A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (106 page)

Unaware of the arguments at Tripoli, Joxe and his team were taken aback by the new rigidity their opposite numbers promptly displayed at Evian. Buron was soon noting that the Algerians seemed to be “even more frightened of their colleagues in Tunis” than of the O.A.S. But over the past few weeks the O.A.S. had left so great a mark that the French recognised that they were in a considerably worse position to negotiate than the previous month. Then, with neither Krim nor Dahlab actively seeking the departure of the Europeans, both sides had taken gambles on the future; now the ground had shifted perceptibly, and Joxe’s hard-fought efforts on behalf of guarantees for the
pieds noirs
already seemed largely academic. In the words of Yves Courrière:

Backed by the Europeans, the O.A.S. had done so much that it was no longer a question of the majority of the
pieds noirs
remaining. Perhaps a tiny minority would cling on. And meanwhile the repeated crimes were burning each day a few more of the bridges between the two communities. Hatred was building up.

“What”, asked Buron, “was the point of proclaiming a cease-fire if, as soon as fighting ceased in the
djebel
, civil war then broke out in the cities?”

By 11 March, under the barrage of “clarifications” and further concessions demanded by the Algerians, the second Evian looked like following in the footsteps of the first. “I am anxious,” recorded Buron. “Louis Joxe seemed to be very tired, that is if not actually ill, all day. The morale of the delegation is not very high.” Joxe tried to force the pace, threatening the Algerians to break off if no progress were made over the next two days. A “nervous and irritated” de Gaulle was constantly on the telephone telling his delegation to threaten the Algerians that — if the worst came to the worst — France would go ahead with unilateral solutions, invoking the short-lived spectre of partition. 16 March was a day of intense cold, with the wind blowing like a tempest across the gloomy lake; on hearing of the murder of Feraoun and his associates, Buron says that the
Götterdämmerung
instincts of the O.A.S. made him think of “the Hitler bunker”. And meanwhile there was still but little progress towards a peace settlement.

Then, suddenly, on 18 March it was all over: “
Et voilà!
We have finished; we have attached our three signatures opposite that of Belkacem Krim at the bottom of ninety-three pages, the fruit of the work of these twelve days,” wrote Robert Buron. After seven and a half years of war, the cease-fire was due to operate with effect from midday on the 19th, both parties hoping that its announcement would at last bring about an end to the O.A.S. outrages.

The Agreement

How, from all the complexity of their ninety-three pages, preambles, chapters, headings and articles, can one distil the salient points of the Evian Agreements? First of all, they dealt with details of the cease-fire, including arrangements for the release forthwith of all prisoners. Next came a
déclaration générale
, recognising the full sovereignty of Algeria, in its territorial integrity, in accordance with the principles of “self-determination” as bestowed by the referendum of 8 January 1961. Early in this
déclaration
were recognised the rights of “French citizens” to share in equality the protection and privileges accorded to all Algerians over a transitory period of three years. At the end of this period they could either opt for Algerian citizenship or retain their French nationality, in which case they would become “foreigners” in Algeria. They could not have it both ways; thus had the French negotiators been forced to concede yet another major bargaining point, that of “dual nationality”. The rights to which the “French citizens” would be entitled during the transitory three years were spelled out to include: respect for private property — no “dispossession” without fair compensation; a “fair and authentic” participation in public affairs; guarantees of non-discrimination in language, cultural and religious matters. All citizens of Algeria would also be equally protected against discrimination, or sanctions relating to any acts committed during the war and prior to the cease-fire.

Thus was the Number One question of the
pieds noirs
regulated — on paper.

