Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (41 page)
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Authors: Jeremy Scahill
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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Back at the ranch in Chile, Pizarro addressed the three hundred men he and his colleagues had chosen for evaluation by Blackwater. “You will be interviewed by American evaluators. They will ask you basic questions,” Pizarro told the Chilean soldiers. “They will test the level of your leadership skills, how smart you are, how well trained you are, etc., your physical ability.” Pizarro said they would be divided into three groups—one for each of the three U.S. evaluators. “It will be a hundred guys per American. It will take basically the entire day. So you need to be patient. I can make no promises. If we can impress these guys, maybe, maybe we’ll be hired to work in Iraq protecting U.S. Consulates and Embassy,” Pizarro said. In the last week of November 2003, Pizarro said, the Blackwater evaluators arrived in Chile. “The three of them, former U.S. Navy SEALs, impressive guys, six foot tall, gigantic, excellent shape, very professional,” Pizarro recalled. “The three of them bilingual. I mean super-impressive. They evaluated 300 guys” in three days. “They went back to the States, and those were the longest fourteen days of my life because for fourteen days there was no news from Blackwater whatsoever.”
In the meantime, the controversy in Chile about Pizarro’s activities was growing. Pizarro said that a few hours before the Blackwater evaluators arrived at the ranch, a Chilean TV station showed up and ended up filming the activities there. On national television in Chile, Pizarro was accused of “training a private army,” under the supervision of U.S. military people, he said. “The news flash presented me like some sort of Arnold Schwarzenegger—Latino version of—it was absurd,” Pizarro recalled. “My family was crying on the phone. My mom was calling, ‘Mike, what are you doing? We’re going to jail.’ ‘No, mom. It’s a dummy rifle.’ ‘It looks so real. You’re going down.’ I mean, even my girlfriend kicked me out.” Despite the mounting controversy and the silence from Blackwater, Pizarro held out hope that his plan would succeed.
Then on December 18, Pizarro said he got an e-mail from Gary Jackson.
We’re up. You’re bringing 100 people in February to be evaluated in the United States
. Pizarro said he chose his “best 100 guys” and prepared to head to North Carolina. The Chilean soldiers were sequestered in Chile for forty-eight hours before departing and were not allowed to call their families.
33
They went to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, which promptly issued them multiple entry visas.
34
On February 4, 2004, Pizarro and seventy-eight Chilean soldiers arrived at Moyock for “evaluation.” Training, Pizarro asserted, “is illegal. You cannot train. They were
evaluated
.” Pizarro said, “Every single one of them was evaluated for English skills, medical skills, first aid, rifle range, pistol range, driving skills, telecommunication skills, and leadership.” Pizarro was particularly impressed with one exercise in which Blackwater evaluators used toy soldiers to present various scenarios that could occur in Iraq and quizzed the Chileans on how they would handle the situation. It was “very smart, very cheap,” Pizarro recalled with amazement. “It didn’t cost a penny, but it really tested my guys to extreme.” In all, the first batch of seventy-eight Chileans spent ten days at Blackwater. Pizarro said the evaluators “were very impressed” with his men. Only one was sent home, he said, because of an attitude problem.
We’re up. You’re bringing 100 people in February to be evaluated in the United States
. Pizarro said he chose his “best 100 guys” and prepared to head to North Carolina. The Chilean soldiers were sequestered in Chile for forty-eight hours before departing and were not allowed to call their families.
33
They went to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, which promptly issued them multiple entry visas.
34
On February 4, 2004, Pizarro and seventy-eight Chilean soldiers arrived at Moyock for “evaluation.” Training, Pizarro asserted, “is illegal. You cannot train. They were
evaluated
.” Pizarro said, “Every single one of them was evaluated for English skills, medical skills, first aid, rifle range, pistol range, driving skills, telecommunication skills, and leadership.” Pizarro was particularly impressed with one exercise in which Blackwater evaluators used toy soldiers to present various scenarios that could occur in Iraq and quizzed the Chileans on how they would handle the situation. It was “very smart, very cheap,” Pizarro recalled with amazement. “It didn’t cost a penny, but it really tested my guys to extreme.” In all, the first batch of seventy-eight Chileans spent ten days at Blackwater. Pizarro said the evaluators “were very impressed” with his men. Only one was sent home, he said, because of an attitude problem.
