Henry Knox (13 page)

Knox also had complained to Adams that by allowing state assemblies to appoint officers, many unqualified men would be given leading positions in the army; instead, the power of appointments should be given to Washington. Adams replied that politics must play a role in the appointment process in order that the army garner support throughout the country. "If you leave the appointment of officers to the General, or to the Congress, it will not be so well done, as if left to the assemblies. The true Cause of the want of good officers in the Army is not because the appointment is left to the assemblies, but because such officers in sufficient numbers are not in America.“
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A letter from John Hancock arrived in camp by the end of September reporting that Congress was already addressing the concerns forwarded by Knox, Washington, and others. Hancock reported that on September 16, the legislature, realizing that short-term enlistments were crippling the army, agreed to enlist men for the duration of the war and provide as an inducement
for privates a bounty of $20 and 100 acres of land, which would go to a soldier's family if he were killed in the war. To attract talented officers, Congress offered commissioned colonels 500 acres; lieutenant colonels, 450 acres; majors, 400 acres; captains, 300; lieutenants, 200; ensigns, 150; and each non-commissioned officer and soldier, 100. Congress provided quotas for each of the thirteen states in hopes of raising eighty-eight battalions. Each state would supply officers, who were to be commissioned by Congress.
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As hopeful as this news was, it offered no help for the present crisis, which threatened to destroy the Continental Army. The enlistments of most of the men currently in service, including Knox's artillerists, were set to expire at the end of the year.

Congress sent a committee to inspect the army in New York. Several members were concerned about reports of panic sweeping through the ranks, and they had questions about the recent defeats. Between September 24 and 27, Knox, Washington, and key commanders met with delegates Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Francis Lewis of New York, and Roger Sherman of Connecticut. Knox told the commission that the army lacked sufficient qualified officers and reiterated the suggestions he had made to John Adams. He also proposed that the military laboratories, which produced such necessities as gunpowder, should not be located near the theater of war, but at a distant, safe place. Knox drafted a letter outlining his recommendations, which he politely placed under the heading "Hints for the improvement of the artillery." It was presented to Congress on October 3.
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The national legislature gave Knox almost everything he asked for. His call for a military academy, a more visionary proposal, could not yet be accommodated. But his persistent efforts would lead to the institution of West Point a quarter of a century later. Henry Knox would be seen as the founding spirit of the national military college.

As Knox daily surveyed his artillery batteries, he could see the extensive fleet of ships moving up the Hudson and East rivers on both sides of Manhattan Island. As the
New York Mercury
reported on Tuesday, October 8: "The multitude of masts carries the appearance of a wood."

At 8
A.M.
on October 9, three British battleships sailed up the Hudson, overcoming the obstacles the Americans had placed in the river and the cannon fire from Knox's men. Henry realized that Washington's army would soon be surrounded.

On Wednesday, October 16, Knox was asked to attend the war council of Washington's generals. Henry was the only colonel included in the meeting;
the commander in chief found his input indispensable. Knox agreed with the prevailing feeling that Harlem Heights should be evacuated.

Knox reached White Plains by Tuesday, October 22, and quickly began to mount the artillery. The enemy attacked the following Monday at Chatter-ton's Hill. Knox and the army retreated about half a mile north to a series of hills on Friday, November 1. As frustrating as the successive retreats had been, Henry explained the underlying strategy to his brother: "The enemy are determined on something decisive, and we are determined to risk a general battle only on the most advantageous terms.“
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The heavy iron guns that Knox and his men were forced to haul during each grueling, successive retreat slowed the pace of the Continental force. The nature of the war had changed since the earlier weeks when the Americans fought behind fortifications on Long Island and Manhattan. The hilly terrain had prevented the British from cannonading their position. But now troops were entering open country without mobile field guns. The redcoats could easily swing field guns into action and rip apart their ranks. Henry told Washington that since the American strategy was to keep the army mobile and avoid a pitched battle against the British troops, which were superior both in number and in discipline, the Continental artillery needed to be tailored to fit their needs. Instead of big iron siege guns, each battalion should be equipped with mobile, brass field artillery mounted on carriages. Knox pointed out that when an iron cannon burst, it was unusable, unlike brass, which could simply be melted down and recast. To make up a respectable artillery train that could duel on par with Howe's gunners, Knox calculated that Washington's army needed cannons in a variety of sizes: a hundred three-pounders, fifty six-pounders, fifty twelve-pounders, and as many eighteen-and twenty-four-pound guns.

This was a difficult order to fill, Knox acknowledged. America was virtually without the high-temperature air furnaces to cast strong-bronze cannons, and he recommended that help should be sought abroad, perhaps from France or the Netherlands. Washington agreed to forward Knox's advice to Congress as soon as he could afford moments away from battle preparations.

Rather than attack the American fortifications head-on at White Plains, the British began to march back toward the Hudson for an apparent attack on American troops at Fort Washington and at Fort Lee on the New Jersey side of the river. Washington decided to split his force and send reinforcements to prevent the redcoats from penetrating into New Jersey or, even worse, marching south through New Jersey to Philadelphia in an attempt to capture the
Continental Congress. Before leaving White Plains for Nathanael Greene's headquarters at Fort Lee on Sunday, November 10, Washington left orders for Knox to divide his field artillery and send whatever guns, men, and supplies he deemed necessary into New Jersey. Washington placed full confidence in Knox's discretion: "With respect to yourself, I shall leave it to your own choice to go over [to New Jersey] or stay . . . your own judgment will govern you, and I am persuaded sufficiently stimulate to the discharge of every act by which the public service can be benefited.“
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Knox chose to accompany the army to New Jersey. Because the Hudson was blocked by British ships, he and his artillerymen had to haul guns and supplies more than ten miles north to Peekskill before crossing the river and turning south on a forty-five-mile trip overland to Fort Lee.

