Authors: Dick Cheney
My first stop was London where I met with Prime Minister Tony Blair, one of America’s most steadfast allies, at 10 Downing Street. (Official White House Photo/David Bohrer)
I have tremendous respect for Prime Minister Blair. He is a Labour Party liberal and I am a conservative Republican, and we didn’t always agree on strategy or tactics. But America had no greater ally during our time in office. His speeches about the war were some of the most eloquent I’ve been privileged to hear. I particularly recall sitting in the vice president’s chair behind the podium in the chamber of the House of Representatives in July 2003 as the prime minister addressed a joint session of Congress. He knew that critics in America were asking why we had to take the lead in liberating Iraq and confronting terror, and he gave the answer: “Because destiny put you in this place in history, this moment in time, and the task is yours to do.” But America wouldn’t be alone, he pledged. “We will be with you in this fight for liberty.”
As we met in March 2002 at Number 10 Downing Street, the prime minister and I discussed our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, including plans to rebuild the Afghan National Army, expand the NATO mission, and get the international community more engaged in helping to rebuild that troubled country. I told Blair that the president had not decided yet about military action against Saddam Hussein and that we wanted to consult widely with our allies as the process unfolded. I also told the prime minister, as I did other leaders on this trip, that if war came, there should be no doubt about the outcome. The president
wanted it to be absolutely clear that if he decided to go to war, we would finish the job. We would remove Saddam Hussein, eliminate the threat he posed, and establish a representative government.
We also discussed the upcoming meeting of the Arab League in Beirut, where the topic would be the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israelis were threatening to bar Yasser Arafat from leaving his Ramallah compound to travel to the summit. I told the prime minister that we were encouraging the Israelis to allow Arafat to attend, but if he continued to incite Palestinian violence while he was gone, we would urge Israel not to allow him back into the West Bank.
In truth, by this time I was skeptical that Arafat could ever be a partner for peace. I believe the president shared my concerns. Just a few months before, Israeli commandos had stormed a freighter on the Red Sea, the
Karine-A
, and found millions of dollars of Iranian-produced weapons bound for terrorists in Gaza. There was no doubt in my mind that Arafat and his colleagues were behind the purchase. Their real interest was in the
Karine-A
’s cargo of Katyusha rockets and C-4 explosive, not in peace.
Still, I stressed to Prime Minister Blair that the United States would certainly remain engaged in attempting to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, but we would not do so at the expense of the War on Terror. I was not as confident as Blair that solving this crisis would take the steam out of the terrorist threat. I believed then, and do now, that were the Israeli-Palestinian crisis solved tomorrow, the terrorists would simply find another rationale for their continuing jihad.
At a press conference following our session, the prime minister was unhesitating in describing the threat that his intelligence, as well as ours, indicated that Saddam represented:
Let’s be under no doubt whatever, Saddam Hussein has acquired weapons of mass destruction over a long period of time. He’s the only leader in the world that’s actually used chemical weapons against his own people. He is in breach of at least nine UN Security Council resolutions about weapons of mass destruction.
Blair concluded, “That there is a threat from Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction that he has acquired is not in doubt at all.” I added that in the context of what we had learned about al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical capability, we needed to be very concerned “about the potential marriage, if you will, between a terrorist organization like al Qaeda and those who hold or are proliferating knowledge about weapons of mass destruction.”
That afternoon Lynne and I took a brief side trip to visit Winston Churchill’s war rooms, the underground complex used by the prime minister and his cabinet during World War II. The modest rooms, their walls hung with yellowed maps, were a powerful reminder of Churchill’s brave leadership and the heroic fight of the Allies against Hitler. I remembered first reading Churchill’s account of World War II nearly forty years before when I’d been building power line in Wyoming during the day and reading his volumes by a Coleman lantern at night.
I FLEW FROM LONDON to Amman, Jordan, for meetings with King Abdullah II. During the first Gulf War, King Abdullah’s father, the late King Hussein, had sided with Saddam Hussein, but now Jordan was a close ally in the War on Terror. I thanked the king for Jordan’s help in combatting terror and then walked him through our concerns about Iraq, none of which surprised him. Iraq’s neighbors were keenly aware of the threat Saddam posed, but they were apprehensive about the consequences of military action. I made clear that military action was not imminent, but could become necessary. If so, it would be decisive, with no question about the outcome.
I told the king that if it came to war, there were a number of fronts on which we would likely request Jordanian assistance. I advised him as well that the president was very interested in consulting with him in the weeks and months ahead. We realized that any military action could have serious economic and political consequences, and we wanted to do what we could to mitigate them.
