Authors: Jonathan Eyers
A combined passenger list and crew complement recognised there as being only 6,050 on board. In the 1980s and 1990s research concluded that there were actually between 8,956 and 10,582 people on the
Wilhelm Gustloff
when she left Gotenhafen, and that around 4,000 of them were children. Whether the true number was
nearer the lower estimate or the higher one, this meant that there may have only been enough lifejackets for about half of those aboard.
The
Wilhelm Gustloff
finally left Gotenhafen at 12.15pm on the 30th, so heavy that it took four tugs to manoeuvre her away from the pier. A lack of escort ships had delayed her departure from the previous evening, the only ones available being small auxiliary vessels of poor seaworthiness, unsuited to an open sea passage. The Kriegsmarine could not spare ships that could match the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's maximum speed of 15 knots, and it lacked the materials to make repairs to others that were more suitable for escort duties, but which had been damaged by Soviet or British air attacks.
Having to feed over 10,000 people, supplies on the
Wilhelm Gustloff
quickly diminished, so her four captains decided to leave with the escort they had rather than risk the possibility of never being able to leave at all. They were to travel in convoy with another passenger liner, the
Hansa
, which was also full of civilian refugees and military personnel. The convoy also included the whaling boat
Walter Rau
and two torpedo boats, but one of those, the
Lowe
, did not have the latest sonar or radar, and the freezing temperatures had caused her other equipment to seize up too. Another snowstorm descended over the Bay of Danzig as they left its sheltered waters that lunchtime. Zahn, looking out at their insufficient escort, commented to Petersen, âThis looks like a dog leading an elephant into the night.'
Two portentous events occurred before the
Wilhelm Gustloff
made it into the open sea of the Baltic. First she had an impromptu rendezvous with the steamer
Reval
, which had come from Pillau and carried 600 refugees. Unable to take them all the way to Germany, her captain requested the
Wilhelm Gustloff
take them instead. The four captains submitted, and all 600 were transferred to the liner. By this stage her corridors were already impassable.
Shortly after that, the
Hansa
developed mechanical problems and one of the torpedo boats reported a leak. Neither could continue and had to turn back. Zahn in particular had been dismayed by their escort when they left Gotenhafen. Now Petersen and the other captains were also unsure whether it would be safe to continue, effectively alone. But Zahn's dismay did not equate with any degree of willingness to fail his mission. So the
Wilhelm Gustloff
headed out into the Baltic Sea, her course set for Kiel, northern Germany.
This was when Petersen and Zahn had their first truly significant disagreement. Zahn was a submariner and believed the best course to take would be a zigzagging course through shallow waters close to shore. Not only did Soviet submarines avoid shallow waters because it made them easier to find, but in the event that the
Wilhelm Gustloff
was attacked, she could always be run aground, and her more than 10,000 passengers could escape ashore. Petersen, however, feared British aircraft more than Soviet submarines, and most RAF activity was either over land or close to the coast. Zahn was more concerned about Soviet planes, though, which as far as he was aware were flying
reconnaissance flights over the Baltic. A coastal course, therefore, would hopefully avoid the Soviet threat altogether.
Ultimately Zahn's recalcitrance failed to sway either Petersen or the other merchant marine captains, and the
Wilhelm Gustloff
continued along a deep-water course that had been swept for mines. The captains ordered the ship's anti-aircraft armaments (of which the
Wilhelm Gustloff
had three 105mm guns and eight 20mm cannons) to be kept at a constant state of readiness. This was easier said than done for the crewmen who had to struggle across the icy decks in a mounting blizzard to repeatedly clear the frozen weapons.
Running into trouble out at sea, with help far away, would leave the ship a sitting duck.
