Humphry Clinker (17 page)

If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined, proposition,
that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence:
If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and believe, that the arguments, on which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it? Some astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the object: Some melancholy from its obscurity: Some contempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me,
Cleanthes
, the most natural sentiment, which a well disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation, that heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation
to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greater avidity: While the haughty dogmatist, persuaded, that he can erect a complete system of theology by the mere help of philosophy,
⁹⁷
disdains any farther aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing
Christian;
⁹⁸
a proposition, which I would willingly recommend to the attention of
Pamphilus:
and I hope
Cleanthes
will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.

Cleanthes
and
Philo
pursued not this conversation much farther; and as nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day; so, I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that
Philo's
principles are more probable than
Demea's;
but that those of
Cleanthes
approach still nearer to the truth.
⁹⁹

1
. (
p. 40
) The reference is to ‘De Stoicorum Repugnantiis' (‘On Stoic Self-contradictions') in Plutarch,
Moralia:
‘Chrysippus thinks that young men should hear lectures on logic first, on ethics next, and after that on physics and should get theology last as the termination for these studies.' Trans. H. Cherniss, Loeb, London, 1976, p. 429.

2
. (
p. 43
) Compare T.316: ‘Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras.'

3
. (
p. 43
) See Introduction, p. 24.

4
. (
p. 43
) Stoicism was a school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium (344–262
BC
), whose successor as head of the school was Cleanthes (died c.232
BC
). A subsequent leading Stoic, Diodatus, taught Cicero. Rivalry between Stoics and Sceptics was a feature of Hellenistic philosophy. Stoics believed that knowledge, of a kind needed for us to lead a rational and happy life, is achievable, while Sceptics doubted that a criterion of knowledge can be given.

5
. (
p. 43
) See Hume, ‘The Stoic', in
Essays: Moral, Political and Literary
, especially pp. 153–4: ‘GLORY is the portion of virtue, the sweet reward of honourable toils, the triumphant crown, which covers the thoughtful head of the disinterested patriot, or the dusty brow of the victorious warrior. Elevated by so sublime a prize, the man of virtue looks down with contempt on all the allurements of pleasure, and all the menaces of danger.'

6
. (
p. 44
) John Milton,
Paradise Lost
, ii, 565–9.

7
. (
p. 44
) Compare T.318: ‘I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me… I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou'd I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I
feel
I shou'd be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.'

8
. (
p. 44
) Compare: ‘Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected.' E.162. References of the form ‘E.n' are to page n. of Hume,
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
in the edition listed in the Select Bibliography.

9
. (
p. 46
) Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727). His
Opticks: or, a treatise of the refractions, inflections and colours of light
was published in 1704.

10
. (
p. 46
)
Nicholas Copernicus (1473—1543). His
De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the revolutions of the heavenly spheres)
was published in 1543. It proposed the heliocentric theory of the universe, replacing the geocentric theory of Ptolemy. The
Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems)
by Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) was published in 1632. This compared the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories.

11
. (
p. 47
)
La Logique, ou l'art de penser (The Art of Thinking;
also known as the
Port-Royal Logic)
by Antoine Arnauld (1612-94) and Pierre Nicol (1625—95) was published in 1662.

12
. (
p. 48
) Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630—1721), Bishop of Avranches. Author of a sceptical work,
Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain (A Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of Human Understanding)
published in 1723.

13
. (
p. 49
) John Locke (1632–1704) published, anonymously,
The Reasonableness of Christianity
in 1695.

14
. (
p. 49
) Pierre Bayle (1674-1706) was a leading sceptic. Hume refers to articles in Bayle's
Dictionnaire historique et critique (Historical and Critical Dictionary).
This massive, rambling work was first published in 1697, and is a treasure-house of sceptical arguments. For a recent assessment of Bayle, see Elisabeth Labrousse,
Bayle
, Oxford, 1983.