The king pressed for us to redouble our efforts on the peace process, and I assured him of President Bush’s commitment, noting that
he had dispatched retired General Anthony Zinni to the region to do what he could to get the peace process back on track. I observed that even though we did not support some of the key elements of the initiative recently announced by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, such as the requirement that Israel return to its pre-1967 borders, we were hopeful that the initiative might provide a way for the parties at least to get back to the negotiating table. I also said, though, that we could not lose focus on the War on Terror. Attempts to reach a lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians had been under way for over fifty years with little progress to show. We could not afford to conduct the War on Terror on a similar timetable.
My next stop was Sharm el Sheikh, an Egyptian resort on the Red Sea, for meetings with Hosni Mubarak, a man I had known for many years. Mubarak, too, expressed his concerns about the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, warning in private that continued violence was playing into the hands of extremists in the region and putting tremendous pressure on moderate Arab leaders like himself. I told him I would relay his concerns to the president.
When we discussed Iraq and the threat it posed to the region, I again conveyed the message that the president had not decided on military action and was very interested in getting advice and guidance from our friends. Should it come to war, we would need some specific assistance from Egypt, such as overflight rights and logistics support. President Mubarak said that he was willing to consider the full gamut of our requests.
My security detail was very concerned about my next flight. We were going to Sanaa, Yemen, and there was particular worry about someone using a shoulder-fired missile to take down our airplane as we came in for a landing. The Secret Service came up with a diversionary plan. During the trip I had been flying in the large 747 that is normally the backup for Air Force One. Parked next to it that morning at the Sharm el Sheikh airport was a C-17 military transport aircraft that usually moves large equipment or troops. Lynne and I approached the stairs to the 747 together, but only she got on. Together with a small group
of staff members, I walked past the 747 and boarded the rear ramp of the C-17.
Lynne and most of the staff flew in the 747 directly to Oman, while I took the C-17 into Yemen. For an additional diversion, the 757 I normally used as Air Force Two made an approach into the Sanaa airport immediately ahead of us—coming in as though to land, but instead pulling up and flying north to Oman. The C-17 executed a tight corkscrew maneuver to evade surface-to-air threats, and we landed safely at the airport. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, there to greet me, seemed unfazed by my unusual arrival.
At this stop and others in the region, I was conscious that Arab leaders had relations with Saddam and that it was likely some of my messages would get back to him. I felt it was important that Saddam hear our resolve and that we do everything possible to make him understand that the president was determined to see Iraq comply with UN resolutions and that if it came to war, the United States would prevail.
I flew from Yemen to Oman, where I had a working dinner with Sultan Qaboos, a gracious host, whose country was making significant contributions to the War on Terror. The next day, March 15, I visited American sailors on the U.S.S.
Stennis
in the Arabian Sea. Fighter jets being launched off the
Stennis
’s enormous carrier deck were conducting operations in Afghanistan, and I had a chance to thank the young Americans on board for their service—and to talk about what lay ahead. “Our next objective,” I said, “is to prevent terrorists and regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.” I went through the cafeteria line and had lunch with some of the sailors of the
Stennis.
I came away impressed, as I always was after I visited with our troops, by the commitment and competence of the men and women of America’s armed forces. I told the press corps traveling with me that my visit to the
Stennis
was the highlight of my trip—and I meant it.
My next stop was the United Arab Emirates, where I met with President Zayed and some of his top aides, including Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, then chief of staff of the UAE armed forces and one of the
most insightful and direct leaders in the Middle East. I then flew on to see Crown Prince Abdullah in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
In the Desert of Saudi Arabia for one of my many visits with King Abdullah. (Official White House Photo/David Bohrer)
King Fahd was still alive, but infirm, and the crown prince was the de facto ruler of the country. I had first met Abdullah twelve years earlier when I had flown to Saudi Arabia the first weekend after Saddam invaded Kuwait to secure basing rights for American forces. Although I did not always agree with him on policy, I had come to trust and respect him over the years as a plainspoken, honest man of deep faith.
In a practice we would repeat numerous times over the next six years, we had dinner together with members of our staffs and then moved to another room to meet privately, with only my professional and trusted interpreter, Gamal Helal, in attendance.
In Ramallah preparing to meet with Palestinian leader Abu Mazen with two of my key foreign policy advisors, John Hannah and Gamal Helal. (Official White House Photo/David Bohrer)
I laid out for Abdullah the enormous impact of the 9/11 attacks on America. With three thousand Americans dead, we could not wait for terrorists to attack again and then deal with them after the fact. As the president had said, waiting for threats to fully materialize was waiting too long. Saddam, his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and his ties to terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, were of great concern. We intended to pursue a diplomatic resolution, but if we couldn’t achieve one, we would be compelled to act. And if war did come, I assured the crown prince, we would prevail.
The crown prince was concerned about Saddam but skeptical about U.S. military action. He wanted more reassurance that we would, in fact, see it through. At the president’s request I conveyed an invitation for the crown prince to visit the president at his Texas ranch, and I offered to have Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Myers meet him in Texas to brief him about our planning prior to his meeting with the president. Abdullah accepted my offer.