Into the Fire: A Firsthand Account of the Most Extraordinary Battle in the Afghan War (28 page)

12
firing an AK at us from his hip:
Rodriguez-Chavez description to West, teleconference, 31 Jan. 2012.

13
the pilots couldn’t do enough to help us:
Tab R. The first flight of pilots to arrive were CW2 Kristopher Bassett, CW2 James O’Neal, CW2 Ryan Neal, and CW2 Michael McClain.

14
ignoring the RPG shells exploding in the air:
CWO Silano description to West, telecommunication, 3 June 2012.

1
six Afghan soldiers were dead and nine wounded:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit II-1 (P.7).

2
Swenson brought back two dead jihadists, too:
Swenson, Exhibit BI.

3
Fabayo got into our turret and Hafez got on the radio:
Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e12.

4
picked up Dodd Ali, and rolled his stiff body into the open back:
Swenson wrote to me on 6 Jan. 2012: “At the time, Dakota was a Marine E-4; I did not know him. I was situationally aware of the location of those who fought at the battle, but putting a name to the role performed is different. You referenced football: I know where the QB [quarterback] was, but I do not necessarily recall his roster number. What I witnessed of Dakota’s heroism, I am certain of.”

1
Swenson got out to talk to the Army platoon leader:
Swenson, Tab J.

2
four Americans were missing:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BR.

3
“You’re not going back into the fight”:
Meyer interview with CBS,
60 Minutes
.

4
left the battlefield:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit II-1. (P.7), concluded that “the 2-8 ETT commander, the record shows that he performed capably and courageously.”

5
“Hold where you are”:
Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.

6
move into the valley:
Email Swenson to West, 6 Jan. 2011.

7
“Spot”:
Meyer interview with CBS,
60 Minutes
.

8
we pulled out about ten or twelve wounded:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.

9
waiting their turn to enter the valley:
Bassett statement, Appendix e13, 14 Sept. 2009.

10
fire missions kept getting denied:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit U. “I heard constant requests for fire support,” Sgt. Summers, up at Shadow 4, said.

11
fended off the endless questions from the TOC at Joyce:
Summers, Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit C1, 17 Nov. 2009. “My feeling is that the Marines and Afghan forces were left out to dry,” Shadow 4—Sgt. Summers—said. “It’s a horrible feeling but that’s how I feel about it. QRF? Air? Nothing but endless questions [by the TOC].”

12
the pilots didn’t return fire:
Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.

13
they were fighting the outsiders:
This is unsurprising. See, for instance, Olaf Caroe,
The Pathans
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 437.

1
a PKM was still shooting at some Askars:
Fabayo, Appendix e14.

2
fell into a deep, well-constructed trench:
Swenson brief to West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.

3
villagers returning to Ganjigal:
The Werth/Hooker investigation (JP, Exhibit A, Part 2, page 16) stated that “no Afghan civilians were either killed or injured during this operation.” In all due respect, this cannot be confirmed. Tens of thousands of bullets were fired over the course of the day. No one walked around keeping count of who was struck, whether Afghan soldiers, civilians who were not involved, civilians who were aiding the enemy, or enemy who were wearing civilian clothes.

1
set the two dead aside for burial:
Exhibits AI and J.

2
bloody handprints:
Kerr reminded me of this in an email dated July 11, 2012.

1
his command had made progress in eastern Afghanistan:
DoD press briefing by Maj. Gen. Scaparrotti, 3 June 2010.

2
The Americans handed out Korans and prayer rugs:
Regional Command East archives, 19 Dec. 2009, reprint of 3 Dec. 2009 story citing Capt. J. L. Saxe, 1-32.

1
“I am staring at the target”:
Swenson, Appendix B1.

2
“I expect to be kicked out”:
Swenson to West at Joyce, 18 Oct. 2009.

3
recommendation for the Medal of Honor in December of 2009:
USFOR-A DCDR-COS Letter of Lateness: Medal of Honor Recommendation, Captain William D. Swenson, United States Army, signed by Col. J. H. Chevallier, USA, 11 Aug. 2011. (Swenson was part of a sixteen-man team advising seven Afghan Border Police units along a 480-kilometer stretch of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. There was very little internal administrative support for the police advisor program. For fitness reports and ratings, Swenson was evaluated by Battalion 1-32 at Camp Joyce.)

4
commanded by Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti:
USFOR-A DCDR-COS Letter of Lateness: Medal of Honor Recommendation, Captain William D. Swenson, United States Army, signed by Col. J. H. Chevallier, USA, 11 Aug. 2011.

5
signatures required for the Medal of Honor:
Army Regulation 600-8-22, 15 Sept. 2011.

6
one of the most important things a commander does in combat:
Michelle Tan, “Missing Medals,”
Army Times
, 2 June 2012.

