Fatal Vision (106 page)

Despite the difference in age and background, and despite the uncertain future MacDonald faced, romance bloomed quickly. "It was strange," Randi Dee said, "from the very beginning— the sparks we felt. We are both vivacious, energetic people. We both love outdoors and children and music and just being together. We're so in love, so excited and happy with each other."

In March, they decided to get married. "I dragged him into the drugstore and bought some brides' magazines, and he helped me pick out a dress. Then we made out our guest list. I'd call out a name from his address book and he'd say yes or no, whatever.

"We decided on a big wedding in Newport Beach. And we decided on children, two of them. Jeffrey loves children."

On the evening of March 24, 1982, MacDonald invited twenty-four friends to his Huntington Beach condominium. Randi Dee Markwith was already there. Champagne was served in crystal goblets and then four limousines pulled up to the door. Jeff and Randi got into the first limousine—a white one. They pulled out of the Mariner Drive complex and turned left on the Pacific Coast Highway, heading south toward Balboa Island, and their favorite restaurant, where dinner was to be served to the entire group.

It was a perfectly lovely evening in every way. Just before the first course was served, Jeff stood to make a brief speech. He said that despite the fact that there remained "some clouds on the horizon," he and Randi had decided, "to say yes to each other, to say yes to love, to say yes to life." Then he formally announced their engagement.

The food, he reported later, was superb. A choice of entrees: filet mignon, stuffed baby salmon, or veal. The only odd part, he said, was his mother. She would not eat. She did not even sample her main course. Having heard the engagement announcement, she just sat there, throughout the dinner, staring down at her plate, saying nothing.

* * *

On March 31, 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, 6 to 3, that Jeffrey MacDonald's constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been violated.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated, "The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
...
is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges."

In the opinion of the court, the period from 1972 to 1974 could not be counted in any consideration of a speedy trial claim, because throughout that time there were no criminal charges outstanding against MacDonald, the Army having dismissed those which had originally been filed.

'I
nevitably," Burger wrote, "there were undesirable consequences flowing from the initial accusation by the Army and the continuing investigation after the Army charges were dismissed. Indeed, even had there been no charges lodged by the Army, the ongoing comprehensive investigation would have subjected MacDonald to stress and other adverse consequences. However, once the charges instituted by the Army were dismissed, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made. He was free to go about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue with his life."

In a footnote, Burger added, "There is nothing to suggest that the Justice Department acted in bad faith in not securing an indictment until January, 1975. . . . Plainly the indictment of an accused—perhaps even more so the indictment of a physician— for the heinous and brutal murder of his pregnant wife and two small children is not a matter to be hastily arrived at either by the prosecutorial authorities or by a grand jury. The devastating consequences to an accused person from the very fact of such an indictment is a matter which responsible prosecutors must weigh carefully. The care obviously given the matter by the Justice Department is certainly not any indication of bad faith or deliberate delay."

In a separate footnote, Burger added: "Our analysis of the speedy trial claim is not . . . influenced by consideration of the evidentiary basis of the jury verdict. The jury that heard all of the witnesses and saw the evidence unanimously decided that respondent murdered his wife and children."

Burger was joined in his opinion by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Stevens filed a separate, concurring opinion, in which he disagreed with Burger's view that MacDonald's speedy trial rights had been in suspension between the Army's dismissal of charges in 1970 and the return of the indictment in 1975. He found, however, that because the murders constituted such "serious offense" the government was entitled to "proceed cautiously and deliberately before making a final decision to prosecute."

Writing a dissent in which he was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall found that the majority opinion was "not justified by the language of the Speedy Trial Clause or the teachings of our cases, and it is hopelessly at odds with any sensible understanding of speedy trial policies."

Marshall continued: "The majority's analysis is simple: the Speedy Trial Clause offers absolutely no protection of a criminal defendant during the period that a charge is not technically pending. But simplicity has its price. The price, in this case, is disrespect for the language of the clause, important precedents of this court, and Speedy Trial policies.
...

"Nothing in the language suggests that a defendant must be continually under indictment in order to obtain the benefits of the speedy trial right. Rather, a natural reading of the language
('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,')
is that the Speedy Trial Clause continues to protect one who has been accused of a crime until the government has completed its attempts to try him for that crime."

In the MacDonald case, Marshall wrote, he found the question of whether the delay had violated MacDonald's speedy trial right to be "close." Most difficult to evaluate, he said, was the question of prejudice, but he noted that "proof of actual prejudice to the defense at trial is not necessary." The mere potential for prejudice would suffice. In MacDonald's case, Marshall wrote, the record was clear that the delay had caused "substantial" prejudice "including continuing anxiety, intrusive publicity, legal expense, and disruption of a new civilian career," and he added that the proof of actual prejudice at trial "although somewhat speculative" was suggested by the possibility that "Stoeckley's trial testimony would have been less confused and more helpful to MacDonald at an earlier date."

Marshall agreed that "the government's interest in reaching an informed decision whether to prosecute is certainly legitimate," but said, "vague, unexplained references to internal disagreement about prosecution cannot justify more than two years of indecision."

