Kim Philby (34 page)

Michael Smith

These documents were released at the beginning of 2014 as a result of a Freedom of Information request. They are contained in the UK National Archives file  PREM 11/4457.

APPENDIX 1

TOP SECRET

NOTES ON THE EARLY STAGES OF THE PHILBY CASE

1. Maclean and Burgess disappeared from the UK on May 25, 1951. Philby was seen by the Security Service but not for formal investigation, on June 12, 14 and 16, 1951. About the end of October, the Foreign Office were told by the Security Service that Philby was under suspicion. On December 8, 1951, the Prime Minister approved a proposal that Philby should be interrogated by Mr H Milmo KC on behalf of the Security Service. The interrogation took place on December 12. The results of this interrogation were discussed at a meeting with the Secretary of State (Sir Anthony Eden) and Sir William Strang (the Permanent Under-Secretary)
¹
on December 14. It was also known at the time of that meeting that the Director of Public Prosecutions had advised that there was no legal evidence on which Philby could be prosecuted. As a result, the Secretary of State agreed that Philby’s passport should be returned to him and not cancelled and that if the Security Service wished to cease surveillance on him they could do so. This was conveyed by Sir W Strang to Sir P Sillitoe, then Head of the Security Service, with the recommendation that he should inform the Prime Minister.

2. On January 14, 1952, Sir P Sillitoe
²
sent to Sir W Strang a final version of Mr Milmo’s report of his interrogation of Philby
incorporating certain amendments proposed by ‘C’ (General Sinclair).
³
Mr Milmo’s report contains a report of ‘findings’ in the following words:-

‘There is no room for doubt that it was as a result of a leakage of information that Burgess and Maclean disappeared from this country on 25th May 1951. There is no evidence in law to prove the source of the leakage or to establish the identity of the person or persons responsible for the leakage. Subject to this important qualification, I find myself unable to avoid the conclusion that Philby is and has for many years been a Soviet agent and that he was directly and deliberately responsible for the leakage which in fact occurred.’

3. In comment on Mr Milmo’s report the Security Service said among other things:-

‘It is not for the Security Service to pass judgment on a case which it cannot prove. Investigation will continue and one day final proof of guilt or innocence may be obtained. Advice must be given now however on the urgent practical issues which arise and on this aspect the Security Service accepts without qualification the independent judgment formed by Mr Milmo; it must recommend that for all practical purposes it should be assumed that Philby was a Soviet agent throughout his service with SIS.’

4. The SIS commented on the report:-

‘We feel that the case against Philby is not proved and moreover is capable of a less sinister interpretation than is implied by the bare evidence.’

5. ‘C’ wrote to Sir W Strang on January 17, 1952, commenting further on Mr Milmo’s report that it presented the case for the prosecution against Philby but that there was no comparably full case for the defence. Correspondence about how much of these papers should be shown to the Americans continued.

6. In a letter to Sir Patrick Dean on September 23, 1955,
⁴
‘C’ (General Sinclair) referred to a current reassessment by the Security Service and SIS of the suspicions surrounding Philby and gave further views which in his opinion ‘reduced very considerably the suspicion that Philby was a Soviet agent’.

7. In a reply on September 30 Sir P Dean told ‘C’ that the Foreign Office had always understood that the case against Philby was not conclusive but that all the relevant considerations would have to be put before Ministers in advising them on what was to be said in the House of Commons.

8. On October 24, 1955 (a fortnight before the debate), ‘C’ wrote to Sir I Kirkpatrick
⁵
enclosing a draft submission for what the Secretary of State should say in the debate about Philby. This
submission was agreed by the Director General of the Security Service (Sir Dick White), and with small amendments formed the basis of what the Secretary of State said in the debate on November 7, 1955, i.e. that there was no evidence to show that Philby was responsible for warning Burgess or Maclean or that he had betrayed the interests of his country.

9. A letter to Sir I Kirkpatrick from ‘C’ on December 21, 1955, enclosed a statement of the considerations ‘for the defence’ of the Philby case which enabled the Director General of the Security Service and ‘C’ to review the existing case ‘for the prosecution’ and to recommend to the Secretary of State the line which he in fact took on the subject of Philby during the debate on Burgess and Maclean. The concluding paragraph of this paper reads as follows:-

‘The Milmo Report, which produces no single piece of direct evidence to show that Philby was a Soviet agent or that he was the ‘Third Man’ is therefore a case for the prosecution inadmissible at law and unsuccessful in security intelligence. It is constructed of suppositions and circumstantial evidence, summing up in a circular argument everything the ingenuity of a prosecutor could devise against a subject. It seems likely to remain as a permanently accusing finger pointed at Philby unless some at least of the arguments which were not included in it are given their due weight. Philby was in
fact convicted of nothing by the investigation in 1951 and despite four years of subsequent investigation is still convicted of nothing. It is entirely contrary to the English tradition for a man to have to prove his innocence even when the prosecution is in possession of hard facts. In a case where the prosecution has nothing but suspicion to go upon there is even less reason for him, even if he were able to do so, to prove his innocence. But if documents summarising the suspicions are permanently to play a part in our assessment it is only just that others which offset those suspicions should lie beside them. The case set out in this recent paper was sufficient to lead to agreement between the Directors of SIS and the Security Service as to what should be submitted for the Secretary of State’s speech. It is submitted that the argument of this paper should be considered as balancing, for reasons of justice, the material in the Foreign Office’s possession.’

10. In sending this paper ‘C’ quotes a comment by the Director General of the Security Service on it as follows:-

‘I regard the memorandum as a paper worth putting alongside others in the case. I think it brings out a number of points which are fair to Philby and that the effect of it is decidedly to reduce the case of his being the “third man”. At the same time I cannot but note that
the memorandum neglects to deal with his early record and consequently does not purport to contain a full intelligence assessment of the case.’

