America At War - Concise Histories Of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexington To Afghanistan (14 page)

The attack began at 6:35
A.M.
Shafter expected the town to fall in two hours. The battle did not end until 3:30 in the afternoon. Moreover, casualties were substantial. The Americans’ numbered 441, 81 of whom were killed. The defending Spaniards lost 235 dead, among them Vara del Rey.

The defenses of El Caney brought great credit to the army of Spain. Vara del Rey and his men fought tenaciously but in the end were overwhelmed by numbers. While they did not defeat the Americans, they so occupied their opponents that the attackers did not participate in the assault on San Juan Heights.

To reach the Heights the rest of V Corps had to move down a narrow trail, ford a small stream, advance across an open field, then scale the hills, the top of which was their objective. While doing so, they would be subject to fire from both Spanish sharpshooters and artillery.

The attack began in the early morning of July 1, 1898. The American Signal Corps employed an observation balloon to spot enemy positions. This worked, but, unfortunately, it also revealed the location of the troops advancing to the stream. There, as along the trail, the result was heavy casualties. The soldiers were anxious to move up the hills but had received no orders to do so. Shafter had lost control of the battle, so the necessary orders were delayed. When they arrived, the Americans launched their final assault. This was in two parts. The first involved a hill to the northeast, forward of the ridgeline, called Kettle Hill. Occupied by the Spanish, it had to be taken first. The assignment was given to the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment and to several regular army cavalry units. (As in the Civil War, the U.S. Army consisted of volunteers who had enlisted for a specific period of time and of regular career soldiers.)

Among the latter were the 9th and 10th Regiments. These were African-American units that, along with the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, formed the famous Buffalo Soldiers. They had fought in the West against the Indians, and had done well. In Cuba they would do well again, thereby helping to refute the absurd notion that military skill and courage were functions of race.

The 1st Volunteer Cavalry Regiment was commanded by Colonel Leonard Wood, a regular army officer who, in addition, was a well-regarded physician. When General Joseph Wheeler fell ill, Wood was advanced to brigade commander, leaving the regiment in the charge of its second in command. This was the one and only Theodore Roosevelt.

At the outbreak of war Roosevelt had been assistant secretary of the navy. This was an important position, one that would have involved the future president in significant decision making. But Teddy wanted action. So he resigned and secured a commission in the army. He then helped recruit volunteers to serve in a cavalry regiment, mostly from the American Southwest. Known as the Rough Riders, they would achieve a special place in American military history.

As did all U.S. Army cavalry regiments in Cuba, the Rough Riders and their fellow troopers of the 9th and 10th served dismounted, essentially as infantry. When the orders to attack Kettle Hill arrived, Roosevelt did not hesitate. The Rough Riders and the Buffalo Soldiers charged up the slope, led by Teddy Roosevelt, pistol in hand. Confronting considerable enemy gunfire, they took the hill. Later they moved forward—assisting in the main assault—and charged the northern slope of San Juan Hill. They soon reached its crest, suffering little loss of life. In doing all this, Roosevelt got the action he wanted. He also secured the fame he sought. And the Buffalo Soldiers earned the respect they deserved.

With Kettle Hill secured, the second part of the American assault, the attack on San Juan Hill, which lay to the southeast, began. Here the attack was carried out by the remaining soldiers of V Corps, about sixty-eight hundred men. They were commanded by two brigadier generals, Samuel Sumner and Jacob Kent. Not lacking in courage, the American troops began their climb. More than a few were cut down and the attack appeared to stall. Then four Gatling guns opened fire. Early rapid-fire machine guns, they laid down such murderous fire that the defenders gave way. Those that could retreated into Santiago. The Americans thus controlled the Heights. In doing so, they were in a position to pound the city into submission, or so it seemed.

In fact, Shafter’s men were in poor shape. At El Caney and the Heights they had suffered more than thirteen hundred casualties. Moreover, V Corps was seriously short of supplies. The food, medicines, and transportation that were available were insufficient to meet the need. Perhaps more important, disease was beginning to strike the Americans. It would do far more harm that Spanish gunfire ever did.

