Hitler's Spy Chief (20 page)

But if Canaris and other Germans were beginning to see all too clearly where Hitler was leading, the lesson was lost on London. The British Lord President, Lord Halifax, was in Berlin at this time, ostensibly at the invitation of Prince Löwenstein, to visit a hunting exhibition. Chamberlain had encouraged Halifax to accept this invitation so that Halifax could meet Hitler and Goering. The visit would, he wrote to his sisters, embody the ‘far-reaching plans I have for the appeasement of Europe.'
20

Chamberlain had been much affected by the economic collapse of 1931 and he was afraid that the steeply rising costs that were bound to accompany a massive rearmament programme would reverse the economic recovery, which five years of prudent finance had fought so hard to achieve.

Moreover, Chamberlain had no confidence in France as a reliable ally. The French were the people most affected by German remilitarisation of the Rhineland but they had shown no sign of wanting to intervene.

The German leadership adopted a softer tone, assuring the diffident but
fair-minded peer that Germany would seek a peaceful revision of her frontiers. Halifax returned to London convinced that ‘the Germans have no policy of immediate adventure.'
21
Halifax told the Cabinet that Germany was too busy building up its own country to cause any alarums or excursions. ‘Nevertheless,' he added,' I expect a beaver-like persistence in pressing their claims in central Europe, but not,' he concluded loftily, ‘in a form to give others cause or probably occasion to interfere.'
22

It is worth pointing out that none of Halifax's colleagues, who included Eden, demurred from this assessment that implied a negotiated settlement with Hitler was possible and indeed desirable. Nor was the Foreign Office, despite subsequent myths woven around the names of Vansittart and Wigram, against the Conservative government's policy of trying to find a negotiated settlement that could deflect Hitler from war. In a document prepared by Sir Orme Sargent in 1937 for circulation to the Cabinet, the senior Foreign Office official noted:

The fundamental idea, is of course, that the ex-allied Powers should come to terms with Germany, in order to remove grievances by friendly arrangement, and the process of give and take, before Germany again takes the law into her own hands. This is the only constructive policy open to Europe.

The alternative policy of drift and encirclement are avowedly policies of negation and despair. There will in this Memorandum be no suggestion that the policy should be abandoned.
23

But if no one in the British establishment could see the implications of Hitler's ‘forward policy towards Austria', in Berlin, General Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, was profoundly disturbed at the thought of occupying Austria. He knew, as all intelligent German strategists knew, that occupying Austria was, is, and always will be the prelude to German penetration of central and south-eastern Europe. It meant a Balkan line, a south-eastward thrust in German policy, assimilation of alien races, the
subordination of the successor states of the Habsburg monarchy and eventually a clash with powerful foreign interests.

It was noted by Canaris' colleagues that following meetings with Beck, Canaris spent more time with Colonel Oster. With the creation of the OKW, Canaris began reporting to its chief, General Wilhelm Keitel, a very dull officer from Württemburg who had made a ‘good' marriage to Blomberg's daughter. Keitel and Canaris never really hit it off. Later, at the Nuremberg Trials and in interrogation sessions with the Allies, Keitel, like Jodl, would recall ‘I always had problems with Canaris.'
24

However, at this stage, Canaris, while determined to undermine the regime, was in no position to prevent the imminent invasion of Austria. According to Jodl's diary on 12 February 1938 he even orchestrated a clever deception plan to spread false but credible rumours which gave the impression of military preparations against Austria through fictitious troop movements. Canaris had no choice if he was to remain head of the Abwehr but to pursue a twin-track policy of simultaneously supporting and checking Hitler where possible. While carrying out to a high degree of professionalism the deeds required of the Abwehr to establish German hegemony in central Europe, the admiral remained committed to explore every avenue that could prevent a European war. This also included circumventing where possible Hitler's moves to strengthen party control of the military and encouraging the liberal democracies to stand up to Hitler.

