America At War - Concise Histories Of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexington To Afghanistan (26 page)

By then, indeed even at the beginning of 1944, Germany’s generals expected the Allies to invade Western Europe. Their problem was that they didn’t know where the landings would occur. Norway was a possibility. So was Holland. The location they themselves would have chosen was in France, at the Pas de Calais. This is where the channel-crossing would be the shortest, and it offered a direct route into Germany. Normandy and Brittany also were possible locations, as was Spain.

To add to the Germans’ dilemma, the Nazi commanders did not know exactly when the Allies would strike. It might be in the spring or, possibly, the summer. The fall would be less likely given the weather. But still, September and October could not be ruled out.

To mislead the Germans the Allies engaged in an elaborate program of deception. Through the use primarily of radio signals that the Allies knew the Germans would intercept, the British and the Americans created phony invasion forces, one in Scotland and one in southeastern England. The latter was “commanded” by Patton, who on occasion would appear in public in Kent and Sussex in order to lend credence to the fictitious army. Such a force so close to the Pas de Calais and led by one of America’s most dynamic generals helped persuade German officers that the invasion would take place across the Straits of Dover. Hitler, himself, thought Norway was a strong possibility.

This effort in deception by the Allies was highly successful. It threw the Germans off balance and kept troops away from Normandy. Indeed, of the two German armies stationed in France, the strongest purposely was deployed in the area around Calais.

To prepare for the invasion, the Germans constructed an extensive network of coastal fortifications. Known then and now as “the Atlantic Wall,” it consisted of guns, beach obstacles, and mines. Of the latter there were many. In order to repel the invaders, the German army planted 6.5 million mines along the French, Belgian, and Dutch coasts.

Further, reasoning that the Allies would require deep water ports to keep their troops supplied, the Germans designated eleven seaports as
festungsbereiche
. These were heavily armed fortress areas. Self-sufficient, they were not dependent on reinforcements and were intended to be impregnable. Deny the Allies ports for their supply ships and the invasion would be contained.

All told, the Atlantic Wall presented a formidable obstacle to Eisenhower and Montgomery. Yet it had one major drawback. It wasn’t finished. Moreover, the Germans faced two further problems, both self-imposed. The first was that many of their troops in France were not first-rate. The second pertained to their command arrangements. These were cumbersome, and they hindered rather than aided efforts to defeat the Allies.

The German generals had still another problem. They did not agree on the strategy to be employed once the Allies arrived. Field Marshal Rommel, reinstated by Hitler, and in tactical control of most German troops in France, wanted to meet the Allies head-on at the beaches. He wanted command of all armored forces, which he would fling at the invaders as they were stepping ashore. Other generals wanted to hold the tanks back from the coast, away from naval gunfire. Their approach was first to determine where the principal attack was taking place (there might be a diversionary landing) and then order the tanks into battle. Rommel’s reply was that armor thus employed would be subject to Allied aircraft as it moved into position.

Both points of view had merit. The solution was a compromise. Some tanks were placed under Rommel’s immediate command. Others were held in reserve, allocated to another general. Still other forces were under Adolf Hitler’s personal control. The arrangement was far from satisfactory, especially given that in the absence of the Luftwaffe, German success depended on rapid deployment of armor.

Eisenhower too faced difficulties in the structure of command established for the invasion. One of the difficulties involved control of strategic airpower. The Supreme Commander wanted to employ the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command in a tactical role. He wanted them to pound railroads, bridges, and roads in and around Normandy so that German troops on the coast could not be reinforced. The air commanders objected. Sir Arthur Harris and his American counterpart, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, thought their aircraft would be best utilized attacking German industry. In particular, Spaatz wanted to destroy the enemy’s petroleum assets. Neither man had much use for Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the RAF officer formally in charge of Overlord’s air campaign. They ignored whatever he had to say and went about their business, which, to them, was strategic air warfare. Eisenhower, however, was adamant. He insisted they divert their planes to Normandy and environs. When they continued to resist, Ike threatened to resign. Harris and Spaatz then gave way. The result was that for several months American and British heavy bombers dropped thousands of bombs on targets in Normandy. But in order not to give the Germans a clue as to where the Allies were to land, the bombers struck more often in the area around the Pas de Calais.

