Read How to be Anonymous Online Online
Authors: A. M. Eydie
If a user cannot initially obtain Zerocoins through a transaction, she will purchase or accept basecoins, and then convert those to Zerocoins. Once the user has Zerocoins, they can be spent without revealing the coin amount or addresses of the parties involved and without relying on a central authority. Importantly, the Zerocoins will not need to be spent in the same amount as the original basecoin conversion (an improvement upon the original Zerocoin project). In other words, a user can convert two basecoins into two Zerocoins, and then only spend one. As long as the two parties in the transaction are willing to accept Zerocoins, there will be no need to convert back to basecoins, although that will be an option. The Zerocash project remains in the testing phase.
In my opinion, for crypto-currencies to achieve widespread use, they must incorporate anonymity. Imagine if all of your financial records are public. Your coworkers will see your income. Your useless friend that needs a loan or your needy pastor that wants to remodel the chapel will know your bank balance. Your nosy neighbor will tell everyone you are broke and a month behind on your Mercedes payment. If the current Bitcoin becomes a dominant currency, this will be your reality.
On my blog (
https://howtobeanonymousonline.info/
) I will keep you up to date on crypto-currency anonymity innovations.
At the source, anyone spying on your home internet connection can see if you are using Tor (You Are Not Stealth). They cannot see what you are doing, whom you are talking to or what you are reading. All they know is that you are going somewhere, and they will probably not find out where (You Are Secure).
In the middle, out in the Tor network, spies can see activity. They cannot see what it is, where it came from or where it is going (You Are Secure).
At the destination, wherever that may be, spies can see Tor users visiting. They cannot see who the visitors are or where they came from (You Are Secure).
On a grand scale, this is all the security you need. It does not matter that you are not stealth. Since you are one person out of hundreds of thousands floating across the Tor network every second, it should not be inferred which of those anonymous connections is yours. On an intimate scale, this is not the case.
During December 2013's final exam's week, Harvard University was emailed a bomb threat. Upon reviewing the email, the FBI could see that it was sent using the Guerrilla Mail service from a Tor IP address. From there, they searched Harvard's system records for all students that accessed Tor around the time of the email. Next, they asked those students if they sent the bomb threat. One student, a Korean whose surname happens to be Kim, confessed (I swear to God, it was a Korean named Kim).
I only use this story as an example of blowing one's cover because the good morality stories do not make the news. Please do not send any bomb threats. You will make us both look like a--holes.
The Germans used the “unbreakable” Enigma machine to encrypt communications during WWII. Unfortunately for the Nazis, the United Kingdom’s Ultra program broke Enigma, and the Brits read their sh-t. See the story in the movie
The Imitation Game
!
In the 1950's, the United States was flying over the Soviet Union with a badass spy-plane called the U-2. Even though the Soviet's could see it, it was too high to shoot down. Then, on May Day, 1960, the Soviets shot one down.
In the 1970's, the Data Encryption Standard was developed and implemented as the United States' federal standard for data encryption. In 1998, it was broken by brute force using background processing power provided by volunteers on the internet.
Eventually, all security is breached. When? Who knows. Apply the analogies as you see fit.
Stay ethical. Stay legal. Have fun.
A M Eydie
***
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***
To donate to Tails, visit:
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/donate
.
***
If you want to send an e-card to taunt or praise Kim Jong-Un, one of these cheerleaders for human equality can forward it to him:
http://www.korea-dpr.com/organization.html
. Long live the Kim's!
***
BONUS Section ahead → → →
WARNING – This is cool, but not highly secure.
This works on microSD cards formatted by Android phones. Like Tails, Android is a Linux-based operating system; therefore, they use the same file format.
A quick preview of what you are going to do... You will format your microSD card with your phone, and then install Tails using a program called UNetbootin.
The following
instructions, with screenshots, are posted at
https://howtobeanonymousonline.info/tutorial/sdcard-2/
The next steps quickly become confusing, so I am going to be specific.
Even though you cannot see it yet, the microSD card drive is now “mounted” to /dev/sd
a
1. This will matter in a minute.
If you need to download the Tails.iso file, see the
Downloading and Authenticating Tails
section for instructions.
Now that the drives are inserted and mounted...
Unfortunately, you cannot create a persistence volume. If you do, you will wipe out everything your phone saved to the card.
WARNING... Again
–
I DO NOT CONSIDER THIS SECURE
. I can imagine too many scenarios in which Kim Jong-Un can hack your phone and manipulate your SD card from Pyongyang.
Secure or not, having a secret operating system in your phone is pretty cool, especially when you can use it to boot someone's computer.
Go impress somebody in the Chess Club.
1: Jianwen Sun, Zongkai Yang, Sanya Liu, Pei Wang, Applying Stylometric Analysis Techniques to Counter Anonymity in Cyberspace, 2012
2: Iqbal, Farkhund, Hamad Binsalleeh, Benjamin Fung, and Mourad Debbabi, Mining writeprints from anonymous e-mails for forensic investigation, 2010
3: Michael Brennan, Rachel Greenstadt, Deceiving Authorship Detection, 2011
4: Aylin Caliskan, Rachel Greenstadt, Translate once, translate twice, translate thrice and attribute: Identifying authors and machine translation tools in translated text, 2012
5: M. Schmid, Computer-aided Writeprint Modeling For Cybercrime Investigations, 2012
6: Michael Brennan, Rachel Greenstadt, Practical Attacks Against Authorship Recognition Techniques, 2009
7: Meiklejohn, Sarah, Marjori Pomarole, Grant Jordan, Kirill Levchenko, Damon McCoy, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage, A fistful of bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with no names, 2013