It was, however, once again, the majority opinion which had the force of law and within an hour of its announcement Judge Franklin
T
. Dupree, Jr., had signed an order revoking MacDonald's bail and federal agents descended upon 16052 Mariner Drive and took him away in handcuffs as a stunned and tearful Randi Dee Mark with stood watching.

He entered the back seat not of a long white limousine as he had just one week earlier, but of a plain gray sedan. And this time, coming out of the Mariner Drive condominium complex, the car turned not left down the Pacific Coast Highway toward Balboa Island, but right, toward the Federal Correctional Institution at Terminal Island from the confines of which Jeffrey MacDonald had enjoyed more than eighteen months of freedom.

During the process of arrest, agents discovered a .44 magnum revolver—the most powerful handgun manufactured in the United States—and a box of ammunition in a nightstand next to his bed. The possession of such a weapon was a violation of the terms of MacDonald's bail, but insofar as he was once again serving three consecutive life sentences for murder, the point was moot. Perhaps, however, Freddy Kassab's repeated threats to "administer justice" personally had not fallen upon entirely deaf ears.

During his first week back in prison, MacDonald wrote me to say that he'd read in the
Los Angeles Times
that Robert Redford was looking for new material and he suggested that Redford be approached about the possibility of playing the role of MacDonald in a movie version of the story.

In June, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument on MacDonald's remaining points of appeal.

On July 12 he wrote to say that "despite a chipped toe & sprained ankle (football) I won the July 4th 3-mile run here. Ran a
great
tactical race & dogged this 22 year old Indian for 17 laps (2 steps behind him)—burst past him with 50 yards to go. Won 6 Cokes and a trophy. Time: 19:51."

Four days later he wrote to say that he had just read the transcripts of the oral arguments made in Richmond in June. "No question—we've won. Only question is if there will be a new trial or complete dismissal."

On August 16, however, the same three-judge panel that had ruled in MacDonald's favor on the speedy trial issue found unanimously that the trial had been error-free and that there was "ample warrant" for the verdict.

Even Justice Murnaghan concurred, "albeit not without substantial misgiving," particularly in regard to Judge Dupree's ruling on the Stoeckley witnesses.

"My view," he wrote, "is that the testimony should have been admitted. If such evidence was not persuasive, which is what the government esentially contends in saying that it was untrustworthy, the jury . . . would not have been misled by it."

In the end, however, Murnaghan stated that it would undermine the concept of trial court discretion "were courts of appeal to label as 'abuse of discretion' any action by a district court with which the appellate court disagrees."

Murnaghan concluded his separate but concurring opinion with the statement. "The case provokes a strong uneasiness in me. The crimes were base and horrid and whoever commited them richly deserves severe punishment. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Still, the way in which a finding of guilt is reached is, in our enduring system of law, at least as important as the finding of guilt itself. I believe MacDonald would have had a fairer trial if the Stoeckley-related testimony had been admitted."

Randi Dee Markwith remained in residence at 16052 Mariner Drive. In the return address on mail she sent out she signed herself as "Mrs. Randi MacDonald." On August 31 she sent me a note which said:

I've enclosed some letters that I've written to Jeff & visa
[sic]
versa. Jeff asked me to send you some, so you could better understand the intense and very beautiful love that Jeff & I share. I've also enclosed a contract which was drawn up by the two of us, and worded by Jeff. It is very meaningful to both of us and it is something that we read often.

In an eleven-page letter within six days after his appeal for a new trial had been unanimously rejected in Richmond, MacDonald had said to his fiancee:

I'm strong and logical and have taken stock in our resources and I feel & believe and know that
I
(we?) will win. I don't know how soon, how, why, any more, but I
will
win. I will be free. How "vindicated" I'll be,
I
don't know, that depends on so many things. It depends on P.R., the new evidence, the strength of my lawyers, investigators, me. It depends on chance (a new witness being found); luck; friends (a pardon?) . . .

Vindication can come in many ways—it may be sudden, full, complete. It may be partial in the courts or thru P.R. or thru the book or movie. It may be thru a pardon. I don't know. Can't tell—but I will win, I will be out, I will fight until that is so. . . .

The "contract" was dated April 12, 1982, which meant that it had been composed less than two weeks after MacDonald's return to prison. In Jeffrey MacDonald's handwriting—the same hand that had written of Eskatrol twelve years earlier; the same hand which a jury believed had written the word
pig
, in Colette's blood, on the headboard of the bed they had shared—the "contract" said:

We, the undersigned, are deeply in love and have agreed to become man and wife forever. We both fully intend for this complete union to occur as soon as it is possible to do so. We both fully intend to have 2 children within our first several years together in order that our children can enjoy our intense love and benefit therefrom as much as possible.

In addition to the above, the undersigned have fully discussed and mutually agree upon another series of binding promises to each other. These promises are part of, but not the total sum of our complete love for each other. These promises were made on or about our fabulous weekend in Palm Springs, during which Jeffrey Robert MacDonald proposed to and was accepted by Randi Dee, the date of which began on Saturday, March 20, in the year of our Lord, 1982. The engagement followed as soon as was humanly possible, namely on March 24, 1982, in a ceremony and gathering of mutual friends, that, by general consensus, was a party of all-time grace, elegance and beauty. The series of binding promises to each other made on that fabulous weekend leading to the engagement party consist of: