Five Families: The Rise, Decline, and Resurgence of America's Most Powerful Mafia Empires (129 page)

Details on bugging the Casa Storta were obtained from James Kallstrom, the FBI agent in charge of Special Operations, and from agents James Kossler and Jules Bonavolonta. Paul Castellano’s history and role as the Gambino boss is based on FBI and NYPD intelligence files; court records; and interviews with Bruce Mouw, former supervisor of the FBI’s Gambino squad, and other agents; testimony given to the President’s Commission on Organized Crimes (1983–1986); commission reports; transcripts of bugs and wiretaps of conversations by Gambino soldiers; and personal reporting. Information about the bugging of Castellano’s home was pieced together through interviews with Kallstrom and Mouw, and other agents who asked for anonymity. Kallstrom and other agents provided information on installing listening devices at Anthony Salerno’s headquarters, the Palma Boys Social Club.

Decisions to initiate the Commission case are based on contemporaneous interviews and statements by Rudolph Giuliani; extensive contemporaneous and later interviews with Ronald Goldstock and Fred Rayano, OCTF’s former chief of investigations; former federal prosecutors Walter Mack and Michael Chertoff; former FBI agents Thomas Sheer, James Kossler, Pat Marshall, and Joseph O’Brien; and G. Robert Blakey. Statistics on the number of FBI agents and NYPD detectives assigned to the five Mafia family squads were obtained from supervising agents. Estimates of Mafia strength were based on FBI analysis and from testimony and a court affidavit by Kenneth McCabe, an investigator for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan.

James LaRossa, Paul Castellano’s lawyer, described Castellano’s activities and conversations shortly before his assassination. Backgrounds on Roy DeMeo and Thomas Bilotti come from court records; FBI and NYPD reports; and interviews with F.B.I agent Bruce Mouw. Rudolph Giuliani’s selection of Michael Chertoff as lead prosecutor in the Commission Case is based on contemporaneous interviews with Giuliani, other prosecutors, and later interviews with Chertoff. The texts of Commission trial testimony and tapes are from the trial record.

Information about defense strategy at the Commission trial came mainly from interviews with James LaRossa, a key defense lawyer, and Michael Chertoff, the lead prosecutor. Trial details were obtained from personal reporting, and transcripts of testimony and tapes introduced as evidence. Estimates of inflated concrete costs caused by the Mafia’s rigged bids were cited in an analysis by
The New York Times
and in testimony by Salvatore Gravano.

The gasoline-tax frauds are based on stories and personal reporting in
The New York Times
; trial transcripts; testimony by Michael Franzese, former Colombo family capo; and interviews with Laura Brevetti and Edward McDonald, former heads of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in the Eastern District of New York. The theft of the West Side Highway materials was described in statements to the FBI and in court affidavits by Salvatore Gravano, former Gambino underboss, and Alphonse D’Arco, former Lucchese acting boss.

Questions about the impact of the Commission trial on the Mafia are based on interviews and statements by James B. Jacobs, NYU School of Law professor; Richard Rhebock, defense lawyer; and Vincent Cafaro’s debriefings by the FBI. The Mafia’s loan-sharking profits and techniques were obtained through personal reporting, and interviews with law-enforcement and organized-crime experts, including Remo Franceschini and Howard Abadinsky. Data on the strength and rackets of the five families were derived from contemporaneous interviews with law-enforcement investigators and officials, and from court records.

Carmine Persico’s background was obtained from court and arrest records; intelligence files compiled by the NYPD, the Brooklyn DA’s office, and the FBI; and interviews with Edward McDonald, former chief of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in the Eastern District, George Stamboulidis, a former federal prosecutor, and NYPD detectives, including Albert Seedman and Remo Franceschini; testimony in 1963 by Joe Valachi concerning Persico and the Gallo Wars; and summaries of FBI debriefings of Joe Cantalupo, a Colombo associate and informer. A description of Persico’s arrest was provided mainly from testimony by Fred DeChristopher and from interviews with Damon Taylor, the FBI supervisor of the Colombo Squad in 1985. Information about Persico’s attempts to place contracts on the lives of Rudolph Giuliani and other prosecutors is based on statements at Michael Lloyd’s parole hearing, and interviews with Aaron Marcu, a former federal prosecutor in Manhattan, Lynn DeVecchio, the former head of the Colombo Squad, and other FBI agents.

