DemocracyThe God That Failed (2 page)

Similarly, the social security systems everywhere are on or near the verge of bankruptcy. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Empire represented not so much a triumph of democracy as the bankruptcy of the idea of socialism, and it therefore also contained an indictment against the American (Western) system of democratic—rather than dictatorial—socialism. Moreover, throughout the Western hemisphere national, ethnic and cultural divisiveness, separatism and secessionism are on the rise. Wilson's multicultural democratic creations, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, have broken apart. In the U.S., less than a century of full-blown democracy has resulted in steadily increasing moral degeneration, family and social disintegration, and cultural decay in the form of continually rising rates of divorce, illegitimacy, abortion, and crime. As a result of an ever-expanding list of nondiscrimination—"affirmative action"—-laws and nondiscriminatory, multicultural, egalitarian immigration policies, every nook and cranny of American society is affected by government management and forced integration; accordingly, social strife and racial, ethnic, and moral-cultural tension and hostility have increased dramatically.

In light of these disillusioning experiences fundamental doubts concerning the virtues of the American system have resurfaced. What would have happened, it is being asked again, if in accordance with his reelection promise, Woodrow Wilson had kept the U.S. out of World War I? By virtue of its counterfactual nature, the answer to a question such as this can never be empirically confirmed or falsified. However, this does not make the question meaningless or the answer arbitrary. To the contrary, based on an understanding of the actual historical events and personalities involved, the question concerning the most likely alternative course of history can be answered in detail and with considerable confidence.
⁷

If the United States had followed a strict noninterventionist foreign policy, it is likely that the intra-European conflict would have ended in late 1916 or early 1917 as the result of several peace initiatives, most notably by the Austrian Emperor Charles I. Moreover, the war would have been concluded with a mutually acceptable and facesaving compromise peace rather than the actual dictate. Consequently, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia would have remained traditional monarchies instead of being turned into short-lived democratic
republics. With a Russian Czar and a German and Austrian Kaiser in place, it would have been almost impossible for the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia, and in reaction to a growing communist threat in Western Europe, for the Fascists and National Socialists to do the same in Italy and Germany.
⁸
Millions of victims of communism, national socialism, and World War II would have been saved. The extent of government interference with and control of the private economy in the United States and in Western Europe would never have reached the heights seen today. And rather than Central and Eastern Europe (and consequently half of the globe) falling into communist hands and for more than forty years being plundered, devastated, and forcibly insulated from Western markets, all of Europe (and the entire globe) would have remained integrated economically (as in the nineteenth century) in a world-wide system of division of labor and cooperation. World living standards would have grown immensely higher than they actually have.

⁷
For a contemporary collection of examples of "counterfactual history" see
Vir
tual
History:
Alternatives
and
Counter/actuals,
Niall Ferguson, ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

Before the backdrop of this thought experiment and the actual course of events, the American system and the
pax
Americana
appear—contrary to "official" history, which is always written by its victors, i.e., from the perspective of the proponents of democracy—to be nothing short of an unmitigated disaster; and Habsburg-Austria and the pre-democratic age appear most appealing.
⁹
Certainly, then, it would be worthwhile to take a systematic look at the historic transformation from monarchy to democracy.

⁸
On the relationship between communism and the rise of fascism and national socialism see Ralph Raico, "Mises on Fascism, Democracy, and Other Questions,"
Journal
of
Libertarian
Studies
12, no. 1 (1996); Ernst Nolte,
Der
europaische
Burgerkrieg,
191
7-1945.
Nationalsozialismus
und
Bolschewismus
(Berlin: Propylaen, 1987).

