Intel Wars (40 page)

118
   “divide and conquer strategy is not working.” Cable, Islamabad 000478, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “New Waziristan Terrorist Alliance,” March 4, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

119
   “damaged, [but] not broken.” Cable, USNATO 000453, “Allies Find Briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy,'” December 5, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

119
   “The U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting al-Qaida operations in Pakistan's tribal areas” Cable, Islamabad 000236, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Special Envoy Holbrooke,” February 4, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

121
   “Pakistan's arsenal of seventy to ninety nuclear weapons” Some analysts outside of government believe that the Pakistanis may have up to two hundred nuclear weapons in their arsenal. But several U.S. intelligence analysts interviewed for this book believe that this number is inflated.

123
   “It appears that the drone attacks have increased [the] militants' motivation for terrorist activity.” Master's Thesis, Irfan Ahmad,
Role of Airpower for Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)
(Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009), p. 76. Unclassified.

124
   “Fear that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will end without the establishment of a non-Taliban” Cable, Islamabad 002295, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Reviewing Our Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy,” September 23, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

124
   “Although Pakistani senior officials have publicly disavowed support for these [terrorist] groups” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

124
   “But what really angered American diplomats and intelligence officials was that the Pakistani Army had refused” Cable, Islamabad 002523, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Terrorists Increase Activity in Advance of Waziristan Operation,” October 16, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

5: WE HAVE TO KILL THEM ALL

126
   “our way of life as a free and open society.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, PowerPoint Presentation,
Strategy for the Long War: 2006–2016
, various dates between September 27, 2006, and November 3, 2006, DOD FOIA. Secret.

127
   “The U.S. intelligence community's fight against al Qaeda and the hundreds of other foreign terrorist groups around the world is run from the National Counterterrorism Center” The following description of NCTC is derived from National Counterterrorism Center, PowerPoint Presentation,
National Counterterrorism Center
, March 2006, Unclassified; National Counterterrorism Center,
NCTC and Information Sharing: Five Years Since 9/11: A Progress Report
, September 2006, Unclassified; National Counterterrorism Center, PowerPoint Presentation to 2008 USMC PS Division Security Conference,
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Overview Briefing
, February 2008, Unclassified.

132
   “According to the latest annual report from the National Counterterrorism Center” Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center,
2009 Report on Terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 30, 2010), pp. 9–10. Unclassified.

133
   “In Canada, over a dozen foreign terrorist groups” Cable, Ottawa 000154, AMEMBASSY OTTAWA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Security Environment Profile Questionnaire—Spring 2009,” February 27, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

133
   “vigorously harassed” Cable, Ottawa 000918, AMEMBASSY OTTAWA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Counselor, CSIS Director Discuss CT Threats, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran,” July 9, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

133
   “a stew of widespread criminality, drug trafficking, [and] corruption.” Cable, Mexico 001487, AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scene Setter for the Visit to Mexico of FBI Deputy Director John S. Pistole, May 21–23, 2008,” May 16, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

133
   “The cartels have assassinated government officials and policemen” Cable, Mexico 000027, AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Mexico—Country Terrorism Report for 2009,” January 6, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Unclassified.

134
   “Israel has evidence that foreign fighters” Cable, Tel Aviv 001580, AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Mossad Chief to CODEL Corzine: Some Foreign Fighters Beginning to Leave Iraq,” March 17, 2005, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

135
   “For example, in the last three years a brand-new al Qaeda offshoot” Cable, Madrid 002023, AMEMBASSY MADRID to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Spain/CT: S/CT Coordinator Dailey Discusses Al-Qaida Threat and Encourages Further Bilateral Cooperation,” October 24, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

135
   “prickly, paranoid group.” Cable, Algiers 000198, AMEMBASSY ALGIERS to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scene Setter for A/S Welch Visit to Algeria,” February 22, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

135
   “Next door in Morocco” Cable, Rabat 001229, AMEMBASSY RABAT to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Gen. Ward Signs CISMOA; Discusses AQIM, ACSA, Guinea, Narcotics and Future Cooperation,” January 4, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

136
   “This has forced the U.S. intelligence community to expand its efforts to these countries.” Cable, Rabat 00000005, AMEMBASSY RABAT to WHITE HOUSE WASH DC, “APHSCT Townsend's Visit to Morocco,” July 31, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

136
   “Another target is the notorious Lord's Resistance Army” Cable, Addis Ababa 000288, AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “AU Summit—A/S for African Affairs Carson Meets French Counterpart,” February 11, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

139
   “Many of the foreign fighters currently operating in Somalia” Cable, Nairobi 001801, AMEMBASSY NAIROBI to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Somalia—CODEL Marshall Scenesetter: How Iraq/Afghanistan Relate to Somalia,” August 26, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

139
   “The CIA and U.S. military tried to help the Somali government by secretly going after the leadership” Cable, Nairobi 001363, AMEMBASSY NAIROBI to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Somalia—Ayrow's Demise,” June 3, 2008, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

