his bed he told his closest associates of his dream, then called together artisans of gold and precious stones and, sitting in the midst of them, instructed them to create him a new imperial standard based on the sign of the cross in his vision, in gold and jewels.

Eusebius, who subsequently saw for himself the new battle standard created to Constantine’s design, was to describe it: “A long spear, overlaid with gold, formed the figure of a cross by means of a transverse bar laid over it.” What Eusebius described was the usual vexillum design used by the standards of emperors for hundreds of years prior to this; the vexillum, a standard also common to units of the Roman army, had always naturally, but incidentally, formed the sign of a cross. “On the top of the whole was fixed a wreath of gold and precious stones,” Eusebius went on. The wreath, representing Victory, was also a common feature of legion and auxiliary unit standards. “And within this, the symbol of the savior’s name, two letters indicating the name of Christ by means of its initial characters [in Greek], the letter P being intersected by X at its center.” Eusebius added that “these letters the emperor was in the habit of wearing on his helmet at a later period.” [Eus.,
EH
,
XXXI
]

From the new imperial standard’s crossbar was suspended a piece of square cloth, as was the usual style with a vexillum, “covered with a profuse embroidery of the most brilliant precious stones” and “richly interlaced with gold.” Below the golden wreath with its
monogram the pole bore a golden portrait of Constantine and his
children—such an imperial
imago
had long been a common feature of legion standards. In fact, the only really novel and distinctly Christian aspect of the new standard was the relatively discreet monogram. [Ibid.]

As Richardson was to remark, in the same way that Eusebius made Constantine’s new cruciform standard sound as if it was something entirely new and solely inspired by Christian faith, the same ancient Christian chronicler attributed a number of things to Constantine alone that were in fact “entirely customary with other emperors.” [Eus.,
EH
,
XIX
, n. 3178]

A later legend, repeated by modern authors, had it that Constantine also had his troops paint the monogram on their shields. This comes from a lone classical author, Lactantius. Yet it was not mentioned by Eusebius, who was otherwise effusive about Constantine’s adoption of Christian symbols. Later Christian writers such as Gibbon and Richardson gave no credence to the legend concerning the use of the monogram on the shields of Constantine. The balance of evidence suggests that Constantine did not instruct his soldiers to paint it on their shields until some years later, when, says Eusebius, Constantine also commanded that his troops should no longer be preceded by their golden eagle standards but only by his new imperial standard. [Eus.,
EH
,
XXI
] It seems that Constantine’s Christian symbolism prior to doing battle with Maxentius extended no further than the
on his glittering new personal standard.

Fifty hand-picked men from Constantine’s bodyguard formed the escort for that new standard, men “who were most distinguished for personal strength, valor and piety.” Their sole duty “was to surround and vigilantly defend the standard, which they carried each in turn on their shoulders.” [Eus.,
EH
, 2,
VIII
] Constantine’s standard came to be called the Labaram. Richardson suggested this title may have had a Spanish origin, coming from the Basque word
labarva
, which means a standard. [Ibid., 1,
XXXI
, n. 3010] Constantine’s spiritual adviser, from perhaps as early as his years in Gaul, was a Spaniard, Bishop Hosius, and he may have given the standard its name.

On the morning of October 26, Constantine and his army arrived at the village of Saxa Rubra, 9 miles (14.5 kilometers) north of Rome. Constantine would have planned to set up camp there at Saxa Rubra, within easy striking distance of the capital, but he was surprised to learn from his cavalry scouts that Maxentius and his army were marching out of Rome and forming up for battle north of the Tiber, near the Milvian Bridge. Constantine immediately called a conference of his officers
and assigned the units their positions. “We are informed, and we may believe, that Constantine disposed his troops with consummate skill,” said Gibbon. [Gibb.,
XIV
] And then Constantine ordered his new standard raised—the signal that today his army would be doing battle.

It took a little over an hour for Constantine’s army to march down to where Maxentius’ army was deployed and waiting. Ahead of Constantine, several deep lines of infantry spread across the river plain, extending all the way to the river, which created a bulwark against retreat by Maxentius’ troops. Behind them, a bridge of boats stretched across the swift-flowing Tiber. The Praetorian Guard, whom Maxentius considered “the firmest defense of his throne,” probably occupied his prestigious right wing. [Gibb.,
XIV
] Positioned on both outer wings, the thousands of heavy cavalry of the Imperial Singularian Horse, clad in fish-scale armor, and unarmored Moorish and Numidian light cavalry from North Africa, tried to settle their restless horses. [Ibid.]

Maxentius himself was there between the lines, mounted on a charger and wearing heavy armor, surrounded by his bodyguards. Before he had ordered his troops to march from the city that morning, he had consulted the Roman priests who kept the Sibylline Books, which were supposed to foretell the future. When Maxentius asked whether he would be victorious if he were to fight Constantine, he was informed that the enemy of Rome would fall that day. [Ibid.] This prophecy, together with his secret scheme involving the bridge of boats, had given Maxentius the courage to proceed.

Preceded by a cacophony of trumpet calls, both sides charged. Constantine had ignored the counsel of his officers to keep himself out of danger; placing himself on one wing, he led the charge of his cavalry, which slammed into the other side. After only brief fighting, the cavalry facing Constantine gave way and withdrew toward the bridge of boats. At the same time, Maxentius and his bodyguards also withdrew. Constantine and his cavalry gave chase.

Constantine would only later learn that this withdrawal by Maxentius and his cavalry was part of a preconceived plan. The cunning Maxentius realized that, if he could do away with Constantine, his leaderless army would be much easier to destroy; it might even come over to him in the same way that Severus’ troops had done. So Maxentius had conceived a way of isolating and killing Constantine. The center of the bridge of boats had been rigged to give way at Maxentius’ signal, and dump whoever was on the bridge at the time into the Tiber. The scheme required Constantine to be lured on to the bridge. And the early withdrawal of Maxentius and his cavalry
after Constantine’s initial charge had this as its objective—Maxentius’ troopers were under orders to deliberately retreat and lure Constantine on to the bridge. [Eus.,
EH
, 1,
XXXVIII
; Zos., 2, 15]

But Maxentius’ ploy, while it began as planned, quickly went awry, and spectacularly so. It was when Maxentius and the troopers of his Singularian Horse were on the middle of the bridge of boats that it gave way. Perhaps it had been poorly constructed. Perhaps the signal to pull the pins holding the bridge together was given too early. Or perhaps a Constantine sympathizer among Maxentius’ troops was responsible. Whatever the cause, the bridge broke under Maxentius, sending the emperor and men of his bodyguard tumbling into the river, horses and all.