A History of the Roman World (41 page)

After the Second Punic War Rome had to face the challenge of the barbarian, as well as of the civilized, world. Cisalpine Gaul must be recovered, subdued and secured. In Spain the natives must be driven back to render the Roman occupation safe; having wrested the Peninsula from Carthage, the Romans no more thought of giving it back to the natives than the Allies after the First World War thought of letting German colonial possessions revert to a native administration. Yet Rome had not entered on a systematic career of conquest; perhaps it would have been better for the native populations if she had. Distracted by eastern affairs and exhausted by the Hannibalic War, she only fought as need arose. A systematic conquest, followed up by the spreading of Roman civilization, could have been accomplished in a few years. Instead, slow wars dragged on interminably, often with little plan, under mediocre or ambitious generals; useless cruelty and great losses were endured by both sides, until at length a semblance of order was imposed. Although the final settlement of these barbarian tribes was only completed by Augustus the peacemaker, yet in the fifty years which followed the Hannibalic War Rome had asserted her suzerainty, not only in Corsica, Sardinia and the highlands of central Spain, but also on her northern frontier from near Marseilles, along the sweep of the Alps to Istria and thence down the western coast of the Balkan peninsula.

At Hannibal’s approach many of the Gauls of the valley of the Po who had just bowed the knee to Rome had rallied to his standard. But they had not given him adequate support; not till the end of the war did his agent succeed
in fomenting a serious Gallic revolt, and then it was too late; the golden opportunity of 218
BC
had been lost. The loyalty of the Veneti and Mantua, Cremona and Placentia gave the Romans an invaluable foothold in the north against Gallic unrest, which only came to a head in 201 when the Boii defeated a Roman detachment (near modern Forli), while the consul Paetus was trying to secure an important pass over the Apennines by the Sapi (Savio) valley. Encouraged by the victory, instigated further by Hamilcar, and supported by the Insubres and Cenomani, they fell on Placentia (200 or 199). The praetor Furius Purpureo arrived too late to save the town, but he parried a Gallic thrust at Cremona where he defeated the Insubres.
¹

When affairs in Greece began to shape better the Senate decided on more drastic action in the north. The consuls of 197 converged on Cisalpine Gaul from opposite directions. Cornelius Cethegus approached from Venetia and found the Cenomani ready to acknowledge Rome’s suzerainty once more, while he defeated the Insubres on the banks of the Mincio near Mantua. Meantime his colleague Minucius Rufus, who marched from Genoa over the Apennines, burnt Clastidium as punishment for its defection in the Hannibalic War, and mastered the country around Litubio; but the Gauls and Ligurians would not meet him in open battle. In 196 both consuls again took the field. Marcellus, the son of the victor of Syracuse, crossed the Po and finished the war in Transpadane Gaul by defeating the Insubres near Comum. They signed a treaty by which no Insubrian was ever to receive Roman citizenship; soon afterwards the district of Mediolanum (Milan) was occupied by Italian settlers. Although the Boii were thus isolated, they withstood the other consul in Cispadane Gaul and perhaps even attacked Marcellus on his return journey. As their submission was expected shortly, little effort was made; the various battles, recorded by Roman annalists, amount to little, and no general won a triumph. In 192 Lucius Flamininus and Domitius Ahenobarbus, the victor of Magnesia, tried in vain to outshine their predecessors. But the next year P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, cousin of Africanus, won a striking and final victory over the Boii, who ceded half their territory and gradually withdrew to Bohemia or else were absorbed by the spread of Roman civilization.

The conquered district was soon organized. In 190 Placentia and Cremona were both reinforced by 6,000 Roman and Latin settlers. The next year Bononia (Bologna; the old Etruscan Felsina) received 3,000 colonists who were given large allotments of 50–70
iugera
. In 183 Parma and Mutina were settled as Roman colonies; the large number of settlers, 2,000 at each, and the traditionally small allotments of 5–8
iugera
emphasize the military need. Meanwhile the consuls of 187, Aemilius Lepidus and C. Flaminius, were linking up these new districts with roads that bore their names: the Via Aemilia, running from Ariminum through Bononia to Placentia, and the Via Flaminia from Arretium over the Apennines to Bononia. Thus the whole
of Cisalpine Gaul in the region of the Po gradually came under Roman influence, from the Adriatic to the Sesia in the west.
²
Beyond this river the Romans did not venture; the Salassi of the western Alpine valleys around Aosta long retained their independence.

