From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (16 page)

The so-called XYZ mission failed not because France insulted American honor but because the U.S. diplomats concluded that no settlement was attainable. Pinckney's much publicized response—"No, no, not a sixpence"—did not reflect the initial view of the commissioners. They were prepared to pay a small douceur if persuaded that negotiations could succeed. Although doubtful the U.S. treasury could sustain a loan of the magnitude requested, they considered asking for new instructions if they could convince France to stop attacking American ships. Eventually,
however, it became clear that Talleyrand had no intention of easing the pressure or compensating their country for earlier losses. Certain that their mission was hopeless, Pinckney and Marshall returned home, playing for all it was worth the role of aggrieved republicans whose honor had been insulted by a decadent old world.

The XYZ Affair set off a near hysterical reaction in the United States, providing an outlet for tensions built up over years of conflict with the Europeans. Adams was so incensed with the treatment of his diplomats that he began drafting a war message. Publication of correspondence relating to the mission unleashed a storm of patriotic indignation. Angry crowds burned Talleyrand in effigy and attacked supposed French sympathizers. Memorials of support for the president poured in from across the country. The once popular tricolor cockade gave way to the more traditional black cockade, French songs to American. Frenzied public gatherings sang new patriotic songs such as "Hail Columbia" and "Adams and Liberty" and drank toasts to the popular slogan "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute." Militia rolls swelled. Old men joined patriotic patrols, while little boys played war against imaginary French soldiers. Exulting in the "most magical effects" of the XYZ furor on public attitudes, Federalists fanned the flames by disseminating rumors of French plans to invade the United States, incite slave uprisings in the South, and burn Philadelphia and massacre its women and children. Basking in the glow of unaccustomed popularity, Adams stoked the martial spirit. "The finger of destiny writes on the wall the word: 'War,' " he told one cheering audience.
⁵⁶

The president eventually settled for a policy of "qualified hostility." Some Republicans challenged the war fever—Jefferson sarcastically talked of the "XYZ dish cooked up by Marshall" to help the Federalists expand their power.
⁵⁷
With only a narrow majority in the House, Adams feared that a premature declaration might fail. Moreover, he learned from reliable sources that France did not want war, giving him pause. Although he remained willing to consider war, he determined to respond forcibly to French provocations without seeking a declaration. A firm American posture might persuade France to negotiate on more favorable terms or provoke the United States to declare war. Continued conflict might eventually goad Congress into acting.

Adams thus pushed through Congress a series of measures that led to the so-called Quasi-War with France. The 1778 treaty was unilaterally abrogated, an embargo placed on trade with France. Secretary of State Pickering reversed Washington's policy toward Saint-Domingue, cutting a deal with the independent black republic to restore trade and employing warships to help solidify its power.
⁵⁸
Congress approved the creation of a separate Department of the Navy, authorized the government to construct, purchase, or borrow a fleet of warships, approved the arming of merchant vessels and the commissioning of privateers, and permitted U.S. ships to attack armed French vessels anywhere on the high seas. Over the next two years, the United States and France waged an undeclared naval war, much of it in the Caribbean and West Indies, the center of U.S. trade with Europe and the focal point of British and French attacks on American shipping. Supported by a fleet of armed merchant-men, the infant U.S. Navy drove French warships from American coastal waters, convoyed merchant ships into the West Indies, and successfully fought numerous battles with French warships. Americans cheered with especial nationalist fervor the victory of Capt. Thomas Truxtun's
Constellation
over
Insurgente,
reputedly the fastest warship in the French navy.
⁵⁹

Adams's more belligerent advisers saw in the conflict with France a splendid opportunity to achieve larger objectives. The war scare provided a pretext for the standing army Federalists had long sought. In the summer of 1798, Congress authorized an army of fifty thousand men to be commanded by Washington in the event of hostilities. Federalists in the cabinet and Senate also sought to rid the nation of recent immigrants from France and other countries who were viewed as potential subversives—and even worse as Republican political fodder—enacting laws making it more difficult to acquire American citizenship and permitting the deportation of aliens deemed dangerous to public safety. Striking directly at the opposition, the Federalists passed several vaguely worded and blatantly repressive Sedition Acts that made it a federal crime to interfere with the operation of the government or publish any "false, scandalous and malicious writings" against its officials. Egged on by Hamilton, some extremists fantasized about an alliance with England and joint military operations against the Floridas, Louisiana, and French colonies in the West Indies.
⁶⁰

