A History of the Roman World (30 page)

When war was declared between Rome and Carthage, Rome’s superiority at sea led her to suppose that she could choose the theatre for the new conflict. And she chose Spain and Africa. One consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, with some 24,000 men and 60 ships, was to conduct the war in Spain, while Ti. Sempronius Longus with about 26,000 troops and 160 vessels was sent to Sicily preparatory to crossing to Africa. The size of the African expeditionary force shows that Rome had no intention of striking immediately at Carthage itself. A demonstration could be made, the native tribes won over, the large estates of the nobles ravaged, and reinforcements for Hannibal intercepted; further support could be sent if events in Europe justified it. Meantime Hannibal must be watched. Naval inferiority would force him to seek the enemy by land either on the defensive in Spain or by an offensive in northern Italy. And because of the fiery spirit of the Barcid house and Hannibal’s intrigues with the Gauls, the Romans might expect him to take the offensive, cross the Ebro, and advance gradually, consolidating his communications
en route
. So they decided to send an army to check him either in northern Spain or more probably in southern Gaul, since an immediate Roman offensive in Spain with no base and in face of the enemy’s superior numbers would be hazardous. Resistance would be easier near the friendly Massilia and in reach of their base at Pisa, while Hannibal’s strength would be less when he arrived there; after repulsing him at the Rhône, the Romans could launch an offensive in northern Spain. But whether they hoped to meet him in Spain or Gaul, they underestimated one factor – his genius.

Hannibal was not content to meet the enemy in Spain and Africa. He realized that a Roman victory in Africa would mean the loss of the war and that therefore he must strike first, while Carthaginian victories in Africa would not break the power of Rome, which could only be smashed beyond recovery by destroying her Italian confederacy. He determined therefore to cut off her source of strength by fighting in Italy and disintegrating the League. His chances of reaching Italy must have seemed meagre, as Rome guarded the seas and the land route was long and difficult, but he trusted in his ability to overcome the obstacles. Where he miscalculated was by assuming that Rome’s allies were unwilling slaves of a tyrannical mistress. He hoped that they would rise to acclaim him as liberator, while Pyrrhus’ career had shown that an army in Italy could seriously embarrass Rome. Further, he could count on the Gauls in northern Italy rallying to his banner; these traditional enemies of Rome, though recently defeated, were not completely crushed. So he formed the bold scheme of sacrificing his communications with Spain and Carthage and swooping suddenly on to northern Italy, which would form a base in place of Spain. He started with a veteran army of perhaps 35,000 or 40,000 men; for the defence of Africa there were some 20,000 men, while he left 15,000 in southern Spain and another 11,000 north of the Ebro.
¹
The total forces which Carthage put into the field were about 80,000 soldiers, 100 ships and 25,000 marines; Rome mustered 70,000 men, 220 ships and 50,000–60,000 sailors. The seriousness of the struggle is shown by the numbers raised by the two Republics, although each of them could have doubled these if necessary. But Rome had two decisive factors in her favour: superiority at sea and the superior quality of the reserve troops which she could produce in her hour of need. The best troops of Carthage were already in the field.

