International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (3 page)

Finally, defining the nature of security, the security object to be prioritized, and the nature of the threat still leaves open the question of how security is to be achieved. This gets to the heart of policy concerns and debates about security. For example, historically speaking—and especially when international security has been equated with state security—security has often been viewed in competitive terms and as dependent upon the accumulation of economic, territorial, and military resources. In other words, security is seen by some as in limited supply with one’s stock of security easily conflated with one’s level of relative power. However, while a focus on possessions and resources in a battle for survival can easily foster a competitive zero-sum mentality with respect to security, an alternative perspective is to view security as something held in common that can be fostered through developing positive relationships between individuals and groups that encourages more harmonious relations. Such views, for example, are more likely to emphasize the promotion of justice and human rights in the building of security. Security, therefore, can be approached in both competitive and cooperative terms. However, those agents responsible for promoting security can also vary considerably. Traditionally, and as indicated by the opening quote, the state has been the actor most frequently tasked with the role of security provider. However, as threats have become increasingly transnational questions have also been raised as to whether states are still the most effective agents for tackling contemporary security challenges. Increasingly alternative security providers are being identified, including international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, social movements, and private security contractors.

Conceptual debates about the nature of security have emerged in conjunction with key developments in the broader international security environment. During the Cold War a rather limited view of security dominated in which international security was, for the most part, conflated with national security. One result was an emphasis on military strategy and the need to uphold the balance of power of the Cold War conflict. International security, therefore, was largely reduced to questions of the use and role of military force in a competitive international environment in which states were viewed as almost inevitably pitted against each other.

However, as the Cold War unfolded this view was increasingly challenged. First, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their refined explosive power fostered awareness of the interdependent nature of security. Contrary to expectations that more military power begets more security, increased numbers of nuclear weapons (which peaked at around 70,000 in the 1980s) only seemed to enhance mutual insecurity. One result of this was an influential report of the Palme Commission published in 1982. As indicated by its title,
Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival
, the report argued that the realities of nuclear war meant that unfettered competition between states could be potentially catastrophic. Instead, the planet’s very survival depended on recognizing that in a nuclear age security required restraint and common action. The report therefore encouraged the adoption of non-offensive force postures and fed into initial moves designed to promote nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, by the 1980s the narrow focus on military issues was also being challenged. A key intervention was made by Barry Buzan in his seminal work
People, States and Fear
, which argued for a sectoral approach to security on the grounds that military security concerns are usually dependent on developments in
non-military fields. Key sectors identified were those of military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security, the central argument being that states have to cope with various threats beyond the purely military (see
Box 1
). Indeed, military threats are often secondary in nature and result from competition between states in the other sectors. For example, the Cold War military standoff was a consequence, not the cause, of East–West disagreements about the nature of the good life (societal sector) and the most suitable economic system for advancing this (economic sector). Focusing narrowly on military issues therefore entailed the danger of overlooking the actual causes of many conflicts.

However, while the sectoral approach broadened understandings of security it also left security centred on the state as the principal focus of security concern. Throughout the Cold War this position was challenged from various standpoints. Third World scholars, for example, argued that prioritizing state security might make sense in a Western and developed world context, but was less persuasive in the developing world where cohesive state structures were often absent and where internal legitimacy for ruling regimes was often lacking. Indeed, throughout much of the Third World the state often appeared less as a security solution and more a cause of considerable internal insecurity for citizens. Moreover, the preoccupation with the Cold War conflict and state–state security interactions also meant that the inequities of the global economic system and associated problems of underdevelopment that afflicted a much larger proportion of the world’s population tended to be overlooked. This criticism was succinctly expressed by Johan Galtung, an eminent peace researcher, who suggested that while traditionally the focus had been on direct violence (war and physical acts of violence) a fully rounded understanding of security would also require focusing on structural violence. He defined structural violence as policies which either knowingly or unknowingly cause suffering to others, such as people unable to access food and dying of starvation in conditions of global surplus food production. One implication of such arguments was that security should therefore be deepened beyond the state to a focus on people and systemic economic structures. Another, however, was to emphasize the interdependent nature of security, with Galtung’s implied suggestion being that instead of maximizing power and resources, global security might be better achieved through distributing them more equitably.

