From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (137 page)

Carter also achieved a breakthrough of sorts in the Middle East, a treaty between Egypt and Israel negotiated under his direction, remarkable more for the fact that it happened than for its contents. Following his initial, disastrous descent into the quagmire of Middle Eastern diplomacy, a chastened president pulled back. A new opportunity seemed to present itself in September 1977 when Egypt's Anwar Sadat stunned the
world by journeying to Jerusalem for talks with Begin and a speech to the Knesset. But in the months that followed, the two sides seemed more at odds than ever. Sadat and Begin stopped speaking to each other. Fearing that any hope of negotiations might be lost, Carter staked his presidency on a bold diplomatic gambit, inviting Sadat and Begin to join him for a summit at Camp David. He also violated the first rule of summitry by bringing heads of state to a meeting to negotiate rather than to ratify agreements already worked out by others. He even drafted in his own hand the outlines of a possible settlement.
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Over thirteen days (September 5–17, 1978) of arduous and intense negotiations conducted under Carter's watchful eye, an agreement was finally reached. The participants worked in an environment "as self-contained as an ocean liner and as assertively American as Carter could make it," historian David Schoenbaum has written.
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The president engaged the two antagonists in direct discussions until it became clear that their mutual antipathy rendered such an approach untenable. He and Vance then adopted the extraordinary technique of negotiating with their technical experts, who in turn dealt with their bosses. Real progress remained elusive. Sadat and Begin did agree that Israel would pull out of the Sinai in return for a peace treaty with Egypt. But the two sides quickly deadlocked over the explosive West Bank issue, Sadat insisting upon a homeland for Palestinians, Begin refusing to dismantle West Bank settlements or agree to a Palestinian state. With the talks near collapse, Carter pulled out a last-minute agreement. Sadat and Begin finessed the knotty West Bank problem by agreeing to work "for the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its respects" over a five-year transitional period. Carter believed he had secured from Begin a promise not to build new settlements in the disputed area. The signatories also vaguely agreed, without specific reference to a Palestinian homeland, to "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and that "elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza should decide how they shall govern themselves."
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Camp David marked a significant milepost in an ancient conflict whose modern roots stretched back three decades. Egypt was the first Arab nation to recognize Israel's right to exist; Israel made important if vague and sharply qualified concessions. Carter viewed it as the most important
achievement of his presidency; the world hailed a major step forward. Begin and Sadat won the Nobel Peace Prize. Such settlements are rarely definitive, however. They are no more than individual steps in an ongoing process, as the Camp David Accords, to Carter's great disappointment, subsequently attested. It took another six months and a last-ditch Carter trip to Cairo and Tel Aviv simply to secure approval of what had previously been worked out. Begin reneged on his settlements "promise." As soon as the Israel-Egypt peace agreement was signed in March 1979, Israel resumed building settlements and refused even to talk about a Palestinian homeland until the Palestinians had conceded its sovereignty over the West Bank. Carter's public protest brought down on him the wrath of the Israel lobby. Sadat was bitterly disappointed with the outcome and isolated at home and among his Arab compatriots. The hopes of Camp David were thus crushed months before its author left office. The agreement starkly displayed the limits of the most dedicated and intense diplomacy. "This remarkable adventure in summit diplomacy achieved more than most its detractors have been willing to acknowledge," participant William Quandt has concluded, "and less than its most ardent proponents have claimed."
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Carter also pointed U.S. policy toward southern Africa in new directions. A product of the rural South, he had lived and worked with people of color since childhood. As an aspiring politician in an age of racial conflict, he had initially accommodated to segregation, but he grew with the times. His religion, basic morality, and sense of fairness brought forth a firm commitment to racial equality. As governor of Georgia, he actively promoted integration. The votes of African Americans helped him win the South—and thus the presidency—and he felt an obligation in domestic and foreign policy to push issues they considered important. Carter thus brought to the White House a firm commitment to improving U.S. relations with the non-white world. Like JFK, he took an especially keen interest in Africa. His 1978 trip to oil-rich Nigeria was the first visit to that continent by a sitting president. A newly potent African American political constituency, with whom Young had especially close ties, linked freedom at home and abroad, provided the president crucial support, and, on occasion, held his feet to the fire.
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In marked contrast to its predecessors, the Carter administration from the outset stood forth against apartheid and for black majority rule in
southern Africa. It stopped short of economic sanctions against the government of South Africa, recognizing the importance of U.S. investments there and rationalizing that American businesses in South Africa might help eliminate apartheid. Carter and his advisers also feared that a hard line could provoke more repression. At the same time, upon taking office the president publicly denounced white minority rule. In May 1977, Vice President Walter Mondale sternly scolded South Africa's prime minister, John Vorster, and warned that continued brutal enforcement of apartheid would seriously damage relations with the United States. When Pretoria tightened repression, the House of Representatives, with administration backing, passed a resolution sharply critical of apartheid. Young voted for a UN Security Council resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo on a "racist regime" that threatened the peace, the first time sanctions had been imposed on a member nation.
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The administration took an even stronger and ultimately more decisive stand on Southern Rhodesia. In 1965, the white minority had defiantly declared independence from Britain to maintain its dominance over four million blacks. No nation recognized the rebellious Ian Smith regime. In marked contrast to policies toward South Africa, the United States joined Britain in imposing sanctions. On the other hand, die-hard southern segregationists like Democrats Helms and Virginia senator Harry Byrd Jr. sympathized with Smith and even compared Southern Rhodesia to their beloved Confederacy. In 1971, they joined conservatives like Goldwater in passing the Byrd Amendment that undercut sanctions by permitting imports of strategic materials such as chrome. Shortly after taking office, Carter boldly asked for and gained repeal of the Byrd Amendment as a "kind of referendum on American racism," in Young's words. The administration was not fooled by Smith's clever ploy to preserve white rule by adding moderate blacks to his government. Insisting that the elections had not been free and fair, it stood forth against Senate conservatives by refusing to lift the sanctions even after a Methodist bishop became the first black prime minister. It dismissed conservative arguments that Robert Mugabe's Popular Front was dominated by Communists. Carter held firm until September 1979, when new elections brought to power a government of Zimbabwe headed by Mugabe.