On February 14, 2004, Blackwater flew the first group of Chilean commandos from North Carolina to Baghdad. “They got deployed immediately,” Pizarro said. “And then I got a contract for another group of seventy-eight within twenty-four hours. So I flew over [to Blackwater] again at the end of February with the second group.” Pizarro recalled with great pride that Gary Jackson—who he said had doubted the project all along—was interviewed by a Chilean newspaper the day the first group of Chileans set off for Iraq, ahead of schedule. “They did incredibly well and they are absolute professionals,” Jackson told
La Tercera
. “So they are leaving today on a flight that departs in the morning to the Middle East.”
35
Jim Sierawski, Blackwater’s director of training, said the deployment happened fast because the Chilean commandos did not need additional training beyond what they had received in the Chilean armed forces. “Their knowledge provides them with the necessary skills to do what they have to do in different missions,” he said.
36
“The Chilean guys from group one were so highly trained, I mean the average age was forty-three years old,” Pizarro recalled. “These were highly seasoned commandos.”
La Tercera
. “So they are leaving today on a flight that departs in the morning to the Middle East.”
35
Jim Sierawski, Blackwater’s director of training, said the deployment happened fast because the Chilean commandos did not need additional training beyond what they had received in the Chilean armed forces. “Their knowledge provides them with the necessary skills to do what they have to do in different missions,” he said.
36
“The Chilean guys from group one were so highly trained, I mean the average age was forty-three years old,” Pizarro recalled. “These were highly seasoned commandos.”
Once in Iraq, the Chilean forces were tasked with doing “static protection” of buildings—generally headquarters of State Department or CPA facilities, Pizarro said. The first group of Chileans was deployed in Samawah, where Pizarro said they guarded a CPA building, as well as a regional office in Diwaniyah. The second batch went straight for a hotel in Hillah that had been converted to an occupation building. They also guarded a CPA headquarters in the Shiite holy city of Karbala. “We are confident,” former Chilean Army officer Carlos Wamgnet told
La Tercera
. “This mission is not something new to us. After all, it is extending our military career.”
37
Former Marine John Rivas told the paper, “I don’t feel like a mercenary.”
38
Pizarro traveled to Iraq twice to observe his men on contract with Blackwater, remaining in the country for a month and traveling to all of the sites “from Baghdad to Basra” where Chileans were deployed. “We have been successful. We’re not profiting from death. We’re not killing people,” Pizarro said. “We’re not shooting. We’re not operating on open streets. We’re providing static security services. We do not interact with Iraqi people. We do not patrol the Iraqi street. We never touch, talk, or get involved in any way, shape, or form with civilians in Iraq.” But, as journalist Louis E. V. Nevaer reported soon after the Chileans arrived in Iraq, “Newspapers in Chile have estimated that approximately 37 Chileans in Iraq are seasoned veterans of the Pinochet era. Government officials in Santiago are alarmed that men who enjoy amnesty in Chile—provided they remain in ‘retirement’ from their past military activities—are now in Iraq.”
39
La Tercera
. “This mission is not something new to us. After all, it is extending our military career.”
37
Former Marine John Rivas told the paper, “I don’t feel like a mercenary.”
38
Pizarro traveled to Iraq twice to observe his men on contract with Blackwater, remaining in the country for a month and traveling to all of the sites “from Baghdad to Basra” where Chileans were deployed. “We have been successful. We’re not profiting from death. We’re not killing people,” Pizarro said. “We’re not shooting. We’re not operating on open streets. We’re providing static security services. We do not interact with Iraqi people. We do not patrol the Iraqi street. We never touch, talk, or get involved in any way, shape, or form with civilians in Iraq.” But, as journalist Louis E. V. Nevaer reported soon after the Chileans arrived in Iraq, “Newspapers in Chile have estimated that approximately 37 Chileans in Iraq are seasoned veterans of the Pinochet era. Government officials in Santiago are alarmed that men who enjoy amnesty in Chile—provided they remain in ‘retirement’ from their past military activities—are now in Iraq.”
