Confronting the Colonies (9 page)

From the outbreak of insurgency, external Cold War dimensions impacted upon understandings of the conflict. The JIC perceived the violence as being internationally influenced and the committee accordingly conceptualised Malaya as part of the broader Cold War. Tellingly, there exist very few JIC reports with ‘Malaya' specifically in the title.
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The JIC was far less interested in assessing the evolution of the insurgency between 1948 and 1951. This was the job of authorities on the ground. Accordingly, the committee only commented on the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign as part of broader assessments on the spread of communism.

There is ongoing debate regarding the extent to which international communism directed the outbreak of the insurgency, with early historians arguing in favour of a ‘Cold War orthodoxy'. This traditional account attested that Malaya was part of a worldwide Soviet-inspired communist campaign, initiated by a joint conference of the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (both groups were controlled by Moscow) in Calcutta in early 1948.

Since the 1970s, however, historians have generally preferred a revisionist account. This suggests that the MCP's central committee launched (or stumbled upon) the uprising internally in March 1948.
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More recently, Karl Hack and Geoff Wade have posited a ‘post-revisionist' thesis in which they emphasise the international element but as part of a dynamic two-way relationship with internal factors. They argue that ‘Zhdanov's “two camp” line [the idea that the world was divided into two camps—that of Western imperialism and Soviet anti-imperialism—and that conflict was inevitable] was being disseminated amongst Asian parties by late 1947, causing […] by February 1948, a widespread and dramatic reappraisal of policies in parties across much of Asia'. Therefore, MCP decisions ‘were firmly anchored in, and justified by, the changing international communist line' which had moved away from past optimism and united front policies.
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The role of external Soviet-led
communism was not clear-cut but was certainly subject to nuances and complexities.

Despite such intricacy, it swiftly became accepted within Whitehall that the conflict was inseparable from wider considerations. Malaya became heavily bound up with the spread of communism across China and South-East Asia. State-centric focus on externalities began as soon as the violence erupted. This view was put particularly grandiloquently by Bernard Montgomery, the outspoken former chief of the Imperial General Staff. In 1951, he described Malaya in the context of: ‘the contest between East and West, between Communism and Democracy, between evil and Christianity'. He further proclaimed that the Cold War was ‘approaching its climax [and the] main objectives of Stalin are today in the East'.
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Whatever the nuanced intricacies of the situation, they clearly did not appeal to ‘Monty'.

International communist patterns were also stressed by the Foreign Office. Placing Malaya in the regional (or even global) and state-centric Cold War context, diplomats argued that Cominform ‘must have' had a plan for South-East Asia. Despite having no direct evidence of Soviet involvement, diplomats also played up the links between the MCP and Chinese communists.
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It is more difficult to generalise about the Colonial Office view, as different officials expressed different interpretations. On the one hand certain colonial papers were stating that it was not possible to single out any one incident as leading to the change-over of the policy of the Communists from indirect to direct action.

