Chain of Title (7 page)

The family returned to Palm Beach for months of recovery, Lisa staying home with Jenna for a few weeks. Finally, on June 3, 2009,
Florida Default Law Group (FDLG), the foreclosure mill law firm litigating on behalf of U.S. Bank, responded to the motion to dismiss. Count II, the “Re-establishment of Lost Note,” had been removed. FDLG now maintained that its client found the note and the assignment of mortgage. They submitted them, along with a bundle of other affidavits and documents. Lisa finally possessed the raw materials to assess U.S. Bank's case. And she got right to it.

The newly found note was not endorsed in blank but directly endorsed from DHI Mortgage to JPMorgan Chase Bank. Kathy Harman, an assistant secretary at DHI Mortgage, signed the endorsement. In Lisa's view, U.S. Bank had to receive the endorsed note under the pooling and servicing agreement. But the chain of title stopped at Chase. The wrong entity was foreclosing.
Furthermore, the mortgage assignment went directly from the
assignor, “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, incorporated as Nominee for DHI Mortgage Company,” to the assignee, U.S. Bank. Lisa made a mental note to Google “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems” later, but she knew enough to see a fatal error. The assignment skipped a link in the chain. It should have gone from DHI Mortgage to JPMorgan Chase, with an additional assignment from JPMorgan Chase to U.S. Bank. But that was not what this assignment showed. It looked like whoever put these things together had no idea which entity belonged in which spot. One affidavit had asterisks wherever the name U.S. Bank appeared, and a handwritten footnote,
“**Chase Home Finance LLC as-attorney-in-fact-for.”

U.S. Bank's address was listed on the assignment as 3415 Vision Drive, Columbus, Ohio. Googling the address revealed it was actually the headquarters of Chase Home Finance, her mortgage servicer. How did two banks fit in the same headquarters? Then there was the date on the assignment: “Assignor has executed and delivered this Instrument on May 21, 2009.” That was three months
after
Lisa Epstein was served with foreclosure papers. According to this document, U.S. Bank had not yet been assigned the mortgage at the time they sued Lisa.

Here in Lisa's hands was clear evidence of securitization FAIL, documented proof that the transactions on her mortgage were either improperly done or not done at all, with the assignment mocked up after the fact. Lisa rechecked the pooling and servicing agreement for her trust; like all of them, it stipulated that
JPMorgan Chase had a ninety-day closing window back in 2007 to deposit the mortgage and note into the hands of U.S. Bank. The documents showed that U.S. Bank never got assigned the mortgage in time, meaning the securities based on her loan were invalid and unenforceable. And this poorly drafted cover-up was presented to a court, entered into the public record for everyone to see. Lisa laughed out loud for what felt like the first time in months.

Lisa also finally had actual names of people involved in these transactions. For example, there was Kathy Harman at DHI Mortgage, who endorsed her note to JPMorgan Chase. Lisa found a number for DHI Mortgage and tracked down Harman. “Hi, Kathy, my name is Lisa Epstein. I bought a mortgage from your company a couple years ago. I don't know what's going on here—I'm being sued by a bank. I don't even know anything about U.S. Bank.”

“Mm-hmm.”

“I just got a copy of the note, and your name is on it. I'm just trying to get to the bottom of this—can you send me what you have in your file about me?”

Kathy Harman may have never received a call like this before. But after the initial bewilderment, she offered to fax Lisa all the information she could find on her mortgage, including screenshots from the computer system. “I hope this can help you,” Kathy said.

One screenshot showed that DHI Mortgage shipped the loan out to something called “Chase Alt-A Bulk” right after Lisa signed it (“Alt-A” is industry shorthand for a below-prime mortgage that isn't quite a subprime loan). JPMorgan Chase “table-funded” the loan, supplying the funding up front and taking possession of the mortgage and note thereafter. Under Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations, table funding actually had to be disclosed; Lisa never received any disclosure. More important, nothing in Kathy Harman's file included any reference to U.S. Bank, whose law firm managed to doctor up the assignment but not the promissory note, which was—by its own evidence—held by a different party.