The war scare of 1798 waned as quickly as it had waxed. When the hostile U.S. reaction made clear the extent of his miscalculations, Talleyrand shifted direction. French officials feared driving the United States into the arms of England, solidifying the power of the Federalists, and denying France access to vital products. Already negotiating with Spain an agreement to regain Louisiana as part of a larger design to restore French power in North America, nervous officials perceived that war with the United States would invite an assault on Louisiana and destroy France's dreams of empire before implementation had begun. The demonstrated ability of the United States to defend its commerce reduced the profits from plunder, rendering the "half friendly, half hostile" policy counterproductive. As early as the summer of 1798, Talleyrand began sending out signals of reconciliation. His message grew stronger by the end of the year.

As belligerent as anyone at the outset, Adams in time broke with his more extreme colleagues. Gerry, who had remained in Paris, the Quaker George Logan, then on an unofficial and unauthorized peace mission in France, Adams's son John Quincy, and other U.S. diplomats in Europe all reported unmistakable signs of French interest in negotiations. Adams had never taken seriously the threat of a French invasion of the United States. Lord Nelson's destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir Bay in Egypt in October 1798 rendered it a practical impossibility. There was "no more prospect of seeing a French army here, than there is in Heaven," the president snarled.
⁶¹

Within the United States, peace sentiment grew. In the absence of formal hostilities, the war fever dissipated, turning to apathy and then protest against the high taxes and repressive measures adopted by the government. Adams gradually recognized, moreover, that Hamilton was behind the more aggressive measures proposed by his cabinet. He suspected, not without reason, that the ambitious New Yorker might be conspiring to gain control of the government. The president was enraged when his cabinet, Federalist senators, and Washington pressured him to appoint Hamilton inspector general of the army, a post everyone recognized, in view of Washington's age and increasing infirmity, was tantamount to actual command. Adams thus decided in early 1799 to send another peace mission to France.

The decision set off a struggle that sundered Adams's administration and in time destroyed his party. Still eager for war—or at least the threat of war—and stunned by Adams's decision, extreme Federalists resisted. A
group of senators vowed to block the nomination of an envoy to France, provoking an enraged president to threaten resignation—which would have left the government in the hands of the despised Jefferson. Adams eventually agreed to enlarge the delegation to three persons. While the president was in Massachusetts tending his ill wife, Pickering, Wolcott, and Secretary of War James McHenry continued to obstruct his policy, delaying issuing instructions to the commissioners and trying to persuade them to resign. There was even talk of something akin to a palace coup, in which Hamilton would have been a major participant, with the cabinet taking control from the president. Returning to the temporary capital at Trenton at the urging of loyal cabinet members, Adams was stunned to find the inspector general conferring with some of his advisers. Without consulting the cabinet, he ordered the delegation to leave for France at once. Upon learning that Pickering and McHenry were plotting with Hamilton to unseat him in the election, Adams forced McHenry to resign. Pickering refused resignation on grounds that he needed the salary to support his large family. Adams was compelled to fire him, making him the only secretary of state to leave office in this manner. The president denounced Hamilton as "the greatest intriguant in the world—a man devoid of every moral principle—and a bastard."
⁶²

A settlement would not come easily. The instructions Pickering drafted for the delegation asked a great deal: formal release from the treaty of 1778; compensation for seizures of American ships and property (estimated at $20 million); and French acceptance of the Jay Treaty. From France's standpoint, the Americans asked everything and offered nothing. French officials desperately wanted to regain exclusive right to bring privateers and prizes into American ports and insisted that they would compensate the United States for damages only if the treaties remained in effect. The negotiations quickly deadlocked, causing an agitated and impatient Adams to reconsider a declaration of war.