39
Pizarro said that Blackwater was so impressed with the Chileans that the company stopped bringing them en masse for evaluation to North Carolina. Instead, Pizarro said he would bring twenty a month to Blackwater’s compound and the rest would fly directly from Santiago to Jordan, where they would be evaluated by Blackwater officials in Amman before being deployed in Iraq. “We created such level of comfort, of professionalism, of trust. . . . Blackwater was addicted to us,” Pizarro said. “Basically for the price of one U.S. former operator, they were getting four, sometimes five Chilean commandos.” He described Blackwater’s thirst for more Chileans as “very, very, very aggressive.” In all, Pizarro said he provided 756 Chilean soldiers to Blackwater and other companies over two years and a month. By March 2004 Gary Jackson had become a public backer of the Chilean forces. In an interview with the
Guardian
newspaper, he explained that Chile was the only Latin American country where Blackwater had hired commandos for Iraq. “We scour the ends of the earth to find professionals—the Chilean commandos are very, very professional and they fit within the Blackwater system,” Jackson said. “We didn’t just come down and say, ‘You and you and you, come work for us.’ They were all vetted in Chile and all of them have military backgrounds. This is not the Boy Scouts.”
40
Amid allegations from Chilean lawmakers that his activities were illegal and that the men Pizarro was recruiting were “mercenaries,” Pizarro registered his firm in Uruguay to avoid legal troubles in Chile. So the contracting was eventually done between Blackwater and a Uruguayan ghost company called Neskowin.
41
“It is 110 percent legal,” Pizarro said in April 2004. “We are bullet proof. They can do nothing to stop us.”
42
Guardian
newspaper, he explained that Chile was the only Latin American country where Blackwater had hired commandos for Iraq. “We scour the ends of the earth to find professionals—the Chilean commandos are very, very professional and they fit within the Blackwater system,” Jackson said. “We didn’t just come down and say, ‘You and you and you, come work for us.’ They were all vetted in Chile and all of them have military backgrounds. This is not the Boy Scouts.”
40
Amid allegations from Chilean lawmakers that his activities were illegal and that the men Pizarro was recruiting were “mercenaries,” Pizarro registered his firm in Uruguay to avoid legal troubles in Chile. So the contracting was eventually done between Blackwater and a Uruguayan ghost company called Neskowin.
41
“It is 110 percent legal,” Pizarro said in April 2004. “We are bullet proof. They can do nothing to stop us.”
42
But as word spread about the use of Chilean commandos trained under Pinochet, it evoked strong condemnation in the country. As a rotating member of the UN Security Council, Chile opposed the war in Iraq.
43
“The presence of Chilean paramilitaries in Iraq has caused a visceral rejection in the population, 92% of which just a year ago rejected any intervention of the US in the country,” said Chilean writer Roberto Manríquez in June 2004.
44
It also sparked outrage and horror from victims of the Pinochet regime. “It is sickening that Chilean army officers are considered to be good soldiers because of the experience they acquired during the dictatorship years,” said Tito Tricot, a Chilean sociologist who was imprisoned and tortured under the dictatorship.
45
The Chilean commandos working for Blackwater “are valued for their expertise in kidnapping, torturing and killing defenseless civilians. What should be a national shame turns into a market asset due to the privatization of the Iraqi war. All this is possible, not only because of the United States’ absolute disrespect for human rights, but also due to the fact that justice has not been done in Chile either. Therefore, members of the Armed Forces that should be in prison due to the atrocities they committed under the dictatorship, walk freely the streets of our country as if nothing had happened. Moreover, they are now rewarded for their criminal past.”
46
43
“The presence of Chilean paramilitaries in Iraq has caused a visceral rejection in the population, 92% of which just a year ago rejected any intervention of the US in the country,” said Chilean writer Roberto Manríquez in June 2004.
44
It also sparked outrage and horror from victims of the Pinochet regime. “It is sickening that Chilean army officers are considered to be good soldiers because of the experience they acquired during the dictatorship years,” said Tito Tricot, a Chilean sociologist who was imprisoned and tortured under the dictatorship.
45
The Chilean commandos working for Blackwater “are valued for their expertise in kidnapping, torturing and killing defenseless civilians. What should be a national shame turns into a market asset due to the privatization of the Iraqi war. All this is possible, not only because of the United States’ absolute disrespect for human rights, but also due to the fact that justice has not been done in Chile either. Therefore, members of the Armed Forces that should be in prison due to the atrocities they committed under the dictatorship, walk freely the streets of our country as if nothing had happened. Moreover, they are now rewarded for their criminal past.”