On the other hand the colonial secretary was quick to point to communism. Two weeks after the declaration of emergency he informed the cabinet that ‘the trouble is almost certainly communist-instigated, though direct connection between the gangsters and the Communist Party cannot always be traced'.
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He later warned all colonial governors that ‘the sources which have inspired the outbreak in Malaya […] are on the look-out for similar opportunities elsewhere'.
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Elsewhere, the rather sedate figure of Marston Logan, an official in the Colonial Office's Defence Department, was busy compiling fortnightly reports on communist activities in the colonies for the Foreign Office. These reports quickly recognised the role of international communism and traced the direction of the uprising back to Cominform headquarters.
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The broader Cold War did gradually impact upon colonial thinking as the year drew on. According to Frank Furedi, ‘government departments
such as the Foreign Office and the War Office bombarded imperial mandarins with warnings about the threat of subversion', and ‘Foreign Office pressure in particular boosted Cold War thinking in the Colonial Office'.
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The archives support this claim. For example, Reginald Hibbert, then a rigorous and straight-laced junior official in the Foreign Office, later admitted as much. He stated that: ‘On one or two occasions we have entered into correspondence with the Colonial Office to try to impress on them our view of the communist threat in south east Asia and the part which the Malayan Communist Party plays in it. I think we should continue to impress our views on the Colonial Office whenever we can'.
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As the year progressed, Colonial Office reports increasingly recognised links between the MCP, China and the Cominform. Logan was convinced and, in October 1948, pointed to ‘the evidence of direct connection between the Cominform and the present outbreak of lawlessness as organised by the Malayan Communist Party'. He added that ‘the presence in Bangkok of an unnecessarily large Russian embassy, the contacts in Calcutta a few months ago of Communist representatives from Europe and Asia, [and] the close similarity in experience between Cominform directive and Malayan Communist Party publications form together substantial grounds for regarding the outbreak as stimulated by Moscow'.
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Even before the outbreak of violence, the Colonial Office informed the JIC that ‘there is no evidence of direct Russian influence' amongst communism in Malaya, but interestingly warned that ‘there are signs that increasing attention is to be paid to Asia as a field for spreading communism', and pointed to the forthcoming Calcutta Conference as evidence.
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By 1950, the agreed line was that the MCP was ‘part of the Kremlin's worldwide campaign against western powers'.
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Despite this, certain sections of the Foreign Office continued to accuse their colonial counterparts of downplaying international trends.
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MI5 also appear to have emphasised the external origins of the Malayan violence. Percy Sillitoe even argued that it predated the Calcutta Conference. In October 1948, he sent an interesting note to the head of SIFE which is worth quoting at length:

there is little doubt, in our opinion that the Malayan Communist leaders must have received some direction from Moscow, either directly or through the Chinese Communist Party or some other channels, such as the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok, which led them, at the beginning of [1948?] to start preparations
for action. Sharkey's [leader of the Australian Communist Party] visits to Malaya and the proceedings of the Congress of the Communist Party of India and the Calcutta Youth Conference in February and March, 1948, added fuel to their flames.
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In the same month, an SIS document highlighted the importance of ascertaining the extent to which local communist parties were directed by Moscow. The priority was re-iterated in a memo circulated by Dick White, then a senior officer at MI5, in February the following year.
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Such thinking clearly featured prominently on the intelligence agenda.

