America's Nazi Secret: An Insider's History (48 page)

⁴⁴
For Gehlen’s memorandum, see Dallin, op. cit. pp. 54546.

⁴⁵
Ostrowsky’s biography, pp. 49-50, notes that on December 20, 1943, Sobolewsky sent him a telegram from Minsk, as chairman of the Byelorussian Relief Organization (Self-Help) inviting him to a conference the next day with SS General von Gottberg. Sobolewsky’s version of the meeting is contained in
The Truth About ABN
by Niko Nakashidze (Munich, 1960), p. 54.

Chapter Three

⁴⁶
Ostrowsky’s biography.

⁴⁷
Decree No. 2 of the President of the Byelorussian Central Council, City of Minsk, January 15, 1944, appointed Kushel, Sobolewsky, and Hrynkievich among the first fourteen members of the Byelorussian Central Council. Copy of document in Byelorussian propaganda book,
For the National Independence of Byelorussia
(London, 1960, copy in Library of Congress).

⁴⁸
The
Minsker Zeitung
is a useful source for identifying the names and ranks of the various collaborators. For example, a man named Russak was identified as the city mayor for Baranovitche and Stankievich was reported as the representative of the Byelorussian Central Council for the region of Baranovitche at the time Ostrowsky visited the city to conduct an anti-partisan propaganda campaign. According to the Nazi press accounts, first Russak spoke of the role of the Central Council in undertaking the war against the “Jewish Bolsheviks.” Stankievich spoke next on the need for building better trust with the German civil administration. Ostrowsky then spoke of the terrible atrocities being perpetrated by the NKVD.

⁴⁹
Minutes No. 1A of the Byelorussian Central Government meeting of Regional Deputies, and the Byelorussian Regional Defense Chiefs, Minsk City, March 28, 29, and 30, 1944, contains a transcript of the discussion on organizing the draft mobilization for the Nazis. During the meeting, Stankievich complained that their forces were more poorly equipped than the other collaborator military units. One of the other collaborators replied that when we were talking about the “uniforms the question was not to look handsome but to have strength.” Stankievich in return claimed that he had organized a force of some 64 officers, 382 sub-officers, and 6,000 riflemen. (Copy in Byelorussian propaganda book,
For the National Independence of Byelorussia
, Library of Congress.)

⁵⁰
Ostrowsky cooperated wholeheartedly with General von Gottberg’s request for assistance in combating the partisans. See, for example, letter of June 8, 1944, from Ostrowsky to the commander of the Slutzk Byelorussian Regional Defense Force (BRD):

Attached please find a copy of my letter to General Commissar of Byelorussia from 5-25-44 and a copy of his answer from 6-6-1944. I am ordering you to send to the most endangered part of the villages special units of BRD battalions under the command of the most qualified officers.

Copy of letter in
For the National Independence of Byelorussia
(London, 1960; copy in Library of Congress).

⁵¹
Sven Steenberg,
Vlasov
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 71-73.

⁵²
The planning for the congress in Minsk took place just as the news of the British and American landings in Normandy were reaching Byelorussia. During one of the planning conferences, Ostrowsky’s vice president, Shkelonak, realized that the invasion meant the end of the German Reich, and suggested that it might not even be wise to hold the congress. When Ostrowsky heard of the blunder, he called the SS official directly and explained that Shkelonak’s German was not that good, and that he really meant the time was right for the congress to begin (Ostrowsky’s biography, pp. 56-59).

⁵³
Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁵⁴
Ostrowsky’s close relationships with the SS and the Wehrmacht gave him special standing among the collaborators in exile in Berlin: “Here I should stress that the BCC at that time had such standing that the leaders of the other now Russian nations looked to it in matters of policy. This is probably the reason why Himmler put the BCC most under pressure. Due credit should be given in this connection to the late Professor Dr. Von Mende, who is opposed to Himmler’s policy and who is a great friend to all the non-Russian peoples enslaved by the Bolsheviks.” (Ostrowsky’s biography, p. 62).

⁵⁵
Franz Kushel insisted that the Byelorussian army should be organized and used only in the struggle against Bolshevism. Apparently, he too was concerned that his troops might be used on the western front. Copy of document in
For the National Independence of Byelorussia
(London, 1960; copy in the Library of Congress).

⁵⁶
Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the Byelorussian Central Council of September 26, 1944 (Berlin) indicated that permission had been received to reorganize the Byelorussian legion. “From the conversation, it can be seen that the German military authorities in principle agree to the organization of Byelorussian military forces, the word army is even used … initially two divisions are to be created, a combat one and reserve one … the outlook for the organization of Byelorussian forces is quite good.” Copy of document in
For the National Independence of Byelorussia
(London, 1954; Library of Congress).

⁵⁷
The SS unit designation is described in National Archives document microfilm roll T45426/85-86. According to the Army letter of November 30,1956, from the ACSI-CDOO, “Under the auspices of the German Wehrmacht Kushel was placed in command of Belo-Russian Brigade which subsequently was expanded into a division. Kushel was made division commander (2-star general) and fought until the end of the war. He surrendered to the Germans in what became the French zone of Germany.” The last sentence erroneously suggested that Kushel fought against the Germans, not for them.