With but one exception, the Overlord air campaign was highly successful. British and American aircraft kept many of the enemy away from the battle. Those that did arrive were delayed and battered. Of critical importance were the Allied fighter-bombers. These were smallish, single-engine aircraft, exceptionally rugged and armed with both bombs and rocket-propelled explosives. Two such aircraft, the British Typhoon and the American Thunderbolt, harassed the enemy every day.

The one exception took place on the day the Allies invaded. American heavy bombers were directed to pulverize the beach areas just before the troops landed. But, fearful of hitting the Americans moving toward the shore, they overcompensated. Their bombs struck well beyond the beaches. Few German soldiers were killed, although the number of cows in Normandy was severely reduced.

Those planes had “bombed long.” A more distressing incident involving “bombing short” occurred in Normandy several weeks later. To support the breakout of American troops from the confines of the ground gained in the first weeks of the invasion, the Eighth again was instructed to strike enemy positions immediately in front of the soldiers. Unfortunately, their aim was off. The bombs struck the Americans instead. Many of them were killed and wounded. Among the dead was Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair. He had been the commander of the huge stateside organization responsible for training and equipping the entire U.S. Army. In Normandy to observe the troops he had trained, McNair was the highest ranking American officer in Europe killed during the Second World War.

Eisenhower faced another difficulty, one over which he as Supreme Commander had no control. This was the weather. Placing thousands of troops on the beaches of Normandy required relatively calm seas to prevent the small landing craft from capsizing. Fair weather also was required for operating aircraft that would fly in support of the invasion. On June 4, the weather was dreadful. Hard rain, high winds, and choppy seas posed too great a risk to Overlord. The forecast was similar for June 5, the date scheduled for launching the attack.

Eisenhower postponed the invasion by one day. Given the prediction for the 5th, this was not a difficult decision. The next one was.

Because of requirements regarding tides and moonlight, few days in June were suitable for the invasion. June 6 was one of them, but the next date was not until June 17. By June 4 the troops had been moved to their embarkation points and much of southern England was sealed off. Further delay would jeopardize the secrecy that so far had been maintained.

What would the weather be on June 6?

Overlord’s chief meteorological officer was J. M. Stagg, a group captain in the Royal Air Force. On June 4, he reported to Eisenhower and the senior commanders that data indicated that on the 6th the weather would moderate. Conditions would not be good, but they would be less severe. The invasion could be carried out. Everyone in the room understood it would be dicey and that there would be no guarantee of success.

At stake was more than the lives of the troops involved. Were the invasion to fail, the consequences would be enormous. There would be no Second Front. Nor would there be a second chance to invade Normandy, at least not for a year or two. Hitler then would be able to concentrate on the east. The outcome of the Second World War, however it played out, would not favor the United States and Britain. A failed Overlord would be seen as a defining moment, a catastrophe that constituted an unparalleled setback to the cause of freedom. And the responsibility would be Eisenhower’s.

Should he again postpone the invasion, or despite the weather, should he order the invasion to proceed? The Supreme Commander did not flinch. He gave the order putting Overlord in motion. The Allies, said Eisenhower, were to land in France on June 6, 1944. Writing in 1983, Montgomery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton noted, “It was Eisenhower’s moment of trial—and he responded with what can only be called greatness.”

Transporting 132,700 soldiers across the English Channel to a Normandy occupied by two German armies was not a simple task. Assembled for the trip were some 5,000 vessels, including 138 warships. The latter included battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and the all-important minesweepers that provided safe passage through mine-infested waters. One of the battleships was the USS
Nevada
, which had been damaged but not destroyed at Pearl Harbor.

The plan of attack called for five landing sites. Each had a code name. From west to east, these were Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword
.
Utah and Omaha belonged to the Americans. Juno was assigned to the Canadians. Gold and Sword were British. Further, three airborne divisions, one British and two American, were to make night jumps on both flanks of the invading force.