The criminal background of Victor Orena and the origins of the Colombo family war were compiled from court records, trial transcripts, FBI and NYPD intelligence reports, and summaries of information supplied to the FBI by an informer, Gregory Scarpa. The government’s strategy and tactics in prosecuting Colombo defendants were obtained from court documents and interviews with John Gleeson and George Stamboulidis, the main federal prosecutors involved in scores of indictments and convictions. Additional materials on the investigations and internal FBI controversies concerning Scarpa came from court documents; trial testimony; and interviews with Damon Taylor and Lynn DeVecchio, former Colombo Family Squad supervisors, and with federal prosecutors and defense lawyers who asked to be unidentified.

Alphonse “Little Allie Boy” Persico’s history was documented from court records; FBI and NYPD reports; and interviews with FBI Colombo Squad agents, federal prosecutors, and organized-crime investigators in the Brooklyn and Manhattan District Attorneys’ staff. The strength of the Colombo family in 2004 was based on data supplied by the FBI

A transcript of the tape of John Gotti discussing his plans for the Gambino family was introduced in court hearings and was obtained from a bug secreted in Gotti’s office by the N.Y. State Organized Crime Task Force. Gotti’s early background was derived from New York and federal court and probation records; intelligence files compiled by the FBI and the Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens DA’s offices; interviews with FBI agents, including Bruce Mouw, Stephen Morrill, Pat Colgan, George Hanna; interviews with NYPD detectives, including Remo Franceschini, Joseph Coffey, Edward Clark, and Edward Wright. Details about Aniello Dellacroce were supplied by Ralph Salerno. John Favara’s abduction was reported by witnesses to the Nassau County Police Department, and theories about his presumed murder and disposal of his body are based on informers’ tips to the FBI and the NYPD. Gotti’s telephone conversation with Anthony Moscatiello was recorded in a wiretap by the Queens DA’s office and used as evidence to deny Gotti bail in 1986.

Mouw’s background, work style, and investigative methods were compiled from extensive interviews with him and with FBI officials and agents and prosecutors involved in Gambino Squad investigations. Portions of the Angelo Ruggiero wiretaps and his reactions were obtained from court documents and from interviews with Mouw, other FBI agents, and prosecutors. Paul Castellano’s demands to obtain the Ruggiero tapes are based on informers’ reports to the FBI and from secretly recorded discussions used as evidence in Gambino family trials. Details on the planning of Castellano’s assassination and Gotti’s installation as boss were derived largely from trial testimony by Sammy the Bull Gravano and from his debriefings by FBI agents and prosecutors.

The accounts of the multiple electronic eavesdropping attempts on Gotti and the transcripts were obtained from court records and follow-up interviews with investigators
and officials from the FBI, the N.Y. State OCTF, and the Queens DA’s office. Information on Gotti’s lifestyle was based on interviews with state and federal investigators who tracked him; from transcripts of wiretapped conversations principally between Gotti and Angelo Ruggiero; and from personal observations. Details of the Piecyk case came from arrest and trial records and contemporaneous interviews with Remo Franceshini. Gotti’s behavior and activities as the Gambino boss were provided by Sammy Gravano’s testimony; Gravano’s debriefings by the FBI and federal prosecutors; and from conversations picked up on bugs in Gotti’s office at the Bergin Social Club. Background on James Failla was obtained from court records; NYPD and FBI intelligence files; interviews with detectives, including Ralph Salerno and Remo Franceschini; and interviews with garbage carters who had dealings with him. Gravano’s history was derived from court and probation records; his version in Underboss; from debriefings by FBI agents and prosecutors; and accounts he gave to his lawyers. The disagreements over strategy in the first RICO prosecution of Gotti in 1986 were confirmed in interviews with Edward McDonald, the former chief of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in Brooklyn; Andrew Maloney, the former U.S. Attorney in Brooklyn; other federal prosecutors; and FBI agents who asked for anonymity. The role of Willie Boy Johnson in the Gambino family was obtained from court records and interviews with Franceschini and Mouw, and with other FBI agents. Events and comments by Gotti and other participants at the RICO trial are based on personal reporting and the reporting of Leonard Buder of
The New York Times
.

