Legacy of Secrecy (59 page)

mounted raids on Cuba . . . to conduct internal sabotage, and to establish

contact with dissidents.” FitzGerald inaccurately told the meeting that

“Artime will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in Feb-

ruary,” ignoring the fact that Artime’s camps had been operating and

launching raids into Cuba since the early fall.

After being asked by LBJ, FitzGerald said the CIA had budgeted “five

million” for the exile groups, with another “2 million” for other Cuban

operations. Only under direct questioning from LBJ did FitzGerald cau-

tiously address the matter of a coup. FitzGerald talked about the CIA’s

efforts to “establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist

elements in the power centers of the regime, with a view to stimulating

an internal coup.” FitzGerald noted the CIA had “been able to make an

important penetration in the Cuban army,” as well as others. He also

said, “Any successful operation to overthrow Castro emanating from

within Cuba will have to be supported by” these officials “if it is to have

any real likelihood of success.”

FitzGerald said the various “dissident elements, while willing to act,

are not yet willing to act together.” To an extent, this statement was true,

since Almeida and AMWORLD were separate from the AMTRUNK

operation, and they were all separate from the unauthorized Cubela

assassination operation. FitzGerald, with Helms’s approval, seemed to

be laying the groundwork for combining those three operations—which

was what both men would soon attempt to do.

The decisions LBJ announced in the meeting signaled a major shift. He

didn’t approve a previously planned attack on a Cuban power station,

in part “because of the Soviet dimension”—his worry that such an attack

would upset the Soviets. This decision represented a major difference

in attitude between LBJ and JFK, who was usually willing to approve

such raids as long as they were just a small part of the buildup to a coup

against Fidel. Even worse for McCone, Helms, and FitzGerald, even

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after hearing about the exile groups and hopes for “an internal coup,”

LBJ made it clear that he was “most interested in economic denial actions

[toward Cuba].” In other words, he wanted to focus on safe ways to

impact Cuba’s economy, instead of potentially risky coup plans or small

hit-and-run attacks.45

The three CIA men could take solace only in the fact that LBJ allowed

the funding for the exile groups to go forward, and didn’t order them to

stop their efforts with dissident Cuban officials. LBJ wanted to preserve

his options with Cuba while minimizing the risk of antagonizing the

Soviets or having a crisis with Cuba in the early weeks of his administra-

tion. If there was going to be a real effort to topple Castro, it was going

to take someone besides McCone, Helms, or FitzGerald to convince LBJ

to go through with it.

In the aftermath of his brother’s murder, Bobby Kennedy struggled to

cope with his overwhelming grief, while trying to maintain some of

his official duties.46
Newsweek
editor Evan Thomas wrote that Bobby

“seemed devoured by grief” that was “overwhelming [and] all-

consuming.”47 The formerly intense dynamo was a shadow of his for-

mer self. One of his Mafia prosecutors, G. Robert Blakey, said that even

months after JFK’s death, Bobby “seemed absolutely devastated.” Blakey

came to feel that Bobby had some “terrible sense—is there something

I did, or failed to prevent, that backfired against [JFK]?”48 Joseph Cali-

fano also began “to believe that the paroxysms of grief that tormented

[Bobby] after his brother’s death arose, at least in part, from a sense that

his efforts to eliminate Castro led to his brother’s assassination.”49

One of the National Security Council’s Cuban subcommittees met on

December 6, but Bobby no longer directed or approved their actions.

In fact, he no longer had any role regarding Cuba. The following day,

Bobby met with John McCone at 9:00 AM; McCone subsequently met

with Secretary of State Rusk at noon, and with LBJ thirty minutes later.

Given the sequence and people involved, the topic of all three meet-

ings was probably Cuba, with McCone keeping Bobby informed about

the subcommittees and operations the Attorney General had once con-

trolled. McCone may have told Bobby and the others about the latest

developments from Mexico City involving Oswald, Kostikov, Duran,

and Alvarado (whose story had finally been exposed as fraudulent).

