God: The Failed Hypothesis (3 page)

3. The people performing the study, that is, those taking and analyzing the data, must do so without any prejudgment of how the results should come out. This is perhaps the most difficult condition to follow to the letter, since most investigators start out with the hope of making a remarkable discovery that will bring them fame and fortune. They are often naturally reluctant to accept the negative results that more typically characterize much of research. Investigators may then revert to data mining, continuing to look until they convince themselves they have found what they were looking for
³
. To enforce this condition and avoid such biases, certain techniques such as “blinding” may be included in the protocol, where neither the investigators nor the data takers and analyzers know what sample of data they are dealing with. For example, in doing a study on the efficacy of prayer, the investigators should not know who is being prayed for or who is doing the praying until all the data are in and ready to be analyzed.

4. The hypothesis being tested must be one that contains the seeds of its own destruction. Those making the hypothesis have the burden of providing examples of possible experimental results that would falsify the hypothesis. They must demonstrate that such a falsification has not occurred. A hypothesis that cannot be falsified is a hypothesis that has no value.

5. Even after passing the above criteria, reported results must be of such a nature that they can be independently replicated. Not until they are repeated under similar conditions by different (preferably skeptical) investigators will they be finally accepted into the ranks of scientific knowledge.

Our procedure in the following chapters will be to select out, one by one, certain limited sets of attributes and examine the empirical consequences that can reasonably be expected by the hypothesis of a god having those attributes. We will then look for evidence of these empirical consequences.

Falsification

Falsification
was the demarcation criterion proposed in the 1930s by philosophers Karl Popper
⁴
and Rudolf Carnap
⁵
as a means for distinguishing legitimate scientific models from nonscientific conjectures. Since then, however, philosophers of science have found falsification insufficient for this purpose
⁶
. For example, astrology is falsifiable (indeed, falsified) and not accepted as science. Nevertheless, falsification remains a very powerful tool that is used whenever possible. When a hypothesis is falsifiable by a direct empirical test, and that test fails, then the hypothesis can be safely discarded.

Now, a certain asymmetry exists when testing scientific models. While failure to pass a required test is sufficient to falsify a model, the passing of the test is not sufficient to verify the model. This is because we have no way of knowing a priori that other, competing models might be found someday that lead to the same empirical consequences as the one tested.

Often in science, models that fail some empirical test are modified in ways that enable them to pass the test on a second or third try. While some philosophers have claimed this shows that falsification does not happen in practice, the modified model can be regarded as a new model and the old version was still falsified.

I saw many proposed models falsified during my forty-year research career in elementary particle physics and astrophysics; it does happen in practice
⁷
.

Popper restricted falsification (which he equates to
refutability)
to empirical statements, and declared, “philosophical theories, or metaphysical theories, will be
irrefutable by definition
⁸
.”
He also noted that certain empirical statements are irrefutable. These are statements that he called “strict or pure existential statements.” On the other hand, “restricted” existential statements are refutable. He gives this example:

“There exists a pearl which is ten times larger than the next largest pearl.” If in this statement we restrict the words “There exists” to some finite region in space and time, then it may of course become a refutable statement. For example, the following statement is obviously empirically refutable: “At this moment and in this box here there exist at least two pearls one of which is ten times larger than the next largest pearl in this box.” But then this statement is no longer a strict or pure existential statement: rather it is a
restricted
existential statement. A strict or pure existential statement applies to the whole universe, and it is irrefutable simply because there can be no method by which it could be refuted. For even if we were able to search our entire universe, the strict or pure existential statement would not be refuted by our failure to discover the required pearl, seeing that it might always be hiding in a place where we are not looking
⁹
.

By this criterion, it would seem that the existence of God cannot be empirically refuted because to do so would require making an existential statement applying to the whole universe (plus whatever lies beyond). But, in looking at Popper’s example, we see this is not the case for God. True, we cannot refute the existence of a God who, like the pearl in Popper’s example, is somewhere outside the box, say, in another galaxy. But God is supposed to be everywhere, including inside every box. So when we search for God inside a single box, no matter how small, we should either find him, thus confirming his existence, or not find him, thus refuting his existence.

Can Science Study the Supernatural?

Most national science societies and organizations promoting science have issued statements asserting that science is limited to the consideration of natural processes and phenomena. For example, the United States National Academy of Sciences has stated, “Science is a way of knowing about the natural world. It is limited to explaining the natural world through natural causes.

Science can say nothing about the supernatural. Whether God exists or not is a question about which science is neutral
¹⁰
.”

Those scientists and science organizations that would limit science to the investigation of natural causes provide unwitting support for the assertion that science is dogmatically naturalistic.

In a series of books in the 1990s, law professor Phillip Johnson argued that the doctrine that nature is “all there is” is the virtually unquestioned assumption that underlies not only natural science but intellectual work of all kinds
¹¹
. In many of the public discussions we hear today, science is accused of dogmatically refusing to consider the possible role other than natural processes may play in the universe.

