A Quiet Revolution (38 page)

Over the course of this book I have described how and why the veiling revolution occurred, and what the appeal, methods, and driv- ing force of the Islamist movement were, and then, also, as I follow in

these chapters the impact of
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on Muslim women in America and the ways in which Islamism is evolving in this country with respect to women, it is consistently clear that the subject of Muslim women, whether in relation to the veil or anything else, and whether in relation to Egypt and the Middle East or Europe and America, is inextricably entangled with the key political and social issues affecting society as a whole. Dress in Egypt was a political as well as a religious issue in the dy- namics of power between the minority and the majority (a minority which in that instance became the majority), just as it is today in Europe and America an issue at times of religion and at others of attempts to ne- gotiate power, to challenge, and to engage in conversation with the larger society, from the position of a minority and around issues in par- ticular of social justice.

It would be impossible to understand the underlying dynamics of the veiling movement of the last four decades without reviewing the his- tory of the Islamist movement and the political crises and conditions that gave rise to it—and how these affected men as well as women in so- ciety. There is no extricating the story of Muslim women from this larger story: to leave men and the broad political situation out of the picture would leave us with a history so full of gaps and silences that it would be quite unintelligible. This is the case with regard to trends affecting Mus- lim women in America: these trends also are inextricably part of the gen- eral and turbulent conditions and politics of our times affecting the larger society as well as specifically impacting Muslim American men as well as women in their diversity. Any attempt to follow out these trends too would make little sense if these general conditions were left out of the story.

This also means that today there is no intelligible overall subject of “women in Islam,” any more than there is an intelligible overall sub- ject of “women in Christianity” that might usefully describe or account for the conditions of Christian women in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, Korea, South America, and the United States. Moreover, against the backdrop of the events and analyses reviewed here, it is evident that the very subject, in particular, of the “oppression of women in Islam”

—the topic invoked now by Horowitz, Coulter, and others as it once

was by Cromer—is above all a political construct conjured into being to serve particular political ends. As in British imperial days, the sub- ject remains fraught and charged with the political agendas of war and domination.
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The reality is that the conditions of Muslim women and what they are “oppressed” by varies enormously depending on the political condi- tions in specific moments of time in different countries—from France and Germany to America, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, Iran, and many more. In each of these countries the na- ture and source of Muslim women’s “oppression”—among them the forces in their variety that (to borrow Abu Lughod’s words) are killing, traumatizing, and maiming them and their children—differ vastly from moment to moment. Overall it seems that it would be fair to say that the subjects of “women in Islam” and in particular of the “oppression of women in Islam” exist today essentially only as relics of an imperial past. They are relics that today are grounded in no contemporary reality, and their substance seems to be now entirely chimerical, rhetorical, and po- litical.

These same general conditions, certainly causing anxiety and turmoil for many Muslim Americans, most particularly for those connected with mosque communities and with American Muslim organizations, would also have the effect of spurring the emergence of an unprecedented level of activism among American Muslim women around issues of Islam, women, and gender. I describe this decade of American Muslim women’s activism in my final chapter, in which I assess the broad direction in which Islamism appears to be heading today as regards women and in the context of America’s dynamic democracy.

But first, in the following chapter, I describe the impact that these post-
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events and circumstances had on the annual conventions of Muslim American organizations, and in particular on ISNA’s conven- tions, as I continued to attend and observe these through the ensuing

years. This chapter begins with a description of the broad themes and concerns emerging at these events, the types of speeches that were deliv- ered there, and the kinds of overall conversations that were pursued. I

then focus on changes in issues relating to women and gender that emerged at ISNA’s conventions throughout those years, undoubtedly in response, in part, to the enormous attention that the “oppression of women in Islam” theme was getting in the media and broader public conversation in America. I conclude that chapter by conveying a general sense of women’s roles and activism at ISNA, and with sketches of some of ISNA’s most notable women.

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ISNA and the Women of ISNA

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lmost every single one of the Muslim American conventions I attended in
2002
featured Zayed Yasin, a fresh-minted Har- vard graduate, as one of its speakers. Although I did not know Yasin personally, he was familiar to me by name because of

the fracas that had erupted around him at Harvard and that was quickly picked up by the national media, in connection with a speech he was due to deliver at the commencement events of June
2002
. Yasin’s proposed speech, in which he reflected on the tensions of being both American

and Muslim, had been chosen from among the many entries received by the committee charged with selecting a graduating senior for the cov- eted honor of delivering the Senior English Address.
1

Yasin’s selection had been uncontroversial until the title of his speech, “My American Jihad,” was announced. By Harvard tradition the actual speech is not made public until the day of the address, but on the basis of the title some people raised strenuous objections. They felt that a speech with such a title must undoubtedly be unpatriotic, and they began circulating a petition requesting the Harvard administration to release the text of the speech before commencement. Among those ob- jecting was a Harvard professor who declared that the “speech was ob- viously an assault . . . primarily an assault on Jews, secondarily an assault on America.”
2

