Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (18 page)

C
HAPTER
5

F
OLLOWING HITLER
’
S ORDER
of 20 October, Army Group North went over to the defense in Courland. Along with the besieged port of Memel, Courland thus became the first of several bridgeheads established along the Baltic coast in the war’s final months. On 26 January 1945 Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. Historians have largely ignored events that took place during the Germans’ isolation in Latvia, focusing their attention instead on the final battles raging in Poland and the Reich itself. For example, Alexander Werth writes, “Thirty German divisions remained, however, in the Courland peninsula, and remained there, as a ‘nuisance’ force until the capitulation of Germany in May 1945.” In a similar manner, John Keegan asserts that the army group’s term in Courland was one of “pointless isolation,” and John Erickson refers to German forces there as “nothing but a wasting asset.”
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This chapter examines several aspects of the army group’s isolation in Latvia, including the Courland Battles, partisan activity, and the army group’s commanders, morale, and supply.

The Courland Battles

I
N THE TIME FROM
H
ITLER
’
S ORDER
to defend Courland until Germany’s surrender in May 1945, the army group fought six major engagements, known as the Courland Battles. In all of these battles the ultimate objective of each side was identical—possession of Libau. Had the Soviets succeeded in capturing this port, lack of supplies soon would have doomed German troops in Courland. In general, the Courland Battles increased in intensity through the Third Courland Battle, and then declined in ferocity. The
army group’s loss of terrain was remarkably slight, especially considering the evacuation of several divisions in early 1945.

The First Courland Battle took place from 27 October through 7 November 1944.
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The Russians’ main blow, which had the goal of capturing Libau from the southeast, fell against Eighteenth Army between Skuodas and Vainode, but the Germans lost little ground in this vital area. The Russians also launched heavy attacks against Army Detachment Grasser, between Autz and Doblen. The Soviets captured Autz on 28 October, but the onset of heavy rains at the beginning of November rendered the terrain impassable, causing the Russians to halt their offensive. The Soviets struck approximately the same sectors in the Second Courland Battle, from 19 to 25 November, which coincided with the final assault on Sworbe. The Russians first hit Eighteenth Army between Preekuln and the Windau River, at the junction of Sixteenth and Eighteenth armies. The Soviets later extended their attacks to Sixteenth Army’s front, in an attempt to seize Frauenburg. Schörner stripped his rear area of troops to steady the line, and, again plagued by heavy rains, the Soviets ceased their attacks with very little gain.

By mid-December the ground had frozen, making the terrain passable once more, and the Third Courland Battle ensued, lasting from 21 to 31 December. This was the fiercest and most costly of the Courland b81 battles.
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Initially the Soviets stormed Frauenburg with four armies, planning to drive a wedge between the two German armies and thrust along the rail line from Frauenburg to Libau. Schörner rushed his reserves to the area and prevented a breakthrough. The Russians then shifted their attacks to the sector north of Doblen but were halted just east of Dzukste. Germans troops repulsed additional attacks directly south of Libau with no loss of ground. In the Fourth Courland Battle, from 24 January through 3 February 1945, the Russians launched their main assault near Preekuln. In hopes of gaining a breakthrough on this decisive front, the Soviets attacked several sectors simultaneously in an attempt to pin down German reserves. The Russians gained some ground northeast of Preekuln before German counterattacks halted their advance. The Soviets then transferred their main effort to the Frauenburg area. Once again, however, “General Mud” aided the Germans, as an early thaw forced the Soviets to break off the battle.

The Fifth Courland Battle consisted of two phases, from 20 to 27 February and from 3 through 13 March. In the first phase the Soviets again attacked at Preekuln; the Red Army captured this bitterly contested city on 21 February. The Russians continued their assault and gained ground north and east of Preekuln before the Germans stopped their advance about twenty kilometers east of Libau. The Soviets also struck Sixteenth Army’s left flank near Tuckum but could not crack German defenses in this area. During the second stage of the battle the Russians unsuccessfully attempted to exploit gains in the Preekuln sector, thrusting toward Libau. Weather again favored the Germans, as blizzards hampered troop movements and grounded Soviet aircraft.
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Second Baltic Front then shifted its attacks and struck toward Frauenburg and Dzukste. The Soviets managed to capture Dzukste, but a thaw set in, and once more rains transformed the terrain into a sea of mud, compelling the Russians to end their offensive. The Sixth and final Courland Battle took place from 17 to 28 March. Planning to capture Frauenburg and advance to the west upon Libau, the Russians launched their main blow against Frauenburg from the south and east while conducting holding attacks near Doblen. German counterattacks halted the Soviet advance after the Russians had crossed the rail line Doblen–Frauenburg northeast of Frauenburg; the city remained in German hands. The army group prepared for a Seventh Courland Battle, but by this time the Soviets were content to await Germany’s surrender.