Details of John Gotti’s daily routine and Gambino family policies were obtained principally from interviews with Bruce Mouw; surveillance records; and reports by informers. Remo Franceschini, who visited Gotti’s Bergin Club periodically, provided information from his observations and surveillance of Gotti. Salvatore Gravano corroborated many details of Gotti’s private life and Mafia attitudes in debriefings by the FBI, in court testimony, and in
Underboss
. The agreement among prosecutors on seeking indictments of Gotti is based on contemporaneous and later interviews with federal and state prosecutors, including Rudolph Giuliani, Andrew Maloney, Ronald Goldstock, and Edward McDonald. Material on Gotti’s trips and his properties outside of New York were compiled from surveillance reports disclosed by federal and state agents and from real-estate records. Gotti’s refusal to allow Joe Armone to acknowledge membership in a crime family was reported to the FBI by informers and cited in
Underboss
. Additional information regarding Gotti’s views on running the Gambino family was based on Gravano’s testimony and his FBI debriefings. The proceedings of the Commission meeting attended by Gotti were obtained from separate debriefings and trial testimony of Salvatore Gravano and Anthony Casso of the Lucchese family by the FBI and federal prosecutors. The circumstances of Gotti’s arrest
in 1989 on state charges of assault were based on interviews with Joseph Coffey, an investigator for the New York Organized Crime Task Force, and Ronald Gold-stock and Fred Rayano of the OCTF. Details of the shooting of John O’Connor and events at Gotti’s assault trial are based on court records, trial testimony, and personal coverage of the trial and its aftermath.

Facts about the FBI’s bugging of the Ravenite Club and Nettie Cirelli’s apartment were obtained mainly from interviews with James Kallstrom, the head of the FBI unit that installed the equipment; with Agents Bruce Mouw and James Kossler; and with Andrew Maloney, the U.S. Attorney in Brooklyn; and from reports by other FBI agents. Descriptions of the building and the club are based on personal observations. Transcripts of the recorded conversations in the Cirelli apartment and elsewhere are part of the court record of Gotti’s 1992 RICO trial in Brooklyn. Gravano’s testimony at the trial provided additional information about the circumstances of the conversations. Details of the contest among federal jurisdictions to prosecute Gotti were based on contemporaneous and later interviews, principally with Maloney; John Gleeson, the lead prosecutor in the case; Ronald Goldstock; and FBI agents and prosecutors in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office who asked to be unidentified. A portrait of the arrest of Gotti and his codefendants was obtained from Mouw, Lewis Schiliro, then the FBI’s Organized Crime supervisor in New York, and FBI reports.

Information on pretrial activities in Gotti’s trial was derived from court records and personal observations. Gravano’s accounts of his discussions and disagreements with John Gotti, and plan to escape from the MCC jail while awaiting trial are based on post-trial testimony by Gravano and statements in
Underboss
. Details of Gravano’s defection, and plea arrangements, his removal from the Metropolitan Correctional Center, and his debriefings were obtained from contemporaneous and later interviews with Bruce Mouw, John Gleeson, Andrew Maloney, and Jim Fox, then the head of the FBI Office in New York, and court records concerning the plea. The description of the trial is based on transcripts; personal observations; the reporting of Arnold Lubasch of
The New York Times
; the reporting of Peter Bowles of Newsday; and interviews with Gleeson, Maloney and Albert Krieger, the chief defense lawyer. Details of Gotti’s reactions to his sentencing and his transfer from the Metropolitan Correction Center were provided by defense lawyers Bruce Cutler and Ronald Kuby.