British Voices (16 page)

With regard to the plans of the IRA it was very difficult to get any information about these in time to take action. This was on account of the very strict oath taken by members of the IRB who alone knew the details of any approaching operations. The ordinary members of the IRA were simply told to parade at a certain place at a certain time, and did not know the nature of the operations until they got there.

It therefore became necessary to study the personality and habits of the IRA leaders very carefully and after each operation carried out by them, to make deductions as to what the next step was likely to be. It was by the use of this method that we obtained our success in the Crushnalanniv patrol encounter as explained to you in my first lecture.

(ii) The Inhabitants of the Country

The attitude adopted by the Crown Forces towards the ordinary inhabitants of the country varied very much in different localities. In some places the attitude taken up was that the whole population was hostile, and should be treated accordingly. This was often the attitude adopted by the Auxiliaries. Personally, I was convinced that such an attitude was fundamentally wrong, and that in conditions of this nature, you must at all costs distinguish the sheep from the wolves. If you fail to do so, you drive the whole population into the hands of the enemy.

This again is one of the duties of the Battalion IO. He must find out all he can about the political sympathies of every civilian: if hostile, whether they are extremists or not; if friendly, whether they are prepared to give information and, if so, what their information is worth.

I found the best way to do this was to keep a large scale six inch map on the wall of my office. On the maps every farm and detached house is marked, and as we got the information, I filled in the name of the occupier of each farm or house. I also kept in a book a note of the political sympathies of these occupiers. I was, therefore, able before any officer went out on a raid, to give him all available information as to whom he was likely to find in each house.

(iii) Topography of the Country

Under this heading comes information as to the most covered approach to each farm or house: the existence of any lanes or ‘borheens' down which any of the enemy might escape and which should be ‘blocked' before the house was approached; good view points from which observation could be kept on the surrounding country during operations; and the state of roads, tracks, etc.

1. Methods of Obtaining Information

Owing to the secret nature of the hostile forces and the strict oath taken by then, bribes were of little use, and, although a limited amount of money was available for this purpose, I only on one occasion found any opportunity of using it. The most profitable methods were as follows:

• (i)
  Most important of all, an IO must move about the country and hunt for information. It will not come to him if he sits in his office all day.
  
• (ii)
  He must keep in close touch with the Loyalists – especially those who are not afraid to tell him what they know.
  

This is not always an easy thing to do, as if the IRA suspected a Loyalist of giving information or being too friendly with the Crown Forces, it meant certain death to him. It was our usual practice therefore to approach their houses after dark, and very long night journeys often had to be made in order to do this.

Captured documents were often of great value. Notebooks often contained the rolls of the local Company, list of arms and ammunition in possession, etc. The well known Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence MacSwiney, was captured as the result of a letter ordering a litigant to appear at a Sinn Féin Court which fell into our hands.

Information obtained direct from members of the IRA. This was very rare, but I had in my area an officer of one of the local Companies whom I had had convicted of some small offence and sentenced to six months imprisonment. As he was the owner of a farm, he found it very inconvenient to go to prison, and so suggested that, if I would get his sentence postponed, he would give me weekly reports of the state of his Company. This I agreed to, but threatened to enforce the sentence if the reports did not come in regularly. He proved very useful.

Anonymous letters. These were very numerous and had to be treated with a good deal of suspicion. It was often the case of one family trying to get a bit of its own back on a neighbouring family.

2. Functions of the Battalion Intelligence Officers

The main duties of the Battalion IO in warfare of this nature are, I think the following:

• (i)
  To obtain Intelligence of the nature I have indicated above.
  
• (ii)
  To submit to his CO plans for suggested operations based on the nature of intelligence in his possession.
  
• (iii)
  Identify prisoners when captured. This was one of the most difficult things in the whole campaign. The hostile leaders were seldom known by sight and they invariably gave false names. A number of them thus slipped through our hands after being actually captured.
  

Picture 50 to 60 civilians lined up in front of you, out of which you have to pick any of the IRA leaders. At first it seems almost impossible, but after a little practice one becomes able to select a few likely ‘types'. It then becomes a question of getting these few men identified and here the IOs' knowledge of the local civilians comes in.

A successful method which I practised for some time was to ask any of the old inhabitants for the names of the suspected men. If the names they gave did not agree with those given themselves, you knew you had got a ‘wrong un'.

Of course, we could not keep a man indefinitely if we could not identify him, and we frequently had to release men whom we were convinced were rebel leaders, from sheer inability to find out who they were.

I think it will be clear from what I have said that the duties of the Battalion IO are very important ones: in fact, the whole success of the conduct of operations in any given area really depends on him. I am of the opinion, therefore, that this position should be filled by a fairly senior officer, who has sufficient standing in the Battalion to enable him to carry out the duties I have described.

That the Intelligence officers did not escape the attention of the IRA is shown by the followings instructions, dated the 16th February, 1921 – ‘it has been decided by the IRA headquarters to compile a list of “aggressive” Intelligence Officers as soon as possible. In determining what IOs would come under the heading of “aggressive”, the following points would be a deciding factor in any decision arrived at:

‘Do they accompany the Military in raids?
Were they concerned in the arrest of Volunteers?
Were they concerned in giving evidence against Volunteers?
Were they concerned in the death of any Volunteers?
Were they concerned in having to go “on the run?”
Do they spy on Volunteers or Volunteers' Houses?
Do they take part in reprisals?
You will also give their full names and addresses with a footnote showing what you think they are worth.'

