A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (16 page)

Mohamed Boudiaf

Mourad Didouche

Mohamed Khider

Belkacem Krim

In 1954 the average age of these
neuf historiques
was thirty-two (Didouche, the youngest, was only twenty-seven); they originated from all parts of Algeria; all were literate, though they came mostly from modestly-off artisan or middle-class families. None was an
évolué
intellectual, or liberal — let alone a supporter of Ferhat Abbas. All were dedicated revolutionaries, holding violence to be indispensable. Ben Boulaid was a miller from the Aurès with seven children who, like Ben Bella, had been a much decorated warrant officer in the Italian campaign; Ait Ahmed, aged thirty-three, was the son of a Kabyle
caid;
his brother-in-law, Khider, had been a deputy for Algiers from 1946; Boudiaf, from the south Constantine area and, at thirty-five, one of the oldest, had had his schooling cut short by chronic tuberculosis.

Krim

Though Boudiaf in the initial stages seems to have been the moving force behind the C.R.U.A. together with Ben Bella, it was Belkacem Krim who was perhaps the most outstanding figure at this time — if for no other reason than that he was the only one to bring with him an operational maquis already in being — and in the key region of Kabylia. He was the only one of the nine to survive the whole war, alive and at liberty, while always holding a high office in revolutionary councils. Born in 1922, Krim was a Kabyle from the Dra-El-Mizan area who had served in the wartime army as nothing more than a corporal-quartermaster, but had become an excellent shot. Earlier, in his school days, he already noted resentment at having to write down the names of his European colleagues in blue, Muslims in red, and later complained: “My brother returned from Europe with medals and frost-bitten feet! There everyone was equal. Why not here?” On demobilisation Krim broke with his father, who was a retired
caid
well-trusted by the authorities, and joined the M.T.L.D. After the arrest of fourteen nationalists, of whom he was to have been the fifteenth, Krim organised a sit-down strike outside the local administrator’s office. He describes himself at this time as belonging “to that Algerian generation which passed from the total innocence of childhood into the maturity of the man”. In March 1947 he was summoned to appear in court and, rather than face the prospects of a prison sentence, he took off, armed with an old Sten gun, into the maquis in the wild mountains of Kabylia. He was then aged twenty-five. Later that same year he “executed” a Muslim
garde-champêtre
, or village constable, and from that time on he became a much-wanted outlaw, with four separate death sentences imposed on him
in absentia.

At an early stage Krim was joined in the maquis by Omar Ouamrane, another Kabyle three years his senior and a former sergeant who had served in the same Tirailleur regiment as Krim. Of immense physical strength and with a vast jaw, Ouamrane throughout the war was to be Krim’s inseparable chief lieutenant. Starting from a small handful of men, the Krim—Ouamrane maquis could, by 1954, claim some 500 at least partially armed members, with a further 1,200
militants
standing by. A small man with flabby features and blubbery lips, and often photographed in an impeccable city suit, Krim himself could have passed more readily as an urban mafioso than as the tough, long-seasoned maquisard that he was — indeed, the only one of the
neuf historiques
with so extensive an experience of this kind.

During the spring of 1954 Krim and Ben Boulaid, the maquis leader of the ever-turbulent Aurès, both agreed to bring their groups to participate in a general revolt. A first full meeting of the C.R.U.A., attended in Algiers by Krim with the faithful Ouamrane (and with a heavy price on his head), provoked a certain amount of acrimony. Krim, smarting somewhat from the preponderance of Arabs over Kabyles within the C.R.U.A., yet knowing also that he had control over the most effective insurrectionary body already in existence, refused point-blank to submit to the orders of any commander located in Algiers. After some heated discussion it was agreed that Kabylia should be an autonomous operational zone.

The C.R.U.A. had thus managed to bridge at this first session the previously disastrous animosity between Arab and Kabyle. Yet it marked the seeds of dissension within the revolutionary camp that were to dog it incessantly through the war, and beyond. At the same time it was to have its bearing on the supreme leadership of the revolutionaries. The
neuf historiques
, deeply admiring of Ho Chi Minh at that time, would have liked initially to appoint from their ranks a similarly prestigious figure to head them; but, while there was no candidate of obviously outstanding stature, to have selected either an Arab or a Kabyle might have run the grave risk of alienating one or other race. Thus the principle of collective leadership was adopted right from the beginning, and it was to constitute a vitally important feature of the revolution all the way through to 1962.

“Arm, train and prepare!”

By historic chance, this first full meeting of the C.R.U.A. took place the day that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was announced. The impact on the Algerians, many of whose kinsmen had been fighting alongside the French in the besieged camp, was electric. Employing subtlest techniques of psychological warfare, the Viet-Minh suggestively quizzed the Algerians captured there: “Since you are such good soldiers, why do you fight for the colonialists? Why don’t you fight for yourselves and get yourselves a country of your own?” Suddenly this unbelievable defeat deprived the glorious French army of its
baraka
, making it look curiously mortal for the first time. Wild rumours exaggerating the defeat began immediately to take root at home in Algeria, greatly facilitating the C.R.U.A.’s work of recruitment; the well-informed J.-R. Tournoux cites a Muslim public employee declaring shortly before the outbreak of the revolt: “We were told that there was no longer any French army; that it had been destroyed in Indo-China.” With this windfall, the “Nine” decided to expedite the day of the revolt at top speed, so as to catch the French government at its moment of greatest weakness. In July[
5
] a wider plenary meeting took place at the Clos Salembier, outside Algiers, comprising the C.R.U.A. plus the leading revolutionary operatives from all over Algeria, calling themselves “The Committee of the Twenty-two”. Here a crucial political decision was taken by unanimous vote: the armed revolt under preparation would
not
be one single blow aimed at drawing concessions from France, but an “unlimited revolution”
à outrance
to continue until full independence was achieved.