The controversy was picked up by the media, including the
New York Times,
and Yasin was interviewed on many of the major news chan- nels. Chris Matthews on MSNBC described Yasin as a “supporter of ter- rorism” who had thrown a fundraiser for Hamas. In a prior year, in fact, Yasin, as president of the Islamic Society of Harvard, had thrown a fundraiser for the benefit of the Holy Land Foundation, a charity whose work in the service of refugees he had observed during a summer spent working for a health organization in the Balkans. After the fundraiser the Holy Land Foundation was charged with ties to Hamas and its assets frozen; the Harvard Islamic Society consequently donated the funds it had raised to the Red Crescent instead, an international organization af- filiated with the Red Cross. The son of a Pakistani father and an Irish Catholic mother, Yasin had also been known during his presidency of the Islamic Society for his activism in promoting interfaith connections between the Islamic Society and Hillel, the Jewish Student Association, and the Catholic Students’ Association.
3

As commencement approached, Yasin received hate mail and death threats. Students opposed to his speech decided to distribute red, white, and blue ribbons that people could wear to show “that they were patri- ots and Yasin was not.” Notably, Harvard Students for Israel dissociated themselves from this protest. Lawrence Summers, however, then presi- dent of Harvard, reportedly had been none too pleased with Yasin’s se- lection for the commencement speech.
4

Yasin did deliver his speech, and it proved to be entirely uncon- troversial. Maintaining that the word “jihad” had been “corrupted and misinterpreted” by both Muslims and non-Muslims, Yasin said that the word’s true meaning was the “determination to do right, to do justice even against your own interests.” Both the Quran and the American Constitution, Yasin asserted, required of him the same thing: “As a Mus- lim and as an American I am commanded to stand up for the protection of life and liberty, to serve the poor and the weak, to celebrate the diver- sity of humankind.”
5
Consequently, he concluded, there was no contra- diction for him in being both Muslim and American. The speech was overwhelmingly well received—provoking, according to the
Crimson,
“loud applause in the audience—and even a partial standing ovation.”
6
Yasin’s speech is interesting for how it seamlessly braids core Amer-

ican themes and values with those of Islam and indeed more specifically those of Islamism. The American notions of the protection of life and liberty for example are blended with the idea of the obligation to “serve the poor and the weak” that is specific to Islamism. For, as we saw ear- lier, it was Islamism rather than old-style Islam (with its focus on per- sonal ethics rather than activism and service, and on personal rather than publicly enacted piety) that considered activism in the service of the poor and in pursuit of social justice to be integral to being Muslim. Similarly, drawing on Quranic language, Yasin brings together American ideals of racial, ethnic, and religious equality with Islamic teachings about hon- oring human diversity—as if indeed these elements in the two traditions quite naturally and self-evidently represented different ways of em- bodying the same ideals.

The particular Quranic verse (
49
:
12
) from which Yasin takes his

language of honoring diversity is a verse that is very popular with Mus- lim American organizations. The verse reads, “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into na- tions and tribes that you may know one another. Verily the most hon- ored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted [with all things].” In fact this verse had been the theme of the preceding year’s ISNA con- vention, entitled “Strength Through Diversity.” Obviously for Ameri- can Muslims, a minority themselves, the principle of honoring diversity is a very important one. In addition, internal Muslim diversity was emerging as an important issue for Muslim organizations to deal with and address in the context of America, where a greater variety of Mus- lim schools and sects coexists today than anywhere else on earth.

The easy blending of American and Islamist ideals of activism and ethical commitments that figure in Yasin’s speech is in fact a common feature of the speeches and writings of American Muslims of Yasin’s gen- eration.

Doubtless, though, it was the attention Yasin received in the na- tional media after the announcement merely of his title—before a sin- gle word of his speech was known—that had led to his being such a sought-after speaker at American Muslim conventions that year. In a time when even non-Muslims were liable to incur the charge of being

unpatriotic should they criticize the administration’s policies with re- gard to the “war on terror,” whether abroad or at home, Yasin’s case per- fectly illustrated—as Yasin found himself the target of threats, anger, attempts to silence him in the name of patriotism—the difficulties with which even attempting to speak as an American Muslim were fraught.

The difficulties of speaking freely and forthrightly in these tense times, particularly for Muslims, were surely preoccupying issues for the convention organizers. Conventions, after all, are events at which speech constitutes the very heart of the proceedings. In addition, in this trying period a key responsibility for organizations was obviously that of pro- viding members with information and analyses that accurately addressed and reflected American Muslim concerns and interests.

As I attended one convention after another, I noticed patterns and similarities in the speeches. These patterns, becoming particularly no- ticeable in
2002
, would persist throughout the years that I continued to attend such conventions—that is, through
2007
.

All of the conventions (as of
2002
) typically featured speakers of both Muslim and non-Muslim background who presented informa- tion on what precisely was happening to Muslims in America in these times. For instance, panelists gave accounts of how many people had been arrested or deported, or noted that these figures had not as yet been disclosed and thus were uncertain. Other speakers, and sometimes entire panels, focused on describing the closure of Muslim charities and the raids on Muslim homes. They also discussed the impact of such events for Muslims on the religious requirement of donating funds to charity.

Another common feature and sign of the times at all the conven- tions that year was the passing out of fliers, along with the periodic an- nouncements, offering pro bono legal services for people who, as a result of the
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backlash, found themselves in need of legal assistance on “im-

migration issues and other matters.” Such details brought home—as did the anxious looks on many people’s faces at all of those conventions— that it was this segment of the Muslim American population most par- ticularly (the people who typically attended mosques and Muslim Amer-

ican conventions) who, after
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, were coming under special scrutiny

and feeling vulnerable to government suspicion. It would be this group

who would feel most fearful and insecure at news of arrests and depor- tations of Muslims.