After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (6 page)

Overall, the new British-influenced political and economic structures that emerged kept most of the region’s monarchies in power well into the twentieth century. It is no coincidence, perhaps, that every sheikhdom involved in the British protection treaties was by the 1950s also in receipt of at least one form of British rent payment. Indeed, in much the same way as Britain’s earlier political support for breakaway sheikhdoms such as Dubai and Qatar, its intervention on behalf of a favoured member of Oman’s ruling family in the 1870s, and its military assistance for Kuwait in the 1920s, the new rents also became an important part of the survival and in some cases creation of Gulf monarchies. In the case of Ajman, for example, the lack of air landing rights or oil concession payments became such a source of concern that the sheikhdom was purposely selected to host a British military base—an agreement which netted Ajman’s ruler an annual rent of 10,000 rupees and allowed him to reduce taxation in his sheikhdom.
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Similarly profiting from British rents was the Sharqiyin tribe of Fujairah—a semi-autonomous Indian Ocean coastline territory nominally controlled by Sharjah. In 1951, concerned that the Sharqiyin were being courted by the American-Saudi oil giant, Aramco, Britain moved to lock the area into another IPC concession. In 1952 the Shariqin’s chief
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was duly upgraded to the status of the other Trucial States’ rulers: this allowed the IPC to begin payments, and Fujairah was declared to be independent of Sharjah.
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Conversely, when sheikhdoms were deemed to be no longer of strategic interest to Britain, or their ruling families were proving problematic, Britain moved to cut payments and in extreme cases facilitated the collapse of dynasties. Hamriyyah and Dibba, for example, were quietly reabsorbed by Sharjah, as without rent payments their respective rulers were in no position to maintain sufficient loyalty from resident tribes. Similarly, the Indian Ocean coastline town of Kalba, which in 1936 had
been recognised by Britain as a sheikhdom with its ruling family receiving rent for air landing rights, was reabsorbed by Sharjah in 1951. Britain had already ceased payments after failing to build an airbase and had chosen not to intervene following a series of fratricidal killings within its fragmented ruling family.
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Other examples included the Al-Kaabi family of Mahadha, close to Oman. Despite repeatedly presenting his case to Britain in the late 1950s for both recognition and the need for rent payments in return for providing soldiers to help guard oil exploration parties, he was refused and Britain allowed Mahadha to fall under the control of Muscat’s Al-Said.
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Independence and state formation

By the time of Abdul-Aziz bin Saud’s death in 1953, Saudi Arabia had already become an internationally recognised state
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with rulership having been handed on to his eldest sons, albeit with some turbulence. The first to take over was Saud bin Abdul-Aziz, who then abdicated in 1964 in favour of his more reform-focused younger brother, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz. Following Faisal’s 1975 assassination at the hands of a younger relative,
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he was succeeded by Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz, who was then succeeded in 1982 by Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. Since Fahd’s death in 2005 another of Abdul-Aziz’s sons, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, has been king, having already effectively ruled Saudi Arabia as Fahd’s crown prince and regent since 1996.
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In parallel to the now very elderly Abdullah, and underscoring the ongoing centrality of the original Saudi-Wahhabi pact to the Saudi state, the religious community continues to be led by the Al-Sheikh family—the direct descendants of Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab.
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Presently led by the one-eyed Abdul-Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the Al-Sheikh remain in control of key positions in government, especially in justice and education, and maintain close family ties to the Al-Saud through intermarriage.
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Together with other relatives and allies they also continue to dominate a number of state-backed bodies such as the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, thus forming the official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.