At this stage in early February, Hitler was concerned at the effect on world opinion if German troops were mobilised to the Austrian frontier. The sham military action did not deceive the Austrian chancellor, Schuschnigg, who suddenly announced a plebiscite on 9 March. The plebiscite was expected to bring a strong majority for the monarchists, Jodl noted in his diary. Hitler, incensed at the prospect, ordered a march into Austria, Operation Otto, named after the Austrian heir to the throne, the same day as the plebiscite. Greeted with flowers by an hysterical Austrian populace, it was a bloodless victory, arousing no harsh words from London. With
almost indecent haste, the British embassy in the Metternichgasse was converted into a consulate-general.
25

Canaris was among the first arrivals in Vienna. He formed a special team to seize any files concerning him from the Austrian archives. Known as ZL, the unit was to lay its hands on anything they could find mentioning Canaris before the SD arrived. Canaris was clearly worried that the Austrian files might contain references to his links with London through the armaments circle and other details on his background.
*

Canaris knew one of the heads of the Austrian service well: Colonel Lahousen. Lahousen and Canaris had exchanged information on both services' common intelligence target, Prague. Lahousen was as typical an Austrian officer as one could find – diffident, amusing, languid in speech, utterly charming and immensely subtle, he was, despite his great height, a kindred spirit for Canaris. As the admiral set about absorbing elements of the Austrian intelligence service into the Abwehr, he reportedly fixed Lahousen firmly with a keen eye and said: ‘Bring me real Austrians. I do not want any Austrian Nazis in my service.'
26

A month after the
Anschluss
, on 21 April 1938, Hitler summoned Keitel, ordering him to draw up plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the so-called Operation Green. As the second officer of the OKW, according to seniority, Canaris was fully informed and like Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, disturbed. The risk of war was obvious and it was Canaris' fear that an attack on the Czechoslovak Republic would bring about a European war that Germany could not possibly win. Again however, Canaris had to pursue a dual policy of preparing supplies to Sudetenland activists undermining the Prague administration, while taking some steps to head off the crisis. However, this was not ‘hedging bets', as some have speculated.
27
Rather, it was a conscious decision to preserve the influence
of the Abwehr so that when it was needed for resistance, it would not be compromised and therefore deprived of its considerable freedom for manoeuvre.

One of those opponents of the regime with whom Canaris was in touch was Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, leader of the old monarchist conservatives and the embodiment of the Junker Prussian landowning tradition. Kleist had strong connections with England. He even mentioned the name of Canaris to English journalists he knew and suspected were in touch with British intelligence.
28
Canaris was determined to discover England's position, which was to outsiders far from clear. Ribbentrop was reporting that England would not resist German action against Czechoslovakia, but General Beck refused to believe the reports. One day in July 1938, Kleist met with Colvin and asked him if he thought England would fight.

Then he dropped his voice and said ‘The admiral wants someone to go to London and find out. We have an offer to make to the British and a warning to give them.'
29

Hitler, meanwhile, sent his adjutant, Captain Wiedemann, to sound out Lord Halifax: a most unconventional mission hatched with the help of Wiedemann's lover, Stefanie Hohenlohe, a Viennese Jewess who was also Hitler's go-between with Lord Rothermere. Rothermere, as recent documents published in Germany reveal, appears to have been much taken with her and bankrolled her until his death.
30
Princess Hohenlohe's (the title came to her through marriage) relationship with Rothermere was a grotesque counterpoint to the serious efforts of Anglo-German go-betweens, but vividly illustrates the desperate clutching at straws by Berlin to keep lines of communication open to pro-Nazi circles in London.

