Legacy of Secrecy (94 page)

trying to deflect the spotlight from . . . Marcello and . . . Hoffa.” Given

that Garrison had originally set his sights on Marcello’s pilot, David

Ferrie, Sheridan’s assessment seems too harsh—at least in regard to

the Garrison inquiry’s early stages. Also, Sheridan had no direct ties to

Garrison himself and was apparently unaware of the District Attorney’s

suspicions of Marcello.10

However, a Garrison staffer’s defection sealed Sheridan’s and NBC’s

low opinion of the DA. Eleven days before the special was to air, the

former Garrison staff member personally told Bobby that “Garrison will

never shed any light on your brother’s murder.” However, the ex-staffer

was unable to explain Garrison’s motivation for his investigation; in

turn, Garrison claimed the man was not a major part of his investigation,

but was “merely a chauffeur and photographer.”11

Garrison supporters have documented how Sheridan and NBC’s June

464

LEGACY OF SECRECY

19, 1967,
White Paper
went to unusual lengths to skewer Garrison, some

of which are detailed in William Turner’s autobiography
Rearview Mirror
.

While the show quite rightly noted Garrison’s weaker witnesses and

speculations, Garrison himself was not allowed to appear. Turner notes

the “special . . . attacked [Garrison] with such unremitting hostility that

the Federal Communications Commission ordered that he be allowed a

half hour of network time in rebuttal under the Fairness Doctrine.”12

CBS’s four-hour
Warren Report
special, hosted primarily by Walter

Cronkite, at least allowed Garrison a brief appearance, “where he held

his own under a when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife interrogation by

Mike Wallace,” according to Turner. However, the special was primarily

a defense of the increasingly-under-attack Warren Report. One of the

Warren Commissioners, John McCloy, was even allowed to comment

on the show’s “rough script.”13

Numerous writers have noted many problems the show experienced

in dealing with issues like the number of shots that hit JFK, and how

quickly and accurately they were fired. For example, the show used

outstanding shooters to attempt to duplicate the three shots attributed

to Oswald, a relatively poor rifleman at the time he left the Marines.

The show and the Warren Report said that Oswald had hit JFK with

two of his three shots, but, as Michael T. Griffith noted, “not one of the

eleven participating expert marksmen scored at least two hits out of

three shots on his first attempt. Seven of them failed to do so on ANY of

their attempts. Oswald would have had only one attempt.”14

Even though the CBS show used a rifle that fired faster and was in bet-

ter condition than Oswald’s, more than a third of the attempts had to be

disqualified “because of trouble with the rifle.” To account for Oswald’s

amazing speed and accuracy, which the experts had trouble duplicating

even under better conditions, the script could only have Walter Cronkite

intone, “It seems equally reasonable to say that Oswald, under normal

circumstances, would take longer [than the experts to fire]. But these

were not normal circumstances.”15

It’s hard to determine how much of what Cronkite said was his own

opinion, and how much was simply part of an approved script he had to

use. Cronkite had only a few skeptical lines, such as noting that the War-

ren Commission “permitted the FBI and CIA to investigate themselves”

about whether Oswald was a government agent. After the special aired,

the field producer who had originally promised Bill Turner “an objective

look” resigned from CBS.