Still, the American army had won a victory. It had landed on hostile territory, defeated the enemy in battle, and fought quite bravely. Its performance since arriving in Cuba may not have been a textbook example of how to conduct military operations—and it wasn’t—but the U.S. Army had accomplished what it set out to do.

Soon it would be the navy’s turn.

Inside Santiago, Linares and his men also were suffering. They too were in need of supplies, and desperately so. Although reinforcements had arrived, they proved more of a burden than a blessing. The Spanish commander had enough men to fight. He did not have enough food to feed them. All the while, the civilians, with little to eat, feared for the future.

Among the defenders in Santiago General Linares had been able to deploy were some one thousand sailors, all from the ships of Admiral Cervera. His squadron, four cruisers and two destroyers, was still in the harbor. Now that the enemy controlled the Heights, his ships were vulnerable. He recalled his men and considered his options. There were three. He could haul down his flag and surrender. He could scuttle his vessels, that is deliberately sink them. Or he could weigh anchor and do battle with the enemy.

Spanish honor dictated that Cervera would fight.

On the morning of July 3, 1898, a Sunday, the Spanish ships steamed out of Santiago Harbor. Led by the flagship
Infanta Maria Teresa
, the vessels were in line astern, their crews at battle stations. The adjectives “heroic” and “foolhardy” accurately describe their sortie. Awaiting their arrival were four American battleships: the
Indiana
,
the
Iowa
,
the
Oregon
,
and the
Texas
, along with an armored cruiser, the USS
Brooklyn
, and two smaller vessels.

At approximately 9:30
A.M.
, the American warships opened fire. Their big guns pounded Cervera’s ships. The two destroyers were sunk. Three of the cruisers were set ablaze and deliberately run ashore. So too was the fourth. Of the 2,227 sailors in the Spanish squadron, 323 were killed. More would have died save for the rescue efforts of the Americans. Only one U.S. sailor was killed.

Once again the United States Navy had triumphed, first at Manila Bay and then at Santiago. That later analysis of both battles showed American naval gunfire to be often inaccurate mattered little. The wreckage of Cervera’s cruisers along the beaches near Santiago was ample evidence that the Americans owned the waters around Cuba.

In command of the American squadron blockading Santiago had been Rear Admiral William T. Sampson. That Sunday morning, aboard his flagship, the armored cruiser
New York
, he had sailed for a conference with his army counterpart, Major General Shafter. Left in charge of the blockading vessels was Winfield Schley, also a rear admiral. When Sampson learned that Cervera had sailed, he had the
New York
come about and steam to the scene of battle, arriving toward the end of the fighting. Meanwhile, Schley simply had each ship do what was expected of them, which was to pursue and fire at the enemy. Neither admiral controlled the sea battle, though both claimed credit for the victory. Their subsequent public quarrels over who was responsible for Cervera’s defeat embarrassed the navy and brought credit to neither man.

The dispute with Schley was not the only disagreement Admiral Sampson experienced. He also differed with Shafter on how best to subdue Santiago, a disagreement less personal than that with Admiral Schley but more fundamental, as it reflected basic differences between the army and the navy. General Shafter wanted the navy to bombard the fortifications of Santiago in order to assist the army’s capture of the city. Admiral Sampson wanted the army to subdue the force, making it safe for the navy to enter Santiago Harbor and force the city to surrender.

Such was the disagreement that when General Linares did give up, Shafter chose not to invite Sampson to the surrender ceremony. Their dispute was a failure in command. Neither man rose to the occasion, although the ultimate blame rests with President McKinley. He chose not to appoint an overall commander. Franklin Roosevelt would make the same mistake in 1942.

Santiago surrendered on July 17, but only after much discussion that entailed proposals and counterproposals. When Linares did capitulate, he turned over not only the troops in Santiago, but also the soldiers in all of eastern Cuba, some 22,700 men. In essence, the fighting on the island was over.