⁹
No less of an establishmentarian than George F. Kennan, writing in 1951, came indeed close to admitting as much:

Yet, today, if one were offered the chance of having back again the Germany of 1913, a Germany run by conservative but relatively moderate people, no Nazis and no Communists, a vigorous Germany, united and unoccupied, full of energy and confidence, able to play a part again in the balancing-off of Russian power in Europe... well, there would be objections to it from many quarters, and it wouldn't make everybody happy; but in many ways it wouldn't be so bad, in comparison with our problem of today. Now, think what that means. When you tally up the total score of the two wars, in terms of their ostensible objectives, you find if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern.
(American
Diplomacy
1900-1950
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951], pp. 55-56)

While history will play an important role, the following is not the work of a historian, however, but of a political economist and philosopher. There are no new or unfamiliar data presented. Rather, insofar as a claim to originality is made, it is that the following studies contain new and unfamiliar
interpretations
of generally known and accepted facts; moreover, that it is the
interpretation
of
facts,
rather than the facts themselves, which are of central concern to the scientist and the subject of most contention and debate. One may, for instance, readily agree on the fact that in nineteenth-century America average living standards, tax rates, and economic regulations were comparatively low, while in the twentieth century living standards, taxes, and regulations were high. Yet were twentieth-century living standards higher
because
of higher taxes and regulations or
despite
higher taxes and regulations, i.e., would living standards be even higher if taxes and regulations had remained as low as they had been during the nineteenth century? Likewise, one may readily agree that welfare payments and crime rates were low during the 1950s and that both are now comparatively high. Yet has crime increased
because
of rising welfare payments or
despite
them, or have crime and welfare nothing to do with each other and is the relationship between the two phenomena merely coincidental? The facts do not provide an answer to such questions, and no amount of statistical manipulation of data can possibly change
this
fact. The data of history are logically compatible with any of such rival interpretations, and historians, insofar as they are just historians, have no way of deciding in favor of one or the other.

If one is to make a rational choice among such rival and incompatible interpretations, this is only possible if one has a
theory
at one's disposal, or at least a
theoretical
proposition,
whose validity does
not
depend on historical experience but can be established
a
priori,
i.e., once and for all by means of the
intellectual
apprehension
or
comprehension
of
the
nature
of
things.
In some circles this kind of theory is held in low esteem; and some philosophers, especially of the empiricist-positivist variety, have declared any such theory off-limits or even impossible. This is not a philosophical treatise devoted to a discussion of issues of epistemology and ontology. Here and in the following, I do not want to directly refute the empiricist-positivist thesis that there is no such thing as
a
priori
theory,
i.e., propositions which assert something about reality
and
can be validated independent of the outcome of any future experience.
¹⁰
It is only
appropriate, however, to acknowledge from the outset that I consider this thesis—and indeed the entire empiricist-positivist research program, which can be interpreted as the result of the application of the (egalitarian) principles of democracy to the realm of knowledge and research and has therefore dominated ideologically during most of the twentieth century,—as fundamentally mistaken and thoroughly refuted.
¹¹
Here it suffices to present just a few examples of what is meant by
a
priori
theory
—and in particular to cite some such examples from the realm of the social sciences—in order to put any possible suspicion to rest and recommend my
theoretical
approach
as intuitively plausible and in accordance with common sense.
¹²

¹⁰
See on this subject Ludwig von Mises,
Theory
and
History:
An
Interpretation
of
Social
and
Economic
Evolution
(Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1985);
idem,
The
Ultimate
Foundation
of
Economic
Science:
An
Essay
on
Method
(Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978); Hans-Hermann Hoppe,
Kritik
der
kausalwissen
schaftlichen
Sozialforschung.
Untersuchungen
zur
Grundlegung
von
Soziologie
und
Ok
onomie
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983); idem,
Economic
Science
and
the
Austrian
Method
(Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995).

Examples of what I mean by
a
priori
theory
are: No material thing can be at two places at once. No two objects can occupy the same place. A straight line is the shortest line between two points. No two straight lines can enclose a space. Whatever object is red all over cannot be green (blue, yellow, etc.) all over. Whatever object is colored is also extended. Whatever object has shape has also size. If A is a part of B and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C. 4 = 3+1. 6 = 2 (33-30). Implausibly, empiricists must denigrate such propositions as mere linguistic-syntactic conventions without any empirical content, i.e., "empty" tautologies. In contrast to this view and in accordance with common sense, I understand the same propositions as asserting some simple but fundamental truths about the structure of reality. And in accordance with common sense, too, I would regard someone who wanted to "test" these propositions, or who reported "facts" contradicting or deviating from them, as confused.
A
priori
theory
trumps
and
corrects
experience
(and
logic
overrules
observation),
and
not
vice-versa.