Since Saud’s accession, Saudi Arabia’s government has been run by a Council of Ministers. Established by charter, it has served as both the executive and the legislative body of the Saudi state, with all of its members being appointed by royal decree.
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In 1992, after a number of demands
and petitions made to the ruling family by both liberal and conservative opponents in the wake of the Kuwait crisis
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and the return of western troops (including female soldiers) to the region, Fahd instigated a number of reforms aimed at appeasing the religious community while also providing the state with a greater veneer of accountability.
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Collectively, the new ‘Basic System of Governance’ or ‘Basic Law’ re-confirmed Islamic
Sharia
law as the basis for all legislation in the state, while also establishing new regulatory bodies to monitor government performance and separate the judiciary from other parts of the government—albeit with judges still being appointed by the king. To provide a greater degree of stability for the ruling family and to guard against internecine disputes or coups d’état, the 1992 reforms also clarified that succession would be limited to male descendants of Abdul-Aziz.
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In this way, Fahd sought to enshrine in law some of the stabilisation mechanisms later observed by Michael Herb in his aforementioned work on dynastic monarchies.
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In 1993, in a further effort to promote accountability, Fahd established a new Consultative Council or
majlis al-shura
. Although, as with the Saudi judges, all involved were appointed by the king.
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Under Abdullah, little has changed. The Consultative Council now stands at 150 members, but each is still appointed, sitting for four-year terms. Its powers remain weak, with its ability to call ministers to question or launch investigations into governmental affairs being very limited, despite supposedly being allowed to propose legislation.
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The only significant development in recent years was an election in 2005 for municipal councils. But this too was severely restricted, with only half of the seats being elected, with only male candidates and voters being permitted, and with councillors enjoying little power as central ministries continued to dictate regional and municipal policies.
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Fresh elections should have been staged in 2009, but these were cancelled on the grounds that the government needed time to study how best to ‘expand the electorate and the possibility of allowing women to vote’. Although elections were eventually staged in late 2011, seemingly as a concession to the Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region, the same restrictions remained in place with no women being involved and with only half of the seats being elected.
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As with Fahd, Abdullah has also tried to address the succession issue and strengthen the Al-Saud as a dynastic monarchy. In 2006 an Allegiance Commission or
Hayat al-Bayah
was set up, ostensibly to allow
for some degree of consensus within the family over appointing new rulers and also to facilitate the dismissal of kings by the rest of the family in the event of illness or other problems.
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Although limiting the powers of Saudi Arabia’s religious police in recent years and—in 2007—separating the Supreme Court from the Al-Sheikh-controlled Ministry for Justice,
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Abdullah has otherwise followed Fahd’s strategy of reinforcing the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In particular, he has ensured that only the state-appointed, Riyadh-based Council of Senior Religious Scholars has the ability to issue a
fatwa
or Islamic legal pronouncement in Saudi Arabia, thus reducing the influence of religious figures elsewhere in the country.
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In 1961 Kuwait joined Saudi Arabia as an independent state, after Britain formally withdrew its control over the increasingly prosperous and autonomous sheikhdom. Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah duly proclaimed himself ‘emir’ and the United Nations granted recognition to the emirate of Kuwait, while the US had already established a consulate before Britain left, and had even begun to process Kuwaiti visas.
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Almost immediately, however, British troops had to be re-deployed following Iraqi claims on Kuwait. But by 1963 a new government in Iraq relinquished these claims
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and over the next two decades the Al-Sabah dynasty consolidated its position. The family has since ruled unopposed, with Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah suffering only a brief exile in 1990 following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and being quickly reinstated in 1991 following the US-led multinational Operation Desert Storm which ousted Iraq’s forces. Jabar was succeeded in 2006 by his crown prince, Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, who represented a different branch of the family. But due to Saad’s poor health he was peacefully deposed and replaced by another member of Jabar’s line, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah, who continues to be Kuwait’s emir.

Following independence, Abdullah was quick to draw up a new constitution for Kuwait and to establish a new parliament, the National Assembly. As discussed later in this book, Kuwait’s merchant population had long been involved in various consultative institutions, given their relative wealth and political influence, so democratic or rather consultative traditions were much more ingrained in Kuwait than in Saudi Arabia. The first parliamentary elections were staged in 1963, with all literate male Kuwaitis being eligible to stand for the fifty seats.
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Significantly, and much like the Al-Saud rulers, Abdullah also sought to strengthen
the Al-Sabah as a dynastic monarchy by confirming in the constitution that the Al-Sabah were the inviolable rulers of Kuwait, and that future rulers must always be descendants of the long-serving former ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah. The constitution also required the prime minister to be a member of the ruling family, and allowed the emir to appoint fifteen of the sixteen cabinet positions. Moreover, political parties were banned, and the emir was able to dissolve parliament as he saw fit and to pass emergency laws when parliament was not sitting.
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But despite these restrictions, the parliament proved more vibrant than anticipated, with various outspoken blocs forming—including Arab nationalists and Islamists—and with some tribes even holding ‘primary elections’ to select their preferred parliamentary candidates.
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Endless debates and controversies—few of which could be resolved given the inherent tension from having elected members of parliament alongside appointed cabinet members—led to unapproved budgets and the stalling of various development projects. While the government tried to boost support for their preferred parliamentary blocs, often by naturalising further tribes in exchange for loyalty, the emir eventually chose to step in and dissolved parliament in 1976.
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Only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran did the emir re-open parliament, expecting greater government support due to uncertainties over Iran’s intentions. Even then, he was prudent to offer loyal parliamentary candidates further advantages: the number of electoral districts was increased from ten to twenty-five, and more naturalisations took place, mostly in the new constituencies. Moreover, in an effort to placate the Islamist blocs and gain their loyalty, the emir called for greater restrictions on alcohol and on the celebrating of Christmas and other non-Islamic events.
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By the mid-1980s Kuwait’s parliament was again under threat, with the Iran-Iraq War continuing to destabilise the region and with a series of car-bombings and an assassination attempt on the emir. In 1986 Jabar duly dissolved parliament, and it remained closed until after the trauma of invasion and liberation.
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During this period the only space for political discussion was in the more traditional setting of Kuwait’s meetinghouses or
diwaniyas
. Since its reopening in 1991 the parliament has remained a source of controversy, having been closed down on several more occasions by the current emir. Such closures have usually been in order to prevent uncomfortable questioning of the prime minister—up until recently Nasser bin Muhammad Al-Sabah. Thus its powers are still
very limited, with the ruling family and its ‘sovereign’ appointees continuing to dominate the emirate’s executive, in something of a neo-patriarchal model. Nonetheless, despite weariness, declining voter turnouts,
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and general disillusionment with the system, elections have continued, having last been staged in early 2012. And on some occasions parliamentary opposition has managed to push through key reforms, notably the 2006 ‘Orange Movement’ decision to reduce the number of electoral districts down to just five—an effort to tackle the corruption and voterigging which was alleged to be taking place in many of the smaller electoral districts.
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