140
   “The area around Mogadishu was under relentless attack by al Shabaab militia forces” Cable, State 063860, SECSTATE WASH DC to Distribution List, “Diplomatic Security Daily,” June 19, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

140
   “Leaked State Department cables show that since 2006” Cable, Addis Ababa 001318, AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Understanding the Ethiopian Hardliners,” June 8, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

140
   “hurt closer ties with the U.S.” Cable, Asmara 000047, AMEMBASSY ASMARA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “An Eritrean Overture to the United States,” February 9, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

144
   “the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan” Cable, Riyadh 000447, AMEMBASSY RIYADH to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Counterterrorism Advisor Brennan's Meeting with Saudi King Abdullah,” March 22, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

145
   “Saleh's decision to reverse himself” Cable, Sanaa 001015, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Saleh Sees Foreign Hand Behind Yemen's Internal Woes,” May 31, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

147
   “The Houthis are your enemies too.” Cable, Sanaa 001669, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Brennan-Saleh Meeting Sep 6, 2009,” September 15, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

147
   “the war against the Houthis is not a distraction from the CT fight.” Cable, Sanaa 002230, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Yemen's Counter Terrorism Unit Stretched Thin by War Against Houthis,” December 17, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

148
   “Over and over again since 9/11, the Political Security Bureau has withheld information from the CIA” Cable, Sanaa 001989, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Townsend-Saleh Meeting Provides Opening for Additional CT Cooperation,” October 30, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

148
   “there continue to be frequent and troubling lapses in the [Yemeni government's counterterrorism] performance” Cable, Sanaa 001790, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Priorities for Washington Visit: Saleh Needs to Be Part of the Solution,” June 28, 2005, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

149
   “The Saudi Arabian foreign intelligence service, the General Intelligence Directorate” Cable, Riyadh 00090, AMEMBASSY RIYADH to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Saudi Arabia: General Jones' January 12, 2010 Meeting with Prince Mohammed Bin Naif, Assistant Minister of Interior,” January 19, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

149
   “President Saleh will not allow any CIA or U.S. military intelligence personnel to work outside the city limits” Cable, Sanaa 000271, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “ROYG Unveils Intel-Sharing Center to Better Coordinate CT Operations,” February 10, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

150
   “We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours.” Cable, Sanaa 1430, AMEMBASSY SANAA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “General Petraeus' Meeting with Saleh on Security Assistance, AQAP Strikes,” January 4, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

150
   “countering financial support for al-Qa'ida” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

150
   “disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity that can be identified in the UAE.” Cable, Abu Dhabi 000009, AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI to SECSTATE WASH DC, January 7, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

151
   “Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is considered the worst in the region.” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

151
   “it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

154
   “In the fall of 2006, a team of U.S. government officials and consultants” Joint Chiefs of Staff, PowerPoint Presentation,
Strategy for the Long War: 2006–2016
, various dates between September 27, 2006, and November 3, 2006, DOD FOIA. Secret.

6: MEN OF ZEAL

155
   “tiny, uncomfortable, low-ceilinged, windowless room.” Henry Kissinger,
White House Years
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 315.

157
   “During the first ten months of 2009” Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center/LA-RTTAC,
Synopsis of Recent Terrorist Arrests
, October 26, 2009, Unclassified; City of Phoenix, Homeland Defense Bureau, TLO Intelligence Brief,
2009 Year in Review: Homegrown Terrorist Plots on the Rise in 2009
, 2010, Controlled Unclassified Information/FOUO.

157
   “The second, David C. Headley, was arrested in Chicago” Joint FBI-DHS Bulletin, Intelligence Bulletin no. 331,
Two Arrested for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Act Overseas
, October 27, 2009, Unclassified/FOUO; Cable, New Delhi 000367, AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI to SECSTATE WASH DC, “FBI Director Mueller Discusses Headley Case with Indian Home Minister,” February 26, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files, Secret.

157
   “Two months later, on Christmas Day 2009, a twenty-three-year-old Nigerian national” Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center,
Preliminary Analysis of the Device Used in the Attempted Bombing of NWA Flight 253
, December 26, 2009. Unclassified/FOUO.

158
   “to inform Hasan's military chain of command and Army security officials” U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack
, February 3, 2011, p. 8. Unclassified.

158
   “Insofar as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was concerned, three separate internal reviews of the incident” White House, Report,
Summary of the White House Review of the December 25, 2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack
, January 7, 2010, Unclassified; U.S. Senate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
, May 18, 2010, Unclassified.

160
   “Full intelligence-sharing relations were restored with New Zealand in August 2009” Cable, AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Scenesetter for Visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to New Zealand,” January 6, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

160
   “The only problem area was the U.S. intelligence community's relationship with the Mossad” For an example of continuing disagreements with the Israeli intelligence services about whether Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon, see Cable, Tel Aviv 003586, AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV to SECSTATE WASH DC, “General James L. Jones' First Meetings in Israel,” December 20, 2007, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files, Secret; Cable, Tel Aviv 2502, AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV to SECSTATE WASH DC, “40TH JPMG: NEA Regional Discussion (Part 3 of 4),” November 18, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.