The mortgage assignment, dated three months after the foreclosure filing, also had a bunch of names on it. Christina Trowbridge was listed as vice president and Whitney Cook as assistant secretary of the mysterious company known as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. The assignment included two witnesses, Zaher Gerges and Vladimir Buskarov. After their signatures came a statement from a notary public from Franklin County, Ohio, named Jennifer Jacoby, who attested that Christina Trowbridge and Whitney Cook “personally appeared” before her and “acknowledged that they executed the foregoing as its duly authorized officers.” Underneath, in small type, there was this little notation: “Recording requested, prepared by and return to: Cirilo Codrington.”

Of all the names on the assignment, Lisa figured she'd have the easiest time finding the real Cirilo Codrington, since that name was so unusual. Plus he wasn't just a witness; he prepared the incorrect, after-the-fact document. Maybe he could shed some light on its origins. So Lisa went to where presumably all private investigators start missing-persons searches these days: Facebook.
When she typed in Cirilo Codrington, only one profile came up. The location: Panama City, Panama. Lisa sent Cirilo a
friend request, not knowing whether someone in Panama would notice an unknown lady from Palm Beach, or what she would even do about it if he did. But Cirilo quickly replied with a confirmation. He then sent Lisa a private message: “Who are u?”

Before panic set in, Lisa pulled together a cover story. “Your name looks so familiar,” she wrote back. “I was searching for someone else and saw your profile and something was triggered in my memory. Have you ever been to Florida or Washington D.C. area (VA and/or MD)?”

Fortunately for Lisa, she cast her net wide enough to find a connection. “Washington dc my dad used to live over there, his name is bruce antonio codrington. I live in Panama and my aunts live in landover hills Maryland.”

“I used to live all over Wash. DC!” Lisa replied. “In No. VA and in Kensington, MD and Columbia, MD. Now I'm in Florida. Do you ever go by Cirilo besides here on Facebook?”

Lisa didn't get a response right away, so a few days later, she tried to pump more info out of her new Panamanian friend. “Hi Cirilo, by any chance did you used to work doing mortgage stuff? I'm just starting to work in the industry and I saw your name on a document and wondered if that was you! I mean, how many people have the same name as you do? Small world! How's life in Panama these days? Lisa.”

Thirteen minutes later, Cirilo messaged back. “Sure I work for Firm Solutions Panama it has to do with foreclosures I am the training manager.”

Maybe private detective work was Lisa's calling, not nursing. She later tried to get Cirilo interested in an interview about mortgage documents with a local paper; she would be the interviewer, of course. Cirilo replied, “I will let u know promptly,” but never followed up.

But Firm Solutions Panama was enough of a lead. The company billed itself as
“the premier legal and financial support services provider in Panama.” They seemed to work directly with foreclosure mills, providing and processing documents. Like outsourcing in American manufacturing, law firms apparently outsourced document creation, which would go from the doc shop in Panama to wherever the documents needed to be signed.
Lisa found one Facebook page where Firm Solutions and Florida Default Law Group, the firm in her case, were connected.

Why would a law firm employ an offshore document processor in Panama unless the documents had never been created initially? These were
basic forms, to be completed for any mortgage transfer. It was obvious to Lisa that this was all a weak attempt to paper over inattention to proper procedure during the go-go housing bubble.
Mortgage originators sold $1.9 million worth of loans
every minute
in the peak bubble years; they had no time or inclination for paperwork. These fabrications covered up the original sin: nobody established the chain of title properly, on perhaps millions of mortgages.

Cirilo seemed nice enough to Lisa. She figured he was just a cog in the Great Foreclosure Machine, a line worker, someone told what to do and when to do it. If it wasn't so sad it would be comical: day by day, unsuspecting Central Americans put on ties and dress slacks, went to the office, and nonchalantly manufactured the raw materials in U.S. foreclosure cases, unaware of their central role in what increasingly looked to Lisa like a criminal enterprise. How many families were thrown onto the street every day because of what someone in Panama did for a living?

