Anzac's Dirty Dozen (31 page)

A superficial review of these figures suggests that Australia is attempting to do more with less, since its military share of GDP is higher on a per capita basis – US$892 versus US$580. Yet, when operational commitments are taken into account, the difference in the two nations' degree of willingness to use military force dramatically changes the equation. A one-to-one comparison leads to the conclusion that it is Canada, not Australia, that is punching above its weight in Afghanistan.

Both countries are currently participating in numerous operations around the world, representing a mix of peace-keeping, peace stabilisation and war fighting missions in places such as Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. There are approximately 2900 ADF personnel serving on ten international deployments, while Canada has about 3900 personnel serving on 14 international deployments.
³⁹
For both Australia and Canada, the most significant mission is Afghanistan, although Canada has also recently become involved in the effort to impose a ‘no fly zone' on Libya, a task to which it has assigned another approximately 650 personnel.
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In its commitment to Afghanistan, Canada has taken responsibility for Kandahar province and deployed a combined arms battalion-size battle group based upon the 1st Battalion Royal
22e Regiment. In support, Canada has deployed its own artillery, engineer, armoured reconnaissance and tank elements. Also in Kandahar Canada has fielded an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, a Civil-Military Co-Operation Team, an engineering team and additional support services. Canada has also deployed an air wing that includes three C-130 transports, six CH-47D medium-lift helicopters (more than the entire ADF inventory, it should be noted), and eight CH-146 Griffon utility helicopters, and has chartered additional medium-lift helicopters from a commercial provider. The Canadian contingent totals over 3000 personnel. In addition, serving under Canadian command in Kandahar is a battalion of US infantry from the 82nd Airborne Division with supporting cavalry elements from the 10th Mountain Division.
⁴¹

Not only is the size of the Canadian contingent twice that of Australia, but its composition is a balanced combined arms team that is aligned for combat rather than the ADF's preference for mentoring, reconstruction and social empowerment. In Uruzgan, only Special Forces troops have the specific task to hunt down and kill the enemy, while the rest of the ADF deployment's focus is on less risky undertakings. In addition, the Australian contingent has not taken complete responsibility for the province, but shares this with the United States and remains dependent on US resources for much of its support. The contrast in posture means that Canadian troops are exposed to more danger, and the casualty figures mirror this. To date Canada has lost 156 soldiers in Afghanistan, compared to 27 Australians.
⁴²

Canada is in the heart of the conflict and it is one of the countries which have not shirked from the threat of losses. When it first deployed to Afghanistan, Canada had decided against sending tanks. Its leaders soon changed their minds and sent out the force's elderly Leopard I vehicles. Canada then quickly upgraded
its armour force by acquiring the newer and more capable Leopard II tank. Canada has also deployed a fleet of helicopters, whereas Australia maintains only two Chinooks in the theatre, and then for only an eight-month interval. The Australian Army's sizeable fleet of Blackhawk helicopters remains at home and the Australians in Afghanistan instead rely on Coalition partners for the extra lift they need. Canada finds utility in employing the symbol of land power projection – the tank – whereas Australia's state-of-the-art M1 Abrams tanks remain in Darwin, without any prospect for operational experience.

There have been suggestions that Australia should do more, to make a larger and more powerful contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Retired Major General Jim Molan has frequently called for the deployment of a brigade group to Afghanistan,
⁴³
yet successive Australian governments have decided that Australia is already doing enough.
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The result is that, while reports of the high regard in which the US-led Coalition holds Australia continue to be released, there are signs of a changing attitude. US General David Petraeus did single out Australia for praise, but he did so while fishing for a larger commitment – an opportunity the Australian government declined.
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Assessments in recent books place Australia above the league of many ‘do-nothing' partners, but still well below the efforts of other countries.
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As one Australian commentator has observed, ‘instead of impressing its allies, Australia's heavily circumscribed commitment dismays them with its timidity'.
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Australia's forces in Afghanistan serve with national caveats designed to limit what they are allowed to do, and are similar to the ones that were in place for the war in Iraq. There is little doubt that these restrictions annoy the leaders of Australia's partners, but they also understand the game and accept that domestic concerns trump the preferences of coalition partners, particularly in wars of choice.
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Elsewhere, the nature of
Australia's commitment has been described as ‘a politically safe deployment, designed to demonstrate Australia's commitment to the war on terror without incurring electorally unpalatable casualties'.
⁴⁹
These are hardly ringing endorsements.

If the ADF does not punch above its weight, then what is its true nature? Through design, the ADF is a provider of niche capabilities to international coalitions. This has been a deliberate and long-standing policy and practice of the government: in fact it dates to the nation's founding. Even the Australian Imperial Forces of the two World Wars were not independent armies, but worked within a coalition upon which they relied for much of their support and sustainment. For example, the tank was a critical factor in the Australian successes at the Battles of Hamel and Amiens in World War I, yet Australia did not raise any tank units. So strong has been the preference to field niche forces that it is no longer clear that Australia would want, or even could, initiate a military operation unilaterally. Moreover, this trend has been reinforced by the ADF seeking greater inter-operability with the military forces of the United States.
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Being a niche provider is not necessarily a bad thing: indeed it represents a sound strand of strategic thinking by the nation's political and military leaders. By being willing to provide a coalition partner with effective niche forces, Australia has been able to provide for its broader security needs at a relatively affordable cost. This has also allowed Australia to achieve desirable international goals that might not otherwise have been available, including the ANZUS Alliance and a free trade deal with the United States. With relatively small contributions, Australia has fulfilled international obligations and enjoys a high standing with its coalition partners.
⁵¹