15
. (
p. 49
) The essay ‘Of Atheism' in
Essays
, published in 1597, by Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Compare also:
‘A little philosophy
, says lord BACON,
makes men atheists: A great deal reconciles them to religion.
For men, being taught, by superstitious prejudices, to lay stress on a wrong place; when that fails them, and they discover, by a little reflection, that the course of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But being taught, by more reflection, that this very regularity and uniformity is the strongest proof of design and of a supreme intelligence, they return to that belief, which they had deserted; and they are now able to establish it on a firmer and more durable foundation' (NHR.4 2). References of the form ‘N H R.n' are to page n. of
The Natural History of Religion
, in the edition listed in the Select Bibliography.

16
. (
p. 49
) Psalm XIV:1.

17
. (
p. 50
) Platonists were followers of Plato, and Peripatetics, of Aristotle.

18
. (
p. 51
) I Corinthians II:9.

19
. (
p. 52
) Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). His De la reckerche de la vérité
(The Search after Truth)
was originally published in 1674-5, and was in a sixth edition by 1712. For the influence of Malebranche on Hume, among others, see C. J. McCraken,
Malebranche and British Philosophy
, Oxford, 1983.

20
. (
p. 52
) Exodus III:14.

21
. (
p. 53
) Argument
a posteriori:
an argument, often inductive, from factual premisses established by observation and experience.

22
. (
p. 54
) Proof a priori: a deductive derivation of a conclusion from premisses which are logically or conceptually true. For the variety of uses of
a priori
and
a posteriori
in eighteenth-century authors, see J. P. Ferguson,
The Philosophy of Dr Samuel Clarke and its Critics
, New York, 1974, Chapter 2.

23
. (
p. 55
) The
final
cause of a process is the end result achieved, which is thought of as the purpose or aim of the process. The notion of final causes is Aristotelian in origin. For Hume's rejection of the Aristotelian classification of causes, see T.221.

24
. (
p. 56
) Compare E.25—32.

25
. (
p. 57
) ‘There is no phaenomenon in nature, but what is compounded and modify'd by so many different circumstances, that in order to arrive at the decisive point, we must carefully separate whatever is superfluous, and enquire by new experiments, if every particular circumstance of the first experiment was essential to it. These new experiments are liable to a discussion of the same kind; so that the utmost constancy is requir'd to make us persevere in our enquiry, and the utmost sagacity to choose the right way among so many that present themselves.' T.225.

26
. (
p. 59
)
animalcule:
literally, a tiny animal. It used to be thought that sperm contains a tiny but complete offspring.

27
. (
p. 60
) Simonides (550-470
BC
), lyric poet. Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse. The story is in Cicero,
De Natura Deorum
, I, xxii.

28
. (
p. 61
) Galileo's
Dialogue
(see
Note 10
, above) has three characters, one supporting the Copernican theory, a second defending the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic conception, and a third, an intelligent layman, who gives his assent to the arguments of the supporter of Copernicus. See the modern translation by S. Drake,
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems
, Berkeley, 1953.

29
. (
p. 65
) ‘In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, ‘tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise… Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.' T.317.

30
.
. (
p. 66
) For the origin of this passage in the writings of the Newtonian, Colin Maclaurin (1698-1746), see the Introduction,
Note 21
.

31
. (
p. 66
) In a letter of 1751, Hume asked Gilbert Elliot of Minto to help him strengthen Cleanthes' position; and he acknowledged his own tendency towards the view of Philo. He continued: ‘And 'tis not long ago that I burn'd an old Manuscript Book, wrote before I was twenty; which contain'd, Page after Page, the gradual progress of
my Thoughts on that head. It begun with an anxious Search after Arguments, to confirm the common Opinion: Doubts stole in, dissipated, return'd, were again dissipated, return'd again; and it was a perpetual Struggle of a restless Imagination against Inclination, perhaps against Reason.' J. Y. T. Greig (ed.),
The Letters of David Hume
, Oxford, 1932, Vol. I, p. 154.

32
. (
p. 67
) Again Hurlbutt (see
Note 30
) has found the origin of this passage in Maclaurin. Plotinus (AD 205-270) was a Roman neo-Platonist whose writings were collected by Porphyry, in the
Enneads.

33
. (
p. 70
) Hume describes the soul, or self, as ‘… nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.' T.300.

34
. (
p. 71
) In Cicero's
De Natura Deorum
the Epicurean, Velleius, puts such an argument: ‘For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist.' Trans. H. Rackham, Loeb, London, 1933, p. 45.