Washington took the time to write Congress with Knox's pleas for more mobile field artillery, penning on Thursday, November 14, "application should be immediately made to such powers, as can and may be willing to supply them. They cannot be obtained too early, if soon enough, and I am told they may be easily had from France and Holland.“
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Knox was still on the road to Fort Lee when news arrived that Fort Washington, a post directly on the other side of the Hudson at the northern end of Manhattan Island, had been captured by the British along with a considerable amount of artillery and ammunition. Knox's heart sank, not only for the loss of men but for the critical military supplies. Washington had been indecisive over whether Fort Washington should be evacuated, first ordering that it be held to the last man and then rescinding the order and leaving the decision whether to pull out to Major General Greene.

Before a plan could be decided upon, the British captured Fort Washington. Greene, shattered by this blow to American hopes, poured out his anguish in a letter to Knox. "I feel mad, vexed, sick, and sorry," Greene confided. "Never did I need the consoling voice of a friend more than now. Happy should I be to see you. This is a most terrible event: its consequences are justly to be dreaded. Pray, what is said upon the occasion? A line from you will be very acceptable.“
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Greene explained that with Howe's men posted near the fort, he, Washington, and General Putnam rowed from Fort Lee across the Hudson to determine if evacuation was wise. Before they reached the Manhattan shore at 10
A.M.
, British cannons boomed, signaling the start of the battle. Greene offered
to stay in New York and fight, but Washington forbade it, and they rowed back across the Hudson to Fort Lee. The 3,000-man garrison at Fort Washington was quickly surrounded by 13,000 redcoats and Hessian mercenaries, and a pounding cannonade battered the position. The Americans returned fire from a line of men outside the fortification, and Knox's artillery sent shot and shell ripping through the enemy ranks, killing hundreds. After three hours of desperate fighting, the Americans retreated into the fort. Within an hour, a white flag was hoisted. More than 150 men from the Continental Army were killed and another 2,828 were taken prisoner; 458 British soldiers were killed. Knox lost more than 100 men and 43 cannons from the artillery regiment.

"I was afraid of the fort," Greene confessed to Knox, "the redoubt you and I advised, too, was not done, or little or nothing done to it. Had that been complete, I think the garrison might have defended themselves a long while, or been brought off.“
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When Knox reached Fort Lee, he noticed that even Washington seemed dejected and forlorn. In the recent weeks, he watched the loss not only of New York but of 4,000 of his troops. His army was divided, half still in upper New York under General Lee. A large part of the American army's munitions was now in enemy hands.

Knox and the other commanders realized that without Fort Washington, Fort Lee was powerless to prevent ships from coming up the Hudson. That post would also have to be abandoned. Knox began to direct the evacuation of the artillery as the army was ordered to march south through New Jersey to Brunswick, Princeton, Springfield, and the Acquackanonk Bridge over the Passaic River.

The British followed close behind, crossing the Hudson on Monday, November 18, and the next day forcing a hasty withdrawal of Fort Lee and the loss of all its cannons except two twelve-pounders. Knox, wondering if these guns could ever be replaced, agonized over his dwindling weaponry. The whole American army seemed to be vanishing, and what remained appeared more "ragamuffin" than ever. Driven from their forts, Knox and the 3,500 remaining troops moved over flat, open ground that favored the British. Rumors floated that the enemy had landed cavalry that could swing in front of the Americans and ambush them. Knox urged his men to push through the fatigue during a trip to Newark, knowing Washington's army had no hope in an open battle against British troops. The redcoats, under the command of Major General Charles Cornwallis, were not far behind. Knox reached
Newark on Friday, November 22, when heavy rains began to pour and slow the British pursuit.

Knox and the rest of the army waited for the weather to improve and for General Lee to send help from his division, which had remained at Peekskill. Help never came. The army was on the move again by early Thursday, November 28, and reached New Brunswick that evening. Knox had no time to rest. With each stop, artillery had to be moved into position to guard against an attack. Picket guards were thrown out around the camp to keep watch for British in the distance. Many of the soldiers grumbled at the apparent hopelessness of their situation and the demoralizing effect of successive retreats. Several were without tents or blankets, which had been abandoned in the flight from Manhattan, and more than a few were clothed in rags. Some were literally naked and would be unable to fight if the British suddenly attacked.

By Sunday, December 1, Cornwallis's 10,000-man division came within a two-hour march of Knox and the main American army, having pushed as far as Woodbridge and Amboy. Washington received credible reports that the British planned to advance to Philadelphia and unseat the capital. Many of the militiamen had seen enough, and two regiments, one from Maryland and another from New Jersey, headed home. Knox was disgusted. Washington's force was reduced to just 3,000 men. The commander in chief had no choice but to order another retreat and keep his army between the British and the American capital. Knox moved his artillery regiment south through Princeton on Monday and on to Trenton, where he immediately began loading the cannons and munitions into boats to cross the Delaware River into Morrisville, Pennsylvania, where a camp was set up. American soldiers traveled along the river in a seventy-five-mile radius, commandeering or destroying every boat, flat-bottom barge, and shallop they could find in order to prevent the British from finding a way to cross. On December 5, reinforcements began to arrive, amounting to about 2,000 men from the regiments of the Pennsylvania Associaters along with Pennsylvania Germans and men from Maryland.