For at least three more days after that meeting, Bobby continued to

think that Oswald could have been assisted by “Castro or . . . gangsters,”

as he told Arthur Schlesinger Jr. on December 9, 1963.50 Due to the

observations of Powers, O’Donnell, and Burkley, Bobby felt that there

had to have been more than one shooter. As he reportedly told Demo-

cratic Party leader Lawrence O’Brien, “I’m sure that little pinko prick

[Oswald] had something to do with it, but he certainly didn’t mastermind

anything. He should’ve shot me, not Jack. I’m the one who’s out to get

them.” As false stories like Alvarado’s fell by the wayside, Bobby soon

abandoned any belief that Castro was behind his brother’s murder.

Instead, Bobby focused on “gangsters,” their associates like Jimmy

Hoffa, and some Cuban exiles. According to a former Senate lawyer

interviewed by author C. David Heymann, Bobby said it was “impos-

sible that Oswald and Ruby hadn’t known one another.” Bobby also

expressed anger at Cuban exiles who were “working for the mob. They

blame us for the Bay of Pigs, and they’re trying to make this look like

a Castro Communist hit. I don’t buy it. And I don’t trust those guys at

the CIA. They’re worse than the Mafia.”51 Based on those comments,

it’s possible that Bobby played a role in Richard Helms’s sacking Tony

Varona from anti-Castro operations. As for the CIA, Bobby’s close friend,

publisher John Seigenthaler, said it became “clear that McCone was out

of the loop—Dick Helms was running the agency . . . anything McCone

found out was by accident.”52 Still, as Bobby told William Attwood, there

were “‘reasons of national security’ for keeping a lid on the case.”53

Bobby’s ability to investigate his brother’s murder was impaired not

only by his personal grief and his need for secrecy, but also by his loss of

power, as typified by the way J. Edgar Hoover treated him. According

to historian Richard D. Mahoney, after JFK’s death, Hoover “ordered

his secretary to get rid of the phone on his desk that linked him to the

Attorney General,” and “the organized crime operation came to a halt.”

Mahoney writes that “as Bill Hundley, head of the Organized Crime

Section, put it, ‘The minute that bullet hit Jack Kennedy’s head, it was

all over. Right then. The organized crime program just stopped, and

Hoover took control back.’ Marcello had been right: Cut the dog’s head

off and the rest of it would die.”54

Amidst his grief in December 1963, Bobby Kennedy made a major

decision that would further strain his already rocky relationship with

LBJ. Bobby decided he would try to persuade LBJ to continue the coup

plan with Almeida. Harry Williams had received a communication from

Almeida indicating that he was still willing to lead the coup. Harry was

ready as well, and Bobby felt that a free and democratic Cuba would be

the best memorial to his slain brother.55

Their first approach to President Johnson hinted at the problems to

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come. Harry tried to use his contacts in Cyrus Vance’s office to arrange

a meeting with LBJ. According to Harry, Vance’s aide Joseph Califano

told him that LBJ had first evoked the Kennedys’ responsibility for the

Bay of Pigs disaster, and had then declared, “I don’t want to see any god-

damn Cuban, especially that son of a bitch Williams.” Apparently, LBJ

had heard enough about the coup plan from McCone to wonder if JFK’s

death was some type of retaliation from Castro. Then, too, LBJ knew that

Harry was a personal friend of Bobby, whom he still didn’t trust.56

While Bobby had not attended LBJ’s big December 19 meeting on

Cuba, he was on good terms with several people who had, and he was

no doubt disappointed by the results. Still, Almeida remained willing

to proceed, and on December 26, 1963, Che Guevara made a televi-

sion appearance in Cuba, showing that whatever issue had resulted in

his house arrest had been resolved. In France, Cuban journalist Carlos

Franqui had been waiting for something to happen regarding the coup.

