Authors: Mark Puls
A congressional committee later in 1786 recommended that Knox's plan be sent to each state and that it could "not only put their militia upon a very respectable but formidable footing.“
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Knox continued to maintain his correspondence with friends who had served in the army during the war. He was delighted that Congress ordered that two cannons be presented to Nathanael Greene to commemorate his heroic service, and he supervised the engraving of inscriptions in his honor. But life had soured for Greene, who felt little joy in the public honors that he had once so desired. Like many soldiers, he had returned home deeply in debt. Greene still owed money for rations purchased for his men. North and South Carolina and Georgia had voted to grant Greene large plots of lands taken from loyalists. He sold the land to help pay his wartime expenses, but the proceeds did not completely satisfy creditors.
Greene moved his family to a Georgia estate called Mulburry Grove, fourteen miles north of Savannah, and hoped for a season of prosperity, only to endure crop failures and other setbacks. Knox was among those who lobbied Congress to provide relief for Greene's debts. Henry received a letter from Greene dated Sunday, March 12, 1786, thanking him for the inscriptions on the cannons but confessing: "I have been so embarrassed and per-
plexed in my private affairs for a long time past, which originated in the progress of the war, that I have but little spirit or pleasure on such subjects."
Greene's letter conveyed a pervading sense of hopelessness: "My family is in distress, and I am overwhelmed with difficulties; and God knows when and where they will end. I work hard and live poor, but I fear all this will not extricate me." He asked for Knox's advice on an offer from Lafayette to oversee and finance his son's education in Paris.
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"Let your answer be as candid as I trust your friendship is sincere," Greene implored. Shortly after receiving this letter, Henry was notified that Nathanael Greene had died. He was forty-four, and died surrounded by his wife and friends.
Upon hearing the news, Knox pulled out Greene's most recent letter and read over the words as if to hear his friend's voice one more time. He could recall their first meeting in Boston during the British occupation in 1774 and remember their discussions of military strategy, their shared hopes for military glory. Henry became emotional as he read the letter expressing Nathanael's distress, writing across the margin of the page, "This is the last letter I ever received from my truly beloved friend, General Greene."
Knox was haunted by fears that he might also face poverty in private life. His current position lacked security and did not allow him to save for the future. The nation's economy was mired in depression because of high taxes and inflation. He and Lucy continued to pin their hopes on the Waldo patent, which would provide them with enough land to satisfy their financial needs. He also had to worry about the future of his brother, William, who was now living in Boston and was in need of employment. Henry found a solution to this problem when Samuel Shaw, who served as a clerk in the War office, resigned. Henry quickly hired William as a clerk.
His fears that conditions under the Articles of Confederation would lead to civil unrest were realized when crowds of debt-ridden farmers in Massachusetts began storming country courts on Thursday, August 31, to prevent their land from being taken by foreclosures. Many of the insurgents complained that they had been impoverished by the economic conditions and taxes. Congress immediately sent Knox to his home state to oversee the situation and advise state leaders.
Back in Boston, he found that the issues stirring up the insurgents had grown well beyond tax complaints. Many of the rebels, in fact, had never paid taxes, but were stoked with dreams of creating a society in which all property was publicly owned and private debt was abolished. They proposed paying off any public debts with unfunded paper money. Landowners became frantic
that they would be attacked or driven off their land by the insurgents. Everyone looked to the state government, wondering if it was strong enough to repel an attack from the rebels or if the situation would explode.
On September 26, 1786, approximately 500 renegades under Daniel Shays, a former captain during the Revolution and a veteran of Bunker Hill, stormed the state supreme court and demanded that it close its doors.
Knox was embarrassed that the national army could not provide help in reining in the unrest—or even to fully protect its own armory at Springfield. Rumors spread that Shays planned to seize the arsenal of weapons. The Massachusetts governor called up 4,000 state militiamen, who were placed under the command of General Lincoln. The state was bankrupt; donations for the effort had to be coughed up by local businessmen and affluent citizens. The troops were hastily sent to Springfield, where the armory housed 1,300 barrels of powder, 7,000 muskets, and 200 tons of shot and shell. Knox reported from Hartford to Congress on Sunday, October 1, that the number of renegades had quickly swelled to 1,200, and were armed with bayonets, muskets, and even sticks.
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The rebels marched to Springfield, where they intimidated the state supreme court from sitting. Knox wrote an urgent note to Congress on October 3, reporting that the national armory was in danger and that the insurgents had formed ranks: "They were embodied in a military manner, and exceedingly eager to be led to action, but the prudence of their leader prevented an attack on the government troops.“
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It seemed to Knox as if the fabric of society was unraveling. According to intelligence, Shays was gaining sympathetic support in the neighboring states of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. Many people welcomed the possibility of annihilating all debts. Throughout the crisis, Knox sent regular reports to Mount Vernon to keep Washington abreast of the situation. Writing on October 23, he stated that the country could no longer wait and that a stronger constitution had become absolutely necessary to prevent lawlessness from spinning out of control. If Americans thought that liberty and reason would elevate them above the shortcomings of human nature, they had been sadly mistaken: "Our government must be braced, changed or altered to secure our lives and property. We imagined that the mildness of our government and the wishes of the people were so correspondent that we were not as other nations, requiring brutal force to support the laws."