At the end of April 218, Hannibal started on his crusade from New Carthage; he crossed the Ebro in early June when the spring flooding of the river had subsided, but he did not reach the Rhône till mid-August. This delay was hardly caused by a serious attempt to subdue the intervening tribes, because he had determined to sacrifice his communications. Possibly he encountered stronger opposition than he had anticipated, or perhaps he marched slowly to deceive the Romans, thinking that if he passed the Pyrenees by the end of July he could then dash forward and get through the Alpine passes before they closed in the autumn. In this way he would lull the enemy’s suspicions and avoid the risk that the four consular legions might concentrate in northern Italy. At the Rhône he would have found P. Scipio waiting to contest his passage, had not the Roman plans miscarried. The Boii and Insubres around the new Latin colonies of Placentia and Cremona (p. 172) rebelled, doubtless at Hannibal’s instigation, and the two legions which Scipio had prepared for Spain had to be directed to suppress the insurrection. However, Scipio raised two new legions and reached the mouth of the Rhône
by the middle of August. Little realizing Hannibal’s real intentions he sent out a cavalry detachment to reconnoitre. Meantime Hannibal, who had found his crossing of the Rhône challenged by hostile tribes on the further bank, sent a force under Hanno across the river higher up, and when they were ready to fall on the rear of the Gauls, he crossed over and won a victory. Scipio’s reconnoitring force, after severely handling a Numidian scouting squadron, returned to headquarters to inform him that Hannibal had crossed the Rhône. Three days later Scipio arrived on the spot and found Hannibal’s camp deserted and that he had crossed the river, elephants and all,
²
and was marching to the Alps. He then took a momentous decision. Instead of attempting a wild goose chase after Hannibal, he sent his army under his brother Gnaeus to Spain, where the enemy might be held at bay now that Hannibal’s best troops had gone. Scipio himself returned by sea to northern Italy to assume command of the two legions there, and to await Hannibal’s arrival. Though he has been criticized for neglecting the Italian front by sending his army to Spain, a truer appreciation shows that his cautious farsighted conduct and his energetic initiative laid the strategic foundations by which victory was ultimately won.

Hannibal marched up the Rhône to the ‘Island’, where it is joined by the Isère (Isara), and then along this valley to Grenoble. Where he actually crossed the Alps always has been and presumably always will be a matter of uncertainty. The problem is literary even more than topographical. Polybius gives a graphic description, based partly on personal discussions with survivors and supported by a journey to the Alps to verify the geography. But even so his narrative does not fix the pass with certainty, while Livy’s account, which derives in part from Polybius, introduces further difficulties. The majority of scholars look for the pass between the Little St Bernard and Mt Genèvre. But wherever the exact pass was, Hannibal’s exploit has stirred the imagination of mankind.
³
The actual difficulty of crossing into Italy was not severe, for whole Celtic tribes often moved in this way. The real difficulties arose from the extreme hostility of the Alpine tribes and the fact that the descent was steeper than Hannibal had anticipated and was rendered more perilous by the snow and frost of the advancing autumn. If he had arrived somewhat earlier, many of the dangers would have been avoided. But in the circumstances it was a magnificent triumph of will and discipline over hardship and loss. And so he reached the plains of northern Italy, but with only 26,000 men. The Alps and their inhabitants had taken their toll.

When Hannibal had stormed the chief town of the Taurini (Turin) he was astounded to find that the legions in northern Italy were commanded by Scipio who had travelled nearly 1,000 miles in a month. Scipio crossed the Po near Placentia (Piacenza), hoping to meet Hannibal before his army had fully recovered from the rigours of its journey. He marched along the north bank of the
river and encamped on the west of its tributary, the Ticinus. His cavalry engaged Hannibal’s advance guard near Lomello, but was beaten back; he himself was wounded and his life was saved by his son, the future conqueror of Hannibal. A somewhat complicated series of manoeuvres followed, leading up to the battle of the Trebia.
⁴
Wishing to evacuate the open country, Scipio withdrew to Placentia, crossed to the south of the Po, advanced again westwards and encamped at Stradella, where he was less exposed to Hannibal’s cavalry. Meantime Hannibal had advanced to the Ticinus, but found that Scipio had destroyed its bridge. Accordingly he retired westwards along the Po till he was able to cross above Tortona and then advanced towards Scipio and offered battle. But Scipio was forced by the desertion of his Gallic allies to retire to the Trebia just south of Placentia, where he awaited his colleague. Hannibal obtained by treachery the Roman post at Clastidium and then encamped opposite Scipio.

