Grant Moves South (50 page)

Nevertheless, both Lincoln and Stanton hedged just a little. On October 20 Stanton gave McClernand a top-secret order, on which Lincoln wrote his own endorsement saying that he approved of McClernand's expedition and wanted it “pushed forward with all possible despatch”; but the order was curiously worded. It specified that McClernand was to visit Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, “to organize the troops remaining in those states and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo or such other points as may hereafter be designated by the general-in-chief, to the end that, when a sufficient force not required by the operations of General Grant's command shall be raised, an expedition may be organized under General McClernand's command against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi river and open navigation to New Orleans.” A final paragraph stipulated that “the forces so organized will remain subject to the designation of the general-in-chief, and be employed according to such exigencies as the service in his judgment may require.”
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There was a big loophole in all of this. McClernand was to have
an independent command—if Grant did not need his men, and if Halleck finally approved. This compound qualification escaped McClernand's notice at the time, but it did not escape Halleck's; nor is there any reason to think that it was supposed to, since both Lincoln and Stanton were competent lawyers who knew how to write airtight documents when they chose to do so. The administration was definitely giving the Mississippi campaign top priority, but it was not really committed to McClernand.

The ultimate effect of this order would be to throw Halleck and Grant much closer together. Halleck had had reservations about Grant for a long time, but these would disappear altogether under the weight of the heavier reservations which he had in respect to McClernand. The idea of the campaign itself Halleck liked. Shortly after McClernand got his orders, Halleck wrote to Major General Nathaniel P. Banks saying that “our prospect for an early movement down the Mississippi is improving,” and adding: “at the west, everything begins to look well again.”
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For the moment, however, a situation had been created which would make Grant's task extremely confusing. McClernand's orders were secret, and Halleck was unable to give Grant any explanation of what was happening. Grant knew that something very odd was going on behind his back, but he had no way of finding out just what it was. Grant began what would become one of the most important campaigns of his life under conditions guaranteed to bewilder him.

There were plenty of rumors about McClernand's new assignment, but they were rumors and nothing more. All that Grant knew was that he himself was expected to plan and execute a new offensive, with the capture of Vicksburg and the final opening of the river as the objective, and he modeled his campaign on the formula that had been so successful down to date. During the past ten months the Mississippi had been opened from Cairo to a point below Memphis, and this had been done chiefly by an advance inland, parallel to the river but well removed from it. Grant had taken Forts Henry and Donelson, Buell had occupied Nashville, Grant and Buell together had defeated the Confederates at Shiloh, and then Halleck's combined host had gone on to Corinth, and this had flanked all of the river defenses. Columbus had fallen without
a blow, Pope's success at New Madrid and Island Number Ten had been a clean-up operation rather than a full-fledged campaign, and although there had been a sharp naval battle in the river just above Memphis that city had really fallen because a large Federal army was in its rear. The way to take Vicksburg and open the remainder of the river seemed to call for a continuation of this sort of approach, and so as November began Grant prepared to move south along the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, sixty or seventy miles east of the Mississippi River itself.