The Romans then addressed themselves to the problem of the tribes on either side of Cisalpine Gaul: the Ligurians and the Istri. The Ligurians who dwelt in the Apennines from the Arno to Savoy were a hardier race than the Gauls of the northern plain. From their mountain heights they threatened alike the valley of the Po and the plains and ports of Tuscany, and even challenged the commerce of Massilia. Their two chief tribes were the Apuani above Luna (Spezia), and the Ingauni north and west of Genoa. By making peace with the latter in 201 the Romans secured control over the important ports of Luna and Genoa, and were in no hurry to undertake the systematic reduction of the Italian Riviera. Minucius Rufus marched through Ligurian territory in 197, and Minucius Thermus forced back the Apuani, who threatened Pisa in 192, and made a demonstration beyond the Auser.
³
The Senate did not take active measures till after the wars with Philip and Antiochus. While constructing a road from Pisa to Genoa in 186 the consul Marcius Philippus ventured with two legions into the mountain fastness of the Apuani and was destroyed in a pass which received his name – Saltus Marcius. The following year one consul proceeded against the Apuani, the other against the Ingauni who had broken their alliance. But the resistance of the Ligurians was slow to weaken. In 181 Aemilius Paullus, the future victor of Pydna, reduced the Ingauni to allegiance; the consuls of 180 defeated the Apuani and transported 40,000 of them to near Beneventum in Samnium. In the vacant territory the Romans probably established a Latin colony at Luca (
c.
178) and in 177 Luna received 2,000 Roman citizens.
⁴

But the Ligurians were far from pacified. A violent revolt occurred near Mutina and campaigning continued till 175. Thereafter fighting was sporadic, and Roman generals found an easy way to win a triumph. Though ambition and cruelty sometimes went hand in hand, the Senate with the zealous Cato at its elbow often checked unlawful activity; for instance, in 172 Popillius Laenas was forced to release prisoners whom he had taken in his campaign against the Statielli. Later the Romans in securing a road to Massilia and Spain came into contact with the more westerly Ligurian tribes. Victories were reported from the Maritime Alps in 166, 158 and 155
BC
. In 154 the Oxybian Ligurians raided the Massiliote ports at Antipolis (Antibes) and Nicea (Nice) and assaulted a Roman embassy which had been sent at the request of Massilia. Punishment was quickly meted out by the consul Opimius and part of their territory was given to Massilia. Thus the land route to Spain was secured and a few years later Genoa was linked with the northern plains by the construction of the Via Postumia to Cremona and Aquileia.

As a result of these Ligurian and Gallic campaigns the Romans obtained, either by direct possession or through their Latin colonies, about half of the 18,000 square miles south of the Po. Although they planted only two citizen colonies, Mutina and Parma (and Dertona, about 120), in this district, individual settlers were encouraged to migrate northwards by the granting of plots of land to applicants (e.g. in 173, to citizens 10
iugera
, to allies 3 by viritane assignation).
⁵
The success of this movement can be traced in the rapid extension of local centres for trade and administration (
fora
and
conciliabula
) and by the growth of the tribe Pollia in which many such colonists were enrolled. With the colonists there came order, prosperity and civilization. The land was reclaimed and improved; in addition to main roads many branch roads were constructed; these served also as embankments against flood, and alongside them ran ditches which helped to drain the land. Nor did the migration stop south of the Po. Roman and Italian farmers gradually bought up a large part of the land to the north and thrust the Celtic tribes steadily towards the foothills of the Alps. The way was thus gradually prepared for the inclusion of Cisalpine Gaul within the sphere of Roman administration, with all that it has meant to later history.

The natural frontier in north-east Italy was the arc of the Cornic and Julian Alps terminating in the Istrian peninsula. This district, which had been subdued before the Hannibalic War, had been lost during that upheaval, but the Romans, whose flank was protected by the friendly Veneti, postponed reasserting their authority until after they had dealt with the Po valley and Liguria. Warnings, however, were sent to the raiding tribesmen from the mountains, and in 181 a Latin colony was founded at Aquileia as a permanent bulwark on this frontier. Three thousand colonists, mostly veteran soldiers, were sent out; in 169 another 1,500 families followed. Exceptionally large allotments, from 50 to 140
iugera
, were granted in order to attract better-class farmers who would run their estates with hired or slave labour and would thus be free to act as a garrison if necessary. When peace was secured Aquileia developed into the most important commercial city in the north, thanks to its nodal position. But its foundation stimulated the angered Istri to further raids, so that an expedition was launched against them under Manlius Vulso in 178.

Manlius advanced from Aquileia over the Timavus and took up a position in the enemy’s country; his two legions camped separately, while 3,000 Gallic allies formed a third camp.
⁶
When the Istrians swept aside his outposts and stormed his camp, the troops fled in a panic to the Roman fleet which was stationed nearby on the coast. Manlius at length steadied his men and then retrieved the day by carrying out a converging attack on the Istrians from his other two camps. After wintering at Aquileia, Manlius advanced before his successor arrived into the Istrian peninsula and won a victory perhaps on the
Quieto. While he was besieging the survivors who had rallied in the south at Nesactium near Pola, Claudius Pulcher arrived with a new army to take over the siege, which he soon completed. After he had stormed two other towns, resistance was stamped out and Istria was conquered as far as the Arsia.

