Closing the Ring (69 page)

On broad grounds of strategy, Hitler’s decision to send into the south of Italy as many as eighteen divisions, involving, with their maintenance troops, probably something like half a million Germans, and to make a large secondary front in Italy, is not unwelcome to the Allies. We must fight the Germans somewhere, unless we are to stand still and watch the Russians. This wearing battle in Italy occupies troops who could not be employed in other greater operations, and it is an effective prelude to them.

*  *  * *  *

General Smuts telegraphed to me next day in terms which illustrate so well his breadth of vision.

General Smuts to Prime Minister
    23 Feb. 44

Your very effective recital of British war effort will greatly impress world public opinion. It gives vast numbers of new facts not generally known, which form the proper pendant to Russia’s magnificent effort. It will also counterbalance the one-sided impression given by our propaganda of our own ineffectiveness in Burma and at Anzio in comparison with vast sweep of Russian victories. I myself have not followed our strategy in the Anzio beachhead, which I had thought would link up with the Cassino front with the object of breaking resistance of Germans in the mountains in the south. An isolated pocket has now been created, which is unconnected with enemy’s main southern front, and which is itself besieged instead of giving relief to the pressure against us in the south.

The position is once more restored to its right proportions by your emphasis on our vast air effort, which destroys Germany’s war effort at its source and prepares for the coming Western Front in the best possible way. But I would not myself give undue publicity to this front, since it may hold unpleasant surprises for us. The retreat of the German armies in the East is not only due to Russian prowess and our attraction of Luftwaffe from that front, but probably also to the Germans withdrawing large strategic reserves to counter our threat in the West. In a theatre where enemy is fully prepared for us, serious delays, if not setbacks, may be met with, and we may have to face grave disappointments. The German plan may be to halt us effectively in the West, and then hasten back to the East to stop the penetration of Russian armies into Germany, which he must mortally fear. If this is not the German plan, I do not understand their strategy of fighting stubbornly against us for every inch of ground in Italy, while letting Russia achieve such successes on the Eastern Front.

Instead of giving undue publicity to our Western Front, our propaganda should for the present be concentrated on our air offensive against Germany. I do believe that this has had even more far-reaching effects than Russian land victories.

If any reserves are called for, remember our now well-trained South African 6th Armoured Division, which is in Egypt. They only need some added transport to give a good account of themselves in a suitable theatre.

  To this I replied, expressing views which I hold to this day:

Prime Minister to Field-Maul Smuts
    27 Feb. 44

Thank you for your telegram. During the Conferences at Carthage and at Marrakesh I was able to clear difficulties out of the way and get this big amphibious operation at Anzio soundly organised. My personal efforts did not extend to the conduct of the battle, which of course I left altogether to the commanders, once they were landed safely at the right place, as they were. In all his talks with me, Alexander envisaged that the essence of the battle was the seizure of the Alban Hills with the utmost speed, and to this end I was able to obtain from the United States their 504th Parachute Regiment, although at the time it was under orders to return for “Overlord.” But at the last moment General Clark cancelled the use of this regiment, and the American General Lucas, a man of fifty-five, who at Salerno had distinguished himself in command of a corps, seems to have had the idea in his mind that at all costs he must be prepared for a counter-attack. As a result, although directly I learnt the landing was successful, I sent Alexander injunctions that he should peg out claims rather than consolidate bridgeheads, the whole operation became stagnant. Needless to say, the logistic calculations all turned out to be on the overgenerous side and there were very large margins in hand. No one can deny that this was lucky, seeing that plans originally made for 50,000 men are now comfortably supporting 170,000.

Naturally I am very disappointed at what has appeared to be the frittering away of a brilliant opening in which both fortune and design had played their part. I do not in any way however repent of what has been done. As a result the Germans have now transferred into the south of Italy at least eight more divisions, so that in all there are eighteen south of Rome. It is vital to the success of “Overlord” that we keep away from that theatre and hold elsewhere as many German divisions as possible, and hard fighting in Italy throughout the spring will provide for the main operation a perfect prelude and accompaniment.

We had hoped that a big thrust would be launched northwards from the Cassino front to correspond with the landing. This was indeed planned, but it did not take place because apparently it proved immensely difficult to debouch past Cassino up the Liri Valley. Naturally we are striving with might and main to join up the two forces, and at any moment the curtain may go up on the next act of the drama. Truscott, a young American Divisional Commander, whom everyone speaks of most highly, has now superseded
Lucas. My confidence in Alexander remains undiminished.

Here at home all goes fairly well, though the little folk are more active. However, their chirrupings will be stilled before long by the thunder of the cannonade.

Most certainly do I look forward to seeing you, and I rejoice that you will be at my side in momentous times.

*  *  * *  *

Such is the story of the struggle of Anzio; a story of high opportunity and shattered hopes, of skilful inception on our part and swift recovery by the enemy, of valour shared by both. We now know that early in January, the German High Command had intended to transfer five of their best divisions from Italy to Northwest Europe. Kesselring protested that in such an event he could no longer carry out his orders to fight south of Rome and he would have to withdraw. Just as the argument was at its height the Anzio landing took place. The High Command dropped the idea, and instead of the Italian Front contributing forces to Northwest Europe the reverse took place. Hitler was enraged at the failure of his Fourteenth Army to drive the Allies into the sea. After their offensive of February 16, he ordered a selected group of twenty officers of all arms and ranks fighting in Italy to report to him personally about conditions at the front. This was the first and only time that this happened during the war. “He would have done much better,” comments General Westphal, “to visit the front himself and been convinced of Allied superiority in planes and guns.”