When news had reached Rome that Hannibal was marching against Italy, the African expedition was cancelled and Sempronius, who had captured Malta, was summoned to northern Italy. Leaving a spuadron to protect Sicily, he hastened with his army to Ariminum and then joined Scipio at the Trebia in late November. Contrary to Scipio’s advice Sempronius determined to fight, being buoyed up by a successful cavalry skirmish. On a bitter December day the Roman army was led breakfastless through the Trebia against the enemy. Hannibal’s plan was for his centre to remain on the defensive and his wings to outflank and defeat the enemy, while his brother Mago, who lay in ambush in a scrub-covered gulley, charged out on their rear. All went according to plan, except that 10,000 Romans broke through Hannibal’s centre of Celts and reached Placentia. But two-thirds of the Roman army was destroyed and Hannibal had won the first real battle of the war. Yet the Senate did not despair. The defeat was due to Hannibal’s superior cavalry; the Roman legionaries of the centre had proved their mettle and were safe in Placentia. Winter would interrupt further operations, and next year their legionaries might yet assert the superiority in which they trusted.

‘The Roman people’, wrote Polybius, ‘are most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real reason for alarm.’ The years which followed the battle of Trebia confirmed this. They put into the field for 217 eleven legions, some 100,000 men; five served as reserves in Rome, Sicily and Sardinia, two were assigned to Spain and four to North Italy. Scipio, who could not be blamed for Trebia, was continued in his command and sent to Spain; the new consuls, Cn. Servilius Geminus and the popular leader C. Flaminius, served in Italy. The election of Flaminius was a criticism by the people of the Senate’s conduct of the war.

The Romans determined to abandon the plains of northern Italy, where Hannibal’s cavalry and Gallic allies were most useful to him, and to defend central Italy; the fortresses in the Po valley could look after themselves. But they could not foresee where Hannibal would cross the Apennines. From Bononia (Bologna) to which he had advanced he could move either southwest, crossing by one of the numerous passes which led into Etruria, or south-east, marching to Ariminum (Rimini) and then along the via Flaminia. So the Senate wisely sent Flaminius to Arretium (Arezzo) to guard the western route while Servilius protected Ariminum, which was a strong strategic position where the Apennines reach the Adriatic and the northern plains terminate. From these two points the consuls could concentrate on any place at need and might even catch Hannibal between them. Though this division has been criticized, it was perhaps the wisest arrangement possible. The Romans might hope to hold fast to central Italy, where they had loyal allies, abundant supplies and knowledge of the country; and Hannibal would lack all these.

In May, when the passes were free from snow, Hannibal again abandoned his base and crossed the Apennines by the pass of Collina.
⁵
This route descends at Pistoia. Between here and Faesulae (Fiesole) Hannibal encountered great difficulties in the marshes which were swollen by the flooding of the Arno and the melting snows. Riding on the sole surviving elephant and suffering intensely from ophthalmia from which he lost the sight of one eye, he got his army through in four days, though with loss. After resting he recommenced his march southwards, ravaging the land as he went. Contrary to the advice of some of his staff, Flaminius determined to follow; if he had waited for and joined Servilius, the combined Roman armies might have caught Hannibal between themselves and the troops in Rome. But Hannibal, reckoning on Flaminius’ rashness, deliberately drew him on by exposing his flank as he marched to Cortona. The Roman, however, was not quite the headstrong fool that tradition has painted him; he declined battle and hung on Hannibal’s tracks.
⁶
But to follow closely with his smaller force was dangerous, especially as Hannibal’s superior cavalry could prevent adequate reconnoitring – a fact which in some way modifies the blame attaching to Flaminius for the disaster that befell. For Hannibal set yet another trap by suddenly swinging off the road to Rome eastwards towards Perugia along the north shore of Lake Trasimene. Here was a narrow defile with the hills coming right down to the lake except round a small plain over three miles long. On the hills above this plain Hannibal placed his troops in ambush.
⁷
Flaminius followed blindly. Early on a misty morning his army marched in column into the defile. Signalling from the hilltops above the mist Hannibal’s troops rushed down simultaneously from all sides. For two hours the fight raged. Flaminius paid for his rashness by meeting a hero’s death. Some 6,000 men in the front cut their way through the enemy but were later rounded up. The disaster was
complete; nearly two legions were wiped out, although Hannibal granted the surviving Roman allies their freedom. There was no disguising the gravity of the occasion and in Rome a praetor announced laconically: ‘We have been beaten in a great battle.’