46
Journalist Gustavo González said that some of the Chileans working for Blackwater “form part of those displaced from active duty by a plan for the modernisation of the armed forces applied in the army by General Luis Emilio Cheyre, the current army chief. Cheyre, like his predecessor, General Ricardo Izurieta, who replaced Pinochet in 1998 as commander-in-chief of the army, carried out a discreet but effective purge, forcing into retirement officers and non-commissioned officers who played a role in the dictatorship’s repression, in which some 3,000 people were killed or ‘disappeared.’”
47
47
Despite growing controversy in Chile over the export of “Chilean mercenaries” to fight a war the vast majority of Chileans—and the country’s elected government—opposed, things were moving along smoothly for Pizarro, and he was predicting in the Chilean press that by 2006 he would have three thousand Chileans deployed in Iraq.
48
In September 2004, Pizarro’s new company, Global Guards, which he says was modeled on Blackwater, placed another ad in
El Mercurio
—this time recruiting helicopter pilots and mechanics to operate “air taxis” for businesspeople going in and out of Iraq.
49
La Tercera
reported that the pilots would be paid $12,000 a month, while mechanics would earn around $4,000. Within hours, forty pilots and seventy mechanics had sent in their résumés.
50
48
In September 2004, Pizarro’s new company, Global Guards, which he says was modeled on Blackwater, placed another ad in
El Mercurio
—this time recruiting helicopter pilots and mechanics to operate “air taxis” for businesspeople going in and out of Iraq.
49
La Tercera
reported that the pilots would be paid $12,000 a month, while mechanics would earn around $4,000. Within hours, forty pilots and seventy mechanics had sent in their résumés.
50
But then Pizarro made a terrible miscalculation.
At the height of his operation, in late 2004, Pizarro branched out from Blackwater and began simultaneously working with its direct competitor, Triple Canopy. “Triple Canopy started asking me for hundreds and hundreds of former Chilean paratroopers for static security [in Iraq],” Pizarro recalled. Eager to expand his business, Pizarro said he provided the company with four hundred Chilean guards. “That was a bad mix. I never realized how much [Blackwater and Triple Canopy] hated each other.” When Blackwater got wind of the deal with Triple Canopy, Pizarro said, Gary Jackson told him Blackwater was ending the partnership. “Gary told me that he felt betrayed, that my move was unforgivable. He couldn’t forgive, he could not pardon me, that I betrayed his trust. He was the one who—which in a way is true—he basically helped me to create my own company.” Pizarro said he deeply regrets that his Blackwater contracts fell through and pointed out that the men he was providing Blackwater were “Tier One” soldiers, “top-notch, fully bilingual, former special forces operators,” while Triple Canopy was interested in cheaper “Tier Two” men, “an average former infantry person with limited language skills and limited operational experience.” Even still, Pizarro said, Blackwater would no longer renew his contracts. “I ended up losing Blackwater,” he recalled with obvious disappointment. “Blackwater is a fantastic company.” To add insult to injury, Blackwater independently hired some of Pizarro’s Chilean commandos directly. While he is “disappointed” in Blackwater, Pizarro said, “The good news is [the Chileans were] making a lot more money.”
After he lost the Blackwater contracts, Pizarro continued to provide soldiers to Triple Canopy and Boots and Coots, a Texas company that specialized in fighting oil well fires. Pizarro’s Chilean commandos became known as the “Black Penguins,” a name he said Blackwater gave his men “because we came from a land from the Antarctica area, from the land of the snow; very short, very dark guys, very slow moving, fully equipped. They called us the penguins.” Pizarro took that on as a brand for his forces and developed a logo around the concept. He also said “Black Penguins” was an effort to “emulate Blackwater.” Beginning in July 2005, Pizarro said Blackwater began the process of replacing his Chileans with cheaper Jordanian forces, “Tier Three, definitely. No English . . . no major military experience, just Jordanian conscripts.” Around the time his Blackwater relationship went sour, Pizarro said, competition had gotten stiff because the “Iraq reconstruction” was put on hold, meaning there were fewer projects for private forces to guard. Many firms, he said, began hiring less-trained, cheaper forces. “We were competing against Salvadorans, Peruvians, Nigerians, Jordanians, Fijians,” he recalled. “We couldn’t compete with them. Our prices were three times their price.”
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