France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (39 page)

They were all members of the French
Groupement des industriels français
in Poland.

Poland was also granted French state loans. During the period we are examining, one particularly large loan came with the Rambouillet agreement (signed on September 6, 1936), and that was confirmed as permanent through an exchange of letters on September 17. The French government, by the Rambouillet agreement, placed 2 billion francs at Poland’s disposal in installments of 500 million for four years. It was understood
that this entire amount would be used for military supplies except for 400 million earmarked for the Silesia-Baltic railroad. The military supplies would come from orders placed in France or purchases made in Poland “toward the creation and development of the Polish war industry.” Noël complained bitterly about Boussac’s intrigues who, according to him, benefited from the French funding at the expense of Poland’s defense. Charvériat, assistant director of political affairs, wrote on October 5, 1938, that, despite Poland’s attitude during the Munich crisis, “this vast development of our industry in Poland” encouraged to “maintain economic and financial cooperation.” However, Léger’s disciple then added, “What appears to be subject to revision are the political and military agreements that tie us to Poland. In this way we would give our collaboration
a purely economic and financial
character, which is much more effective and less dangerous that what we have followed so far.”
⁶²
We shall see further ahead what happened to that wish.
⁶³

Foreign debt in Yugoslavia was gigantic, representing 85 percent of total debt. In December 1937, 65 percent of the funding of corporations was foreign. France came ahead of Great Britain and the United States. French capital was mostly invested in mining (the mines at Bor). Even when Germany annexed Austria and part of Czechoslovakia—each one being very active in Yugoslav banking, the wood industry, sugar and textiles—it remained behind France.

Most of industry and banking in
Romania
belonged to French, American and British investments. France was just behind Great Britain and ahead of the United States and Belgium. The following chart (in millions of lei) is from an excellent book by Swiss historian Philippe Marguerat:
⁶⁴

France was in a very good position in the banking industry through the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, which had large interests in two large Romanian banks, and the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, which held
a majority of the Banca Commerciala Romana. In steelworks the CEPI (
Compagnie Européenne de participation financière
), an international holding company with Romanian, British, and French capital—through the Banque des pays de l’Europe Centrale—controlled a large company, Resita, which was the largest in Eastern Europe after Skoda. All of Romanian steel production was controlled by CEPI. Other French capital (namely the
Société française d’études et d’entreprises
) had interests in railroad equipment, armaments, etc.

In textiles a few companies from Tourcoing (Caulliez-Coisne) and Mulhouse (Dollfuss-Mieg) owned large interests that were on the increase between 1935 and 1937.

Finally, 45 percent of the oil business was controlled by British, French, Belgian, and Dutch investments. Five out of seven large companies “obey French or British decisions.” One of them, Columbia, had almost entirely French stock ownership (the Omnium français des pétroles and the Desmarais group).

The Romanian government had a large foreign debt. France lent it on April 1, 1939, some 18.7 billion lei, or 27 percent.

In 1918 Czechoslovakia was already largely industrialized (50 percent of the population was involved in secondary or tertiary activities). It represented 70 percent of Austro-Hungarian industry (for 26 percent of the population), exporting and importing capital at the same time. Between the wars Czechoslovakia used foreign capital as a matter of course, particularly coming from France, to replace the Germans and Austrians. There was, once again, a connection between politics and the economy. Later on,
⁶⁵
we shall look at France’s financial role in Czechoslovakia in greater detail. We may say at the outset that France came behind Great Britain but had a doubly strong position because of banking (44.5 percent of foreign investments) and the machine tool industry. The French company Schneider et Cie. actually controlled the powerful Skoda factories through the Banque européenne industrielle et financière.

For France the “Czechoslovak bastion” was actually a Schneider—Le Creusot position. The company had taken over the Banque de l’Union parisienne—a cornerstone of Protestant banking—and was very powerful within the Credit Lyonnais. It also created the Union européene industrielle et financière, which financed operations in Czechoslovakia and Austria (
Société d’escompte de Basse-Autriche, Osterreichische Berg-und Hüttenwerke
) and in Poland.

The regulatory role for most of these countries was played by the
Banque des pays de l’Europe centrale
, headquartered in Paris, with a branch in Vienna (
Zentraleuropaische Lander Bank Niederlassung Wien
) handling investments in Czechoslovakia (where it controlled the
Banque du commerce et de l’industrie)
, in Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania. The famous economist Charles Rist was a long-time president of the Prague branch. Following the Anschluss (March 1938), the Banque des pays de l’Europe centrale had to divest its Viennese branch to the
Dresdner Bank
of Germany, but kept up its interests in Czechoslovakia as long as possible and in the other countries where it had investments.

We should also point out that France had slid from second place for capital investments abroad behind Great Britain and Germany in 1914 to third place after Great Britain and the United States; the latter two had foreign investments in 1930 six times larger than in 1913. Great Britain had granted few foreign loans before 1914 and had opted for industrial investments and consequently suffered far fewer losses because of the war than France did.

4.