Furthermore, being a niche provider is not incompatible with the claim to punch above its weight, because some parts of ADF's
forces do just that. Rather it is the myth's universal application that needs to be checked. For example, the Australian Army's Special Forces are justifiably held in high regard by the nation's allies and, perhaps alone amongst the rest of the ADF, they do punch above their weight.
⁵²
US officials sincerely describe the Australian SAS as ‘shit hot' and acknowledge that their own military personnel ‘love to work with them'.
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However, such comments are not indicative of the organisation as a whole, and too many examples exist where the applicability of ‘punching above its weight' is patently false. Can an army that is unable to wage combined arms warfare, or a navy that fails to have any submarines or major amphibious vessels fit for sea, or an air force that nurses its aging jets on the promise of the joint strike fighter, realistically claim to be an above-average organisation?
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This myth is an especially pernicious one because it prevents the ADF from realistically assessing its own worth. Instead, it encourages the mistaken notion that Australian military personnel can do anything, anywhere, and do it better than anyone else. In war, this is a dangerous belief to hold, particularly when the ADF does so little to back it up. Our coalition partners are realists, and they accept that there are domestic political limitations on what Australia can provide. They are content to accept a largely symbolic presence, as was the case in post-invasion Iraq and for much of the war in Afghanistan. Officials in Washington are also aware that it is the political fact of Australia's contribution that really matters, not its composition. However, our coalition partners are also composed of people, some of whom have written letters to the families of soldiers who have died under their command, soldiers who fought with quiet dignity and without vocal claims to greatness. There are signs of the beginning of a change of attitude in the United States from those who have sacrificed so much towards those who contributed so little.

Whether this affects Australia's strategic relationship is yet to be determined.
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This myth is dangerous for another reason, for it encourages wishful rather than clear, realistic thinking. It prevents the ADF itself from perceiving what it really is: a niche provider of discrete military elements to coalition warfare. In assessing Australia's military worth, it is best to start from a point of reality rather then one of bravado. If being a niche contributor is openly acknowledged, than it can be assessed; if found undesirable it can be changed. If the ADF requires more ‘weight', a case can be made for it receiving a larger share of the nation's wealth. In understanding the true nature of the force the government and the ADF can make plans and policies backed by what the force can and cannot do. National security is just too important to allow the ‘punching above its weigh' myth to survive any longer.

Further reading

Australian Department of Defence,
The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in
the Middle East in 2003
, DoD, Canberra.

J.R. Ballard,
Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United
Nations Peacemaking in East Timor
, Praeger, Westport, 2008.

B. Breen,
Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET)
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001.

B. Breen & G. McCauley,
The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals in Somalia and East Timor
, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2008.

C.A. Collier, ‘A new way to wage peace: US support to Operation Stabilise',
Military Review
, January–February 2001, pp. 2–9.

P. Cosgrove,
My Story
, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2007.

D. Horner, ‘Deploying and sustaining INTERFET in East Timor in 1999', in P. Dennis and J. Grey (eds.),
Raise Train and Sustain: Delivering Land Combat Power
, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2010, pp. 204–29.

A.J. Molan,
Running the War in Iraq: An Australian General, 300 000
Troops, the Bloodiest Conflict of our Time
, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2008.

P. Pigott,
Canada in Afghanistan: The War so Far
, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 2007.

M. Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight: Australia as a middle power',
Strategic Insights
, 18, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005.

H. White, ‘The road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian strategic decisions concerning East Timor, December 1998–September 1999',
Security Challenges
, 4(1) Autumn 2008, pp. 69–87.

L. Windsor, D. Charters & B. Wilson,
Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada's Afghan Mission
, Wiley, Mississauga, 2010.

[11]

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIA–US ALLIANCE

Michael McKinley

Australia's military relationship with the United States of America, formalised by the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, is officially acknowledged as the Australian Defence Force's ‘most important defence relationship'. The 2009 Defence White Paper, an important planning document that forms the foundation of future Defence capabilities, asserts that:

In day-to-day terms, the alliance gives us significant access to materiel, intelligence, research and development, communications systems, and skills and expertise that substantially strengthen the ADF … Without access to US capabilities, technology, and training, the ADF simply could not be the advanced force that it is today, and must be in the future, without the expenditure of considerably more money.
¹

This White Paper is part of a long and continuing tradition of frequent, regular and meaningful professions of faith in the alliance. Such faith, such unquestioning and uncritical certainty in the absolutely indispensible nature of the Australian–US alliance, lumbers along in the background of defence debate in this country,
no matter what contrary evidence the historical record might contain. Although there are often debates in the media and think-tanks about whether Australia should contribute to a particular US-led military operation, most of these discussions are largely conducted over tactical issues such as what kinds of forces should be deployed: the number of infantry, the number of ships and aircraft, or the degree of logistic support. These debates occur, however, within a shared framework of agreement: that the alliance with the United States is vital to our ‘national interest' and must be protected by regular acts that affirm its ongoing importance. A more fundamental question is rarely asked, and almost never answered in any depth: is the Australia–US the alliance worth it? This basic question is the subject of this chapter. In all likelihood an attempt to answer it will attract various charges of impiety for proposing that ANZUS, an article of faith, be subject to an impudent test of facts, but then that is the very nature of the myth under investigation here.