It would be very interesting to see what sort of a report one got!

3. Training of the Troops

A guerrilla war of this nature demands a very high state of training on the part of troops.The majority of the operations are carried out in small parties and a great many of them at night. Individuality in the NCO and Private Soldier is, therefore, of great value. In this regard the whole Army was seriously handicapped in 1920-21, as a very large proportion of the men in the ranks were youngsters of two or three years' service, or even less.The work from the Private Soldier's point of view was very arduous, as escorts were constantly being called for. In addition, it was necessary to put restrictions on the area in which the soldiers could ‘walk out', for fear of their being kidnapped.

A large number of the raids and searches carried out were naturally unsuccessful, and in these conditions, there was great danger of the troops becoming tired and slack. To avoid this, we decided to try and make them interested in the proceedings which we did by means of lectures and talks on local IRA celebrities, etc. We also encouraged them to bring in any information they might pick up. The result was extremely good, as the troops, almost without exception, became very keen on the work and took a great interest in everything that was done.

Of course, the work there was excellent training for young troops, as they always had to be very much on the alert to prevent being surprised – especially when they were on sentry duty.

Their chief failing was in the lack of Musketry training they had received. In this type of warfare targets are few and fleeting. I think those who have tried it will agree that it is no easy matter to hit a single man running fast and across country, especially when you have often run some distance yourself. Troops taking part in such warfare should have very thorough musketry training as each individual man really becomes a sniper.

4.Use of Arms other than Infantry

Artillery

Permission was not given for the use of Artillery till the summer of 1922, at Belleck, and therefore we had no experience of it. I do not consider, however, that there is any scope for the use of artillery in warfare of this nature, unless the rebels form themselves into larger bodies than they did in Ireland. As it was, there were really no targets upon which artillery could fire.

Tanks

These were too slow moving and too noisy to be of much use in the very open warfare of the South of Ireland. They might, perhaps, be useful in large cities for clearing streets, or taking on rebel strongholds, such as the Four Courts in Dublin.

Armoured Cars

Two types of armoured car were used – the heavy and slow Peerless, and the fast Rolls Royce. Both were very useful.

• (i)
  The Peerless. This was used chiefly to economise manpower in escorts, etc. It was suitable to accompany three-ton lorry convoys, and also for local work, e.g., mail escort to the station, escort for officers drawing pay, ration parties, etc. It was a mistake to send Crossley cars with the Peerless AC, as the reduced speed of the latter caused a heavy strain on the axles of the Crossleys.
  
• (ii) The Rolls Royce. The chief uses of this were:
  
• • (a)
    To escort Crossley cars or Sunbeam touring cars. In this way they were usually employed when Brigade commanders or staff officers wanted to make a tour of the Brigade area.
    
  • (b)
    For offensive operations. They were used with great success for sudden descents on given areas in towns, or on outlying country villages, when the state of the road permitted. Owing to their speed and quiet running they were particularly suitable for this work. They carried a crew of four and were armed with a Vickers Gun. A Hotchkiss gun was often carried also, as a reserve and for use if the AC broke down.
    

Aeroplanes

Owing to the shortage of landing grounds these were little used. It is doubtful whether an airman can see much in a country of this nature, but he should, I think, be able to reconnoitre roads and report whether they are trenched or blocked. Also if an ambush is reported in a definite locality the RAF could be asked to make a reconnaissance of that locality. This I did on one occasion, sending the request by wireless, and having a message with the report dropped in our Barrack Square at Kinsale about a couple of hours later. Where landing grounds were available, aeroplanes would be of great assistance as a quick means of transport for Commanders and Staff Officers.

5. Staff Duties

The Brigades in the South had very large areas to control, and their duties, especially after the declaration of Martial Law, became very arduous.

The Cork Brigade at one time had as many as nine Battalions besides a large amount of MT etc. The question, which then arose was whether it was better to maintain the existing Brigade and increase the staff, or form a new Brigade and divide the area. The former alternative was adopted, the argument in favour of it being that it would take a new Brigade staff some weeks or even months to pick up the threads of a vary intricate situation. The existing Brigade staff was, therefore, increased until it consisted of:

• 1 BM
  
• 1 Assistant BM
  
• 3 Staff Captains (one of whom dealt entirely with legal matters)
  
• 2 Intelligence Officers
  
• 1 Signal Officer
  
• 1 MT Officer.
  

Even then the work was found to be too much for one staff and after the Truce, the area was actually divided into two in view of possible further trouble. The duties of the ‘G' Staff are to co-ordinate the work of other units, to arrange for the maintenance of communications between units, and Brigade HQ, and to disseminate information. The majority of the actual operations must be left to the initiative of the unit commanders, but the work of the Mobile Columns should be contained by Brigade headquarters.

6. General

Ruses – All ranks must always be on the alert to avoid being taken in by the enemy ruses. Reports were frequently received of the IRA ambushes in outlying districts, these reports having been spread by the IRA themselves with a view to inducing us to send out a party to clear the road. This party would then be attacked on the way out.

The people who wage guerrilla warfare are usually adepts in the art of ‘bluff '. On one occasion, the secretary of the Demobilized Soldiers and Sailors Federation asked for an interview with me. On being admitted he offered to help us. We had several interviews until I discovered one day that he also held the position of Battalion commandant in the IRA and that his visits were designed to gain first-hand information of the interior of our Barracks!