The JIC is a product of its constituent parts. Given the predominance of the Cold War mindset amongst its member departments, the committee unsurprisingly followed suit and blamed external communist forces for influencing the Malayan violence. This perception was significant in shaping the policymaking context. In July 1948 the JIC warned cabinet members and local authorities that ‘the fundamental aim of the Soviet leaders is to hasten the elimination of capitalism from all parts of the world … [through] aggressive promotion of Communism in all parts of the world'.
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Intelligence blamed the outbreak of violence in Malaya on the aforementioned Calcutta Conference. The JIC, which at the time assumed ‘an identity of interest between Peking and Moscow and tended to treat China almost like a Soviet possession',
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asserted that the conference ‘should probably be regarded as evidence of the higher priority given by the Soviet leaders to the promotion of Communism in the Far East and South-East Asia in particular'. According to the committee's intelligence, ‘these meetings were closely followed by a marked intensification of Communist activities including strikes and terrorism in Burma and Malaya'.
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This was a mistake. Recently released Soviet archival documents undermine the theory, at least in terms of direct instruction. No orders from Moscow were passed to local communists to rebel. Instead, Soviet involvement leading up to the Calcutta Conference involved a desire for increased information and links but also caution about the prospects of Asian communist parties. Chin Peng and the MCP were aware of outside influences but did not receive specific instructions from outside the colony including from the Soviet Union or China, to instigate an insurgency. Instead it was driven by local grievances and small town loyalties.
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Whilst the committee was correct in looking to a broader international trend to an extent—by 1948 armed communist uprisings
had occurred in Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia—intelligence assessments did not go far enough in emphasising the relationship between external and internal factors. Whilst the insurrection was portrayed as being inspired by forces in Moscow or Beijing, local colonial authorities later admitted that evidence for this was scant.
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By 1950, John Strachey, the secretary of state for war, was informing cabinet that ‘there seems to be little evidence that either Russia or China is giving much direct assistance to the Malayan uprising'. If so, Strachey argued that this was simply following communist precedent: ‘only a minimum amount of help, except in exceptional conditions, has been given to Communist Parties who have entered into armed struggle in various parts of the world'.
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The JIC further concluded that Soviet-driven communism would aim to exploit nationalist grievances. This idea became a trend regarding intelligence assessments during the first fifteen years of the Cold War. It was, for example, repeated seven years later in relation to the Cypriot insurgency. The JIC reaffirmed its stance at the end of 1948. Leaving little doubt, intelligence stated that in Malaya, as well as Burma and Indonesia, ‘there is a strong reason to believe that the change in policy was occasioned by factors in the international, rather than the national, situation'. Soviet strategy, according to the JIC, aimed to forge ‘a militant Communist front in the Far East', including in Malaya, which would include aggravating conflicts between imperialism and oppressed colonial peoples. When solely discussing Malaya, the committee did show some awareness of changes in local MCP policy, but emphasised how it was ‘clearly based on Zdhanov's review of the international situation'.
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In fairness, the committee did attempt to demonstrate awareness of the complexities of the situation. Intelligence tried not to conceptualise the violence solely as an order issued directly from Moscow. But such discussion lacked detail. For example, the JIC acknowledged that international communism ‘offered the general guidance which the Asian Communists had lacked […] and was partly responsible for the subsequent re-orientation of Communist policy in […] Malaya'. This was tantalisingly close to the truth. Having noted only general guidance and partial responsibility however, the assessment failed to elaborate on the interplay between this and other internal factors.
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Perhaps it was the utter inadequacy of local intelligence that prevented the more sophisticated discussion of internal factors. As is often the case in insurgencies
(and was to happen in Cyprus and Aden), intelligence started to dry up as police informant networks were targeted by the guerrillas.

The JIC not only looked to international factors when assessing the causes of violence. As the conflict progressed, intelligence assessments continued to internationalise events in Malaya. However, by 1949, the JIC's state-centrism began to focus more on China than the Soviet Union. This shift perhaps reflected growing doubts about the monolithic nature of world communism following the Soviet-Yugoslav schism in June 1948. The JIC inserted caveats into the standard line that Mao was a loyal disciple to Moscow, speculating ‘whether Chinese Communists will remain loyal to Moscow when national interests and the policy of the Kremlin are in doubt'.
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Focus on China also reflected Foreign Office thinking, where officials had since reappraised views of the Calcutta Conference. According to Reginald Hibbert, any suggestion that the MCP was controlled by Moscow via Calcutta ‘seemed very farfetched;' it was far more connected to Chinese communism.
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Greater divergences between Foreign Office and Colonial Office thinking were more prevalent and increasingly acrimonious when it came to external links with China. Criticising the latter's inexperience in dealing with communism, Hibbert argued that the ‘Colonial Office underestimate the MCP, misunderstand the relationship between overseas Chinese and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], and draw the wrong conclusions about the relative positions in communist strategy of the MCP and CCP'.
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For its part, MI5 officials also moved towards the Chinese assistance, if not direction, thesis. In 1950 MI5's security liaison officer for Malaya confirmed that the Chinese were ‘training repatriates' from Malaya with a view to infiltrating them into the colony. Not wishing to totally dismiss potential Soviet influence however, he added that ‘whether the Soviets will be prepared to stand by and watch the C.C.P. attain this theatre leadership, or whether it will once again intervene in an attempt to link the M.C.P. to itself […] time alone will show'.
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