Blood and Daring (30 page)

On November 21, Monck ordered the Guelph factory’s warehouse seized until the owners signed a bond pledging that nothing in it and nothing that would be manufactured in the future would be sold to Confederates or those who would transport it to Confederates. The bond was signed.

The next day, Macdonald supported Monck with a proclamation banning all exports of armaments to the United States. On November 30, more boxes of ammunition from the Guelph plant were discovered in Sarnia in the possession of men believed to be Confederate agents. Meanwhile, despite the many eyes upon the
Georgian
, its captain managed to disappear.

While the Chicago and New York missions and the
Georgian
intrigue were being played out, Bennett Young and his St. Albans co-conspirators remained in Montreal. Proceedings began again on December 13. This time, chief counsel John Abbott questioned the legality of Magistrate Charles-Joseph Coursol’s hearing the case. He went back to the legal arguments of the John Anderson case and in a complex argument he drew the Webster-Ashburton Treaty and Canadian law together to contend that Coursol had no jurisdiction in the matter before him.

Coursol considered the argument over lunch and then shocked the court by agreeing with Abbott and ordering the St. Albans raiders released. Crown lawyers scrambled to stay the implementation of the decision, but Montreal police chief Guillaume Lamothe did not wait. He had been put in charge of a receipt for $84,000 of the money stolen from St. Albans banks. Minutes after Coursol’s announcement, he surrendered it to an agent working for Thompson, who rushed to the Bank of Ontario’s back door, after closing time. He was met by a bank official who arranged for the transfer. The money went from Thompson’s contact in the bank to his agent on the street, to Chief Lamothe and then to Young and the others. They took it and ran.
¹¹⁴
Through Thompson’s intervention, they had stolen the money again.

The release of the St. Albans conspirators and the pilfering of the money sparked outrage in the North. The
New York Times
reported, “It may be said that this will lead to a war with England. But if it must come, let it come.”
¹¹⁵
The
New York Herald
called for war and blamed an ineffectual Canadian government and legal system for all that had been happening throughout the Civil War. “The next raid,” it threatened, “is likely to be avenged upon the nearest Canadian village which gives refuge to the marauders.”
¹¹⁶

General Dix ordered his troops to find Young and his cohorts and bring them to justice in the United States, no matter where they were or who claimed jurisdiction in the matter. This was the second time Dix had ordered his troops to ignore the border and British neutrality. The
London
Times
called Dix’s order a declaration of war against Canada.
¹¹⁷
The
Times
may have been overstating things a little, but not much.

At that moment, as was his wont and his mission, Thompson made a tense situation worse. He ordered another already planned raid on America to immediately proceed. On December 16, John Beall led a number of men over the border to intercept a train transferring several Confederate generals from Johnson’s Island to New York’s Fort Lafayette. The train was not intercepted and the generals were not freed, but Beall, who had so many times narrowly escaped capture, was arrested. The raid was a fiasco of bad planning and misunderstandings, but it offered one more example to those screaming about Confederates who seemed to have carte blanche to wreak havoc from across the border.

There were long debates around Lincoln’s cabinet table regarding the many overlapping incendiary issues tied to the suddenly ramped-up problems on the border, and specifically about Dix’s latest directive to ignore it. On December 17, Lincoln overturned the order with a new one stating that any American troops needing to cross into Canada had to first clear their plans with Washington. Lincoln’s order ended the practice established following the 1837 Upper and Lower Canadian rebellions, when it had been agreed that troops in “hot pursuit” could cross the line to apprehend their prey. Lincoln was wisely taking away the power to initiate international incidents from zealous generals such as Dix and Joseph Hooker, who had also publicly stated that he would have no compunction about ordering his troops into Canada.
¹¹⁸

Despite Lincoln’s order, American patience with Canada had ended. Throughout the Civil War, the floors of the Senate and House of Representatives had heard fiery anti-Canadian speeches with every outrage from across the border. In October 1864, the House had been debating the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty, which had created a free-trade zone between Canada and the United States and brought great benefits to the Canadian economy. On the day that Coursol freed the St. Albans raiders, the House was scheduled to vote on whether to abrogate the treaty. Congressmen voted 87 to 57 to end it. And on January 12, the Senate voted 38 to 8 in
support of killing the treaty. Iowa senator James Grimes spoke for many when he argued in a long speech that the decision to end the treaty involved a number of long-debated economic and political issues but that many senators were now voting in direct response to Canada’s decidedly mixed support for the Union, its harbouring of Confederates, and the numerous cross-border incursions it had allowed. Grimes said he was one of those who hoped that the treaty’s abrogation would result in no more need for Northern defences, for it would lead to Canada’s annexation.
¹¹⁹

A second agreement between Canada and America also hung in the balance. Days after the St. Albans Raid, Seward had warned Britain’s foreign secretary, Russell, that border tensions could lead to the abrogation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement.
¹²⁰
Congress had been shouting for its abrogation for years, with Charles Sumner, the powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, among the loudest. On November 23, Canada and Britain were informed that that the agreement would be repealed in six months.
¹²¹
The Great Lakes would be remilitarized.