Dan Rather gave a mixed performance in the special. He admitted

he was not “totally convinced about the single-bullet theory” but said it

wasn’t “necessary to the final conclusion of the Warren Commission”—

even though most experts agree that it is central to their “lone nut” con-

clusion. While he was overwhelmingly supportive of the Warren Report,

even Rather said he was “not content with the findings on Oswald’s pos-

sible connections with government agencies, particularly the CIA.”16

Neither the NBC nor the CBS show mentioned David Ferrie’s work

for Carlos Marcello, and they didn’t mention Marcello (or Trafficante

or Rosselli) at all. Also avoided was any talk of a JFK-approved plot to

kill Castro in 1963, even though Garrison’s remarks about that had been

reported in high-profile newspapers the previous month. As a result of

the two specials, Garrison was largely discredited to the rest of the main-

stream press. More than two-thirds of the commercial television stations

in America were affiliated with CBS or NBC, and after they broadcast

their high-profile support for the Warren Report, major reporters for TV,

newspapers, or radio were not going to risk their careers by support-

ing a conspiracy. Essentially, those two specials ended any attempts by

mainstream journalists to seriously investigate the JFK assassination

until 1975, in the wake of Watergate. The fallout from the 1967 NBC

and CBS specials would have a similar chilling effect on the media’s

investigations of the assassinations of Bobby Kennedy and Dr. Martin

Luther King, the following year.

Even some of Garrison’s former associates admit that he could be his

own worst enemy, due in part to his love of publicity. Garrison also had

a tendency to overreach the limited evidence available to him, while not

realizing that infiltrators like Alberto Fowler were affecting the direc-

tion of his inquiry. While Garrison does not appear to have taken direct

orders from Marcello, the godfather was able to use intermediaries to

influence Garrison by using infiltrators, informants, and political associ-

ates, like Senator Russell Long.

Bobby Kennedy, Walter Sheridan, and Garrison had all focused on

Marcello by May 1967, but the NBC special and other attacks by Sheri-

dan ended any possibility of the three working together against Mar-

cello. Coupled with the lack of support (and outright hostility) from the

government, this situation probably helped to drive Garrison closer to

those he should have been most wary of, figures seeking to use him for

their own ends. This pattern became apparent by late June 1967, when

Garrison leaked to the press that he was investigating Edward Grady

Partin, the federal government’s key witness against Jimmy Hoffa,

thereby confirming Bobby’s and Sheridan’s worst fears.

From that point forward, Garrison’s investigation seems to have been

466

LEGACY OF SECRECY

hopelessly compromised. On July 7, 1967, Garrison even issued a war-

rant for Sheridan’s arrest, for allegedly trying to bribe a witness against

Shaw. When Sheridan surrendered, Bobby Kennedy issued a statement

saying that Sheridan wanted “as much as, or more than, any other man

to ascertain the truth about the events of November, 1963,” and that

Sheridan wouldn’t “do anything which would in the slightest degree

compromise the truth.” Sheridan eventually beat the charges.17

Though Clay Shaw’s investigation and eventual trial would drag on

for another two years, Garrison’s efforts increasingly became the gro-

tesque sideshow some journalists claimed it was. However, several pri-

vate citizens assisting Garrison (Turner, Fensterwald, and others) would

go on to play important roles in helping to expose the JFK-Almeida coup

plan and the Mafia’s use of it to assassinate JFK. Garrison’s investiga-

tive files, most of which were unrelated to Clay Shaw and never used at

trial, would also become an important reference for later Congressional

investigations and journalists.

Garrison suddenly focused on Hoffa informant Edward Grady Partin

in late June 1967 because Carlos Marcello was still trying to take advan-

tage of the Mafia’s $2 million Spring Hoffa fund (more than $12 million

today). If Partin could be induced or bribed to recant his testimony—or

claim the government had used illegal wiretaps to convict Hoffa—the

Teamster president would win a new trial, and likely his freedom.

Carlos Marcello summoned Frank Ragano to New Orleans so the

mob lawyer could meet with Partin personally. As a sign of the serious-

ness of the effort, Marcello himself drove Ragano to Baton Rouge to

see Partin. On the drive, Marcello was pulled over by a Louisiana State

Patrol officer who pointed out the expired tag on Marcello’s Cadillac.

