A Theory of Contemporary Rhetoric (37 page)

Persuasion, although it is a central concern of Aristotle's work, is only one dimension of interest in the present book. Argument, for example, is seen to be persuasive here; but it also has other functions, as discussed in
chapter 6
, such as clarification, resolution, defense, and entertainment. That is to say,
persuasion
per se is not the focus of a theory of contemporary rhetoric. Because, in contemporary terms, rhetoric covers the arts of discourse in public
and
private settings, the persuasion of an audience by an orator or an actor is not the main focus of the present theory. To explore this central tenet of Aristotelian rhetoric in more depth, persuasion is concomitant with one-way discourse: A tries to persuade B of something. The persuasion
may
be two-way, but in each case, A is trying to persuade B, and B is trying to persuade A. We can see how such dualistic persuasive encounters can be conceived of as argument, but suggest that such two-way encounters are not essentially dialogic or dialectical.

Indeed, there is a fusion in Aristotelian thinking between persuasion and dialectic, which may well lead to the confusion about the parameters
and nature of the field of classical rhetoric. For the purposes of the present book, it is useful to separate persuasion (one of several functions of argument) from dialectic (the private, public, and/or academic practice of making an argument).

Rather than persuasion, it is dialectic that classical and contemporary rhetoric have in common. There is a close affinity between the two in Aristotle's
Rhetoric
, and an equally close but somewhat different affinity between dialectic and contemporary rhetoric. In classical rhetoric, dialectic—the practice of making an argument—has as a subcategory the deployment of the enthymeme as a device to secure deductive proof. Elsewhere, we have suggested that the micro-logical nature of the enthymeme (itself a type of syllogism) is not scaleable to everyday discourse, nor indeed to public discourse. Such an approach to dialectic is driven by logic and logical proof. In contemporary rhetoric, dialectic is a two-way operation or practice of making an argument, drawing on deductive and inductive reasoning to make its points. In other words, it is more dialogic, more interactive. It can be seen as a subcategory of argumentational rhetoric.

Although there is close affinity between dialectic and rhetoric in such a contemporary theory, it is also important to note that, whereas for Aristotle dialectic was the practice of making arguments in private and academic fields and rhetoric was the domain of public practice in persuading (including defending, or accusing), the case is different in contemporary rhetoric. Dialectic and rhetoric are not seen as operating in different fields or domains. Rather, rhetoric can operate in private, public, and academic fields; dialectic serves rhetoric in providing an operational means whereby arguments can be conducted in a civilized, rigorous, and mutually beneficial way.

Finally, with regard to the
Rhetoric
, the separation of thought from style in Aristotle prefigures the fissure that periodically leads to the decline of rhetoric. It is as if such a conception of classical rhetoric has a fault-line. Earlier in the present book, we referred to Grierson's (1945) work on rhetoric as a form of literary stylistics. But any reduction of rhetoric to a stylistic addendum to thought diminishes and relegates it. In the present book, thought and the manifestation of thought in action and/or in its representation in one or a number of modes makes thought and expression integral.

We now turn to poetics, where there is ostensibly a closer connection between classical and contemporary thinking about rhetoric; not because they have a common interest in stylistics, but because the deliberations about the relationship between the rhetor and his/her audience, and with the subject matter to be exchanged, are central to the
Poetics
and to contemporary poetics and rhetoric.

The
Poetics
is ostensibly about the art of poetry, covering the genres of epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, “dithyrambic poetry” (lyric poetry performed
by a chorus), and music for the pipe or lyre. Much of the
Poetics
is concerned with the differences between tragedy, in all its aspects, and epic—clearly the issue of the time for Aristotle, as the oral epic tradition transformed into a period in which drama was prevalent.

What is notable about comparisons between contemporary rhetorics and the rhetoric/poetics of Aristotle is that the terms of reference are changed. We can no longer undertake a direct comparison between classical and contemporary rhetoric on the basis of these terms. First and foremost, the scope of the
Poetics
is more limited than any such poetics today; furthermore, as has been established in the present book, rhetoric subsumes poetics.

Take, for example, the three respects in which types of imitation (
mimesis
) can be differentiated from each other in Aristotelian poetics. Aristotle discusses the three ways in respect “of their different
media
of imitation, or different
objects
, or a different
mode
(i.e., a different manner)” (1996, 3). Whereas for Aristotle,
medium
means what we would now called
mode
, for example, the spoken voice, still images, or “rhythm, language and melody” (3); for the contemporary rhetorician, “mode” is reserved for the code in which the message is transported (spoken voice, the written word, gesture, etc.), and rhythm, language, and melody would be category errors: rhythm and melody being a feature of musical sound that could also apply to the other arts, and
language
being a term of such generality, using the basic meaning of verbal language to apply metaphorically to a range of languages, including musical language, mathematical language, and choreographic language.

The category of
object
is one reserved by Aristotle for the moral nature of the subject of the composition and is closely connected to the concept and practice of imitation. The notion that comedy “aims to imitate people worse than our contemporaries, and [tragedy] better” (op.cit, 5) is not one that is used in contemporary rhetoric because the value judgments that applied for Aristotle are not applicable now. Furthermore, contemporary rhetoric is more amoral than classical rhetoric.

Mode
is used by Aristotle to mean the “way” in which imitation takes place, meaning, for example, whether the message is narrated, and/or is a monologue “or else with all the imitators as agents and engaged in activity” (5). In contemporary terms, we could characterize this Aristotelian category as concerned with genre, meta-genre (narrative, argument, description), and voice. But as part of the terminology of contemporary rhetoric,
modes
are best deployed as they are in multimodal theory,
viz
. as the principal codes or “languages” via which communication takes place.