7
investigation by the television correspondent Dan Rather: Dan Rather Reports
, TV series, 13 Sept. 2011.

8
packet recommending the Medal of Honor:
The narrative written to justify the recommendation for Swenson’s Medal of Honor implied, despite Swenson’s testimony, that strong artillery support had been provided at Ganjigal. “Due to the extreme close proximity of insurgent fighters to their ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] positions,” the narrative stated, “multiple fire missions were unsuccessful in deterring the enemy’s advance.” Source: Narrative for the Medal of Honor, Cpt. William D. Swenson, undated, p. 3.

9
guidelines were crystal-clear, with no ambiguity:
See Army Regulation 600-8-22.

10
uploaded into the Army electronic archives:
AR 600-8-22 Military Awards, Fort Knox, KY, plus DA form 638.

11
Army Sgt. 1st Class Westbrook:
Although his bravery went without official recognition, the Marines deeply appreciated his devotion to his comrades. Mr. Punch Haynes of the Marine Corps—Law Enforcement Foundation donated a series of $30,000 scholarships to the Westbrook children in appreciation for Sgt. Westbrook’s stand beside his fellow Marines.

12
informed the Marine Central Command about the recommendation for Swenson:
Col. Yoo memos to MarCentCom, on 5 and 10 Aug. 2010.

13
he was noting this “for the record”:
Col. Daniel D. Yoo to MarCentCom, response to request for information, 5 Aug. 2010.

14
“This has caused disquiet among those who were at Ganjigal”:
West email to Gen. Casey, 19 April 2011.

15
found the lost recommendation, and resubmitted it in August:
USFOR-A DDR-COS, 11 Aug. 2011.

16
“Because it was the right thing to do”:
Bing West, “The Afghan Rescue Mission Behind Today’s Medal of Honor,”
Wall Street Journal
, 15 Sept. 2011.

17
“Be the hunter”: Washington Post
, 9 July 2010. “You go into Afghanistan,” Mattis said, “you got guys who slap women around for five years, because they didn’t wear a veil. You know guys like that ain’t got no manhood left anyway. So it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot ‘em.”

18
Lute had the reputation of being a straight shooter:
Meyer sent the email on 30 Nov. 2011.

1
Every retelling of battle is a description of confusion:
Researchers have estimated that 37 percent of the memory about details of a chaotic event has changed a year after the event. See William Hirst, Elizabeth A. Phelps, et al., “Long-Term Memory for the Terrorist Attack of September 11: Flashbulb Memories, Event Memories, and the Factors That Influence Their Retention,”
Journal of Experimental Psychology
, American Psychological Association, 2009.

2
No outpost was ever established in the valley of Ganjigal:
Email from Sgt. Eric Jones, 1-235 INF, to West, 17 Apr. 2012.

3
a hard-core Islamist dedicated to winning:
QZR kidnapped the British aid worker Linda Norgrove, who was killed in a rescue attempt in October of 2010.

4
“positively identified enemy forces within a residential compound”:
Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, Tactical Directive, Kabul, 1 July 2009.

5
“situations in which there may be no non-hostile actors”:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit L.

6
“you always have the right to defend yourself”:
Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e12.

7
“you’ll not be forgotten”:
Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, USA, DoD News Transcript, 3 June 2010.

8
cover-up for the higher-ups:
Dan Herbeck, “Marine’s Death Stirs Cover-up Questions,”
Buffalo News
, Dec. 11, 2011. 203
“it’s going to save lives”:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BI.

9
“The key here is to empower and not be the bottleneck”:
Orin Harari,
The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002).

10
Rodriguez-Chavez several times thought he had been killed:
Rodriguez-Chavez remark to West, 22 April 2012.

11
Fabayo tried to wave off the chopper:
Fabayo, Exhibit BH.

D
AKOTA
M
EYER
was born and raised in Columbia, Kentucky, and enlisted in the United States Marine Corps in 2006. A school-trained sniper and highly skilled infantryman, Cpl. Meyer deployed to Iraq in 2007 and to Afghanistan in 2009. In 2011, he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his unyielding courage in the battle of Ganjigal. He now competes at charity events in skeet and rifle competitions. He also speaks frequently at schools and veterans’ events to raise awareness of our military and remains dedicated to the causes of our veterans. For the families of wounded troops, he has raised more than one million dollars.

www.dakotameyer.com

B
ING
W
EST
, a Marine combat veteran, served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. He has been on hundreds of patrols in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A nationally acclaimed war correspondent, he is the author of
The Village, No True Glory, The Strongest Tribe
, and
The Wrong War
. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, West has received the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation award, the Colby Award for military nonfiction, the Veterans of Foreign Wars News Media Award, and the Marine Corps University Foundation’s Russell Leadership Award. He lives with his wife, Betsy, in Newport, Rhode Island.

westwrite.com