Henry Knox (28 page)

"True," Washington replied to Greene, "And therefore I cannot part with him.“
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This was no idle compliment to Knox or a polite way to dismiss Greene's recommendation. By now Knox had become more critical to Washington's own success as commander in chief than even a talented strategist and battle-field leader such as Greene. Washington was fully capable of leading troops into battle himself and could live without one of his top field generals. But Henry's specialized knowledge and skills in artillery as well as his understanding, expertise, and management of the entire U.S. arsenal of weapons could not be easily replaced. It was clear to Washington that Knox's importance had far transcended his title as brigadier general or even his position as the head of the corps of artillery. His experience in erecting the military machinery and channeling supplies and ordnance from various states, his diplomacy with congressional delegates and various governors and French allied commanders, along with his talent as a strategist and battlefield technician, meant that he influenced nearly every move the army made. No other man possessed the
wide array of skills that Knox had developed in the course of the war or could step in as his replacement without crippling the Continental military. Washington could not plan any campaign without Knox at his side.

Washington therefore informed Greene on Saturday, October 14, that he, not Knox, had been appointed to lead the Continental Army's southern department.

Writing the news of Greene's promotion to South Carolina congressman John Mathews on October 23, Washington expressed his faith in Nathanael while alluding to the difficulties the southern commander would face: "I think I am giving you a general; but what can a general do, without men, without arms, without clothing, without stores, without provisions?“
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Washington spelled out to Congress just how vital Knox had become to the army after news arrived that delegates promoted William Smallwood of Maryland to the position of major general. Washington viewed the promotion as a purely political move based upon "the principle of a state proportion" of top generals. Building an officer corps based on geography rather than merit threatened the most outstanding generals in the army, foremost among them Knox. Washington wrote to New Hampshire congressman James Sullivan on Saturday, November 25, warning that if Knox were passed over for promotion due to political appointments, "he will undoubtedly quit the service; and you know his usefulness too well not to be convinced this would be an injury difficult to be repaired.“
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A month later, Washington wrote New York congressman James Duane that the army could not lose Knox or pass over his promotion and risk his resignation: "I am well persuaded that the want of him at the head of the artillery would be irrepairable.“
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Lucy had left Boston with the couple's two children and accompanied Henry as the army moved into winter quarters at New Windsor, New Jersey, near Morristown. They took up lodging in a small, quaint farmhouse in a secluded wooded area a short distance from the artillery park. Washington and Lafayette brought Francois-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, a major general under the command of Rochambeau and one of only forty members of the French Academy, to visit Knox's home. Knox received them, standing at the head of his artillery, which had been formed in a manner that mirrored artillery formations of the best European armies. Knox wanted to demonstrate that the American artillery corps, which he had built and trained virtually from scratch, met the standards of the leading armies in the world. The monumental nature of this achievement was not lost on Chastellux, who
nodded in wonder that Knox had been able to develop into a first-class officer and produce a professional artillery corps without attending a renowned military academy or without experience in the military prior to the war. Chastellux later wrote of Knox: "From the very first campaign, he was entrusted with the command of the artillery, and it has turned out that it could not have been placed in better hands." Chastellux believed that Du Coudray, the career French artillery general who had tried to replace Knox earlier in the war, was far inferior to Henry as an officer.

Knox was at his likable best with Chastellux. With a wink, Knox explained that he would have been happy to greet the esteemed Frenchman with a full military salute of booming cannon fire, except that British soldiers were posted on the opposite side of the river, and he did not want rouse them for battle. Knox rode with Washington and the French general down the wooded trail that led to his rural lodging. Chastellux was touched by the sight of Henry's family following him to war. "We found [Lucy] settled in," Chastellux later recalled, "at a little farm where she had passed part of the campaign, for she never quits her husband. A child of six months and a little girl of three years old formed a real family for the general." He described Knox as "very fat, but very active and of a gay and amiable character.“
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As winter weather set in, Henry dreaded the thought of another miserable season in which the army was ill-fed, ill-clothed, and again neglected by Congress and the states. Many men wanted to return home rather than face another year of deprivation in the Continental army. Henry wrote to his brother on Saturday, December 2 that the soldiers were fighting for people who had failed to support them: "We depend upon the great Author of Nature to provide subsistence and clothing for us during a long and severe winter; for the people, whose business, according to the common course of things is to provide the materials necessary, have either been unable or neglected to do it."

To William, Knox poured out his feelings of concern over the plight of the enlisted men and expressed his admiration at their resolve: "The soldier, ragged almost to nakedness, has to sit down at this period, and with an axe—perhaps his only tool, and probably that a bad one—to make his habitation for winter. However, this, and being punished with hunger in the bargain, the soldiers and officers have borne with a fortitude almost superhuman." Knox told himself that each of these men would someday return home to a hero's welcome and bask in the gratitude of his wartime achievements. He tried not to entertain the thought that the soldiers who had borne such suffering would
be greeted with apathy by their countrymen. He told William: "The country must be grateful to these brave fellows. It is impossible to admit the idea of an alternative.
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Yet he and other officers were concerned that the resentment running through the ranks was a powder keg ready to explode.

By the end of the year, some soldiers had reached their breaking point and decided they could no longer take the missing paychecks, the starvation, and neglect by the national and state governments who had sent them to war. At 9
P.M.
on Monday, January 1, 1781, several noncommissioned officers and privates from Pennsylvania stormed from the barracks at Morristown, carrying their muskets and swords, and shouted for others to join them in a march to Congress to demand their back pay. They carted off mobile artillery and raided ammunition to fire on any troops that stood in their way. Commissioned officers ordered the mutineers to stop and placed themselves in the path of the angry men. In the confusion and shouting, shooting erupted, with both officers and enlisted men killed. Nevertheless, the dissidents were not dissuaded, but marched down the road to Philadelphia in full gear.