On November 2, Grant notified Halleck that he was beginning to mass his troops at Grand Junction, halfway between Memphis and Corinth. He would move on to Holly Springs, Mississippi, twenty-five miles to the south, and after that he would push for Grenada, eighty-four miles below Holly Springs. Sherman, at Memphis, was ordered to make a demonstration toward the southeast, to confuse the Rebels. Halleck endorsed the plan, saying “I hope for an active campaign on the Mississippi this fall,” and promising reinforcements; on November 5 Halleck said that twenty thousand new troops would shortly be coming down to join Grant's command, and he suggested that they might as well go direct to Memphis. On learning this, Grant told Sherman to forget about the planned demonstration; the campaign had not yet got off the ground but it was obviously growing, since Federal troops at New Orleans were planning to make an advance upstream, and it seemed likely now that a contingent from Curtis's command in Arkansas would cross the river to co-operate with the southward drive from western Tennessee. Sherman had better stay at Memphis for a while, Grant said, and when he was able to assemble two full divisions he could then march down and join Grant's column. Grant estimated that the Confederates had approximately thirty thousand men somewhere in the neighborhood of Holly Springs, and Grant was not quite ready to tackle so large a group: “I cannot move from here with a force sufficient to handle that number without gloves.” He would wait, therefore, until the picture got a little clearer, and when he moved Sherman would move with him.
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Grant was assembling a field army of considerable strength. Massed along the railroad he had McPherson, with two divisions,
and Hamilton, with three, and for the first time he had a fair allotment of cavalry, which was driving Confederate patrols southward and clearing the way for an advance. The Confederate command picture, meanwhile, had changed. Van Dorn had been blamed for the defeat at Corinth, had been relieved of his command, and had demanded a court of inquiry, which presently would clear him of charges that he had handled his troops incompetently; the Confederate forces in Mississippi now were under Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton; Van Dorn would serve as Pemberton's chief of cavalry, and no less imposing a figure than General Joseph E. Johnston would soon be coming down with instructions to coordinate Pemberton's movements with those of Bragg, whose unhappy army was stationed in central Tennessee. Grant believed that as soon as he could bring Sherman and the reinforcements down from Memphis he could push south along the railroad to good effect.

There were, however, two very serious problems. One of these grew out of the rumors about McClernand. It was an open secret now that he was organizing a large new force north of the Ohio, and although Halleck saw to it that as fast as his fresh regiments were organized they were sent to places in Grant's department, while McClernand himself stayed in Springfield, it was beginning to be plain that some sort of amphibious movement of major proportions was going to go down the river from Memphis. Grant had planned nothing of the kind. Vicksburg was his objective, and Memphis was in his command, and he had to find out what McClernand was up to. On November 10 Grant sent a message to Halleck: “Am I to understand that I lie still here while an expedition is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman move subject to my order, or is he and his forces reserved for some special service? Will not more forces be sent here?”

To this Halleck sent the cryptic but reassuring reply: “You have command of all troops sent to your department and have permission to fight the enemy where you please.”
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Halleck could not tell Grant what was up, but he obviously wanted him to get his campaign developed well enough so that it would take precedence over anything McClernand might be contemplating. As far as Grant was
concerned the picture still was very shadowy, but what he could see looked encouraging. On November 14, after he had been given a little additional information, he tried to explain the situation to Sherman.

Halleck had told him, he said, that in addition to the troops already promised more would come down from Ohio and Kentucky, all to be collected at Memphis. It seemed definite that some sort of combined military and naval expedition would eventually move from Memphis toward Vicksburg, and this, “taken in connection with the mysterious rumors of McClernand's command, left me in doubt as to what I should do.” But Halleck had told him to keep going—“fight the enemy my own way”—and Grant would act on this direction. Sherman, accordingly, was to assemble his troops and march overland to join Grant's army somewhere along the Tallahatchie River, which crossed the railroad a little distance south of Holly Springs. If Sherman could move with three divisions, that would be fine; future plans would be developed once all the troops were assembled.
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By the end of November Sherman had made the move, and Grant had his army south of Holly Springs, the troops massed in three wings—Sherman, McPherson and Hamilton. Back home, news of the advance aroused enthusiasm, and the
Chicago Tribune
, unaware of the behind-the-scenes maneuverings, rejoiced that Grant was no longer tied to Halleck's leading string: “Gen. Grant is invested with large discretionary powers and we are sure that he will use it wisely. His forward movement is an indication that he means work, and with him work is not bloodless strategy but strategy that leads to hard fighting and decisive results. He is looking for the enemy and when he finds him there will be bloodshed.”
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Much more tangible than the problem raised by McClernand's venture was the problem of supplying the advancing army. This at bottom was a matter of the railroads. There still was no direct connection between Grant's army in northern Mississippi and Memphis, even though Memphis was no more than fifty miles away. Food, ammunition and equipment for the army had to come by boat to far-off Columbus, Kentucky, and from Columbus these supplies had to come to Holly Springs by railroad—a two-hundred-mile haul over a single-tracked line through hostile territory. When
he moved south along the line of the Mississippi Central, Grant's ultimate goal—if he wanted to capture Vicksburg and break the Confederates' blockade of the river—would be the Mississippi capital, Jackson, two hundred miles to the south, a scant forty-five miles due east of Vicksburg. His army was already dangling at the end of an extremely vulnerable supply line, and its position would get progressively worse as it advanced.