¹¹
See Brand Blanshard,
Reason
and
Analysis
(LaSalle, Ind.: Open Court, 1964); also Arthur Pap,
Semantics
and
Necessary
Truth
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958); Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in
Semantics
of
Natural
Language,
Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds. (New York: Reidel, 1972); and Paul Lorenzen,
Methodisches
Denken
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1968).

¹²
Even a "good empiricist" would have to admit that, according to his own doctrine, he cannot possibly know
a
priori
whether or not
a
priori
theorems exist and may be used to decide between incompatible explanations of one and the same set of historical data; hence, he would have to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, too.

More importantly, examples of
a
priori
theory
also abound in the social sciences, in particular in the fields of political economy and philosophy: Human action is an actor's purposeful pursuit of valued ends with scarce means. No one can purposefully
not
act. Every action is aimed at improving the actor's subjective well-being above what it otherwise would have been. A larger quantity of a good is valued more highly than a smaller quantity of the same good. Satisfaction earlier is preferred over satisfaction later. Production must precede consumption. What is consumed now cannot be consumed again in the future. If the price of a good is lowered, either the same quantity or more will be bought than otherwise. Prices fixed below market clearing prices will lead to lasting shortages. Without private property in factors of production there can be no factor prices, and without factor prices cost-accounting is impossible. Taxes are an imposition on producers and/or wealth owners and reduce production and/or wealth below what it otherwise would have been. Interpersonal conflict is possible only if and insofar as things are scarce. No thing or part of a thing can be owned exclusively by more than one person at a time. Democracy (majority rule) is incompatible with private property (individual ownership and rule). No form of taxation can be uniform (equal), but every taxation involves the creation of two distinct and unequal classes of
taxpayers
versus
taxreceiver-con
snmers.
Property and property titles are distinct entities, and an increase of the latter without a corresponding increase of the former does not raise social wealth but leads to a redistribution of existing wealth.

For an empiricist, propositions such as these must be interpreted as either stating nothing empirical at all and being mere speech conventions, or as forever testable and tentative hypotheses. To us, as to common sense, they are neither. In fact, it strikes us as utterly disingenuous to portray these propositions as having no empirical content. Clearly, they state something about "real" things and events! And it seems similarly disingenuous to regard these propositions as hypotheses. Hypothetical propositions, as commonly understood, are statements such as these: Children prefer McDonald's over Burger King. The worldwide ratio of beef to pork spending is 2:1. Germans prefer Spain over Greece as a vacation destination. Longer education in public schools will lead to higher wages. The volume of shopping shortly before Christmas exceeds that of shortly after Christmas. Catholics vote predominantly "Democratic." Japanese save a quarter of their disposable income. Germans drink more beer than Frenchmen. The United States produces more computers than any other country. Most inhabitants of the U.S. are white and of European descent. Propositions such as these require the
collection of historical data to be validated. And they must be continually reevaluated, because the asserted relationships are not
necessary
(but "contingent") ones; that is, because there is nothing
inherently
impossible, inconceivable, or plain wrong in assuming the opposite of the above: e.g., that children prefer Burger King to McDonald's, or Germans Greece to Spain, etc. This, however, is
not
the case with the former, theoretical propositions. To negate these propositions and assume, for instance, that a smaller quantity of a good might be preferred to a larger one of the same good, that what is being consumed now can possibly be consumed again in the future, or that cost-accounting could be accomplished also without factor prices, strikes one as absurd; and anyone engaged in "empirical research" and "testing" to determine which one of two contradictory propositions such as these does or does not hold appears to be either a fool or a fraud.