APPENDIX 2

TOP SECRET

Sir Dick White came to see the Prime Minister on February 14 in order to report about a former employee of M.I.6, a Mr. Philby. Mr. Philby was mentioned at the time of the Burgess and Maclean defections. He was at the time the M.I.6 representative in Washington. No evidence was then available against Mr. Philby but he was asked to leave the Service and has since been working as a journalist in Beirut in the employ of
The Observer
and
The Economist.
Sir Dick White said that a few days ago Mr. Philby had confessed to a member of M.I.6 that he had in fact been working for the Russians from 1934 to 1946 and had recruited both Maclean and Burgess into the Soviet network at Cambridge before the war. Mr. Philby had signed this confession but had subsequently disappeared and no-one knew where he was. It might be that he was still in the Lebanon, he might have gone to Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East, or he might be in the Soviet Union.

Sir Dick explained that it would not have been possible to extradite Mr. Philby from the Lebanon or to prosecute him if he had come to England because the evidence was not sufficiently strong for a Court of Law.

It was agreed that Sir Dick White should prepare the necessary material in case Press enquiries became embarrassing.

February 15, 1963

APPENDIX 3

TOP SECRET

CASE OF H. A. R. PHILBY

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER’S TALK WITH MR. HAROLD WILSON

1. Philby’s Government service from 1940 to 1951 was as a member of the British Secret Service (M.I.6). His appointments as First Secretary at H.M. Embassies in Turkey and in the U.S.A. gave him the cover for his M.I.6 functions in these countries. In America he acted as liaison officer between M.I.6, C.I.A. and the F.B.I.

2. In May, 1951, Maclean fled to Russia with Burgess, after apparently becoming aware that he was under suspicion. Enquiries were immediately made into the possibility that Maclean had been alerted by some person in the Foreign Office, M.I.6 or the Security Service.

3. Philby was included in these enquiries by reason of his friendship with Burgess, who had been sharing Philby’s home in Washington. Philby protested that since Burgess had been considered fit for employment in H.M. Embassy there seemed no reason why they should not have lived together. Nevertheless, it was felt by the then Head of M.I.6 that in view of Philby’s friendship with Burgess he could not continue his employment. He was accordingly asked to resign in July 1951 and he was paid the sum of £5,000 with no pension in compensation for the loss of his career. (He had only 8½ years reckonable service, and not 10 − the minimum for a pension).

4. It was after Philby’s resignation that enquiries by the Security Service produced the first evidence of early Communist sympathies. The possibility that he might have been working for the Russians also now came under close investigation. No direct evidence of this could be obtained and it was decided at the highest level to put the matter to the test by severe interrogation. This was undertaken by the experienced barrister, Mr. H. P. Milmo, then by the Security Service and finally by M.I.6. Throughout these cross examinations Philby refused to admit more than youthful Marxist interests and strenuously denied all charges of disloyalty. Nevertheless, the circumstantial case against him seemed strong. Enquiries into the case, therefore, continued both in the Security Service and M.I.6 from 1952 to 1955. These failed to develop anything further against him. On the M.I.6 side certain things were discovered in his favour, in particular that he had himself provided an important clue to the detection of Maclean. It also had to be taken into account that he had had prior knowledge of certain espionage cases which had been successfully completed, e.g. in the U.K., Nunn May and Fuchs;
⁶
and in the U.S.A., Greenglass, Gold and the Rosenbergs.
⁷
In these circumstances the Security Service and M.I.6 agreed that Philby must be given the benefit of the doubt. It was upon this joint report that the Foreign Secretary made his statement in the House of Commons on the 7th November, 1955.

5. After his resignation in 1951 Philby had found no worthwhile permanent employment. He had no private means and a wife and five children to support. The then Head of M.I.6 considered it bad security for a former member of the Secret Service to be destitute and, bearing in mind that an
injustice might have been done him, agreed to give him help in finding a journalistic appointment on the ‘Observer’. The approach to the Editor was made by an officer of M.I.6. The Editor undertook to consider an application from Philby if he applied in the normal manner and could obtain the job on his journalistic merits.

6. Philby took up his new assignment as the ‘Observer’s’ Middle East correspondent in 1956, resident in Beirut. He was similarly employed by the ‘Economist’, who were however unaware of any M.I.6 connection. While Philby was in the Lebanon M.I.6 maintained contact with him under strict security precautions. [
Editor’s note:
There are then just over two lines redacted which almost certainly informed Macmillan that Philby continued to work for MI6 during his period in Beirut.] … He had no access to official information. The arrangement whereby a connection was preserved with Philby seemed right to those who felt that one day further evidence might come to light requiring new investigation. [A final passage of this paragraph is also redacted.]

7. Philby’s continuous residence in the Lebanon from 1956 to 1963 was broken by a few visits to the U.K. on vacation and for consultation with his newspapers. On one of these visits he also remarried. As these were visits by a British subject, they were not recorded by the Immigration Authorities and are, therefore, not on the files of the Security Service. In 1962, certain new information, including the first direct allegation by someone who knew of his activities before the Second World War, came into our hands. The case was therefore re-examined by the Security Services and the conclusion reached that we now had a better
chance to induce Philby’s confession, if he were tackled on neutral ground, since without this there was insufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution. An M.I.6 officer, with intimate knowledge of his character, was accordingly sent to the Lebanon in January 1963 where he managed at last to secure from Philby admissions of his guilt, including a
signed
statement which he typed himself.