A chapter on the “settlement of the military questions” gave France twelve months in which to reduce her armed forces to 80,000, and a further twenty-four months to repatriate them altogether; the lease of Mers-el-Kébir was fixed at fifteen years, renewable by agreement after that; leases on other military installations as were deemed “necessary” to France were granted, but for unspecified periods. Under “Economic and Financial Co-operation”, France was committed to continue for three years, renewable, to provide aid “at a level equivalent to that of current programmes”; i.e. the multi-million franc Constantine Plan. Algeria would remain part of the franc zone, and Algerian workers would be free to remain in France. Under the all-important item of petroleum rights, a complex agreement permitted the French oil companies concessions on the bases of past enterprises, and preferential treatment for new exploration and development over a period of six years. To preside over the “transitory period”, a Provisional Executive would be appointed — comprised of equal numbers of Algerians and French — and one of its first acts would entail the fixing of a referendum to ratify the Evian Agreements within three to six months of the cease-fire; not, as originally envisaged by de Gaulle at the time of his “self-determination” statement in 1959, after an elapse of four years. The Agreements ended with a pious “Declaration of Principles”, to the effect that: “France and Algeria will resolve the differences that may arise between them by pacific means of settlement.” (I.e. French forces still
in situ
would be precluded from intervening in the event of any infringement of the Algerian side.)

Thus, layer by layer, had the onion of French demands been peeled in the face of Algerian refusal to compromise: first, the French insistence on a prior cease-fire; then her refusal to recognise the G.P.R.A. as the sole
interlocuteur valable
; then de Gaulle’s requirement of a four years’ hiatus between a cease-fire and “self-determination”; then the Sahara, and then the safeguard of dual nationality for the
pieds noirs
. And so on.

In fact, almost every one of the above provisions was to remain a dead letter, overtaken by events for one reason or another.

Algerian jubilation: French misgivings

On the night of 18 March, over the transmitters of all North Africa, President Ben Khedda proclaimed triumphantly “a great victory of the Algerian people”. It could indeed be said that, through its extraordinary consistency, the F.L.N. at Evian had fulfilled virtually all of its original war objectives as framed at the Soummam Conference back in 1956. In France
Le Canard Enchainé
, abandoning its satirical style, blazoned in a bold headline: “To de Gaulle, from his grateful country: once and for all,
merci
!” The feeling of Frenchmen in general was one of relief but no rejoicing, accompanied by a great deal of criticism from all quarters. “We felt not the slightest surge of joy,” wrote Simone de Beauvoir: “The Algerians’ victory didn’t just wipe out the seven years of French atrocities, suddenly brought out into the light of day … the prevailing sentiment — ‘Yes, the poor Germans; one realises now it wasn’t their fault.”’ There were others on the Left who attacked the amnesty clause in the Agreements for letting the “torturers” go unpunished. There were those like General Massu who condemned them for “betraying” the Muslim administrators and
harkis
who had remained loyal to France, while Lacoste castigated de Gaulle for “letting the petroleum go within forty-eight hours”. Many felt that the main weakness of the Agreements was the lack of watertight guarantees for the
pieds noirs
; that de Gaulle in his haste had sold them down the river. “Our legitimate war aim”, the liberal Germaine Tillion had written in 1960 “is the safeguarding of the lives and interests of a significant population which has its claims on France.” Had this been achieved at Evian?

There were those who felt that
only
France was bound by the Agreements: with herself fettered to resolving future differences by “pacific means”, with her army withdrawing, what possible sanctions could be applied against the G.P.R.A. if it failed to respect the Agreements? Other critics pointed to a small matter of validity; the Agreements had been signed with representatives of a body that was not even a legitimately constituted government — therefore, France would be bound, while a future Algerian regime could repudiate. (Indeed, within a month Chanderli at the United Nations would be claiming that the Evian Agreements were purely provisional, and capable of renunciation as soon as this would be in the interests of Algeria.) In France the Conseil d’État was to challenge the validity of the Agreements by pronouncing as “unconstitutional” the referendum endorsing them. “This government has required four years of war to impose on its adversary the solution which was precisely his final objective,” was the caustic comment of Professor Maurice Allais, and many criticised de Gaulle for going too slowly over the four years from 1958, but too fast in the final weeks and days. Some of those, too, most intimately involved in bringing the Agreements to fruition were far from being entirely happy with the results. Tricot, the brain behind the scenes, held reservations that dealings for a cease-fire and for the future organisation of Algeria had to be compressed into one stage: “It was extremely bad to have to make arrangements for the future in an atmosphere of war and terror,” he says in retrospect. For Robert Buron, it was “a very strange document” at the bottom of which his signature figured; he felt “conscious of having done my duty in the full sense of the word, but I do not experience any genuine satisfaction”. In Paris, Premier Debré composed his letter of resignation, incensed in particular by the surrender of the Sahara. De Gaulle once again dissuaded him; then let him go the following month, once the dust had settled, replacing him quietly by banker Pompidou.