⁵⁸
Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the Byelorussian Central Council in Berlin, December 12,1944. The minutes note that Dr. Stankievich, the editor of the newspaper Ranitsa, was invited to the meeting along with Colonel Kushel and several others. Ostrowsky discussed the position of the BCC with regard to General Vlasov’s army. Ostrowsky spoke of the continued need to prevent the Byelorussian forces from being absorbed into Vlasov’s divisions. Copy in For the National Independence of Byelorussia (London, 1954; Library of Congress)

⁵⁹
According to one version, as the Allies were approaching, General Kushel went to see General Maltsov of General Vlasov’s army. Maltsov and Kushel decided to defect to the U.S. Army. Between them and the U.S. troops was a German SS division stationed in Eisensteinstadt. According to a knowledgeable source, Maltsov and Kushel sent emissaries to the American commander and at his direction fought through the German SS division until they reached Zwissel, where they joined the U.S. troops and were interned as prisoners of war.

Chapter Four

⁶⁰
On Bradley’s telephone call to Patton, see
Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story
(Henry Holt, 1951).

⁶¹
Patton’s comments on the Soviets are quoted in Cookridge, op. cit., p. 127.

⁶²
The most detailed account of Operation Keelhaul is in Nicholas Bethell,
The Last Secret
(Basic Books, 1974).

⁶³
The flight from Berlin to the western regions of Germany is described in Ostrowsky’s biography, p. 63.

⁶⁴
General Anders was trying to keep the members of his “Polish Army” intact in the camps until a more permanent home could be found.
New York Times
, May 20, 1946.

⁶⁵
From an OSI informant.

⁶⁶
Among Stankievich’s many employers was the Language Institute of the World Church Service at Ulmmanube where he was employed from March 10,1949 to May 1, 1950. It should also be noted that the World Church Service was frequently listed as sponsor of Byelorussian Nazis into the United States under the Displaced Persons Act.

⁶⁷
According to Ostrowsky’s biography, p. 70, the members of the BCC remained in hiding in the British, American, and French zones of western Germany “because the majority of them were afraid that they might be called to account before the Allies for collaboration with the Germans during the War.” Ostrowsky recognized that it was necessary to suspend the activities of the BCC and create another front group for the U.S. zone, the Byelorussian National Committee, formed at the Regensburg DP camp (where most of the Belarus SS legion was then located).

⁶⁸
The history of the various postwar conventions, the attempts to escape repatriation as war criminals, and the subsequent reorganization in the United States is more fully described in FBI File NY97-1251. According to the FBI, Ostrowsky’s BCR organization in the DP camps had about 4,000 members, about half of whom later emigrated to America. This, of course, does not include those members of the Belarus who sided with Abramtchik‘s faction, such as Kushel and Stankievich. As of 1954,according to the FBI, this faction had more than a thousand members living in the United States.

⁶⁹
Abramtchik’s Gestapo background in Paris is also noted in a document contained in the Stankievich “blue file,” USAIRR, Ft. Meade, Maryland.

⁷⁰
Paragraph 189 of the 1948 CIC Consolidated Guidance Manual noted that the Abramtchik faction apparently had connections to the NTS and also received funds from the Vatican.

⁷¹
The most complete account available of Gehlen’s activities is in Cookridge. Gehlen’s own memoirs are less candid.

⁷²
For background on the OSS, see Kermit Roosevelt,
The War Report of the OSS
(Walker, 1976).

⁷³
The dismembering of OSS was accomplished in a letter from President Truman to Secretary of State Byrnes, September 20, 1945.
Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, April 12 to December 31, 1945
(Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 331.

⁷⁴
For the breakup of the OSS see
Final Report, US. Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Operations
(Government Printing Office, 1976), Book IV, pp. 5-6.

Chapter Five

⁷⁵
Quoted in Andrew Tully,
CIA, The Inside Story
(William Morrow, 1962) p. 16.

⁷⁶
The organization of the CIG is outlined in Select Committee Report, op. cit., pp. 6-12.

⁷⁷
Immediately after the war there was a great deal of controversy about the possibility of Nazis residing in the DP camps. See
New York Times
, March 2, 1946, p. 1 (“U.S. Must Turn Over Members of Axis Army”); March 10, 1946, p. 5 (“Weeding Out Nazis in POW Camps”); May 12, 1946, p. 18 (“Army Screening to Seek Imposters”); March 24, 1946, p. 16 (“Nazis Living in Camps”); March 30, 1949, p. 17 (“Nazi Camp Guard Posing as Displaced Person”); April 1, 1949 (“Former Camp Guard Held at Ellis Island”).

⁷⁸
The existence of the Belarus SS and other collaborationist units did not go entirely unnoticed in the DP camps. See
New York Times
, March 24, 1946, p. 16.

⁷⁹
Kushel’s transformation of the White Russian “Boy Scouts” into the military formation of the BVA is discussed in paragraph 204 of Chapter V, p. 50, 1948 CIC Consolidated Guidance report.

⁸⁰
Friedrich Buchardt’s unpublished manuscript is entitled “Die Behandlung Des Russischen Problems Wahrend Der Zeit Des Nationalsozialistischen Regimes in Deutschland.” (
The Treatment of the Russian Problem During the Period of the Nazi Regime in Germany
). Top Secret, ACSI-Sensitive Document File, Suitland, Maryland.

⁸¹
For a discussion of how the ex-Nazis assisted Soviet intelligence agents in the Byelorussian DP camps after the war, see Stankievich’s “blue file,” USAIRR, Ft. Meade, Maryland.