MAP
7.
COURLAND

Army Group Courland’s repulse of all these Soviet offensives represented a major accomplishment, for the Red Army was far superior in men and materiel, particularly artillery, and Soviet aircraft dominated the skies over Courland. Russian artillery bombardments reached an incredible intensity on several occasions. For example, during the Second Courland Battle the Germans reported that the Soviets fired a barrage of over 275,000 rounds on 23 November, and hurled approximately 480,000 shells against Eighteenth Army alone from 19 through 25 November. The army group informed OKH that on 21 December, the first day of the Third Courland Battle, the Russians fired 170,000 rounds of artillery and attacked on a thirty-five-kilometer sector with twenty to twenty-five divisions. On the same day the Germans reported 3,000 sorties by enemy aircraft.
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The army group’s defensive victories, however, came at a high price. German casualty figures in Courland are sketchy, but the army group suffered well over 100,000 casualties during the six Soviet offensives, with the heaviest losses in the Third Courland Battle.
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During their defense of Courland overall, the Germans suffered a total of more than 150,000 casualties.
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The Soviets also paid dearly for the few kilometers of Courland that they wrested from the Germans over a seven-month period; the German army group reported inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces in Courland. When Hitler learned that the Soviets had supposedly lost 522 tanks in the First Courland Battle, he exclaimed that this vindicated his conviction that German soldiers won when they stood their ground. The army’s greatest losses, he declared, had resulted from retreats intended to gain “operational freedom.”
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During a period of the war in which Soviet forces crushed German armies seemingly at will, what accounts for their failure against the Wehrmacht here in western Latvia? Several reasons explain the successful German defense of Courland. The troops realized that they had their backs to the sea and could ill afford to lose ground, particularly near Libau. More important, Army Group
Courland had uniquely large numbers of men and heavy weapons at its disposal. In early January the army group possessed powerful concentrations of artillery to support its defense, by far the most favorable ratio of guns per kilometer of front in the East.
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At the same time, divisional frontages in Courland were only a fraction of those held by other army groups on the Eastern Front.
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The army group also fielded a surprisingly powerful armored force. At the beginning of the Third Courland Battle Schörner’s divisions possessed a total of 525 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled guns. In mid-February 1945 the army group reported an armored strength of 632 tanks and assault guns, including 69 Panther and Tiger tanks.
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In March, the Courland armies had a total of 510 tanks and assault guns, of which 330 were operational. In response to a plea from the army group for delivery of replacements and ammunition, Guderian replied that there were as many tanks and assault guns in Courland as there were then on the entire Western Front!
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Possessing more men, artillery, and armor per kilometer of front than possibly on any other sector, Army Group Courland managed to defend its positions in the face of furious Soviet offensives until the capitulation in Germany.

Despite the difficulties involved in supplying Courland by sea, the German Navy maintained deliveries until the end. Vietinghoff cited the army group’s good supply status as the main reason for its success in battle. He reported the supply situation in Courland as better than in Italy, from which he had recently arrived. Another reason for the German success was the construction of a deeply echeloned system of defensive positions. One of the army group’s slogans was “Trenches instead of Graves”
(Gräben statt Gräber).
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The Germans usually kept most of their troops to the rear, occupying the foremost lines with relatively few men. Once a Soviet artillery barrage lifted, German troops moved forward to man frontline positions or launch counterattacks. The relatively short length of the front and interior lines of communication facilitated their ability to rush reserves from one threatened sector to another. While infantry manned the front lines, the army group held its armored divisions (originally three, but only two from mid-January 1945) in reserve to conduct counterattacks in especially endangered areas. The Germans also displayed a talent for improvisation, creating an armored detachment from captured Soviet tanks.
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Such mobile defense tactics usually enabled the divisions in the line to contain enemy attacks until reserves arrived.

The Germans also greatly benefited from Courland’s terrain and weather. Courland had few roads and was heavily forested, with numerous swamps, rivers, and lakes—terrain that is unsuited for tanks and favors the
defender. In practically every engagement the Soviets were hampered by rain or snow, which often negated their superiority in armor and aircraft and forced them to halt their offensives prematurely. In addition, German warships occasionally assisted in the defense of Libau, shelling Soviet troop concentrations near the coast south of the city.
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In general, the Germans in Courland considered Soviets forces opposite them to be of low quality. A divisional after-action report following the Second Courland Battle stated that although Soviet artillery units were well trained, their infantry consisted in large part of hastily trained conscripts from recently recaptured territories. Russian artillery barrages were heavy, effective, and well conducted. Preparatory barrages succeeded in quickly eliminating the defenders’ wire communications, which forced the Germans to communicate by radio. The army group rated Soviet artillery as good at identifying and shelling command posts but poor at counterbattery fire. The Germans also gave the Russians high marks for correctly ascertaining and attacking unit boundaries and for quickly establishing antitank defenses in areas they captured. The army group recognized the enemy’s talent for infiltration and reported several cases of Soviet troops attacking or slipping through German lines wearing German uniforms.
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A particular criticism leveled against Soviet commanders was failure to exploit initial successes. The Germans were convinced that the Russians could have thrust deep into their positions and simultaneously rolled up their flanks had they not hesitated when they encountered stiff resistance, even if by only a few men. This reluctance slowed the Russian advance and granted the defenders time to organize countermeasures. German counterattacks reportedly achieved great success in regaining positions, especially at night. Moreover, German intelligence in Courland helped to identify the time and location of coming Soviet attacks, as well as to gauge enemy intentions. Rendulic noted a change in Soviet tactics during the Sixth Courland Battle: along with one or two major attacks, the Russians conducted several smaller assaults along the front. Based on the results, the Soviets frequently shifted the main point of their offensive. This rendered the previous German practice of stripping sectors currently not under pressure much more problematic.
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