On December 17, tensions worsened when Lincoln signed a law stating that no one could enter the United States without a passport. The Canadian and New Brunswick borders were long and largely undefended, so the law was meant less to stop traffic than to express displeasure. The
Toronto Leader
saw it for what it was: “a vindictive expedient.”
¹²²
The law nonetheless threatened workers, by making travel for employment in the United States more difficult. The thickened border would also punish Canadian businesses by complicating bilateral trade. Macdonald met with the presidents of the Great Western and Grand Trunk railways, who predicted that the passport regulations would cost their companies eighty thousand dollars a month.
¹²³

Not since the
Trent
crisis of 1861 had Britain and the United States been so close to war. Once again, Canada was paying the price in insults meant to intimidate, actions designed to injure and threats too real to ignore. The situation in December 1864 was as treacherous as it was complex. But other events at the time complicated the situation even more and made the stakes higher still.

Canadian and Maritime political leaders were trying to stave off invasion and annexation from within a rickety political system that no longer reflected the colonies’ demographic realities or evolving independence. In particular, they lacked the structural and fiscal capacity to defend the people for whom they were responsible. The Civil War was making clear to all that tinkering with old ways would not do. Canada and the Maritimes had to reinvent themselves to save themselves, and they needed to act quickly or there might be nothing left to save. A leader was needed who would be willing to risk his career by telling the hard truths and getting essential changes made. In May 1864, a man few Canadians believed had the capacity or desire to be that kind of leader stepped forward.

5
 
GEORGE BROWN AND THE IMPROBABLE NATION

B
Y MAY
1864,
THE
Confederacy was dying and Canada was struggling to be born. In the white brick legislative building in Quebec City that was home to Canada’s government, seventeen men entered a non-descript committee room with casual chatter, light jokes and an air of nonchalance. But the tension was palpable. Many of the men did not trust each other. Many did not like each other. Some hated each other.

George Brown was there. The owner-editor of Toronto’s influential
Globe
, former leader of the Reform party and now member of the legislature for South Oxford, rose as the others took their seats. He walked to the door and, with a dramatic flourish, locked it and pocketed the key. “Now gentleman,” he said, glaring at the startled, silenced and somewhat bemused group, “you must talk about this matter, as you cannot leave this room without coming to me.”
¹

The matter at hand was an idea that had been tossed around for years as a way to end the political and economic instability that had challenged
British North America and stunted its development for over two decades. With the Civil War, this challenge was threatening its very existence. The word “Confederation” had come to represent the notion of ending the current political structure and creating a new and efficient federated one, its two levels of government better able to address divisive and paralyzing regional, ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages. Some dared to dream of extending Confederation to include the Maritime colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and maybe even Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland. Others hoped to include the vast northwestern territories that began at Lake Huron and touched towering Rockies and Arctic ice. But dreams are not plans, and progress had been stifled by a general lack of incentive and political courage.

Brown was not the first to call for Confederation. That distinction fell to Alexander Galt. Galt was born in Scotland and came to Canada in 1828 with his businessman father. By the 1840s, he had become a visionary entrepreneur, with interests in real estate, manufacturing and railways. Galt entered politics in 1849, toyed with the idea of annexation to the United States, lost his seat, and then was re-elected in 1853.

In July 1858, John A. Macdonald’s Conservative government fell over arguments about the establishment of a permanent capital. Governor General Head offered Galt the premiership, but he declined and instead suggested that George Cartier of Canada East form a new government with Macdonald. Ignoring Galt’s advice, Head offered the government to George Brown. When Brown’s cabinet resigned in order to run for re-election, according to the parliamentary practice of the day, Macdonald’s Conservatives voted to defeat the temporarily reduced government. After only two days, Macdonald was back in power. He then moved his old cabinet out of their jobs for one day and back the next, thus avoiding their having to quit and run again. It was a dirty but legal trick called the “double shuffle.” Brown was humiliated.