Another difference between Aristotelian and contemporary rhetoric is that, for Aristotle, narrative is seen as the
sine qua non
of epic, but as one element of the evolution of tragedy as a genre. Aristotle traces the origin of plot-construction to Sicily (the home of pre-Athenian rhetoric)
and identified plot as the main element of tragedy. In his study of the emergence of tragedy as a major art form, Aristotle is keen to see it as “better” than epic in that it contains all the elements that epic contained, and more. It also contained the elements of character, diction, reasoning, spectacle, and lyric poetry. In an interesting section of the
Poetics
as far as the present book is concerned, the elements of tragedy are ranked in importance: first, plot, or an arrangement of events; second, character, as the agents who instigate plot.

Third is reasoning. This is the ability to say what is implicit in a situation and appropriate to it, which in prose is the function of the arts of statesmanship and of rhetoric. (12)

Fourth is diction or verbal expression; the rest are song (“The most important of the sources of pleasure” (13) and spectacle. Interestingly,
à propos
our discussion of theatre in
chapter 10
, “the effect of tragedy is not [merely] dependent on performance and actors [because] the art of the property manager has more relevance to the production of visual effects than does that of poets” (12).

The distinction between the domain of the
Poetics
and that of the
Rhetoric
is clear in the previous listing. Rhetoric is seen as doing the work of the world in prose; poetics is seen as the world of drama, theatre, tragedy, comedy, and the arts. In contemporary terms, however, poetics covers prose as well as poetry and drama (including drama in prose). It is still limited in twentieth-century terms to literary production. But as argued in the present book, in twenty-first-century terms, poetics is an increasingly defunct category because rhetoric is the more powerful, comprehensive theory via which to make sense of literary production as well as of the operation of the other arts and of communication in the real world. The key in making this leap to a higher level of theoretical application is via framing, specifically the liberation of the act of framing from its reification in genres and other text-types, and via multimodal theory.

What is also notable about the significant place of reasoning in the Aristotelian theory of tragedy is the fact that reasoning is seen as the “ability to say what is implicit in a situation and appropriate to it.” We could see this as manifested in the speeches of the Chorus in Greek tragedy, providing commentary on the actions of the tragic heroes and heroines. Such commentary is an abstraction from the main action; a place of reflection between that of the main actors and the audience; explication and exegesis of the action; the beginnings of literary criticism, in terms of interpretation and commentary; and a suggestion that the public recognition of the import of the action is part of the main aim of the dramatic performance itself.

The present book has not started with a comparison between classical and contemporary rhetoric, partly because it has wished to build the case for a new rhetoric from practice rather than in counterpoint to existing theory; and to undertake a full comparison between the
Rhetoric
, the
Poetics
, and other manuals and theories from the classical period (and their derivatives in medieval, Renaissance, and twentieth-century, as well as in multilingual and intercultural rhetorics) would necessitate a multi-volume work in itself. The process of working from practice toward theory has another purpose: to indicate that a contemporary rhetoric must be lightweight, fit-for purpose and transportable, like scaffolding to put up a building.

Theory, and its diagrammatic representation in modeling, is an imagined art. It takes the form, metaphorically, of a canopy or umbrella under which a range of practices have commonality as well as differences, and in which they make sense. Most importantly, it “explains” specific phenomena and occurrences by providing an over-arching rationale for them. Necessarily, it has an ethereal quality and can be easily discounted as irrelevant, over-abstract, or self-referential. However, good theory is connected to each and every practice or event that it purports to explain. It is “practical” in the sense that it provides an explanation of how practice works and of what the key informing variables are. It should not dictate, but instead provide a framework for positive and successful action in the world.

It needs to be lightweight in order to fulfil its framework-like function, but also so that the attention is not so much on the theory but what it allows to happen and the connections between phenomena that it reveals. If the framework it provides becomes a constraint, or if it is no longer fit-for-purpose, the theory becomes outdated and redundant. That is why I believe the manuals of Renaissance rhetoric were like carapaces of real action. They attempted to classify, in some detail and exhaustively, the possibilities of gesture and action, instead of seeing that the possibilities were endless within an appropriate framework. This category error of attempting to reify, in a comprehensive categorical system, the range of possibilities afforded by a theory, is easily made. But such reification, at the same time as classifying, also fossilizes practice, making it rule-bound and instilling notions of correctness into a wide-ranging set of practices.

The other danger of an over-classificatory approach to rhetoric is that once the finite set of devices is defined and described, it becomes tempting to see the catalog as a template for teaching. The notion that this finite set can be taught and learnt and that this, the science or art or craft— the
technē
—of rhetoric provides a comprehensive guide to success in the field, is a flawed one. Pedagogically, learning is not as simple as that. It is more a matter of practice, guidance within a template of possibilities,
finessing of technique, and the bringing together of intention, feeling, intellect, judgment, and the consideration of audience.

In these senses, practice drives theory. Theory must remake itself to adapt to changes in practice and be generous enough to accommodate new practices. It must be able to make links between existing and new practices across a wide range of possibility. The inductive inclination of rhetoric places it in relation to humanities and arts disciplines—and, to an extent, social sciences—where analysis begins from the actualities of the field. Texts in literary and communicational fields; events, people, motivation, and patterns or trends in history; the particularities of languages and contexts in linguistics; making in the arts; social schemata and practices in sociology and social work; the organizational and pedagogic demands of teaching practice—all these disciplinary and practice fields are concerned with interpretation and action on the ground and derive their own disciplinary and practice cultures from problem solving that is inductively driven. That is not to say that they are not also informed by theories; nor that science, medicine, philosophy, and logic operate purely deductively. What we can say, however, is that “the scientific method” takes a deductive approach to investigation and problem solving and that it, too, depends on an interaction of the deductive and the inductive to reach hypotheses and conclusions.