Both sides found reason to compromise. Napoleon by late 1800 had assumed near dictatorial powers and was busy promoting schemes to end the European war on favorable terms and restore the French empire to North America. The reacquisition of Louisiana was nearing fruition. The United States had to be pacified at least until France could take control of its new territory. Napoleon was also encouraging European neutrals to arm against Britain. He saw an opportunity to loosen Anglo-American ties and win over the neutrals by demonstrating his commitment to liberal
maritime principles. Sensing that France was daily growing stronger in Europe and further delay might be costly, the U.S. delegation departed from its instructions and agreed to compromise. The Convention of 1800 restored diplomatic relations, tacitly terminated the alliance of 1778, postponed (forever as it turned out) further consideration of treaties and financial claims, and included a statement of neutral rights that did not conflict with Jay's Treaty. To impress Europe with his achievement, Napoleon staged an elaborate signing ceremony at Mortefontaine on October 3, 1800, complete with sumptuous banquets, rounds of toasts, fireworks and booming cannon, and plays and concerts.
⁶³

Although unpopular in the United States, the convention was eventually approved. Americans' expectations continued to exceed their nation's power. As with the Jay Treaty, critics protested that the commissioners had paid too much for peace. Jefferson complained of "bungling negotiations."
⁶⁴
Extreme Federalists complained of further humiliation at the hands of France. Upon first submission to the Senate, the convention failed to receive a two-thirds majority. The prospect of continued hostilities with France provoked sober second thoughts, however. Many senators concluded that the United States could not do better and might do worse. Adams quickly resubmitted the agreement. It was narrowly approved with an amendment striking out the provisions calling for further discussion of treaties and indemnities. The document was ratified by his successor, Thomas Jefferson, in December 1801.

The Convention of 1800 represented a giant step toward an independent U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, the commissioners abandoned substantial, if inflated, financial claims against France. As with the Jay Treaty, however, when viewed from the longer perspective, the advantages far outweighed the shortcomings. The convention ended five years of conflict with France and eliminated, at least temporarily, the threat of a war the United States could ill afford. It stopped French plunder of American commerce and secured the release of ships. France recognized the independence of the United States as it had not before and tacitly accepted the Anglo-American connection set forth in Jay's Treaty. Most important, although it could not be fully appreciated at the time, the United States freed itself from the alliance of 1778, a source of tension with France and domestic discord since the outbreak of the European war. Continuation
of that conflict until 1815 perpetuated the threat to the United States, but severance of ties with France rendered its situation much less complicated. The nation would not be a party to another "entangling alliance" until the mid-twentieth century.

If the price for peace and freedom of action was relatively low for the nation, it was high for its principal author and his party. Adams's belated commitment to negotiations with France irreparably divided his party, sealing his defeat in the election of 1800 and contributing to the demise of Federalism. At least in retrospect, he insisted that the price was worth paying. "I desire no other inscription over my gravestone," he later wrote, "than: 'Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility for peace with France in the year 1800.' "
⁶⁵

Despite their partisanship and occasional excess, the Federalists skillfully guided the United States through a perilous era. Displaying opportunism and pragmatism in time of crisis, they exploited the European war to America's advantage while scrupulously avoiding the full-scale involvement that would have been disastrous at this stage of the nation's growth. Insisting on its rights to trade with both major belligerents, the United States suffered heavy losses in shipping but achieved major gains in foreign trade. Exports increased from $20 million in 1792 to more than $94 million in 1801, imports from $23 million in 1790 to $110 million in 1801, and the reexport trade jumped from $1 million in 1792 to nearly $50 million in 1800. This prosperity was based on unusual conditions, to be sure, but it provided a foundation for future economic growth. The removal of British troops from U.S. soil, along with Spanish recognition of the southern boundary and granting of access to the Mississippi, eased the foreign threat to frontier communities, curbed secessionist impulses among westerners, and facilitated incorporation of the West into the Union. By the end of the decade, moreover, restless Americans had begun to filter into Spanish Florida and Louisiana, preparing the way for future acquisition. Federalists gained a measure of international respect for the United States not forthcoming in the 1780s. They secured release from the French alliance, making possible a truly independent foreign policy. Few decades in U.S. history have been as dangerous and yet as rich in accomplishment.