Orders were now despatched through the underground Algerian grapevine: “Arm, train and prepare!” In Cairo, Ben Bella and his two colleagues were instructed to apply urgent pressure upon the pan-Arabist Nasser regime for maximum support in arms and propaganda. On 10 October the new revolutionary movement received its name; Front de Libération Nationale — F.L.N. That same day a date was fixed for the simultaneous outbreak of revolt all through Algeria: “00.01 hours on 1 November” — All Saints’ Day.

[
1
] The estimated Algerian population today stands somewhere short of sixteen million.

[
2
] The reversal of situations between the Fourth Republic of 1953 and Britain of 1974 onwards is,
en passant
, instructive.

[
3
] The first electoral college comprised all French citizens, some 500,000 eligibles (in 1954), plus a number of “meritorious” Muslims; these included recipients of higher education, civil servants,
bachagas
and
caids
, holders of the Legion of Honour and distinguished
anciens combattants
, and they then numbered 60,000. The second college embraced the eligible voters of all the remaining nine million Muslims.

[
4
] Early in this debate one of Abbas’s fellow deputies had declared: “You showed us the way, you gave us the taste of liberty, and now when we say that we wish to be free, to be men — no more and no less — you deny us the right to take over your own formulas. You are Frenchmen, and yet you are surprised that some of us should seek independence.” After this eloquent plea, he had been brought to order by the President of the Chamber in this contumelious fashion: “Monsieur Saadane, I have already reminded you that you are at the French tribune. I now invite you to speak in French there.…”

[
5
] The exact date of this historic meeting is curiously imprecise, with different accounts putting it variously at 10, 21, 22, 25 and 27 July — or even early June. The discrepancy of memories here is in itself one indication of the difficulties of historical accuracy that historians encounter when dealing with the war as a whole.

PART TWO

The War: 1954–1958

We had been told, on leaving our native soil, that we were going to defend the sacred rights conferred on us by so many of our citizens settled overseas, so many years of our presence, so many benefits brought by us to populations in need of our assistance and our civilisation.

We were able to verify that all this was true, and, because it was true, we did not hesitate to shed our quota of blood, to sacrifice our youth and our hopes. We regretted nothing, but whereas we over here are inspired by this frame of mind, I am told that in Rome factions and conspiracies are rife, that treachery flourishes, and that many people in their uncertainty and confusion lend a ready ear to the dire temptations of relinquishment.… Make haste to reassure me, I beg you, and tell me that our fellow-citizens understand us, support us and protect us as we ourselves are protecting the glory of the Empire.

If it should be otherwise, if we should have to leave our bleached bones on these desert sands in vain, then beware of the anger of the Legions!

Marcus Flavinius, centurion of the Augusta Legion, quoted by Jean Lartéguy in
The Centurions

CHAPTER FOUR
All Saints’ Day, 1954

This sad day … for Frenchmen who refuse to understand, for Kabyles who refuse to explain.…

Mouloud Feraoun,
Journal 1955–62

C.R.U.A. finalises its plans

THE choice of All Saints’ Day for launching the revolt was by no means fortuitous. Striking on a night when the staunchly Catholic
pieds noirs
were celebrating so important a festival would, it was argued, find police vigilance at its minimum; while the choice of such a date would carry with it the maximum propaganda impact. For a people as fond of symbolism as the Algerians, and with memories of Sétif still etched in their minds, the fact that All Saints commemorated the persecution of the early Christian martyrs was also not without significance.

It was with a similar mixture of care and method that the C.R.U.A. finalised its plans, borrowing organisationally from the experiences of both the French wartime resistance and, more recently, the Viet-Minh. The country was divided into six autonomous zones or Wilayas, giving the rebellion an integral structure that it would retain over the next seven and a half years. Operation groups would be formed in watertight compartments, with no more than four or five trusted men knowing each other. On D-Day each group leader was to act in accordance with a very precise plan, and attacks were to be directed against specific public installations, private property of the
grands colons
, French military personnel and gendarmes, and Muslim collaborators. European civilians — especially women and children — were to be strictly immune; there would be no repetition of Sétif. General tactical instructions to be observed went as follows: “After a
coup de main
, if it’s not possible to disengage at once, hold until the arrival of reinforcements. Popularise the movement. Keep yourself informed!” and, above all: “Never accept frontal combat!” To realise its pledge that this would be no isolated blow, but the opening of a sustained revolt, greatly exacerbated the already massive triple problems of recruitment, arms and finance that confronted the C.R.U.A. leadership. For fear of alerting the French authorities it had to pursue its recruitment propaganda with the utmost discretion, creating a climate of revolt by burrowing away at such essentially negative issues as agrarian discontent. Yet somehow, with the miraculous efficacy of the
téléphone arabe
, the word ran through the cafés of the Casbah to the outer fringes of the
bled
that a revolt was afoot. Enlistment of the first F.L.N.
djounoud
,[
1
] however, proceeded slowly; the prevailing attitude being cautiously one of wait and see — would the revolt succeed, or would it be instantaneously and mercilessly crushed?