During the Cold War such arguments were often marginalized. However, with the Cold War’s end the dominance of statist accounts of security was again challenged. The UN in particular has taken a lead with its development of the concept of human security. In its 1994 report
Redefining Security: The Human Dimension
, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) made the case for placing humans at the heart of debates about international security. As they put it, focusing on traditional questions of the national interest, territorial sovereignty, and nuclear deterrence was far removed from the key security concerns faced by most ordinary people, which might instead be centred on questions of hunger, disease, and repression, education, housing, and employment. Although the concept of human security has its detractors (see
Chapter 6
) the key point is that conceptions of security are today much broader and deeper than they were throughout the Cold War. In turn, this breadth has inspired a diverse range of theorizing about both the mechanics of international security and the normative goals of security policy.

Having a sense of different theoretical approaches to security is important if we wish to understand the political nature of debates about the topic. This is because even policy makers prone to depicting questions of international security as uncontested givens rely on theoretically informed assumptions about the nature of
security, whether they acknowledge this or not. Being aware of different theoretical approaches is therefore one way of expanding both our understandings of the topic, but also the options we might see available when thinking about and responding to particular international security issues. Over the years the scope of theorizing about international security has expanded significantly, and since the end of the Cold War the field has become characterized by a proliferation of approaches drawing on diverse theoretical traditions and schools of thought. Broadly speaking, though, this rich theoretical tapestry can be divided into a tension between so-called ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ approaches to security.

Traditional approaches typically claim to take the world ‘as it is’ and see theorizing as a largely neutral exercise in determining the objective nature of international security dynamics. Such theories therefore adopt a scientific approach to knowledge, meaning that they hold that theoretical claims about how international security works, what constitutes a threat, what the best responses may be etc., can be tested against empirical reality. Theories can therefore be refined in light of findings in order to take account of unexpected anomalies. Being premised on maintaining a distinction between the world of theory and the world of empirical reality such approaches can be characterized as having an orientation towards problem-solving. That is to say, instead of advocating radical change they instead seek to provide guidance as to how best to cope with the world and the international security environment ‘as it is’. For their critics this makes such approaches status quo oriented, while for their defenders such criticisms are blind to the assumed basic mechanics of security.

Traditional approaches to security have tended to place military conflict between states at the heart of the international security agenda, with the most influential approach being that of realism/neorealism. At a philosophical level realist/neorealist approaches express a generally pessimistic view of the human condition, seeing violent conflict between humans as almost inevitable.

Realists base this view on a negative understanding of human nature as essentially selfish and desirous of power, while neorealists argue it is the anarchic structure of the international system which turns world politics into a continual struggle between states for dominance. The international system is anarchic in that it lacks any overarching central authority able to regulate the behaviour of states by enforcing contracts and ensuring they act cooperatively. In the absence of such a central sovereign authority neorealists argue states cannot rely on the goodwill of others and are therefore impelled to emphasize principles of self-help. For neorealists the anarchic international system militates against cooperation, fosters mistrust, and leaves states in a position of competition of all against all. In such a system, to survive prudent states will arm themselves and enhance their military and economic power to ward off threats to their survival. Paraphrasing the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, from this perspective the experience of states in international anarchy is therefore one of continual fear and danger of violent death and one where imprudent states will find their existence nasty, brutish, and short. As such, realists of all stripes suggest cooperation between states will always be short-lived since given the predatory and self-help nature of the system states must be continually sensitive to their relative position in the distribution of power. In other words, if one state stands to gain more from a cooperative endeavour there can be no guarantee that they will not later capitalize on this advantage to pressure and potentially threaten their former partner in the future.

Returning to the questions we asked about security earlier in the chapter we therefore see that for realists/neorealists the focus of security is the state, with state security equated with preserving its territorial sovereignty. In turn, threats are largely identified as emanating from other states, with the potential to always assume a military dimension. Finally, in this competitive world states cannot rely on anyone else but must be the agents of their own security. Typically, therefore, such approaches adopt
a largely negative understanding of both security and peace. The understanding of security is negative as it is assumed that security can only be achieved through power and domination, a view which easily equates more military capability with more security, and a view which also establishes a zero-sum framework for thinking about security. In other words, if one state feels more secure because of having enhanced its power capabilities it is assumed the security of others will have been undermined. Such logic feeds into the dynamics of the security dilemma explored in
Chapter 3
. Meanwhile, peace is also understood negatively in that peace becomes equated simply with the absence of war. This is a negative construct as outside of war all kinds of bad things might go on which sit largely outside a realist/neorealist conception of international security. The prioritization of states and war at the heart of international security therefore reduces the space available for considering broader issues of social justice and welfare.