Congressional delegates led by Alexander Hamilton decided to use an economic conference slated for May 1787 to overhaul the Articles of Confederation. Knox pressed Washington's sense of duty and patriotism in admonishing him to support the convention and changes to the Articles: "Every friend to the liberty of his country is bound to reflect, and step forward to prevent the dreadful consequences which shall result from a government of events.“
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Washington became alarmed as he read Henry's words. He quoted extensively from Knox's letter in a November 5 note to Virginia congressman James Madison, lamenting that the British had apparently been correct in scoffing: "Leave them [Americans] to themselves, and their government will soon dissolve.“
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Knox, characteristically, took it upon himself to come up with a solution, and created a blueprint for a new constitution, which he sent to Washington in a letter written Sunday, January 14, 1787, offering it for consideration at the Philadelphia convention: "Where I to presume to give my own judgment, it would be in favor of the convention, and I sincerely hope it may be generally attended."
Knox's "Plan for a General Government" resembled to a remarkable degree the eventual outline of the U.S. Constitution. Knox seemed almost prescient in his ability to anticipate the country's next step and offer sound suggestions that would closely reflect the eventual remedy. He already believed that the Articles of Confederation could not merely be altered to solve the nation's problems; the present form of government needed to be swept away and a completely new plan formulated. He told Washington that it was not premature to begin thinking of a new constitution even before the Philadelphia convention convened: "It would be prudent to form the plan of a new house before we pull down the old one."
In laying out his solution, Knox acknowledged that an ideal American constitution should establish a democratic republican government but that the federal government needed the power to oversee the state governments and set the course for the entire country.
His proposed a federal government that would consist of three branches: an executive, a legislative, and a judiciary. The legislature would be bicameral, with House members serving one- to three-year terms and senators serving five- to seven-year terms. The executive would be chosen to a seven-year term by the House and the Senate, and could be impeached by House members
and tried in the Senate. The judiciary would be chosen by the executive and serve for life during good behavior.
Knox thought that the sovereignty of the United States should reside with the federal government: "The laws passed by the general government to be obeyed by the local [state] governments."
He realized that his proposal for a powerful central government was a drastic step, but he believed the time for half-measures had long passed. To Washington, he stated: "To attempt to establish less will be to hazard the existence of republicanism, and to subject us either to a division of the European powers, or to a despotism arising from high-handed commotions.“
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Knox was aware of Washington's desire to remain out of politics and continue a life of tranquil seclusion as a Mount Vernon planter. But Henry believed that the crisis caused by the weak national government had become too serious to ignore. "There may indeed arise some solemn occasions in which you may conceive it to be your duty again to exert your utmost talents to promote the happiness of your country," he admonished Washington.
Shays's men closed in on the Springfield armory on Thursday, January 25. Shays appeared outside, shouting his demand for military stores and provisions for his men. The troops inside the armory threatened to fire, and Shays ordered his men to seize the arsenal. When the rebels came within 300 yards, a shot was fired over their heads. When they stepped within 100 yards of the arsenal, the soldiers lowered the sight of a cannon and fired a blast of grapeshot directly into the throng.
Three men were killed and another lay wounded. The insurgents fled, retreating to Pelham.
Knox returned to New York to await intelligence reports. He threw himself into the cause of promoting a new constitution and rounding up support for the Philadelphia convention, writing to prominent leaders urging the necessity of changes and exploring legal means for replacing the Articles of Confederation. To Massachusetts congressman Stephen Higginson, he wrote on Sunday, January 28, that the "poor, poor federal government is sick almost unto death." Some politicians questioned the legality of the upcoming convention and pointed out that it had no authority to change the Articles of Confederation. Only Congress had a public mandate from voters.
Knox suggested to Higginson that the convention and new constitution could be established legally by following the steps that both Congress and the Articles had to become the law of the land: The state legislatures could elect delegates to the convention and a new constitution could be sent to the states
for ratification. Knox asked the rhetorical question: "Would not this, to all intents and purposes, be a government derived from the people and assented to by them as much as they assented to the confederation?“
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In Massachusetts, Shays and his insurgents retreated to Worcester County and stopped at Petersham on Saturday, February 4. General Lincoln's militia caught up with them by 8
P.M.
In a surprise attack, the next morning 150 rebels were taken prisoner as the renegades dispersed in all directions. Shays escaped.
In Knox's updates to Washington, he reported the encouraging news. But he continued to pin his hopes for a long-term solution to the national troubles on the Philadelphia convention. Washington was uncertain, however, whether to attend and was concerned that the event might tarnish his reputation if it failed. He was among those who questioned the legality of the convention. Yet like Knox, Washington had little faith that the delegates were capable of fostering the kind of fundamental changes needed to steady the national government. He did offer his opinion on Knox's plan for a federal government; he thought it certainly represented a more effective constitution than Articles of Confederation but that Knox was perhaps overly optimistic and far reaching. Washington believed that state leaders would never give up any of their power and submit to the authority of a central government. To Knox, he wrote in early February: "The System on which you seem disposed to build a national government is certainly more energetic, and I dare say, in every point of view more desirable than the present one."
After Shays fled to Vermont, the insurgency was soon broken. Many of the rebels returned to their homes, and Lincoln's militia restored order. Knox informed Congress on Monday, February 12, that "the rebellion in Massachusetts is in a fair train of being speedily and effectually suppressed.“
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