Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (46 page)

Recommendations for reform were soon presented. Henceforth, persons would be appointed as chamberlains without respect to whether they belonged to the nobility or the samurai class. It was hoped that even if there were only a few samurai among the chamberlains, they would eliminate abuses of long standing. The chamberlains were also given a new duty, keeping the emperor informed of matters old and new, Eastern and Western. Senior chamberlains would assist in the emperor’s intellectual growth. The changes did not affect only the emperor: it was decided that the empress and her ladies also needed to be familiar with both old and new conditions in Japan, China, and the West and that they therefore should be allowed to listen to lectures delivered before the emperor.
⁹

Men in the emperor’s staff with aristocratic names like Sanj
ō
nishi, Uramatsu, and Ayanok
ō
ji were replaced by samurai with names like Murata Shimpachi.
¹⁰
On September 15 all the female officials were dismissed and replaced with younger women.
¹¹
Saig
ō
Takamori, in a letter he sent on January 20, 1872 to his uncle, Shiihara Yosanji, wrote with evident satisfaction,

Among the many changes of every kind, those most to be rejoiced over and prized relate to the emperor’s person. Up to now, no one who was not a noble was permitted to come into the presence of His Majesty. Even officials of the Ministry of the Imperial Household who happened to be of the samurai class could not enter his presence. But these bad practices have all been changed, and members of the samurai class have been chosen to serve even as chamberlains. Nobles and samurai have been selected without distinction, and the emperor shows particular favor to chamberlains appointed from the samurai class, a truly admirable development.

The emperor intensely dislikes being cooped up in the women’s quarters and remains all day, from morning to evening, in his office. He and the chamberlains read and discuss together the learning of Japan, China, and the West. He is so occupied with his studies that he dresses much more simply than was customary with daimyos up until now. His diligence in his studies is exceptional, far greater than the average man’s. The emperor today cannot be as emperors were in the past. Even their lordships Sanj
ō
and Iwakura say that he must be far more active. Fortunately, he is of a brave and wise nature, and he has an extremely robust constitution. The nobles say there has not been so healthy an emperor in recent generations. He goes riding every day that the weather permits, and he has said that he intends shortly to drill one platoon each of his personal guards every other day. It is reported that he is determined to lead a battalion and to be his own grand marshal.
¹²

Later in the same month, the cabinet was reorganized, and the offices of minister of the left, minister of the right, and major councillor were abolished, along with various lesser offices. The government was divided into three branches: the executive (
sh
ō
in
), headed by the emperor; the legislative (
sa-in)
; and the judicial (
u-in
).

Once these major domestic changes had been made, greater attention could be paid to international developments. First in importance was the establishment of the northern frontier. The settlement of Ezo (or Hokkaid
ō
, as it came to be called in September 1869) was an urgent concern lest the Russians get there first. Important officials were sent to administer Hokkaid
ō
and Chishima, which were divided into eleven provinces and eighty-six counties.
¹³
On October 5, 1869,
Ō
kunitama was established as the principal god to be worshiped by those engaged in the development of Hokkaid
ō
, and a ceremony of enshrinement was carried out. Major temples encouraged parishioners to emigrate to the new territory.

The chief problem in establishing the frontier between Japan and Russia related to Sakhalin. Both Russia and Japan had established settlements on the island, and the boundary between the two was by no means easy to draw. In March 1870 a commission for the development of Sakhalin was appointed, but in the absence of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia, it was not possible to negotiate. On March 3 Terashima Munenori (1832–1893),
Ō
kuma Shigenobu, and It
ō
Hirobumi met with the American minister resident Charles E. De Long to discuss the question of Sakhalin. The officious De Long, stressing the great importance to the rest of the world in settling the boundary, proposed himself as the mediator. He pointed out the close relations between the United States and Russia and promised that if entrusted with this mission, he would spare no pains in reaching a solution.
¹⁴
The Japanese accepted the offer with the proviso that the border be established along a degree of latitude: north of 50 degrees would be Russian territory, and south of 50 degrees, Japanese.

Despite De Long’s self-confidence, his negotiations failed to produce a settlement. Minor clashes between Japanese and Russians continued, and the Japanese still had not made up their minds what policy to adopt. They had at least three choices: (1) to pay the Russian settlers a sum of money in return for leaving Sakhalin and then rule the whole island; (2) to divide the island and move Russian settlers north of the boundary, giving them some money for their expenses; and (3) to yield the entire island to Russia, receiving compensation in return.
¹⁵

In June 1871 Soejima Taneomi was sent to negotiate with the Russians in the Russian part of Sakahalin. When he was about to leave, the emperor told him:

Russia is the country closest to our own, and it is therefore highly desirable that we maintain friendly relations. This is particularly true of Sakhalin where our two peoples live together, coming and going in the course of earning their livelihoods. How could we fail to devote our efforts to preserving this situation? In the past, as far back as 1852, the Russian czar sent an ambassador plenipotentiary to discuss how the border might be settled, but because of circumstances on both sides, the discussions did not bear fruit. Later, in 1867, a treaty was provisionally signed in St. Petersburg, providing for mixed occupation by both peoples. When I examine now the situation on Sakhalin, it makes me wonder whether because of the differences in language and intent, suspicion and even hostility are not likely to arise in people’s hearts, leading to hostility and finally to a disruption in the friendly relations between the two countries. It is most urgent that the border be determined. This is a deep concern not only of myself but of the czar of Russia who has been gravely concerned. For this reason I command you, Taneomi, to go with the full powers delegated to you, and negotiate to determine the boundary. I hope that you will profit by this opportunity to settle this matter and enable the people of both countries to continue enjoying their blessings and that our friendship [with Russia] will be ever closer and long lasting. See to it, Taneomi, that you take my words to heart.
¹⁶

It is noteworthy that the emperor spoke of the czar as sharing his concern with achieving a peaceful solution to the border problem; he declared that their mutual desire was peace, which would permit their subjects to continue earning their livelihoods undisturbed. This statement suggests that the emperor now was aware of both the duty of a sovereign toward his people and the desirability of sovereigns of different countries acting in concert.