We knew nothing of all these changes of plan at the time, but it proves that the aggressive action of our armies in Italy, and specifically the Anzio stroke, made its full contribution towards the success of “Overlord.” We shall see later on the part it played in the liberation of Rome.

¹
Westphal:
Heer in Fesseln
, page 240.

²
Heer in Fesseln
, page 242.

11
Italy: Cassino

Mussolini and Ciano___Marshal Badoglio’s Harassed Government___Correspondence with President Roosevelt in February___My Statement About Italy in the House of Commons, February
22___
The Monastery at Cassino___The Second Major Attack, February
15___
Deadlock in March___Vesuvius in Eruption___My Telegrams to the President of March
8
and
13___
His Reply Disappoints Me___The Russians Recognise the Badoglio Government___I Report the War Cabinet’s View to the President, March
15___
The Campaign in Italy Drags___Alexander’s Convincing Explanation, March
20___
Two Months’ Delay___Anglo-American Argument About “Overlord,” “Anvil,” and the Italian Campaign___Views of General Eisenhower and General Wilson___Agreement Reached___My Telegram to General Marshall of April
16___
Italian Politics___The Crown Prince Humbert Becomes Lieutenant-Governor of the Realm___Prelude to the New Allied Offensive in May.

T
HE BITTERNESS AND CONFUSION
of the Italian scene were heightened in the New Year. Mussolini’s phantom Republic came under mounting pressure from the Germans. The governing circles round Badoglio in the South were assailed by intrigues in Italy and despised by public opinion in Britain and the United States. Mussolini was the first to react.

When he arrived in Munich after his escape, he found there his daughter Edda and her husband, Count Ciano. These two had fled from Rome at the time of the surrender, and, although Ciano had voted against his father-in-law at the fateful meeting of the Grand Council, he hoped, thanks to the influence of his
wife, for a reconciliation. During these days in Munich this in fact happened. This aroused the indignation of Hitler, who had already placed the Ciano family under house arrest on their arrival. The reluctance of the Duce to punish the traitors to Fascism, and particularly Ciano, was perhaps the main reason why Hitler formed such a low opinion of his colleague at this critical time.

It was not until the declining strength of the “Republic of Salo” had fallen far, and the impatience of its German masters had sharpened, that Mussolini agreed to let loose a wave of calculated vengeance. All those leaders of the old Fascist régime who had voted against him in July and who could be caught in German-occupied Italy were brought to trial at the end of 1943, in the mediaeval fortress at Verona. Among them was Ciano. Without exception they received the death sentence. In spite of the entreaties and threats of Edda, the Duce could not relent. In January 1944 the group, which included not only Ciano but also the seventy-eight-year-old Marshal de Bono, a colleague in the march on Rome, were taken out to die a traitor’s death—to be shot in the back tied to a chair. They all died bravely.

The end of Ciano was in keeping with all the elements of Renaissance tragedy. Mussolini’s submission to Hitler’s vengeful demands brought him only shame, and the miserable neo-Fascist Republic dragged on by Lake Garda—a relic of the Broken Axis.

*  *  * *  *

In the South, Badoglio was continually harassed by the remnants of the opposition to Fascism in its early days and which had sprung up in political groupings since the previous summer. They not only pressed for a broader administration in which they would share, but also sought to destroy the Monarchy, which they declared to be compromised by prolonged acquiescence in Mussolini’s rule. There was growing public support for their activities, both in America and in England. In January, a congress of the six Italian parties was held in Bari, and resolutions in this sense were passed.

I therefore telegraphed to the President:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    3 Feb. 44

I earnestly hope that the existing régime in Italy will be allowed to function at least until the great battles now being fought by the soldiers of our two countries have resulted in our capture of Rome. I am sure that a disturbance now of such authority as remains in the Italian State and the attempt to create a new authority out of political groups with no real backing will add greatly to our difficulties. Moreover, these groups, when formed into a Government, in order to win credit from the Italian people, would feel it essential to assert Italian interests in a much stronger form than the King and Badoglio dare to do. I feel it would be a great pity if Badoglio threw in his hand, and our reports show that the Italian Navy might be powerfully affected by action against the King. Much British and American blood is flowing, and I plead that military considerations should carry weight.

His reply was reassuring:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
    11 Feb. 44

I have directed the Department of State to take no action toward effecting any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time, and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied forces.

I think, though, that you and I should regard this only as a temporary reprieve for the two old gentlemen.

  I elaborated my view:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    13 Feb. 44

I fully agree we should review the whole scene after we are settled in Rome. We have not got there yet, and Lincoln’s birthday celebrations remind me about not crossing the Fox River till you get to it.

The present regime is the lawful Government of Italy, with whom we have concluded an armistice, in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over, and, with some of the Italian Army and Air Force, are fighting on our side. This Italian Government
will obey our directions far more than any other that we may laboriously constitute. On the other hand, it has more power over the Fleet, Army officials, etc., than anything else which can be set up out of the worn-out débris of political parties, none of whom have the slightest title by election or prescription. A new Italian Government will have to make its reputation with the Italian people by standing up to us. They will very likely try to wriggle out of the armistice terms. As for being instrumental in handing over without a mutiny part of the Italian Fleet to Russia, I cannot conceive that they would do so, or that if they did their writ would run with the Italian Navy. I hope therefore that when the time comes we shall consult together. I gave strong support to the State Department over Darlan. They seem rueful about that episode now. Looking back upon it, I consider it was right. Several thousand British and American soldiers are alive today because of it, and it got us Dakar at a time when we could ill have spared the large forces needed for its capture. …