Lisa had one more question. What was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems?

Several different entities had a connection to Lisa's loan: DHI Mortgage, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Chase Home Finance, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank. But this new company, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, seemed to play no role in the securitization chain. The assignment called it the nominee for DHI Mortgage. But the note said DHI sold the originated loan to JPMorgan Chase. How was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems the nominee for the mortgage but not the note? How did they fit into the picture?

The answer can be found in hundreds of obscure county offices all over America. In Palm Beach County they call the lead administrator at this office the “clerk of courts.” Elsewhere they are called “county recorders” or “registers of deeds.” Whatever the title, public servants have managed these offices since before the American Revolution. They track and record property transfers on every piece of land in the United States. You could walk into a county recording office and trace the history of your property for as long as it existed.

Property recordation is based on old English common law. After the feudal period, when the monarchy owned all land, statutes governing privately owned real estate gradually developed. The need for standardized
property laws intensified during the Crusades, when landowners would travel to fight and leave their properties in the care of trusted colleagues. Often, when the landowners returned, the colleagues proved to not be so trustworthy, as they would refuse to give the properties back.

The Statute of Frauds, passed in England in 1677, required that all agreements related to land, from leases to conveyances of transfer, had to be recorded in writing, signed and dated by all parties involved in the transaction. Later, notarizations, the ultimate assurance that the proper person signed a document on a specific date and in a particular place, were added. Contracts without written evidence would be unenforceable. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds, laid out in its preamble, was “For prevention of many fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury.” It allowed courts to fairly adjudicate disputes over property, and it gave land a specific value, turning it into a tradable and insurable instrument. If anyone could claim property without consequence, nobody would have confidence to buy or sell real estate. In
The Mystery of Capital
, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto identifies accurate property records as what separates undeveloped countries from developed ones.
“What creates capital,” de Soto writes, “is an implicit process buried in the intricacies of its formal property systems. The formal property system is capital's hydroelectric plant. This is where capital is born.”

Without a landed gentry in America, colonists frequently bought and sold property, prompting the need for a system to codify transfers in law.
The Massachusetts Plymouth Bay Colony established a recording law in 1636, mandating public acknowledgment to the governor for all home and land sales. Other colonies followed, legalizing the recording statutes used today.
They created land registration offices, typically at the county level, to track property transfers and hold evidence of legal title. These offices designated what instruments needed to be recorded and preserved, along with penalties for failure to record. The information was indexed and available to the public, so mortgage lenders could confirm ownership before they issued loans, tracking the chain of title back to the original owner and ensuring the lack of defects in that chain. All transfers included a nominal fee to the public recording office to cover administrative costs. Like any pen-and-paper
system subject to human error, it wasn't without its occasional rough spots. But it worked pretty well for three hundred years.

When banks started securitizing mortgages on a wide scale in the 1980s, they viewed recording offices as a problem to be overcome. The nominal recording fee, typically between $25 and $50, barely registered on a mortgage costing several hundred thousand dollars. But to create the bankruptcy-remote trusts used in mortgage-backed securities, banks needed to transfer mortgages multiple times. Under the old system, that would trigger a recording fee and document creation at every step. With millions of mortgages expected to enter securitization, suddenly recording fees represented a drain on profits.

In October 1993, at the Mortgage Bankers Association annual convention, a white paper suggested the creation of a private electronic database to track mortgage transfers. A subsequent accounting study by Ernst & Young identified hundreds of millions of dollars in savings by avoiding recording fees, leading to the incorporation in 1995 of
the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), backed by funding from several major financial institutions, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. By the end of the 1990s, practically all GSE and private-label mortgage securities involved MERS. Despite the lack of public debate or legislative approval, this database commandeered the land recording system for a substantial majority of mortgages in the United States.