Five days before the surrender, eight thousand American soldiers and tons of supplies arrived in Cuba. The troops were under the command of Major General Nelson A. Miles. He was the U.S. Army’s senior officer, its commanding general. Miles participated in the negotiations with Linares, but he wished to lead troops in combat. He got his wish when the president approved his plans for the invasion of Puerto Rico. The landings began on July 25 and eventually involved eighteen thousand soldiers. There were several battles, all on the small scale, and all in which Miles and his men acquitted themselves well. The entire island would have been taken by force had the war with Spain not come to a halt.

This came about diplomatically. Spain authorized the French ambassador in Washington to strike a deal with the Americans. The government in Madrid had had enough: Spain’s warships had been destroyed and a Spanish army had been beaten. It was time to stop the killing. The ambassador secured an agreement to what is known as a protocol. Dated August 12, 1898, it set forth the basic terms for ending the conflict. Immediately, there would be an armistice. Cuba would become free and independent. Spain would cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. (Guam had been captured on June 21 by sailors and marines of the cruiser
Charleston
as the ship escorted army transports to Manila.) American troops would occupy Manila while the disposition of the Philippines would be resolved in the course of negotiating a formal treaty of peace.

The treaty was to be negotiated in Paris. Discussions began in the French capital in October and concluded on December 10. Tenets of the August 12 protocol were formalized in the treaty. Spain granted independence to Cuba and ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States. Interestingly, Article X of the treaty stated that the inhabitants of the territories relinquished by Spain were to enjoy “the free exercise of their religion.”

The treaty also called for the repatriation of Spanish troops and their families in Cuba, at the expense of the U.S. government. America honored the obligation. Aboard sixteen chartered vessels 22,864 men, women, and children were sent home to Spain, at a reported cost of $513,860.

In Cuba, once the Spanish no longer were in control, the Americans worked hard to improve conditions for both Cubans and the U.S. soldiers on the island. Roads were built, hospitals established. A major effort was made to improve sanitation, which, under previous rulers, had been neglected. Hunger was also addressed. Among the first ships to arrive once the blockade was lifted was a vessel belonging to the American Red Cross. Aboard was the organization’s founder, Clara Barton, with a great deal of food that was given to Cuban civilians.

Though no longer short of food, Shafter’s troops were not in good condition. Disease had struck V Corps and its commander pleaded with the secretary of war to order the soldiers home. In total, disease in Cuba killed 514 servicemen. The troops were transported to a hastily built camp at Montauk Point on Long Island. Once there, 257 additional men died of disease. As in the war with Mexico, enemy gunfire accounted for fewer deaths than disease.

According to a report of the U.S. Army’s adjutant general, 345 soldiers were killed in action during the fighting with Spain. Yet 2,565 more died of disease, either in the United States or overseas. The then limitations of medical knowledge plus surprisingly unsanitary conditions in army camps caused the high loss of life. In addition to the war resulting in the deaths of 2,910 Americans, it saw 1,577 men wounded. Total U.S. casualties in the brief conflict numbered 4,487.

Of these 4,487 only a few, 123, occurred in the Philippines. The reasons for such a low number there are twofold. First, except for Dewey’s naval battle, little fighting took place in the Philippines, at least initially. Second, the long sea voyage to and from the United States itself was beneficial to the health of the soldiers in transit.

Once Commodore Dewey had defeated the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay, he informed the secretary of the navy in Washington that he had too few sailors to take control of the capital city. The secretary of the navy so informed the secretary of the army who, with the approval of President McKinley, promptly sent 10,850 troops to the Philippines. Commanded by Major General Wesley Merritt, these soldiers soon convinced the Spaniards to haul down the flag.

Thus the future of Manila and the entire Philippine Archipelago were on the agenda in Paris once the negotiations between Spain and the United States began. Ultimately, President McKinley had to decide—or at least approve—the disposition of the city and the islands. He chose annexation. Agreeing to accept $20 million, Spain in turn transferred control of all of the Philippines to the United States.

Most Americans were pleased by their new acquisition (although most of them probably could not identify its precise location). Not so pleased were the thirteen thousand Filipinos who had been in revolt against the Spanish. They had been excluded from participating in the capture of Manila and, once the Americans had occupied the city, had been told to stay out. To them, the Treaty of Paris simply replaced one set of imperial rulers with another.