Zahn also urged Petersen to push the engines to their limits. At a maximum speed of 15 knots, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
could outrun most submarines. Though Petersen refused, he had good reason to. The liner had been docked at Gotenhafen for the better part of four years, in which time her engines had not been run at all. Not only did running her engines at top speed risk causing them to break down, but it also risked reopening a gash in the hull that the ship had received from an earlier explosion whilst in port. Makeshift welding ensured she was sufficiently seaworthy for this trip, but not without limitation. Petersen knew why the captain of the
Hansa
had turned back rather than risk the journey. Running into trouble out at sea, with help far away, would leave the ship a sitting duck, and they would stand little chance against either the Soviets or the British, whichever found them first. What's more,
the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's hull had not received any anti-fouling treatments for a long time. Encrusted with barnacles, she would struggle to make 15 knots. As it was, the most she managed on her final voyage was 12 knots, a speed at which she might have struggled to outrun submarines.
The weather grew steadily worse as evening approached. The snowstorm became thicker and visibility dropped almost to zero, which brought mixed blessings â on the one hand, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
was harder to spot; on the other, so were her enemies. The four captains ordered each lookout watch to be increased to eight men.
The weather grew steadily worse as evening approached. The snowstorm became thicker and visibility dropped almost to zero.
Sailing into darkness with her lights off, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
received an odd radio message. Atmospheric interference caused by the bad weather made it difficult to receive and accurately decode long distance radio messages, but the four captains took the message at face value. Apparently there was a minesweeper heading along the same course, but in the opposite direction, and she would intercept the liner shortly. However, the source of the radio message could not be ascertained. Zahn ordered that the ship's navigation lights be turned on, an order Petersen quickly countermanded. But this time he would not get his way. The other captains were as concerned about the risk of collision as Petersen had been about the risk of driving the engines too hard, and they supported Zahn. Red running lights lit up the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's port side, green her starboard. They not only made her easier to spot in the dark and amidst the
blizzard, but they gave away her size and her course too. By the time the captains reached a point where they should have passed the minesweeper, realised she didn't actually exist and turned the navigation lights off again, it was already too late.
They had also received another radio warning but felt far enough away from the danger to ignore it. Soviet submarine movements had been decoded, and there were supposedly three submarines patrolling the Bay of Danzig. That was where they had come from, and Zahn knew the Russian vessels were too far behind to catch up with them now. What he didn't know was that one of the submarines, S-13, commanded by Captain Alexander Marinesko, had left the others behind hours before, and by chance alone was now only a few miles from the
Wilhelm Gustloff
.
As Hitler ranted, a baby was born in the belly of the ship.
Below decks, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's passengers were suffering. The temperature may have dropped to â17°C (5°F) outside, driven by a Force 7 gale, but inside the ship the sheer number of people squeezed onto her eight decks created a hot and increasingly humid atmosphere. Those with lifejackets had been ordered over the ship's loudspeakers to wear them at all times, but many removed them because it was so hot. Facilities designed to cater for fewer than 2,000 people struggled to cope with more than five times as many, not least the 145 toilets, which quickly became blocked. It didn't help that the rough seas made thousands of people seasick. Foul odours permeated through the corridors, where hundreds sat and
lay on the floor because there was no room for them anywhere else. Meanwhile, upbeat music was played over the loudspeakers.
The 30th January was the twelfth anniversary of the day Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. To commemorate the occasion he gave a speech calling upon every German to rise up and resist the Jewish Communist plot to destroy Germany before it was too late. In the end it turned out to be the last radio speech he made. At 8pm a recording was played over the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's loudspeakers. The refugees listened to it because there was nothing else to do, but gone were the days when Hitler's triumphalist rhetoric inspired an almost hysterical reaction. On the bridge, officers joked that they would happily switch it off, but didn't want the hassle from the Gestapo. As Hitler ranted, a baby was born in the belly of the ship.
The speech lasted about an hour, at the end of which Zahn and the other captains headed to Petersen's cabin for dinner â hot pea soup. The cooks and stewards worked round the clock, because by the time one group had been fed, it was time to feed another. The ship's passages were so crowded it made it difficult for stewards to reach everyone with soup, sandwiches, porridge and other basic rations. But their tallies of the number of people that needed feeding gave the captains their most accurate estimation of the number aboard, and, including those too seasick to eat, the figure was at the upper end of all the estimates.