The piquant idea of the Olympian Halifax holding a serious conversation with the athletic, stupendously unintellectual, former heavyweight boxer Wiedemann must belong to one of the most picaresque chapters in Anglo
German diplomatic relations. It inevitably left neither side the wiser. While Hitler was satisfied with Wiedemann's somewhat glowing account of his meeting with Halifax who,
pace
Wiedemann, would like nothing more than to see Hitler ride with the King down the Mall (!),
31
Beck noted in his diary: ‘I think it is a dangerous error to believe that Britain cannot wage a long war. The war effort of Britain has always been long-term because her strength lies in the immeasurable resources of the Empire.'
32

He continued: ‘If she fights, it will not be so much to succour Czechoslovakia as to defeat the new Germany that has become a disturber of peace and a threat to the principles of statesmanship, recognised by the British: Law, Christianity, Tolerance.'
33

Wiedemann, like Hohenlohe and her doting admirer Rothermere, was not taken seriously in the Abwehr. Indeed, Wiedemann's pedantic correspondence with Canaris over hostile press reports concerning Hohenlohe and Rothermere
34
illustrates a completely naive and superficial reading of events. If England needed further convincing of what was in store, the admiral would try to undeceive the British in his own way. Together with Beck and Kleist, they formed a plan in a brief conversation in Beck's office.

“Through yielding to Hitler,' Beck observed, ‘the British government will lose its two main allies here, the General Staff and German people.' The general then continued in a conspiratorial tone: ‘If you can bring me from London positive proof that the British will make war if we invade Czechoslovakia then I will make an end of this regime.'

Kleist asked him what he would regard as proof. Beck replied: ‘An open pledge to assist Czechoslovakia in the event of war.'
35
It was decided then and there to send Kleist, with Canaris' help, to approach London and bring this news directly to the attention of certain persons in British political life who might influence the formulation of policy.

The choice of Kleist was wise. He was pre-eminentiy a gendeman, an unwavering opponent of Hitler, had charm of manner, honesty of bearing
and ‘deep sincerity'.
36
Getting Kleist to London was a challenge for Canaris. Kleist was watched by the Gestapo and officially at least would need their permission to leave the country. In London, there was, however, the risk that British intelligence might treat him as a German spy. Kleist used Colvin to tip off British intelligence and Canaris, who had the spy-chief's usual cavalier attitude towards the passport system, procured a fresh identity and some sterling for Kleist. By the time Kleist arrived at the great semicircular arcade of Tempelhof airport, he was no longer just a patient German traveller waiting for his passport to be stamped, but a civilian whose escort was a German general (his nephew) and whose car was a Mercedes belonging to the OKW. The car drove onto the runway without making any detour towards customs or passport control and the civilian was escorted by the general to the plane. There was no question of interference. The civilian sat back in his seat and the escort, a kinsman, General von Kleist, got back into his car and drove off to the war ministry.

At Croydon, British security officials noted his arrival and watched him board the bus to London and take a taxi to the Park Lane Hotel, where Lord Lloyd was waiting to take him off to dinner in a private room at Claridges. Lloyd spoke no German, Kleist no English. The two men communicated in French. Kleist impressed upon Lloyd that the mobilisation plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia were complete. Then he related the reluctance of the generals, the fear of war among the people, the unpre-paredness of the armed forces. If England took a firm and positive stand against Hitler, the generals had plans to arrest him and make an end of the Nazi regime. These plans were well advanced. Beck had told him that 30 September was the last possible day of peace. Thereafter events would gather their own momentum.

Later, Kleist went over the same ground with Sir Robert Vansittart, former Permanent Under Secretary and then the chief diplomatic adviser to the cabinet. Kleist, according to ‘Van', was the living embodiment of the Junker tradition and was not prepared to compromise on Poland.
Vansittart later claimed: ‘Of all the Germans I saw, Kleist had the stuff in him for a revolution against Hitler. But he wanted the Polish corridor, wanted to do a deal.'
37
This rather off the cuff remark suggests a certain unease, if not a guilty conscience, about the meeting. On the one hand, it confirms that Kleist, who would later be hanged for his efforts, left no doubt in Vansittart's mind that the generals were serious. Kleist had listed some of the officers involved in the conspiracy. But it also contradicted Kleist's own version of the conversation and even the British official documents published since the war which made no reference to Poland.
38
‘Van' was either being studiously disingenuous as well as, predictably, cautious, or keen only to probe Kleist's sources of backing and not to offer anything in return.