Hannibal followed up the victory by sending his cavalry leader, Maharbal, against an advance guard of 4,000 of Servilius’ horsemen who were riding hot-spur down the Via Flaminia. They were surprised and destroyed near Assisi.
⁸
But this crowning success must have been qualified for Hannibal by the obstinate fact that no towns of Umbria or Etruria opened their gates to him. A saviour from Rome’s tyranny was at hand but they would have none of him. Knowing that an attempt on Rome itself would be vain, although the way thither lay open, he turned instead over the Apennines to Picenum, where he could rest men and horses. Then with fire and sword he blazed his way to Apulia and ravaged the territory of Luceria and Arpi. But once again the towns barred their gates.

The disaster of Trasimene caused such a crisis in Rome that the traditional remedy of appointing a dictator, unused for thirty years, was revived. As one consul was dead and the other cut off from Rome, the task was assigned to the Comitia Centuriata, which elected a man of wide experience and well-known caution, Q. Fabius Maximus. The Comitia, not the dictator, then appointed the Master of the Horse, M. Minucius Rufus. The essence of the dictatorship was absolute power, but now the power of the Master of the Horse, though subordinate, derived from the people and not from the dictator himself. Whatever the explanation of this hampering of the dictator’s power may have been – distrust of reviving the office, popular demands, or the rivalry of the noble families – it did not work well. Fabius first restored the morale of the people by some religious celebrations, and then stated his policy: to dog Hannibal’s heels and avoid pitched battles at all cost. He took over Servilius’ army and marching to Apulia camped at Aecae near the enemy at Vibinum. Hannibal, unable to bring about a decisive outcome, struck through Samnium past Beneventum into Campania, one of the most fertile regions of Italy. Fabius followed and looked on while Rome’s allies were unsupported and their land laid waste. Such a strategy of exhaustion was only justified as a temporary expedient; the Romans could still trust in the invincibility of their legions, so a breathing space was only permissible until Hannibal could be manoeuvred on to favourable ground. The situation was changed by the disaster at Cannae the following year, but now Fabius had to offer very solid recompense for the severe economic and moral loss which his strategy inflicted on the Roman cause. At length came the chance to prove the wisdom of his policy. Hannibal wished to withdraw to Apulia for the winter, but Fabius himself held Callicula, the pass by which Hannibal hoped to leave Campania.
⁹
Here was the opportunity to force him to battle on
ground which would hinder his cavalry and where the Roman legions fighting in close order might anticipate success. But the over-cautious Fabius was outwitted as easily as the impetuous Flaminius. By a famous ruse, Hannibal at night drove 2,000 oxen with burning faggots tied to their horns towards Fabius’ camp on the high ground; the pickets left the pass to investigate and under cover of the resultant surprise and confusion Hannibal slipped through. He marched back to Apulia, crossing the Apennines for the fourth time that year, and captured Gerunium near Luceria. Yet though his army was laden with booty, no city in Campania had revolted to him.

All this time opposition to Fabius’ policy had been growing, though with courageous tenacity of purpose he had turned a deaf ear. No sooner was he summoned to Rome to confer with the Senate than Minucius, who had followed Hannibal to Gerunium, disobeyed Fabius’ orders and attacked with considerable success, forcing Hannibal to change his camp. In Rome Fabius vainly tried to check popular discontent by getting Atilius Regulus elected consul in Flaminius’s place, but the people demanded that Minucius should be made co-dictator with Fabius, an extraordinary undermining of the very nature of the dictatorship, which thus soon fell into disuse. When, after this political upheaval, Fabius returned to Minucius, the army was divided into two camps. Hannibal, counting on the discord of the Roman generals and on Minucius’ desire for battle, soon drew him into an engagement which would, it is said, have proved disastrous but for the timely help of Fabius. Again the aristocratic tradition has perhaps exaggerated the danger of Minucius, the popular favourite, and the importance of Fabius’ help; in any case Fabius allowed the Carthaginians to retire unopposed.
¹⁰
But Fabius’ period of office soon expired, and the consuls, Servilius and Regulus, took over the command at Gerunium.