After the war with Perseus and Genthius the Romans had secured the Dalmatian coast as far north as the Narenta. It only remained to reduce the strip from there to Arsia to turn the Adriatic into a Roman lake. When the Dalmatae, the chief tribe of this coastal strip, began to harry certain neighbouring tribes and Greek colonists, the Senate intervened. A Roman embassy was insulted and the consul C. Marcius Figulus was sent to Dalmatia (156). After an initial defeat, he ravaged the country and besieged the capital, Delminium.
⁷
But, like Manlius at Nesactium, he was not allowed to complete the task, which fell to the lot of his successor, P. Scipio Nasica. Meanwhile L. Cornelius Lentulus had advanced in the north from Aquileia into Pannonia, perhaps to Siscia (156). As this demonstration was not followed up, there was still a small gap left between the Roman possessions on the Adriatic coast – from Arsia to the Titius, which was not dealt with till 129. But with this trifling exception Rome had now extended her authority from the Ligurian tribes near Marseilles, round the sweep of the Alps to Istria and thence down the western coast of the Balkan peninsula.

Sardinia and Corsica had remained at peace for twenty years after the Hannibalic War – a period marked by the governorship of Cato, who banished all moneylenders and reduced the exactions made on behalf of the Roman governor (198). But during Rome’s preoccupation with the Ligurians the two islands revolted, perhaps in conjunction with the mainlanders (181). Corsica soon submitted, but the Sardinians held out longer, until brought to heel by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who doubled their tribute (177–176). Occasional fighting flared up again in Corsica until its final submission in 163; and even then brigandage occasionally lifted its head in the interior.

The Romans had not fought the Hannibalic War to win Spain, but once having stepped into the shoes of Carthage, they intended to keep the spoils of victory. They had won only a small, but the most valuable, part of the whole Peninsula: the lower Ebro valley, the east coast and the Baetis valley. They then had to decide whether to disregard or to conquer the highland tribes of the interior, who had remained untouched by the Carthaginians apart from Hannibal’s lightning campaign; though the Romans ended by conquering them, they did not necessarily start with that intention. The desire for law and order on the frontiers and the need for further conquests to protect previous ones partly explains the long series of wars waged in Spain. But the rich
resources of the land excited Rome’s cupidity at a time of exhaustion when she had to rally her strength to meet the demands of the eastern wars. So she began to exploit her new province, which naturally evoked increasing discontent among, and ultimate conflict with, the natives of the interior. These wars, which continued till 133
BC
, were waged by both sides with much cruelty and treachery, albeit often with great courage, and brought to the surface many of the baser elements of the Roman character.
⁸

Scipio Africanus had conquered Spain, not as a regular magistrate, but merely as a
privatus
on whom the Roman people had conferred proconsular
imperium
. His successors were nominated in a similar way (205–198). But Rome soon adapted her machinery of government and from 197
BC
the annual number of praetors was raised from four to six; two were sent to Spain with proconsular rank, with twelve lictors in place of the six granted to their colleagues. Each administered one of the two separate provinces (Hispania Citerior and Ulterior) into which Spain was now divided in order to surmount the difficulty of maintaining communications throughout the land. Nearer Spain comprised the valley of the Ebro and the east coast to a point south of Cartagena; in the northern part the natives were unused to foreign rule. Further Spain consisted of the far richer Baetis valley south of the Sierra Morena, where the inhabitants had long been accustomed to a foreign yoke.

In general Rome took over the reins of government from Carthage, and the Spaniards who had at first welcomed the Romans as protectors soon found that they had merely exchanged masters. Special treaties were granted only to larger communities and to certain Phoenician and Greek towns such as Gades and Emporiae. The colony of Italica, founded by Scipio Africanus, retained its Roman citizenship, and in 171 a Latin colony was founded at Carteia. Communes and towns were encouraged at the expense of larger tribal units, while native chiefs were no doubt controlled. The Romans levied auxiliaries and imposed tribute in the form of a fixed tax (
stipendium
), not a tithe; this was paid partly in natural products, such as corn, but mostly in bullion or in coined money; to this end the natives were encouraged to mint silver and copper on a Roman monetary standard. But it was the extortion of the Roman governors, rather than the tribute itself, which galled the natives most and which opened a shameful page in the history of Roman provincial administration. As the Spaniards themselves in the sixteenth century fell on the riches of Mexico and Peru, so with like avarice and cruelty the Romans exploited their new Eldorado. Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia is reported to have levied 40,000 auxiliaries, while in ten years (206–197) 130,000 lb of silver and 4,000 lb of gold were transported to Rome. The result of this continued maladministration was that in 171 the first court to try cases of extortion (
repetundae
) was set up and in 149 it was established on a permanent basis.
⁹