Knox received an urgent message from Washington, who was uncertain if the unrest would spread through other regiments in the army, that Henry must travel immediately to Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to make a direct appeal for supplies to help keep the army together. In a circular to New England leaders, Washington said he was sending Brigadier General Knox to solicit help "that you may have every information that an officer of rank and abilities can give of the true situation of our affairs." For the army to make it through the winter, Knox needed to bring back money, flour, and clothing, especially shirts, vests, breeches, stockings, and coats.
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The mutineers marched to Princeton, New Jersey, where they stopped and settled in at the campus of the university. There the renegades set up a board to issue their demands to Congress. After a tense few days and the intercession of General Anthony Wayne, the mutineers agreed to terms with congressional delegates. The entire Pennsylvania regiment was allowed to take a furlough until March, and the mutiny ended, although some of the instigators were later hanged.

Knox returned to Boston with news of the mutiny and to plead the case of the neglected Continental soldiers before the Massachusetts general court and governor John Hancock. On Tuesday, January 16, he detailed their grievances: "The non-commissioned officers and soldiers of Massachusetts, in common with the troops of the other states, labor under a total want of pay
for a year past." Soldiers who had joined regiments in Massachusetts were especially bitter that their enlistment bounties had been deducted from their pay, a practice not done in other states. "Until this measure shall be repealed, no peace or contentment can be expected in the Massachusetts line." Henry explained that the recent mutiny was symptomatic of the perpetual suffering throughout the army and that this latest revolt could trigger even more unrest and cost America the war. "The revolt of the Pennsylvania line may possibly infuse new ideas and induce them to extend their expectations further. From the critical situation of the revolted troops it is probable that part of those terms will be a new bounty," he stressed.
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Knox's warnings proved prophetic. Four days after his address to Massachusetts leaders, a group of New Jersey soldiers ignored their officers and marched out of camp at Pompton. Washington responded by sending General Robert Howe and 500 troops to put down the mutiny. The dissidents then reentered the Pompton camp and barricaded themselves in. A loyal force of soldiers surrounded them and restored military order. Two of the mutiny's ringleaders were sentenced on the spot and shot.

Knox meanwhile proceeded to the other New England states and made similar appeals. By mid-February, he reported to Washington that the "Eastern States are awakened by the late tremendous crisis to greater exertions than have hitherto been made.“
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The mission had demanded diplomacy and judgment to deal with sensitive state governments. Knox had to gently convey to the representatives the frustrations of the soldier, subtly chiding them for neglecting their own fighting men and tugging at their sense of embarrassment or shame for the condition of their home-state troops. Yet at the same time, Knox could not alienate the leaders who could offer help. Washington praised the success of Knox's mission in a letter to him on Wednesday, February 7, adding that his tactful approaches to the various state leaders all had "my entire approbation and merit my warmest acknowledgments for the zeal and judgment so conspicuous in them. The result of your applications, I hope, will be as satisfactory as it will be beneficial to the troops.“
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But Knox had a litany of reasons for not placing his trust in the promises of state leaders, regardless of how genuinely concerned and committed they seemed to be over the plight of the suffering soldiers. Past applications for help had been received with enthusiastic offers to send food, clothing, and money and prayers. Yet time and time again, those supplies and wages never materialized. Upon his return to New Windsor, this fact played on
Knox's mind as he sat down to estimate ordnance needs for the 1781 summer campaign with the French. The report had become a yearly ritual of frustration for Henry. As he calculated the number of shells, the amount of shot, gunpowder, cannons, and other equipment needed for a possible siege of New York, the inventory seemed like a wish list. He wondered where these materials would come from. Unfortunately for him, he was in charge of obtaining them. He felt compelled to express his anxiety over the prospect of meeting the army's equipment needs to Washington in a letter written Tuesday, February 13: "Your Excellency well knows our present supplies of ordnance & stores are totally inadequate to the demands of an arduous operation—I have strained every nerve public and private to obtain an ample supply of shot & shells.“
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Knox's counterparts elsewhere did not have to deal with the problems that besieged him in trying to run his various departments. Unlike the more established military institutions of other nations, America did not have well-grooved channels in which to route supplies and no long-established arms manufacturers. Other countries were not split into thirteen state governments, each with its own bureaucracy contributing to the national army. Ordnance and artillery officers of other nations did not have to solicit for critical supplies from national and state legislators and deal directly with civilian contractors.

Knox wondered if he had been given an impossible task that no amount of heroic effort or ingenuity could overcome. Upon his shoulders rested all the hopes of the American army—and even those of the county itself. He worried that, despite his best efforts, the supplies would not come and that the failure would leave him in dishonor and disgrace.

Henry Knox had little reason to believe that the military campaign of 1781 would put an end to the war. Another year of failed promises and unrealistic expectations appeared to lay ahead.

He did not entertain high hopes as he saddled up and rode with Washington along the winding roads through Connecticut farmland to Wethersfield for a meeting with the top French generals, Rochambeau and Chastellux. On Monday, May 21, the generals decided to again attempt to lay siege to New York, even though similar plans had been aborted the previous two summers because the Americans lacked virtually everything required for such an ambitious undertaking. And no siege could be successful without help from the French navy.