De Gaulle himself greeted the Agreements with characteristically cynical realism. To his cabinet the following day he remarked: “It’s an honourable exit. It’s not necessary to write an epilogue on what has just been done, or not done…. That the application of the Agreements will be capricious [
aléatoire
] is certain…. As for France, it will be necessary for her now to interest herself in something else.” In his mind the subject of Algeria was now dismissed.

Cease-fire: but no peace

On the day of the cease-fire, Monday, 19 March, contemporary news films show tough, scruffily dressed men of Boumedienne’s A.L.N. standing in one minute’s solemn silence to commemorate the claimed one million Muslim dead of the seven-and-a-half-year war. Then followed scenes of wild emotion as the
moudjadhiddine
danced, hugged and embraced each other. In the
pied noir
strongholds of Algeria the news of the peace signed at Evian was greeted with dumb and glum disbelief. On a day of sparkling spring sunshine the streets of Algiers emptied, except for the constantly patrolling vehicles of the police and army. The O.A.S.’s first reaction was to go round ripping down the posters that had suddenly appeared, showing a Muslim and a European child smiling at each other above the caption, “For our children, Peace in Algeria.” A general strike was called by Salan, and an O.A.S. order went out declaring that — in addition to the civil law-enforcers, the C.R.S. and the gendarmerie — the French army was now considered an enemy. Far from leading to an end to O.A.S. violence as the delegations at Evian had hoped in hastening signature, the week after the cease-fire brought the bloodiest interlude that Algiers had yet seen as the O.A.S. strained every muscle to nullify the Agreements.

The O.A.S. first extended its promiscuous attacks against Muslims of all walks of life, and both sexes, with the Deltas issuing a total ban on Muslim employees entering the European quarters of Algiers.[
4
] On the 20th, the day after the cease-fire, an O.A.S. deserter lieutenant sighted a 60 mm. mortar from a Bab-el-Oued balcony at the Place du Gouvernement, which, at midday, was thronged with happy Muslims. Six bombs fell into the packed crowd, killing twenty-four and wounding fifty-nine, and creating a murderous urge for revenge which — for the first time — the French army and F.L.N. officials at hand collaborated to control. Two days later twenty men of the O.A.S. “Z Commandos”, equipped with machine-guns and bazookas, trapped a gendarmerie patrol emerging from the Tunnel des Facultés. They knocked out three of the half-tracks, killing eighteen gendarmes and wounding twenty-five. Three events now marked the climax of pure civil war, of Frenchmen killing Frenchmen. On the 23rd two army trucks loaded with young conscripts were surrounded by hostile
pieds noirs
in Bab-el-Oued. A new addition to Degueldre’s Deltas, called an “A-Commando” after its leader Jacques Achard, arrived on the scene and attempted to disarm the soldiers. Apparently a Muslim private nervously cocked his sub-machine-gun; Achard’s squad ruthlessly opened fire, killing outright seven of the conscripts and wounding another eleven. “It was”, admits Pérez, “a very grave action.” Salan’s instructions had been obeyed, but the massacre of the young conscripts totally transformed the attitude of the army — hitherto almost passively neutral — towards the O.A.S. A determination to avenge fallen comrades took over.