T
HE
E
MPIRE

The unofficial name “Empire” was being used more and more by the French as globally meaning their colonies, protectorates, and mandates. Yet the colonies were administered by the ministry of the colonies (except for Algeria which was divided into departments). The real protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia) were part of the ministry of foreign affairs that supervised the residents general. The protectorates in Indochina (Annam, Tonkin, Principalities in Laos, Cambodia) were like the colony of Cochinchina under the control of the ministry of the colonies, and the entire area was under a single governor general. French West Africa (AOF), French Equatorial Africa (AEF), Madagascar and its smaller islands (Comores, la Réunion) and the French Coast of the Somalis and Djibuti were all colonies; Togo and Cameroon were category B mandates (lands considered unprepared for independence for a longer period), under special administration and the mandated power was to report to the League of Nations. However, the ministry of the colonies was actually in charge, as well as of the colonies in America
(the tiny islands of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, the Antilles—Martinique, Guadeloupe, and their islands—and French Guyana), plus the five cities in India, the islands of the Pacific, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Finally, the ministry of foreign affairs administered the category A mandates in the “Levant”—Syria and Lebanon—headed by a high commissioner. A few small deserted islands in the South Seas (Kerguelen, Amsterdam, Saint-Paul) and Adélie on the continent of Antarctica made up this impressive list.

In all it represented about 12 million square kilometers and a population of about 60 million (20 million were located in Indochina.) Such spaces—including the 5 million square kilometers of the Sahara—were a vast assemblage of identical colors on the map but actually translated into huge differences at the demographic, economic and strategic levels. For example, a certain “base”-oriented strategy that favored this scattering (insufficient at the time of the coal-driven navy, it became acceptable with oil powered furnaces and the piston engine.) The very remote territories, Indochina included, could not be defended, however, while the vast components of North Africa and Black Africa appeared to be a kind of rear base for metropolitan France and actually did play that role.

France’s relations with the different parts of its Empire do not enter into our investigation since it is part of a common foreign policy decided by the home country. There could be an exception regarding the mandates in Syria and Lebanon where there was a strong desire for independence and the nationalists tried to replace the submissive relationship with state-to-state type relations. This, however, is a different subject and part of the vast decolonization movement. In 1939 France was firmly in charge of its mandates as the incident of the sandjak of Alexandretta was to prove.
⁶⁶

The Empire only comes into play here as an “object” and implied a number of issues of prestige, economics, strategy and defense where France was concerned. It was to French power a “backup,” a “reinforcement” and an “area to fall back to.” Large interests were concentrated there. It provoked jealousies and even demands, and held a more or less modest place in French foreign policy during the 1930s.

The war had, no doubt, reduced the general indifference of the French population. Some 569,000 soldiers and 200,000 workers had come to help the mother country, and 71,000 had “died for France,” including 35,900 North Africans, a rather low number considering the 1,300,000 Frenchmen killed and, at the same time, huge if one remembers
that those men often behaved heroically being French “subjects” and not full-fledged French citizens.
⁶⁷

With prosperity at the end of the 1920s, the wave of public opinion favoring “an even greater France” got underway. In 1929 there were some “38 committees or private colonial leagues, 12 agencies and more or less official councils” located in Paris. In 1930 there were 71 colonial newspapers in Paris and 5 in the provinces. The best known writers went on the African or Asian pilgrimage: André Gide, Paul Morand, Louis Gillet, Roland Dorgelès, Maurice Dekobra, Jean d’Esme, André DeMayson, Albert Londres, Henri de Monfried, etc.
⁶⁸
Major newspapers increased their reporting and sections on colonial issues, focusing attention on the difficulties of colonization; the Rif war, the Druse war, and the Tonkin insurrection (the Yen Bay incident in February 1930) helped glorify great military victories, condemn foreign incursions and fuel anti-communist propaganda. The Colonial Exhibition from May to November 1931 at Vincennes was intended, according to the minister of the colonies Paul Reynaud, “to make the French people aware of their Empire” and received 7 million visitors.
⁶⁹

Was it a passing fancy? Ageron notes that the number of colonial titles tended to decrease. Out of about 14,500 yearly titles legally recorded, 439 colonial titles were registered in 1929; 361 in 1930; 395 in 1931; 194 in 1933 and 196 in 1934. Lectures were attracting fewer attendees, and colonial films brought in reduced box office sales. Gabriel Hanotaux, who had authored, in collaboration with Martineau, the
Histoire des colonies françaises
between 1926 and 1930, said in 1935 that “public opinion fell asleep after the success of the Colonial exhibition.”
⁷⁰

Actually, the main motivation was not anti-colonialism but rather indifference. A tiny number of candidates in the 1932 elections discussed colonial matters in their platforms. The Colonial Party—a group of deputies and senators of different political tendencies favoring colonization—disappeared after the 1932 elections.
⁷¹
The Communist Party was anti-colonialist in its doctrine and some of its rank and file even played an active part in supporting the Druses and the Rif insurgents. Later on, faced with the colonial demands by fascist countries, it would modify its position. The Socialist Party actively denounced colonization’s brutalities, terror, repression, and exploitation; since 1931 it published a monthly supplement to
Le Populaire
entitled
Colonisation et Socialisme
. However, only a minority condemned colonialism as such (22.6 percent of the votes at
the 1938 convention, according to Ageron). The
Ligue des droits de l’homme
, a 150,000-member organization voted in favor of the anti-colonialist motion introduced by Felicien Challaye by 1,523 votes to 634 (70.7 percent to 29.9 percent). The early rumblings of nascent nationalisms in the colonies led to the publication of anti-colonialist books, the most famous being
Indochine SOS
(1935) by André Viollis. These were rather isolated initiatives, as were the articles by colonial nationalists published in
La Flèche
, edited by Gaston Bergery. There were no “outspoken anti-colonialists” among the radicals; at the most we can mention Joseph Caillaux, who called for an association of European states, including Germany and Italy, to develop the colonies, a kind of “Eurafrica” before its time. There were some Catholics with attitudes critical to the abuses of colonization (
Semaines sociales, Annales de la jeunesse coloniale française
) but, for the most part, the right was very much in favor of colonization.