When the officer realized he had pulled over Carlos Marcello, the patrol-

man became apologetic. Ragano says Marcello asked the officer if he

“would buy the plate for me and bring it to my office.” The patrolman

replied, “Yes, sir, I’d be glad to.” Marcello gave the officer $20 for the

tag, plus another $100 in thanks, before continuing on his way with

Ragano.18

Ragano’s meeting with Partin didn’t produce the desired results, so

Marcello had his associates offer a bribe of $1 million, which Partin

declined. That was the most Marcello was willing to offer, even though

the Spring Hoffa fund contained twice that amount; the rest would have

been profit for Marcello. The effort to free Hoffa would soon involve

Senator Russell Long, Louisiana’s governor, World War II hero and

B-movie star Audie Murphy, and Dallas media owner Gordon McClen-

don, a friend of both Jack Ruby and the CIA’s David Atlee Phillips.19

Even though Marcello’s 1967 efforts to free Hoffa were unsuccessful,

Marcello still felt he deserved a huge loan from the Teamster Pension

Fund, so that he could build a Las Vegas casino for himself and Traf-

ficante, fronted by a seemingly legitimate business associate. Hoffa had

left Allan Dorfman in charge of distributing such loans, but with Hoffa

in prison, Dorfman became greedy, demanding a $500,000 fee and 25

percent interest in the casino. Marcello and Trafficante were outraged.

A few weeks later, on July 26, 1967, in an upscale Chicago suburb, two

masked gunmen blasted Dorfman’s car with shotgun fire. Dorfman was

driving but was uninjured. As Trafficante explained to Ragano, “If they

had wanted to kill him they would have. This was just a warning.”20

Marcello preferred dealing with Hoffa, but it became apparent that

getting him out of prison would be a longer-term undertaking. The 1968

election would represent an opportunity, since it looked like Richard

Nixon was going to run. Marcello and Hoffa had donated $500,000 to

Nixon’s 1960 presidential run, and Nixon would soon be seeking Team-

ster backing for his bid. Also, given both Hoffa’s and Carmine Galante’s

ties to Marcello, it’s likely that at some point Marcello was told of Hoffa’s

plan to kill Bobby Kennedy if he tried to run for president.

In the early summer of 1967, the future looked promising for Johnny

Rosselli. A year earlier, he’d faced the possibility of deportation and the

loss of his patron, Sam Giancana. Now he had a new financial source

(Howard Hughes) and had recently gotten his cut from their first casino

deal, with more in the works. Leaking the CIA-Mafia plots to Jack Ander-

son had worked as he’d hoped, and Rosselli’s friend William Harvey

was still able to feed him inside information from the CIA.

Even though he was in the clear, the sixty-three-year-old Rosselli

wasn’t ready to relax or back off from his illegal activities. A criminal for

all of his adult life, Rosselli couldn’t resist continuing a card-cheating

scam at the prestigious Los Angeles Friars Club, where Frank Sinatra

had sponsored Rosselli for membership in 1963. Since then, Rosselli’s

men had bilked some of the wealthy members—including comedian

Phil Silvers and singer Tony Martin—for $400,000.

On July 20, 1967, the FBI raided the Friars Club in Los Angeles and

found the electronic equipment Rosselli and his men used in their card-

cheating scam. The government then used a grand jury to pressure

Rosselli. Because of the still pending immigration matter, the Mafia don

468

LEGACY OF SECRECY

couldn’t even answer when asked, “Are you . . . John Rosselli?” and

instead had to plead the Fifth.21

Because of the high-profile nature of the case and the notables

involved, a new criminal division chief at the US attorney’s office in

Los Angeles also used it to press the immigration case against Ros-

selli. Eight members of Rosselli’s family were subpoenaed, followed by

several of his Los Angeles friends. According to Rosselli’s biographers,

“on October 21, 1967, Rosselli was indicted on six counts for failure to

register as an alien.” Though “released on $5,000 bond,” Rosselli and

five codefendants would be indicted in December 1967 for the Friars

Club charges. True to form, Rosselli’s first reaction was to hire notori-

ous hit man Jimmy “The Weasel” Fratianno to kill the main witness in

the Friars Club case. However, that approach failed when the man went

into the Federal Witness Protection Program, leaving Rosselli with few