Given the public position of many scientists and their organizations, Johnson and his supporters have some basis for making a case that science is dogmatically materialistic. However, any type of dogmatism is the very antithesis of science. The history of science, from Copernicus and Galileo to the present, is replete with examples that belie the charge of dogmatism in science. What history shows is that science is very demanding and does not blindly accept any new idea that someone can come up with.

New claims must be thoroughly supported by the data, especially when they may conflict with well-established knowledge. Any research scientist will tell you how very difficult it is to discover new knowledge, convince your colleagues that it is correct—as they enthusiastically play devil’s advocate—and then get your results through the peer-review process to publication. When scientists express their objections to claims such as evidence for intelligent design in the universe, they are not being dogmatic. They are simply applying the same standard they would for any other extraordinary claim and demanding extraordinary evidence.

Besides, why would any scientist object to the notion of intelligent design or other supernatural phenomena, should the data warrant that they deserve attention? Most scientists would be delighted at the opening up of an exciting new field of study that would undoubtedly receive generous funding. As we will see, intelligent design, in its current form, simply incorporates neither the evidence nor the theoretical arguments to warrant such attention.

Furthermore, the assertions that science does not study the supernatural and that supernatural hypotheses are untestable are factually incorrect. Right under the noses of the leaders of national science organizations who make these public statements, capable, credentialed scientists are investigating the possibility of supernatural causes. As we will discuss in a later chapter, reputable institutions such as the Mayo Clinic, Harvard University, and Duke University are studying phenomena that, if verified, would provide strong empirical support for the existence of some nonmaterial element in the universe. These experiments are designed to test the healing power of distant, blinded intercessory prayer. Their results have been published in peer-reviewed medical journals.

Unfortunately, the prayer literature is marred by some very poor experimental work. But in reading the best of the published papers of the most reputable organizations you will witness all the indications of proper scientific methodology at work. If they are not science, then I do not know what is.

The self-imposed convention of science that limits inquiry to objective observations of the world and generally seeks natural accounts for all phenomena is called
methodological naturalism.
We have also noted that methodological naturalism is often conflated with
metaphysical naturalism,
which assumes that reality itself is purely natural, that is, composed solely of material objects.

Methodological naturalism can still be applied without implying any dogmatic attachment to metaphysical naturalism.

The thesis of this book is that the supernatural hypothesis of God is testable, verifiable, and falsifiable by the established methods of science. We can imagine all sorts of phenomena that, if observed by means of methodological naturalism, would suggest the possibility of some reality that is highly unlikely to be consistent with metaphysical naturalism.

For example, it could happen that a series of carefully controlled experiments provide independent, replicable, statistically significant evidence that distant, intercessory prayer of a specific kind, say, Catholic, cures certain illnesses while the prayers of other religious groups do not. It is difficult to imagine any plausible natural explanation for this hypothetical result.

Impossible Gods

Before proceeding with the scientific evidence bearing on the God hypothesis, let us make a quick review of those disproofs of God’s existence that are based on philosophy. For a recent survey, see
The Non-Existence of God
by Nicholas Everitt
¹²
. Philosophers Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier have assembled a volume of essays on the logical arguments claiming to show the impossibility of gods with various attributes
¹³
. Here is how they classify these types of disproofs:

• definitional disproofs based on an inconsistency in the definition of God

• deductive evil disproofs based on the inconsistency between the existence of God who has certain attributes and the existence of evil

• doctrinal disproofs based on an inconsistency between the attributes of God and a particular religious doctrine, story, or teaching about God

• multiple-attribute disproofs based on an inconsistency between two or more divine attributes

• single-attribute disproofs based on an inconsistency within just one attribute These disproofs merit greater credence than the claimed philosophical proofs of the existence of God, for the same reason scientists and philosophers give more credence to falsifications of scientific models than to the verifications. The logical disproofs seem inescapable, unless you change the rules of the game or, more commonly, change the definitions of the words being used in the argument.

In the following, formal statements for a sample of nonexistence arguments are listed, just to give the reader the flavor of the philosophical debate. They will not be discussed here since they are independent of the scientific arguments that form my main thesis; the conclusions of this book are in no way dependent on their validity. They are listed for completeness and for contrast with the scientific arguments. For the details, see the individual essays in the compilation by Martin and Monnier
¹⁴
.

The first two are examples of definitional disproofs:

An All-Virtuous Being Cannot Exist

1. God is (by definition) a being than which no greater being can be thought.

2. Greatness includes the greatness of virtue.

3. Therefore, God is a being than which no being could be more virtuous.

4. But virtue involves overcoming pains and danger.

5. Indeed, a being can only be properly said to be virtuous if it can suffer pain or be destroyed.

6. A God that can suffer pain or is destructible is not one than which no greater being can be thought.

7. For you can think of a greater being, one that is nonsuf- fering and indestructible.

8. Therefore, God does not exist
¹⁵
.

Worship and Moral Agency

1. If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.

2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent.

3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God
¹⁶
.

We have already briefly noted the problem of evil, and will be saying much more about it. For now, let us just indicate its formal statement:

The Problem of Evil

1. If God exists, then the attributes of God are consistent with the existence of evil.

2. The attributes of God are not consistent with the existence of evil.

3. Therefore, God does not and cannot exist
¹⁷
.