The consuls elected for 216 were the aristocrat L. Aemilius Paullus and the popular leader C. Terentius Varro who was a
novus homo
; the aristocratic tradition deals with him no more kindly than with his predecessors Flaminius and Minucius. He is represented as a radical demagogue opposed to the Senate, but his career shows that he enjoyed its confidence. Tradition made him the scapegoat of the disaster of Cannae, but he was scarcely more culpable than his colleague. He was decried as a butcher’s son, as Cromwell was called a brewer, but he did not lack sterling qualities.

Suddenly came news that Hannibal had captured the Roman post at Cannae on the right bank of the Aufidus. Though he had carefully chosen a position in the plains by the Adriatic where his cavalry would have full scope, the Romans decided to give battle. The new consuls advanced to Cannae with their four legions slightly reinforced. Hidebound by tradition and hampered by practical difficulties, they probably did not unduly increase their usual force, as they still trusted in the quality of their troops. They outnumbered
Hannibal’s infantry, though they had few cavalry. Reaching the Aufidus they camped probably on the left bank not far from Cannae. Hannibal was encamped on the other bank some three miles higher up near Cannae. The Romans then formed a smaller camp on the right bank, as a protecting outpost. At this Hannibal transferred his camp to the north bank.
¹¹
It was probably early in August that both armies crossed the river to battle. The Romans disposed their cavalry on the wings and massed their infantry in deep and close formation in the centre where they hoped to break the foe; they relied on their weight and push. To meet this Hannibal trusted the elasticity of his formation. He drew up his line in crescent shape. The Gauls and Spaniards held the centre; on their flanks
en échelon
behind them stood the African troops; the cavalry held the wings. As he expected, his cavalry was successful; the left wing of Spanish and Gallic horse defeated the Roman right, and began to surround the rear of the infantry, while a detachment was sent to help complete the defeat of the Roman left wing. Meanwhile the Roman infantry gradually forced back Hannibal’s centre; if it broke before the cavalry could assail the Roman rear, Hannibal had lost the battle and probably the war. But the retreating Gauls held firm and the Roman centre was gradually drawn into a trap: Hannibal’s crescent was now becoming a hollow, while the Africans began to encircle the Romans flanks. This encirclement was completed when the Carthaginian cavalry assailed the rear. The Romans, massed together and unable to move, were completely surrounded and cut to pieces. Aemilius, Minucius, Servilius and some 25,000 men fell; 10,000 were captured, while perhaps 15,000 escaped, including Varro. The enemy lost only 5,700. So ended the greatest battle the Romans had yet fought. Rome’s prestige in Italy was shaken. Many towns in Samnium and Apulia and nearly all Lucania and Bruttium revolted to Hannibal; and, worse still, in the autumn Capua, the second city in Italy, and other Campanian towns followed suit. But the whole of Latium, Umbria and Etruria remained loyal. And Rome herself was safe; Hannibal dared not march against her walls.

Cannae showed with tragic clearness that Rome must now abandon any attempt to seek out the main armed forces of the enemy and that Fabius’ strategy of exhaustion must be rigorously followed. As Rome refused to accept defeat, Hannibal could only persevere in trying to break up her Italian Confederacy. But instead of asking his home government for further reinforcements for this task, he advised or acquiesced in a new Carthaginian strategy. This aimed at embarrassing Rome still further by extending the theatres of war and by raising up a circle of enemies around her. In the west the war was to be prosecuted vigorously in Spain and a landing effected in Sardinia; in the north were the hostile Gauls; in the east an alliance was sought with Philip of Macedon who would attempt to drive the Romans from Illyria; in the south the Greek cities of Sicily would be encouraged to revolt to
Carthage, more readily when she was allied with Philip. Thus from all sides Carthage sought to encompass Rome, and before the fortunes-of Hannibal in Italy are followed further, the new theatres of war in Spain, Sardinia, Macedon, and Sicily must be viewed.