Chief quartermaster for the army at St. Louis was Robert Allen—the same whom Halleck had once thought of for Grant's own job; the same, also, who had helped Grant return from California to New York in 1854, when Grant badly needed help—and to Allen, in the middle of November, Grant sent word that he needed at least two hundred freight cars and six locomotives as soon as possible. He had nearly 30,000 men at Holly Springs and he would have from 10,000 to 15,000 more when Sherman reached him; he was keeping a reserve of 100,000 rations on hand, he proposed to double this as soon as possible, he had 800,000 rations in stock near Grand Junction; and he wanted two solid trainloads of grain brought down for his horses. All in all, the railroad was his lifeline, and Holly Springs was to be his advance base, and it was vital to keep it in good operating condition. Grant supplemented his wire to General Allen by revising his figures upward, notifying Halleck that he wanted twelve locomotives.

Back from Halleck came a surprising reply. The locomotives could not be had, because “it is not advisable to put railroads in operation south of Memphis. Operations in north Mississippi must be limited to rapid marches upon any collected forces of the enemy, feeding as far as possible upon the country. The enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from Memphis as soon as a sufficient force can be collected.” To Allen, Halleck wrote to the same effect, saying that no cars or engines should be purchased except those needed for the roads already in operation.
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Considered in the light of what Grant knew at the time, this was nothing less than astounding. All spring and summer, Halleck's emphasis had always been on repairing and using the railroads. When Grant suggested that the network near the Mississippi border be abandoned Halleck had failed to approve, and Grant had set out, with Halleck's blessing, on an offensive which was directly
dependent on railway transportation. Now he was being told that the railroads were not to be relied on, and his plan of campaign was being turned inside-out. Yet it was hard to get things explained. Grant wrote that he planned to attack Pemberton, that Sherman would be in his force, and that Steele with troops from beyond the Mississippi would cross the river so as to threaten Pemberton's flank: must this plan be countermanded? Halleck replied simply: “Proposed movements approved. Do not go too far.”
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Grant moved. The anticipated Confederate resistance along the Tallahatchie River failed to materialize, and Grant got his army to the town of Oxford, thirty miles south of Holly Springs. Pemberton, as far as Grant could learn, had his troops grouped below the Yalobusha River, at Grenada, fifty miles farther on; Grant believed that he himself could go that far, pinning Pemberton in position there, and sending his cavalry under Colonel T. Lyle Dickey off on a swing to the east, to cut the state's other north-south railroad line at Tupelo and, if possible, to destroy the Confederate munitions plants at the Mississippi industrial city of Columbus. Meanwhile, if there was to be a move down the river from Memphis, he wanted the soldier he most relied on, Sherman, to lead it. Sherman, accordingly, taking one division with him and leaving his other two divisions with Grant, must return to Memphis, assemble the new troops that were gathering there, add to them if possible part of Steele's force from Arkansas, and (with the Navy's gunboats for escort) steam down the river to the mouth of the Yazoo, just north of Vicksburg. Then, if Grant kept Pemberton busy at Grenada, Sherman ought to be able to dislodge the Rebel garrison at Vicksburg, and in the end Pemberton and all his troops could be driven off into eastern Mississippi and then brought to battle.
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Grant informed Halleck that heavy rains and flooded rivers had made Mississippi's roads almost impassable, and that he would be tied pretty closely to the railroad.