During the next few months Soejima Taneomi met the Russian envoy Evgenii Karlovich Biutsov many times, but their negotiations failed to settle the status of Sakhalin.
¹⁷
In February 1873 Kuroda Kiyotaka, the vice president of land development in Hokkaid
ō
, presented a memorandum urging that Japan abandon Sakhalin completely, declaring that funds would be better spent on developing the huge tracts of land available in Hokkaid
ō
than on attempting to develop the wastelands of Sakhalin. He claimed it was unlikely that the income derived from the sale of grain, coal, or fish produced in Sakhalin would ever sustain the population and praised the Russians for their wisdom in having sold Alaska to the Americans in 1868 for similar reasons.
¹⁸

The situation was not resolved until May 1875 when a treaty was concluded between Minister Plenipotentiary Enomoto Takeaki and the Russian Plenipotentiary Alexander Gorchakov providing that His Majesty, the emperor of Japan, would yield all rights over the entire island of Sakhalin to His Majesty, the czar of all the Russias, in return for the latter yielding to the emperor of Japan the eighteen islands of the Kurile chain. The border between the two countries was established between Shumshu Island, the northernmost of the chain, and Lopatka, at the southern tip of Kamchatka.
¹⁹

In the meantime the emperor’s attention was diverted to events occurring far from Japan. Soon after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, fought between July 1870 and May 1871, the Japanese government sent four senior samurai as observers. By the time they reached Europe, the Prussians had been victorious in every battle and were besieging Paris. The Japanese observers went to Paris where they compiled minutely detailed reports on the fighting, the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants, the merits and demerits of the weapons used, the causes of victory or defeat, as well as general conditions in Europe. Without exception, they were deeply impressed by the strength and battle tactics of the Prussian military. Until this time the Japanese had followed French models in organizing a modern army, but the French defeat in the war induced the Japanese to change their mentors: henceforth, the German army would provide the model.
²⁰

The emperor took an exceptional interest in the war. Takashima Tomonosuke, an army officer, recalled years later how the emperor had carefully examined reports reaching him of the Franco-Prussian War and questioned his advisers about the strategies adopted by the two armies. Soon after the war ended, a German warship called at Yokohama, and the captain offered the emperor photographs of the war. The officer asked permission to explain the photographs, which the emperor readily granted. He listened with great interest as the officer described not only what was shown in the photographs but all that had happened up to the conclusion of the war. Takashima reported that “the dragon face looked unusually pleased as he listened.”
²¹

The date of this incident is not clear, but needless to say, it was unheard of for the emperor to admit a foreigner into his presence for such a purpose.
²²
The emperor again broke precedent when he granted an audience to Adams, the acting British minister, who was being transferred to a superior post. The emperor expressed his pleasure that the value of his services had been recognized by his sovereign but regretted that Adams was leaving. Under the circumstances, he could not detain him but hoped that he would take good care of himself on the voyage home.
²³
There was nothing in the least remarkable in the emperor’s words, but they indicated with what rapidity the court had accustomed itself to European usages.

As the result of his armies’ victories, the king of Prussia, Wilhelm I, was crowned as kaiser of Germany at Versailles in January 1871 and sent notification of his new eminence to Emperor Meiji. The latter responded with a message of congratulations and two albums of Yamato-e, a return gift for the war pictures the kaiser had sent the previous autumn. The distance between Japan and Europe was still enormous, but Japan had assumed a role important enough in the world for the emperor to be kept abreast of the news of his “cousins,” the crowned heads of Europe.

The most important development with respect to bringing Japan into closer contact with the rest of the world at this time was undoubtedly the departure of the Iwakura mission for America and Europe on December 23, 1871.
²⁴
The treaty of commerce signed with the United States in July 1858 had stated that its provisions might come up for reconsideration in 171 months, so this was an appropriate time for the mission to visit the countries with which Japan had signed treaties.
²⁵
The treaties had provided for extraterritoriality and fixed import tariffs, both highly unpopular with the Japanese as infringements on their sovereignty. It was hoped that these objectionable provisions might be eliminated by negotiation.

In February 1871 It
ō
Hirobumi, then in Washington, wrote to various highranking officials proposing that a mission of outstanding officials be dispatched in the near future to Europe and America to examine in each country the situation with respect to friendly relations, trade, and customs duties, as advance preparation for fulfilling the conditions necessary for revision of the treaties. It
ō
hoped that members of the proposed mission would succeed in convincing persons in the countries they visited that Japan had reached maturity as a modern state and therefore should not be treated as a backward country whose laws and finances could not be trusted. The chief purpose of the mission would be to win the confidence of the major Western countries and to communicate to them the government’s desire for revision of the treaties.

In May 1871 the government ordered Councillor
Ō
kuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) and Yoshida Kiyonari (1845–1891), an official of the Finance Ministry, to examine the advisability of sending a mission to the West in the hopes of revising the treaty. They concluded that a mission should be sent, and the cabinet prepared a statement that was submitted to the emperor.