The longer he stayed in France, the greater the chance that Fidel might

view Franqui’s long absence with suspicion. By late December, it became

obvious to Franqui that in the wake of JFK’s death there wasn’t going

to be a coup, so he returned to Cuba. Fidel and Raul Castro didn’t real-

ize that Harry Williams and Bobby Kennedy were the ones who had

arranged Franqui’s sojourn to France, as part of the plan for the coup.

In early January, Harry and Bobby talked about trying one last time

to get LBJ to continue with Almeida’s coup plan. Since LBJ wouldn’t see

Harry, there was only one thing left to try: Bobby would have to swallow

his pride, put his own feelings aside, and plead his case personally to

LBJ. Their relationship had been terrible since 1960, when Bobby had

managed JFK’s campaign for the presidential nomination against LBJ

and the other challengers. Their feelings toward each other had not

improved during Johnson’s tenure as vice president, and had been even

worse since JFK’s death, because Bobby felt that Johnson had moved

into the White House and asserted control too quickly.

However, LBJ had tried to reach out to Bobby at times and perhaps

that was why Bobby felt that talking to LBJ directly was worth a try. Also,

we got the distinct impression from Harry that Bobby—and apparently

McCone and Helms—had not told President Johnson everything about

Almeida and the coup plan. There were apparently things that Bobby

intended to tell LBJ only if he agreed to continue the plan. LBJ could

become Bobby’s political rival in the future, so it made little sense for

Bobby to describe every aspect of his most sensitive plan to LBJ until

after President Johnson had agreed to the coup.

Bobby’s meeting with LBJ about the coup plan did not go well. Only

the two of them were present, and Bobby later told Harry that LBJ lis-

tened sympathetically but made it clear that he would not continue

with the plan. LBJ’s decision also included ending the Cuban exile troop

program at Fort Benning and Fort Jackson, since the exiles’ real purpose

had been to be among the first US troops into Cuba after the coup.

However, LBJ did agree to keep funding Bobby’s favored Cuban exile

groups, in case they proved useful in the future. This was LBJ’s way of

preserving his options and asserting control: Formerly, Cuban opera-

tions had essentially been run by Bobby, through Army Secretary Cyrus

Vance and Richard Helms. Now, Cuban operations would be primar-

ily the CIA’s responsibility, with McCone reporting to LBJ. Probably at

Bobby’s urging, LBJ agreed to meet with the leader of the Fort Benning

Cuban American troops the following day, to break the news to him

personally.

The leader of the Cuban American troops at Fort Benning was Second

Lieutenant Erneido Oliva, later a Major General in the National Guard.

Oliva had been second in command at the Bay of Pigs and was one of

the men who presented JFK with the flag of the Brigade at the Orange

Bowl ceremony. An Afro-Cuban, Oliva had been praised in a speech

by JFK, who had planned to give Oliva a major role in the new Cuban

provisional government after Almeida’s coup. Oliva later wrote this

account of his mid-January 1964 meeting with LBJ and Bobby:

President Johnson . . . said that he really wanted to help Cubans

recover their homeland from communism, but . . . the moment was

not appropriate for any anti-Castro activity. He added that he was

sorry to terminate the Special Presidential Program established

by President Kennedy the previous year, but each Cuban officer

would be given the opportunity to “stay in the service or find a

new job.”57

LBJ tried to refer Oliva to the Secretary of Defense, but Oliva tried

one last time to get LBJ to change his mind. With Bobby sitting beside

him, Oliva told LBJ:

. . . as strongly as possible that the plans for Cuba established by the

previous Administration were essential for the overthrow of Fidel

Castro. But Johnson stayed firm in his decision. . . . At the Pentagon,

Oliva and Kennedy were welcomed by Secretary of Defense Rob-

ert McNamara, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, Army General

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Counsel Joseph Califano, and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M.

Haig Jr. . . . Thus, with a short sixteen-minute meeting at the White