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Southern Africa was the last bastion of white rule over people
of color. By standing firmly for principle in Southern Rhodesia, Carter led a successful assault against it.
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In Zaire and Angola, more conventional Cold War imperatives held sway. Invasions in March 1977 and May 1978 of Zaire's mineral-rich Katanga province, newly renamed Shaba, by Katangan rebels based in Angola assumed the form of classic Cold War crises where essentially local conflicts took on international implications and realpolitik prevailed over principle. In each case, the Carter administration backed the venal and brutally oppressive Zairean regime of Joseph Mobutu against insurgents allegedly controlled by the leftist government of Angola, the Soviet Union, and, most disturbing to Americans, Cuba. The incursions are still shrouded in uncertainty. The instigators were definitely anti-Mobutu Katangans who had sided with the victorious MPLA in Angola. They claimed to have leftist political views, but their interests were mainly local. The MPLA likely knew what they were doing and assisted them, but the Soviet role appears to have been quite limited. Careful study based on Cuban documents concludes that Castro did not instigate the invasions but rather sought to stop them for fear of provoking a Western response that might bolster the visibly shaky Mobutu regime or even topple the infant Angolan government.
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Alleged Cuban involvement eventually provoked a vocal U.S. response. Although Mobutu played the usually reliable red card, the Carter administration's reaction to the first invasion was notably cautious. The president had no use for the repulsive Mobutu. In the aftermath of Vietnam, no thought was given to direct U.S. intervention. The Cuban role was not clear. On the other hand, the United States had important economic interests in Zaire, and the administration was loath to do nothing. It thus provided Mobutu $2 million in non-lethal military supplies and encouraged French and Belgian support. By the second invasion, much had changed. Carter was under fire at home for his alleged weakness in foreign policy, the Cold War was heating up, and the hard-nosed Brzezinski had gained control. The Cuban role was still murky, but top U.S. officials cherry-picked from inconclusive intelligence those items emphasizing Cuban involvement. Carter used Cuba as a whipping boy to prove his toughness. Americans were eager to believe the worst of their insolent southern neighbor. The administration thus publicly and noisily blamed
Cuba for the second Shaba invasion and provided limited aid to Mobutu. "This may be a defensible enterprise," the
New York Times
opined, much too charitably as it turned out, but it "is not a noble or holy one."
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The Carter administration is remembered for its focus on human rights, and historians disagree sharply in assessing its record. Carter's defenders cite his emphasis on human rights as a major achievement of his presidency. Liberal detractors insist that he applied the policy inconsistently and often let expediency and geopolitics triumph over principle. Realists claim that a naive, do-gooder president permitted human rights concerns to interfere with more urgent national security considerations.
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Carter's human rights policy built on the work of others. A growing interest in the issue emerged out of 1960s activism. It spread across the world in the 1970s through private networks that reflected a phenomenon—what would be called globalization—that would dominate international life in the late twentieth century. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch first began to define and call attention to the inviolable rights of individuals against state-sponsored repression. They employed the new technologies of the information age to collect, disseminate, and publicize information on abuses across the world. They pioneered direct mail fund-raising to expand their membership and operations and enlisted the support of benefactors such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. In an age of celebrities, they used prominent figures to get across their message. Congress passed legislation in the mid-1970s declaring it a "principal goal" of U.S. foreign policy "to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries." It began to link the dispensing of foreign aid to the human rights records of recipient nations. "Human rights is suddenly chic," an activist proclaimed in 1977.
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Carter set out to put human rights at the top of the government's agenda. His interest in the issue sprang naturally from his Christian faith and his missionary impulse to do good in the world. It also seemed good politics given the post-Vietnam reaction against imperialism and realpolitik and the growing attention given human rights by liberals and conservatives. America's real strength, he insisted, resided more in what it stood
for than its vast military power. He firmly believed that the nation must pursue policies consistent with its traditional principles. He later recalled his hope that human rights "might be the wave of the future of the world" and his determination that the United States "be on the crest of the movement."
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The Cold War, in his view, had forced compromises that undermined these principles, including the support of repressive dictatorships and anti-Communist interventionism. The nation's "commitment to human rights must be absolute," he affirmed in his inaugural address.
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It was, of course, much more difficult to implement human rights policies than to talk about them. The president and his advisers were not naive in their approach to the issue, as has often been charged. They recognized the difficulties of application in specific cases. They were painfully aware of the limits of U.S. power and understood that intrusion into the domestic affairs of other states could make things worse for victims of repression. They saw the need to balance human rights concerns with national security imperatives. Inevitably, there were inconsistencies and contradictions. The United States continued to make much of Soviet repression of Jews while turning a blind eye to China's human rights violations. It remained silent about the repression by important allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and most notoriously Iran. Ignoring protests from human rights advocates and legislators, the administration did nothing to stop the murderous Pol Pot regime from committing genocide in Cambodia. Indeed, as part of its larger strategy of containing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, it provided covert support to the Khmer Rouge after they were driven from power by the Soviet-backed government of Vietnam.
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