American paratroopers numbered approximately thirteen thousand. They were superbly trained, perhaps the best soldiers in the entire United States Army. Carried to Normandy by 822 C-47 aircraft, they were to secure the causeways leading away from Utah Beach and delay, if not prevent, German reinforcements from dislodging the American 4th Division that had come ashore.

The paratroopers, and their comrades who arrived by glider, achieved these goals but at great cost. More than a few C-47s were shot down killing all aboard. The Germans had flooded the environs of Utah, so many paratroopers drowned. Practically none of them landed where they were supposed to. Confusion was great, but somehow the airborne soldiers rallied, and started to kill Germans. When, in August, the Battle for Normandy was over, the two American airborne divisions were in need of rest. One of them, the 82nd—one of America’s most famous military units—had endured a 46 percent casualty rate. Their dead numbered 1,142.

The U.S. Navy’s big guns opened fire at 5:30
A.M.
At Utah the tide carried the troops somewhat south, but the 4th Division was able to secure the beach with relatively light losses. Indeed, the Americans had lost more soldiers in a disastrous training exercise at Slapton Sands on the southeastern coast of England than they did at Utah
Beach. Among the soldiers in the first wave was Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr. The son of the former president, he did well that day, earning the Congressional Medal of Honor. In July, while still on duty, he died of a heart attack. The general was buried in Normandy, in an American military cemetery. Nearby is the grave of his younger brother, Quentin, an aviator killed in the First World War.

At Omaha U.S. infantry and combat engineers landed at six-thirty in the morning. They were met with murderous enemy fire. Those that survived, as well as those that died, passed into legend. Omaha Beach today is one of America’s most sacred spots. Loss of life on June 6, 1944, was great, and early on, consideration was given to withdrawing the troops. Part of the difficulty was the terrain. Heights close to the beach provided excellent fields of fire for the defenders. Another was that, unbeknownst to the Americans, a first-rate German division was stationed at Omaha. Still another problem was the absence of U.S. tanks. Most of those allocated to Omaha floundered in the rough water while attempting to reach shore. During the morning, American soldiers, many dazed and wounded, huddled beneath the coastal bluffs. To them and to their commanders, the situation looked grim.

Instead of withdrawing, the soldiers picked up their weapons and attacked. Supported by U.S. warships that moved in close, individual soldiers rallied, motivated in part by Charles Taylor, one of their officers, who shouted, “Two kinds of people are staying on this beach, the dead and those about to die. Now let’s get the hell out of here.” And they did. By late afternoon, U.S. troops had secured the beach and moved a mile or so inland. The cost, however, was high. Casualties at Omaha
numbered slightly over forty-one hundred, of whom at least a thousand were killed.

Hard fighting took place at the other landing sites as well. The British and the Canadians fought tenaciously. By day’s end, they had established a presence in Normandy that the Germans were unable to dislodge. After five days, the Allies had landed 326,000 men. Eisenhower’s army was on the Continent to stay.

What followed in the fighting that lasted until August 22 is now called the Battle for Normandy. At times, the combat was fierce. Allied commanders proved skillful, and despite occasional setbacks (Montgomery at Caen, for example), they were able to defeat their enemy. When it was over, a great victory had been achieved. Hitler had lost some four hundred thousand men, half of whom were casualties. The rest were prisoners. The Allies too had suffered. Nearly thirty-seven thousand were dead.

***

On August 25, 1944, Allied soldiers liberated Paris. More and more troops were arriving, so that by September General Eisenhower commanded seven separate field armies. In the north were the Canadian First Army and the British Second Army under the overall command of Montgomery, newly promoted to field marshal. In the center, Omar Bradley, one of Ike’s most trusted generals, was in charge of the U.S. First, Third, and Ninth Armies (George Patton, reporting to Bradley, commanded the Third Army). To the south, having come north after landing in Southern France, were the Free French First Army and the U.S. Seventh Army. Both of these were under the direction of Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, who, like Bradley and Montgomery, reported to Eisenhower. In total, the Supreme Commander commanded well over three million men. It was a formidable force, one that many hoped would end the war by Christmas.