Now that they had turned the navigation lights off again, the four dining captains felt as good as invisible in the dark and in the constant snow. They were fatally mistaken.
The Soviet submarine S-13 had been stalking the
Wilhelm Gustloff
for over an hour. Her petty officer had been on watch duty when he spotted the liner's navigation lights. The blizzard and the big seas could have hidden the ship from the S-13's periscope view, but her lights shone like a beacon in the darkness. Indeed, the Russians initially mistook the
Wilhelm Gustloff
for a lighthouse, and only on consulting their charts did they realise it was a ship. Just after 9pm, her lights now off, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
was about 19 miles (30km) off the Polish coast, near the Stolpe Bank. The S-13's Captain Marinesko ordered his crew to surface on the ship's port side, on the assumption that the liner's lookouts would be paying more attention to dangers from seaward. Slowly, unnoticed, the Soviet submarine closed to 3,000ft (less than 1km).
In the panicked silence of the following moments, passengers throughout the ship's crowded cabins and corridors wondered what they had hit.
Four torpedoes were primed and ready to fire. Marinesko gave the order. Three launched successfully. The fourth jammed in its tube. Most of the S-13's crew were too busy trying to disarm it to take any notice of their target's fate.
The first torpedo struck the
Wilhelm Gustloff
near the bow, level with the bridge. Everybody on the ship would have heard the thunderous roar. In the panicked silence of the following moments, passengers throughout the ship's crowded cabins and corridors wondered what they had hit. Many assumed it was a mine. The emergency fire bells started ringing immediately, but for most there was nowhere to go, not until everyone between them and the stairs moved first.
Then the second torpedo struck, and after that there was no mistaking the fact that the ship was under attack. The torpedo hit near midship, blasting a hole in the hull just above the drained swimming pools. The explosion killed many of the women housed there instantly. The torrent of freezing seawater that followed killed the rest.
The third torpedo hit the
Wilhelm Gustloff
just as the senior officer on the bridge was ordering an emergency stop. It struck the hull below the ship's single funnel. From the Russians' perspective, this was their most successful torpedo. It scored a direct hit on the engine room. In an instant, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
lost all power. Her internal lights blinked off, plunging thousands of terrified passengers into darkness. The ringing of the fire bells and the constant hum of the ship's systems was replaced by deathly silence, broken only by the screams and shouts of those trapped inside the bowels of the ship. The emergency generators quickly activated, but the dim red emergency lights would only have been bright enough to show most people just how difficult it would be to escape such an overcrowded ship.
By the time the four captains made it onto the bridge, the
Wilhelm Gustloff
was already settling by the head and listing slightly to port. Both Petersen and Zahn knew immediately that the ship was doomed. âDas ist es,' Petersen muttered.
This is it
. He knew as well as Zahn how many people they had aboard, and he knew that with the ship foundering so fast, most of them would die. He took the decision to close all the bow bulkheads. Doing so slowed the water's progress and gave people more time to try and escape. Despite this, it was not an easy or obvious
decision to make. After all, sleeping in their bow quarters at the time of the attack were most of the crewmembers who were trained in how to launch the lifeboats. Closing the bulkheads not only condemned them to death, but ensured everyone else aboard would have to fend for themselves too.
Finding the line to the engine room dead, Zahn accepted the futility of hoping to restore power to send a distress signal. The emergency generator provided insufficient power to send long-distance messages, so Zahn used a spotlight to contact the torpedo boat
Lowe
, which was 15 minutes away. The crew of the
Lowe
received the sobering news that the
Wilhelm Gustloff
would sink within the hour, and dutifully carried out Zahn's instructions. They sent the SOS that the sinking liner could not, requesting immediate assistance and directing all available ships to hurry to the
Wilhelm Gustloff
's aid. Then the
Lowe
's captain followed those directions himself.