As a protest against Roman policy a vast insurrection swept through Spain in 197, starting in the south among the Turdetani; it included the Phoenician cities of Malaca and Sexi, which doubtless had suffered from Roman governors since even Rome’s ally, Gades, had to endure a Roman
praefectus
. The revolt spread rapidly over the central highlands to the north, where a praetor Tuditanus was defeated. In 196 Rome herself was too busy in Greece and Cisalpine Gaul to reinforce the Spanish praetors, who nevertheless won a success in Turdetania and probably brought the Phoenician coast towns to heel. In the following year it was decided to raise the legions in Spain to four (about 50,000 men, excluding native allies), by despatching a consular army under Cato. Though welcomed by the Greek settlement at Emporiae, he had to face a grave situation: in the north only the Ilergetes remained loyal. He took care to support his army from the land, remarking to the army contractors that ‘war feeds itself’, and then advanced against the enemy whom he defeated in battle. Consequently the rebellion in the north subsided enough to allow the praetor at Tarraco to join his colleague in the south where together they checked the less warlike Turdetani. When this tribe was strengthened by 10,000 Celtiberian mercenaries Cato himself marched south. Here he tried to buy over the Celtiberians and achieved little: a signal failure considering the size of his army. Marching back through the highlands he unsuccessfully attacked Segontia and Numantia, although he was not technically at war with the Celtiberians.
¹⁰
This campaign consequently thus destroyed all hope of peace and ushered in the Celtiberian wars which lasted intermittently till 133; but perhaps open war was better than a state of peace under cover of which the Celtiberians could ravage Roman territory by serving other tribes as mercenaries. Returning down the Ebro, Cato pacified the restless mountain tribes of Catalonia, and after reorganizing the working of the mines there he led his army back to Rome to receive a triumph. His campaign benefited the treasury, but it did not crush the spirit of revolt; indeed the interest which attaches to his personality has led to the magnifying of his exploit. Valuable geographical knowledge of the Celtiberian theatre of war may have been gained, but what might not a Hannibal or a Scipio have accomplished with Cato’s forces?

The war continued, and even spread to the Lusitani (in southern Portugal) who were defeated by Scipio Nasica near Ilipa in 194. Then the Romans advanced from the south against the central highlands of Old Castile, subjugating the Oretani and Carpetani and capturing Toledo (193–192). Indecisive hostilities dragged on: for instance, Aemilius Paullus, who was defeated by the Lusitani in the Saltus Castulonensis in 190, retrieved the situation the next year. In 186 the Senate supplemented the inadequate forces by raising the number of legions in Spain to four, and maintained this strength till 179. Although the Roman praetors defeated the Lusitani, who were aided by the
Celtiberi, in Carpetania in 185, they were reluctant to risk penetrating into the heart of the little-known districts of Lusitania and Celtiberia, notwithstanding their 40,000–50,000 men.

In 181 the Lusones, a Celtiberian tribe, tried to migrate into Carpetania. Their southward advance was checked at Aebura by Fulvius Flaccus, who after severely trouncing them in battle marched northwards, captured their capital, Contrebia, and took the district which the Romans called Celtiberia Citerior (i.e. south and east of the plateau of Almazan and the Sierra del Moncayo). The following year he started to attack Celtiberia Ulterior, but was recalled by the arrival of his successor, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus; while returning to the coast he was assailed in the Saltus Manlianus (Jalon valley) but turned the tables by winning a fresh victory. Meanwhile Gracchus advanced up the Ebro and snatched Caravis (north-west of Saragossa) from the clutches of the Celtiberians, against whom he planned a converging attack. His colleague, Postumius, assailed the Vaccaei in the west and then advanced along the upper Douro towards Celtiberia, while Gracchus himself penetrated up the Jalon valley from the east. After a victory near Contrebia Gracchus made a treaty with the southern Celtiberians, by which they furnished auxiliaries and tribute, while in Further Celtiberia the warlike Arevaci concluded a favourable alliance. Like the elder Scipio and Hasdrubal, but unlike so many other generals, Gracchus sought to win over the natives by sympathy rather than by force; and his name was long honoured in Spain for fair dealing and wise moderation. He even made some attempt to Romanize the conquered country by founding Graccuris on the Upper Ebro; later another town, Corduba, was established in southern Spain as a centre of Roman civilization (168 or 151). This First Celtiberian War (181–179) had resulted in the subjugation of the southern tribes and alliance with the northern. Comparative peace reigned for twenty-five years, so that Rome could devote herself to the Istri (178–177), the Sardinians (177–176) and above all to Perseus (172–168).